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UN police are involved in establishing the rule of law, in UN Peace Operations. 
However, they themselves commit serious crimes, but are not generally prosecuted. 
This is likely to have an impact on the UN’s effectiveness and legitimacy. Are the 
UN’s mechanisms for addressing criminal accountability effective? If there is a 
problem, how can it be mitigated?  
 
To answer these questions, the qualifications, qualities and functions of UN police 
were identified. Next, an attempt was made to quantify the problem of their criminal 
behaviour. Current accountability mechanisms were assessed. Jurisdictional and 
immunity issues were examined as potential barriers to prosecution. Finally, the 
obligations of States and the UN to investigate and prosecute criminal acts 
committed by UN police were examined.  
 
Research confirmed that UN police officers commit serious crimes, but probably 
mostly while not on duty. Whether officers commit crimes appears to be linked more 
to their personal integrity than their functions. In the main, they are not being called 
to account. In addition, the UN is not effective in generating information fit for use in 
criminal proceedings. However, the laws on jurisdiction and immunity do not 
constitute legal barriers to accountability, although immunity poses some problems in 
practice. The principal problem appears to be the lack of political will to bring 
prosecutions. The finding that States, and arguably the UN, have an obligation to 
investigate and prosecute crimes may encourage prosecution.  
 
The lack of criminal accountability of the UN police appears to be linked to the 
mismatch between the ambitious Peace Operation mandates and the number of 
qualified personnel these attract. The UN also lacks transparency, which makes it 
difficult accurately to determine the scale of the problem.  It is recommended that 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The issue 
Since the 1990s, reports of serious misconduct by personnel engaged in United Nations 
(UN) Peace Operations have begun to come to light. In particular, allegations of sexual 
offences and human trafficking have attracted the public’s attention.1 These allegations 
have been made against various categories of UN personnel, including the UN police. 
One would expect criminal proceedings to be brought against the alleged offenders. 
However, there is little evidence that this is happening. This may be simply a lack of 
publicly available information about any such proceedings,2 or it may indicate that 
proceedings are not being brought at all. This calls into question the efficacy of the legal 
and practical framework for ensuring criminal accountability. That a lack of 
accountability is perceived as being problematic is clear from the fact that the UN 
General Assembly has discussed measures to ensure the individual criminal 
accountability of civilian members of UN Peace Operations, including the UN police.3  
 
                                            
1
 See Chapter 3, sections 1 and 2-2-1. 
2
 See Chapter 3, section 3. 
3
 UNGA, 'Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission with Respect to 
Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations' (16 August 2006) UN Doc. A/60/980, (hereinafter 
‘2006 Legal Experts Report’); UNGA, 'Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on 
Mission' (11 September 2007) UN Doc. A/62/329, (hereinafter ‘2007 Secretariat Note’); UNGA, 'Report of 
the Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission' (15 
April 2008) UN Doc. A/63/54, (hereinafter ‘2008 Ad Hoc Committee Report’); UNGA, 'Comprehensive 
Report on All Processes Involved in the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes Committed against 
Deployed United Nations Peacekeepers' (9 December 2011) UN Doc. A/66/598, (hereinafter ‘Report on 
Investigation’). For all discussions held by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly since 2006, see 
UNGA Sixth Committee, ‘69th Session: Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on 
Mission (Agenda Item 75)’ (2014) <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/69/criminal_accountability.shtml> 
accessed 30 November 2014. 
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Whilst these problems are not unique to the UN police, there are three reasons why this 
work focuses exclusively on the criminal accountability of the UN police. First, although 
accountability issues have been discussed at length elsewhere in relation to members 
of military contingents, they have not been addressed in relation to the UN police.4 
Second, whilst it is clear which States have criminal jurisdiction over members of the 
armed forces, it is not so clear in relation to the UN police.5 Third, as will be shown, 
because of the evolution of their functions, the UN police play a more public role than 
before.6 Thus, there may be a significant impact on public trust in the police if criminal 
conduct by the UN police remains unaddressed. 
 
For these reasons, it is very important that the criminal accountability of the UN police 
be effectively addressed, over and above the general principle of accountability in 
normal societies. As will be shown,7 this has become more important as Peace 
Operations and the functions required of the UN police have evolved over time. The UN 
police are being called on not only to monitor the local police, but also increasingly to 
carry out actual policing tasks, and to build or rebuild national rule of law institutions. It 
                                            
4
 Marten Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005), 
(hereinafter ‘Accountability of PSO’); Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘UN Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations in Post-Conflict Situations’ in Nigel D White and Dirk Klaasen (eds), The UN, Human Rights 
and Post-Conflict Situations (Manchester University Press 2005), (hereinafter ‘UN Accountability for 
Human Rights Violations’); Andrew Ladley, ‘Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for 
Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability on International Peace Operations’ (2005) 1 Politics and Ethics 
Review 81; Guglielmo Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (Cambridge 
University Press 2011), (hereinafter ‘Who Guards the Guardians’); Sarah Elizabeth Mendelson, Barracks 
and Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans (CSIS 2005); Elizabeth F Defeis, ‘UN 
Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity’ (2008) 7 Washington University 
Global Study Law Review 185; Alexandra R Harrington, ‘Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations 
Against UN Peacekeepers and the Role of Law in Preventing Them in the Future’ (2005) 12 ILSA Journal 
of International & Comparative Law 125. 
5
 In the case of members of armed forces, their sending States have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over 
any crimes they commit. See Chapter 5, section 2. 
6
 See section 2. 
7
 See Chapter 2, section 1. 
31 
 
is thus extremely important that crimes committed by the UN police are addressed in an 
effective manner, as, during missions, it is the UN police who are in a position to 
inculcate the concept of criminal accountability in local communities, including creating 
trust in the concept and function of a police force.8 If criminal behaviour committed by 
the UN police were to be appropriately addressed, and if the local people were aware of 
these proceedings and sanctions, they may learn that accountability is taken seriously 
and may then act as a “watchdog” for their own police forces.  
 
In an ideal world, one would seek to eliminate all criminal conduct by UN police, but this 
is not a realistic goal. Instead, the emphasis arguably should be on deterring UN police 
from committing crimes. Ensuring that a proper investigation is conducted where an 
individual member of the UN police is alleged to have committed a crime, and bringing 
criminal proceedings leading to an appropriate sanction where such an allegation is 
proven, would show that accountability is taken seriously by the UN. It would also act as 
a deterrent to other UN police members.9  
 
Whilst all forms of punishment may be seen as having a deterrent effect on the future 
commission of crimes, the fact that criminal proceedings take place in public, as well as 
the nature of the penalties that may be imposed, may well increase this effect. As the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in relation to genocide:  
                                            
8
 See section 2. See also Chapter 2, section 1.  
9
 See section 3. 
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One of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts, in general, is to 
provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those 
penalties effectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to prevent.10 
 
In order to understand the incidence of criminal behaviour by the UN police and the 
machinery that has been developed to address it, an appreciation of the dramatic 
evolution of Peace Operations and, more specifically, the role played in these 
Operations by the UN police, is required.    
 
2. The evolution of UN Peace Operations 
Understanding the context in which the UN police have undertaken operations is 
fundamental to understanding the evolution of UN Peace Operations themselves. There 
is nothing in the UN Charter which explicitly authorizes or establishes Peace 
Operations.11 Instead, they have evolved on an ad hoc basis.12 Early Peace Operations 
were established following the end of inter-State conflicts, where it was mainly a matter 
of making sure that hostilities between States did not re-ignite. Originally, the parties 
concerned were required to give their consent to an Operation. Initially, the UN police 
played only a small role in these operations. Over time, the UN began deploying police 
                                            
10
 Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment of 26 February 2007) [2007] 
ICJ Rep 43 (ICJ), para.426. 
11
 Over time, the UN has used different terms to describe different types of Peace Operations, including 
‘Peacekeeping Operations’, ‘Peace Operations’, ‘Peace Enforcement’, and ‘Peace Support Operations’. 
See UN GA and UN SC, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping' 
(17 June 1992) UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, (hereinafter ‘Agenda for Peace’); UN GA and UN SC, 
'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations' (January) UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, (hereinafter ‘Supplement 
to Agenda for Peace’); UNGA/SC, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations' (21 August 
2000) UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, (hereinafter ‘Brahimi Report’); UN DPKO/DFS, 'United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines' (January 2008) UN Doc. -, (hereinafter ‘Capstone’).    
12
 The UN police were established in 1948, and have since evolved out of necessity to fill the gap left by 
the idea of a standing UN Force, as provided for in The Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 
1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 43 (hereinafter ‘UN Charter’).     
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alongside its military contingents.13 However, at that stage, it was not clear whether the 
UN considered the role of the police as being distinct from that of the military. 
 
The end of the Cold War led to many more Peace Operations being established. The 
mandates for all these Operations were created by the UN Security Council.14 These 
mandates were broader and more wide-ranging than those of earlier Operations, 
because they were dealing with a very different kind of a situation. From this point 
onwards, UN police were often deployed in situations of internal rather than 
international armed conflict. Generally, these were situations in which either fighting was 
still continuing, or where the cessation of hostilities was very fragile. In some instances, 
either the Operation as a whole, or the mandate of the force concerned, had been 
imposed by the UN under a Chapter VII resolution. In many cases, the State being 
assisted by the UN was extremely weak, and was either failing, or had already failed.15  
 
Amongst these Peace Operations, two were unique, in that the UN became, in effect, 
the government of the State concerned. This was the case with both the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In these missions, the UN did not simply work 
alongside the local government. Rather, it was the only governmental authority. As a 
result, the UN police constituted the sole police force.  
 
                                            
13
 This took place from around 1960, until the end of the Cold War. See Chapter 2, section 1-1. 
14
 Only one mandate was created by the UN General Assembly before 1990. See section 2. 
15
 For example, Somalia. For the background to this mission, see UN DPKO, ‘Somalia: United Nations 




Since the turn of this century, Peace Operations have focused more on establishing the 
rule of law, and not solely on ensuring there are no hostilities. By doing so, the UN is 
trying to restore faith in the machinery that delivers the rule of law, accountability and 
security. In some States, the UN is attempting to build the rule of law for the first time, 
based on an acknowledgement that establishing peace and stability are reliant on this 
taking place.16 The role of the police is vital to this process. If, in the process of 
attempting to inculcate the values of good governance, the rule of law, and 
accountability, there were to be a mismatch between these values and the way in which 
UN personnel behave, it would in all likelihood have a seriously adverse effect on the 
UN. In other words, it is not so much the fact that UN police commit crimes, but that 
these crimes go unpunished that harms the UN.17 This harm could manifest in two 
ways: first, the UN may become less effective if the population loses confidence in the 
values that it is trying to inculcate; and, second, the UN may lose legitimacy through not 
living up to these values itself.  
 
This work is limited to considering the criminal accountability of UN police members in 
relation to serious crimes.18 Criminal law is an expression of a community’s 
condemnation of certain types of conduct, which carries with it the possibility of 
punishment by the State.19 Disciplinary penalties do not have the same connotation as 
                                            
16
 UN SC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies' (23 August 2004) UN Doc. S/2004/616. 
17
 Note that the Secretary-General reported in this regard that, ‘[…] if the rule of law means anything at all, 
it means that no one, including peacekeepers, is above the law’. Ibid, para.33. 
18
 See section 4. 
19
 William Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory (2nd edn, Pearson Education 2003), p.4. 
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criminal sanctions. For these reasons, this work will focus solely on individual criminal 
accountability. 
 
3. The scope of this work  
This work thus focuses on crimes committed by members of the UN police, whether 
deployed as Individual Police Officers (IPOs) or in Formed Police Units (FPUs).20 
Presumably, the UN’s aim is to ensure that where members of the UN police commit 
serious crimes, they are called to account by the relevant criminal justice system. In 
light of this, this work attempts to assess whether, in practice, serious criminal 
behaviour goes unpunished and, if so, why that is the case.  
 
Because this research aims to suggest pragmatic remedies to address any identified 
shortcomings, it is necessarily underpinned by an examination of the current context. 
The first part of this work entails an examination of the nature and scale of the 
problems. The data used to conduct this analysis consists of allegations of crimes 
committed by personnel associated with UN Peace Operations, collected by the author 
from publicly available information sources.21 The main source of information was 
material available on the internet.  Most of the information was found on the websites of: 
1) the UN, its Peace Operations and UN agencies, 2) host State and sending State 
                                            
20
 On the different forms of deployment, see Chapter 2, sections 1-6 and 3-3-1. 
21
 These data are referred to throughout this work as the author’s data. Part of the data concerning 
allegations before 2005 was collected by the author, in conjunction with 68 volunteer researchers 
coordinated by the author, in a previous study for a working paper for the former Sub-Commission for 
Human Rights. UN ECOSOC, 'Working Paper on the Accountability of International Personnel Taking 
Part in Peace Support Operations Submitted by Françoise Hampson' (7 July 2005) UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/42. The creation of the database, its modification, and the collection of information 
since 2005 have been carried out by the author. 
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governments, 3) NGO reports, and 4) media articles. UN sources and NGO reports are 
treated separately for several reasons: one is that information derived from UN sources 
only contains those allegations that in fact ended up in a form of complaint to the UN, 
while NGO sources can contain other, broader information regarding allegations; 
another is the uneven number and types of reports by the UN, in particular after offices 
were established to deal with misconduct;22 and yet another is that the contents of the 
information provided by these two sources may differ.23 The analysis focuses not only 
on the way in which complaints are responded to, but also the need to address 
situations in which crimes have been committed, but no official allegations have been 
made. Thus, the scope of this work is not limited solely to allegations brought to the 
attention of the UN, but also includes criminal behaviour that goes unreported. The 
trigger for an entry in the author’s data was an allegation of criminal conduct. In each 
case, there was an attempt to identify whether administrative or criminal proceedings 
had ensued, and whether any information was available regarding the ultimate outcome 
of these proceedings. In cases in which an allegation was brought before the Court, 
court records were sought. The information was corroborated, where possible, with 
other sources.24 Measures taken to prevent the commission of crimes are touched upon 
wherever they arise, even though prevention is not the focus of this work.  
                                            
22
 See Chapter 4, section 2. 
23
 For example, it is possible that the UN reports more on allegations that are properly responded to. 
24
 Allegations and offences dealt with in the author’s data are those that meet the definition of crimes for 
the purposes of this work. See section 6 for this definition. The allegations are not necessarily 
substantiated. All the allegations in the author’s data concern crimes by people who are, or have been, 
involved in Peace Operations, and are not limited to UN police. This category is considered in a broad 
sense, ranging from members of armed forces, to UN police officers, UN international civil servants, other 
international components, and other foreign and local personnel. This is done in order to make possible a 
meaningful comparison between different categories of personnel or different types of crimes. Where the 
information from two sources appears similar, but is not identical, the two pieces of information are 




The second part is the evaluation of the effectiveness of the machinery which currently 
exists to ensure the criminal accountability of UN police members. This evaluation may 
make it possible to identify the source of any problems arising in this regard. These may 
be legal, practical or political problems, including the lack of political will.  
 
Traditionally, only States can exercise criminal jurisdiction in relation to criminal acts 
alleged to have been committed by individual UN police members.25 Although the UN 
has the authority to bring disciplinary proceedings, it has no authority to bring criminal 
proceedings. However, given that the UN police are part of the UN structure, it is likely 
that allegations will be brought to the attention of the UN in the first instance. It is 
therefore necessary to consider the role that the UN system can play in relation to the 
instituting of criminal proceedings by the host or sending States.26 As members of the 
UN police belong to the UN, this may raise very specific issues in relation to the 
exercise of criminal accountability. There may be a claim that acts of UN personnel are 
subject to immunity from prosecution. Therefore, when considering barriers to 
prosecution, it is necessary to consider the operation of the immunity system, both in 
theory and in practice. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
actually dealing with a single allegation. For each alleged case, information was sought about the name 
of the alleged perpetrator, the name of the victim (where appropriate), the date(s) of the event, the kind of 
offence, a description of the offence, the person or section to which the act or omission of misconduct 
was first reported, case details, immunities claimed or waived, details of any criminal, disciplinary or 
administrative proceedings carried out in response to the allegation, the nationality and status of the 
alleged perpetrator, the nationality and status of the alleged victim, and the source of the information. 
25
 Where one is dealing with an international or hybrid court, the sovereign State must have accepted the 
transfer of authority to that court. 
26
 See Chapter 4. 
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If it is found that legal and practical barriers do not sufficiently explain all the problems 
identified, it is possible that the problem is that there is insufficient political will on the 
part of States to pursue criminal accountability. This work seeks arguments under 
international law to encourage States that are otherwise unwilling to address the issue 
to bring criminal prosecutions and, separately, arguments which support the UN in its 
attempts to enable prosecution by States.   
 
It is acknowledged that the machinery in place to address criminal behaviour on the part 
of UN police members has evolved dramatically since its inception. In 2005, the 
publication of a UN report which established a strategy to eliminate sexual exploitation 
and abuse (known as the “Zeid Report”) had an important impact on this machinery.27 In 
order to present an accurate picture of the issues surrounding this machinery, and to 
analyze its efficacy, this research deals primarily with the period running from 1990 until 
late 2014. With regard both to data relating to alleged wrongdoing, and also to the UN 
system for dealing with alleged misconduct, the cut-off date in this regard is 31 
December 2014. However, as regards misconduct, the period covered is that of each 
relevant Peace Operation.  
 
4. Issues outside the scope of this work 
 
                                            
27
 UNGA, 'A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (24 March 2005) UN Doc. A/59/710, (hereinafter ‘Zeid Report’). Prince 
Zeid, who was appointed as a Special Advisor on SEA in Peace Operations, examined the nature and 
extent of SEA problems, analyzed existing mechanisms for dealing with SEA allegations in Peace 
Operations, and sought ways to eliminate future incidents. Ibid, p.1. 
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As already noted, this work focuses on the individual criminal accountability of UN 
police members. However, given that there are many closely related issues, it is 
important to identify which issues fall outside the scope of this work. 
 
 
Based on the assumption that serious crimes cannot be fully accounted for through 
disciplinary sanctions, this work excludes disciplinary accountability. Disciplinary 
accountability is defined, for these purposes, as disciplinary or administrative sanctions, 
and the proceedings through which these are imposed. However, since it is possible 
that these proceedings deal with disciplinary offences which are also criminal in nature, 
some steps taken during these proceedings may be discussed where they are, or can 
be, used in subsequent criminal proceedings. 
 
It is possible that victims of some crimes may seek civil redress independently of any 
criminal prosecution of the wrongdoer. However, it may not be possible to seek civil 
redress from an individual UN police officer if the act is carried out in relation to his 
official functions.28 Even if it is possible to lodge a civil claim, a consideration of the civil 
liability of individual UN police personnel for criminal acts is outside the scope of this 
work.  
 
It is also possible that the UN’s legal responsibility as an employer may be questioned 
in relation to its employees’ wrongdoing. As a result, the issue of the vicarious liability of 
the UN arises, particularly if the conduct occurred in the course of discharging their 
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 See Chapter 5, section 2-4. 
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functions.  29 For example, if UN police members are alleged to have engaged in the 
indiscriminate shooting of civilian demonstrators whom the police were supposed to 
control, and to have caused fatal or serious injuries in the process, there may be a 
question as to whether the UN is responsible. In some cases, victims may seek to bring 
civil claims against the UN. 30 This issue falls outside the scope of this work.  
 
Separately, there may be circumstances in which the UN’s civil liability for its own acts 
in relation to the criminal conduct is scrutinized. These may include instances where the 
UN condones or covers up criminal conduct committed by the UN police, or is perceived 
to do so. This issue falls outside the scope of this work.  
 
In the case of incidents such as traffic accidents, the UN may offer a voluntary payment 
to the victim. These are ex gratia payments, which do not amount to an admission of 
responsibility on the part of the UN. They are made on a discretionary basis,31 although 
it is not clear how decisions are reached in this regard. However, this practice does not 
come within the scope of this work. 
 
As far as sending States are concerned, UN police members are not State agents.32 
Therefore, the issue of State responsibility for the acts of State agents does not arise.33 
                                            
29
 Françoise Hampson and Ai Kihara-Hunt, ‘The Accountability of Personnel Associated with 
Peacekeeping Operations’ in Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric De Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Unintended 
Consequences of Peacekeeping (UNU 2007), pp.204-205, (hereinafter ‘PKO Personnel Accountability’). 
30
 Such claims are normally handled through a Civil Claims Unit. Ibid, pp.204-205. 
31
 UN, 'Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations' (9 May 
2003) UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/7, Regulation 5.11, Rule 105.12. 
32
 See Chapter 7, introductory section. 
33
 However, in exceptional circumstances, the conduct of FPUs may be attributed to their sending States. 
See Chapter 2, section 1-6, and Chapter 7, section 6. 
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The sending State’s responsibility for the conduct of its own UN police officers is not 
discussed in this work. 
 
5. Structure 
This work begins by presenting a detailed overview of the problems encountered in 
ensuring that the UN police are held to account for any crimes they commit. Chapter 2 
examines the evolution of the functions of the UN police as an institution, and the 
evolution of the roles that they play in Peace Operations. It then analyzes how the UN 
ensures that the required expertise is delivered, so that these functions can be 
effectively fulfilled. It also considers the way in which situations into which the UN police 
are deployed, and the revised functions they are called on to perform, might lead to an 
increase in the risk of criminal behaviour. Chapter 3 identifies the nature and scale of 
the problem created by criminal behaviour by members of the UN police and, based on 
this information, explores whether any pattern emerges relating to criminal wrongdoing. 
The information used is derived from the author’s data.34 The chapter also considers, 
within the limits of the available information, the question of the prosecution of suspects.  
 
Chapter 4 considers the effectiveness of the various mechanisms currently used for 
addressing criminal conduct by the UN police. In particular, it focuses on the way in 
which the UN generates evidence that can be used by a State in criminal proceedings. 
The initial focus is on the UN’s own mechanisms, but the chapter also examines the 
way in which the UN relates to the host and sending States in attempting to ensure that 
they bring criminal proceedings against individual UN police members.  
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The next two chapters consider whether there are any legal obstacles to bringing 
criminal proceedings against members of the UN police and, if so, what these are. 
Chapter 5 examines whether there are any restrictions on the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction by the relevant States. Chapter 6 considers whether a State, in attempting to 
exercise jurisdiction, may be confronted by the argument that the acts in question are 
protected from judicial scrutiny by UN immunity. The issue of immunity is therefore 
examined both in theory and in practice.  
 
By the end of Chapter 6, a determination may be made as to what extent any problems 
affecting the effectiveness of the existing machinery are attributable to practical matters 
or legal concerns. Insofar as these concerns do not explain the problems identified, 
another possibility is that there may be a lack of political will in this regard. However, a 
consideration of the role, if any, played by political will in this process is outside the 
scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, a question arises as to whether it is possible to 
construct arguments based on other areas of law in order to put pressure on an 
otherwise unwilling State to bring criminal proceedings. The obvious source for such 
arguments is international human rights law (IHRL). Chapter 7 therefore considers 
whether arguments can be made under IHRL that a State has a legal obligation to act. 
Leaving aside any legal obligation, given that the effectiveness and legitimacy of UN 
operations are at stake, it is reasonable to expect that the UN should do all it can do to 
encourage States to launch criminal proceedings. Any potential obligations on the part 
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of the UN in this regard, and the practical implications of any such obligations, are also 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 8 sets out the conclusions reached in this work, and makes specific proposals 
for addressing the problems identified, where feasible.  
 
 
6. Definitions and clarifications 
Some terms and concepts used in this work require definition at the outset. 
 
First, for the purposes of this work, Peace Operations include all Operations created by 
or endorsed by the UN, with the exception of enforcement actions or operations based 
on a collective right to self-defence. Operations created by the UN are those holding a 
mandate under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are established 
either by the Security Council or, in exceptional cases, by the General Assembly.35 They 
include traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Sometimes the 
term ‘Peace Support Operations (PSOs)’ is used to refer to some of these operations, 
but this term excludes traditional peacekeeping.36 These operations may or may not 
include a military component. Also included are operations authorized by another 
organization which are subsequently endorsed by the UN, such as the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) in Kosovo, and the Economic Community of West African States’ cease-fire 
                                            
35
 To date, there has been only one such operation, UNEF I. UN DPKO, ‘First United Nations Emergency 
Force: UNEF I (November 1956 - June 1967)’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unefi.htm> accessed 30 November 2014.  
36
 For example, the UN used this term in relation to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). UNSC Res 1547 
(11 June 2004) UN Doc. S/RES/1547, op. paras.1, 3, 5. See also Alex J Bellamy, Paul Williams and 
Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (1st edn, Polity Press 2004), pp.165-185; UN ECOSOC, Sub-
Commission Paper, (hereinafter ‘Sub-Commission Paper’). 
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monitoring group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia. These are only considered if they fall 
into the general categories of peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peace support 
operations.37 
 
Second, as noted earlier, those crimes referred to in this work are limited to serious 
crimes. These are crimes which attract the possibility of a sentence of imprisonment in 
virtually every State. Examples of such crimes include murder, rape, and sexual 
abuse.38 Crimes therefore exclude acts such as minor traffic offences, which normally 
only attract fines. However, States’ national laws may vary as to what constitutes 
criminal conduct, and there is no universal definition of each crime.39 Therefore, for an 
act or omission to be termed a crime in this work, it is not necessary for the conduct to 
be categorized in the same way, or to have the same scope, in every jurisdiction.  
 
Third, allegations and substantiated allegations need to be defined. An allegation refers 
to information that indicates that a criminal offence has been committed. This can take 
the form of a complaint made to the UN or another body, or information reported by 
external sources including the media. An allegation is therefore not substantiated by the 
outcome of any kind of investigation, whether it be criminal, administrative or 
disciplinary. However, a complaint that does not appear to have been made in good 
faith and where it is not corroborated by other sources, is not dealt with in this work. 
Substantiated allegations are those allegations into which an investigation has been 
                                            
37
 This definition is based on an earlier study. See Hampson and Kihara-Hunt, ‘PKO Personnel 
Accountability’, pp.195-196. 
38
 This list is not exhaustive. For example, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, certain 
cases of theft, abuse, physical assault and certain forms of trafficking offences are also included.  
39
 UNGA, 2006 Legal Experts Report, para.19.  
45 
 
conducted, often by the UN or States, and where the investigation’s findings have 
corroborated the complaint.  
 
Fourth, UN police personnel include all individuals who have either been selected and 
seconded by a State to the UN, or who have been directly selected and recruited by the 
UN,40 and who are deployed to a Peace Operation to deliver a service as part of the 
international police presence in the mission. They may be deployed either as IPOs, or 
collectively as FPUs.41 They are required to be, and normally are, serving or recently 
retired police officers in their home States.42 However, this work also includes those 
who do not fall into this category, where they are nevertheless deployed as part of the 
international police body. Some may be employed by private companies hired by States 
to select, train and deploy police to international missions, such as the American 
members of the UN police.43 The UN previously referred to the international police 
deployed in Peace Operations as “CIVPOL”,44 but has re-named this “UNPOL”.45 This 
work includes both CIVPOL and UNPOL within the category of UN police. 
 
Fifth, the terms host and sending State must be defined. The host State is the State in 
whose territory the Peace Operation takes place, although some operations may be 
                                            
40
 On different modes of selection, see Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
41
 On different modes of deployment, see Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
42
 On the criteria for selection, see Chapter 2, section 3. 
43
 See Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
44
 The term ‘Civilian Police’, which is the origin of the term CIVPOL, began to be used when the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was operational. See Chapter 2, section 1-1. 
45
 This name was changed in 2005. See Chapter 2, section 1-7. 
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based in two or more host States.46 The term sending State denotes a State that 
contributes members to the UN police. The sending State does this by selecting, 
training, and seconding police officers to the UN. In cases where the UN recruits police 
directly, technically there is no sending State, as the State of nationality is not involved 
in this process.47 In these instances, the term sending State will nevertheless still be 
used to indicate the State of nationality of the UN police concerned. However, in the 
main, the sending State is normally the State of nationality of the police officer 
concerned.48 




As this chapter has demonstrated, ensuring that UN police members are held to 
account for crimes they commit would have a significant impact both on the 
effectiveness and the legitimacy of UN operations. Crimes alleged to have been 
committed by the UN police and others, and the apparent lack of a response to these 
allegations, appears to be generating a range of problems. It is significant that this issue 
is being discussed by the UN and its Member States in the General Assembly. It is 
possible that there are genuine obstacles, both legal and practical, standing in the way 
of States which are willing to bring criminal proceedings. However, there could also be 
political unwillingness on the part of States to bring such proceedings. This work 
addresses the efficacy of every stage of this process, from the point at which the 
                                            
46
 For example, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the United Nations Military 
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), 
and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had two host States. 
47
 See Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
48
 See Chapter 2, section 3-1. 
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alleged criminal act is committed, to the prosecution, whether successful or not, of the 
alleged wrongdoer. Where a State potentially has a primary obligation to do something, 
but does not act accordingly, an issue arises regarding the responsibility of the UN to 
take measures to deal with the situation. Where the UN fails to take any action in the 
face of the non-prosecution of members of the UN police suspected of criminal 
behaviour, it may be necessary to distinguish between situations where the UN simply 
fails to act, and those, if any, in which the UN covers up the non-prosecution. Part of the 
problem is the lack of publicly available information regarding actions taken, or not 
taken, by the UN. This is related to the general problem of a lack of transparency on the 
part of the UN.       
 
The first step is thus to establish an accurate picture of the issue. This requires an 
examination of the UN police and their position within UN Peace Operations. Therefore, 
Chapter 2 analyzes the evolution of the institutional functions and roles that the UN 
police play in UN Peace Operations, and the expertise they require in order to fulfil 




CHAPTER 2: UN POLICE IN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
The previous chapter suggested that criminal behaviour committed by the UN police 
has a significant impact on the UN’s legitimacy and effectiveness. This chapter 
considers some of the issues which may affect both the rate at which the UN police 
commit crimes, and the types of crimes they commit. These issues arguably include: 1) 
whether the increasing number of functions the UN police are called on to perform leads 
to an increase in the number and types of crimes they commit; 2) whether the 
environments in which the UN police operate, which are likely to be volatile and violent, 
affect the number and kind of crimes committed; 3) whether the increasing numbers of 
UN police officers deployed has a bearing on the rate and type of crimes they commit; 
and 4) whether a lack of certain skills and qualities on the part of UN police officers 
affects the number and type of crimes committed by them. These four issues are 
expanded on below. 
 
First, the type of functions which the UN police are called on to perform, and how these 
have evolved, must be examined, in order to see if this has any bearing on the crimes 
they commit. If, increasingly, different demands are being made of the UN police, 
different mechanisms may be necessary to deal with these demands. It has already 
been suggested that the proper delivery of criminal accountability of UN police is vital to 
the success of a mission,1 but if they are engaging in functions that require more 
contact with the local population, their behaviour will be more visible to this population. 
Delivering different functions may mean that they have more opportunities to engage in 
                                            
1
 Chapter 1, section 1. 
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criminal behaviour which is either directly2 or indirectly3 related to these functions. 
Separately, if a crime is committed for which no-one is prosecuted, the population is 
likely to be more aware of the lack of criminal accountability. This makes it all the more 
important that criminal accountability be properly addressed. This is not only critical for 
the accomplishment of the mission, but also to establishing respect for rule of law 
institutions in the host State. 
 
Second, the evolution of their functions may be linked to the different contexts in which 
the UN police operate. If some functions appear to be linked to a higher incidence of 
criminal behaviour, it may not be so much these functions that are triggering more 
criminal conduct, but rather the field environment. Thus, it is necessary to examine the 
context in which the UN police are called on to operate.  
 
Third, whether there has been an increase in the number of UN police officers requires 
consideration. One way to determine whether the manner in which the functions of the 
UN police have evolved is indicative of the police’s increased importance, is to analyze 
any change in the size of the UN police force. If the number of UN police officers has 
increased, and especially if it has grown disproportionately in relation to the other 
mission components, this may indicate additional importance being attached to this 
force. The deployment of a larger number of officers means that the UN police are more 
visible to the local population, both in terms of their behaviour and any consequences 
                                            
2
 For example, if, in early missions, the UN police did not engage in crowd control, but do now, there is 
the added possibility that they may use excessive force in order to control a crowd.  
3
 For example, if these broader functions mean that the UN police are driving more in order to carry out 
their duties, this may give rise to more criminal behaviour in the form of driving offences. 
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they face if they commit crimes. The size of the UN police force also matters with 
respect to the possibility of a co-relationship between the size of the police presence 
and the scale of their criminal wrongdoing.  
 
Lastly, whether UN police officers are selected with reference to the functions that they 
are required to exercise must be considered. If there are changes in the functions and 
roles of the UN police, the expertise required of them will also change. If, for example, 
the UN police were not required to control a violent crowd in earlier missions, but are 
required to do so in current missions, ensuring the deployment of UN police officers with 
the appropriate skill set and equipment may reduce the risk that they will use excessive 
force in delivering this new function. Thus, it is necessary to probe the way in which the 
UN is ensuring that the appropriate skill set is delivered through its control over the 
selection and training of UN police officers. In relation to the incidence of criminal 
conduct, expertise-oriented selection and training in particular skills is only relevant in 
relation to crimes that are committed in the performance of their duty. For example, 
whether or not a UN police officer rapes someone in his private accommodation whilst 
off-duty is not affected by whether he is equipped with a specific skill set. There may 
also be other elements that contribute to mitigating the likelihood of criminal behavior. 
 
1. The evolution of the functions of the UN police in UN Peace Operations  
The transformation of the situations in which Peace Operations are deployed has 
resulted in an evolution of the functions of the UN police. The reasons for the creation 
and expansion of the UN police, and the evolution of their functions, are analyzed 
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insofar as this may have impacted on criminal behaviour by UN police officers, and the 
machinery developed to address this behaviour.  
 
1-1. The creation of the institution of the UN police 
UN police were not originally involved in Peace Operations. This is not surprising, as 
early Peace Operations were established in generally benign environments after inter-
State conflicts had ended.4 Thus, there were no major law and order problems.5 Police 
                                            
4
 This was with an exception of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). 
5
 The first ‘Peacekeeping Operation’ was the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UN DPKO, 
‘UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/> accessed 3 August 2014. It was established in 
1948 to monitor the truce in Palestine following the partition of Palestine, which took place in order to 
resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping (3 
edn, UN 1996) p.17. Similarly, a UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was 
established in the following year to observe the ceasefire between these two States. UNSC Res 39 (14 
January 1948) UN Doc. S/RES/39; UNSC Res 47 (21 April 1948) UN Doc. S/RES/47. These two 
operations included unarmed military observers with a limited mandate to monitor the ceasefire between 
States. Established in 1956, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was the first peacekeeping operation to 
include armed military personnel. UN DPKO, ‘First United Nations Emergency Force: UNEF I (November 
1956 - June 1967)’ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unefi.htm> accessed 30 
November 2014. It worked as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. In addition, some policing functions 
were delivered by a Swedish special civil section. However, it was very clear from the beginning that the 
arrangement was temporary. Erwin A Schmidl, Police in Peace Operations (Militärwiss Büro d 
Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung, Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Issue 10, 1998), p.8, 
(hereinafter ‘Police in PO’). UNEF I had a wider mandate than the two earlier operations, assisting in the 
maintenance of law and order and the prevention of the recurrence of conflict. Law and order functions 
were assumed by the military on a temporary basis, and came within the military role of assisting civilians. 
Robert B  Oakley, Michael J Dziedzic and Eliot M  Goldberg (eds), Policing the New World Disorder: 
Peace Operations and Public Security (NDU Press 1998), p.17, (hereinafter ‘Policing Disorder’). These 
two types of operations were subsequently conceptualized, largely by the then Secretary-General 
Hammarskjӧld, under the heading of ‘preventive diplomacy’.  Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, 
Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd edn, Polity 2010), pp.83-84, (hereinafter ‘Understanding 
Peacekeeping’). They became the ‘peacekeeping’ blueprint. UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United 
Nations Peacekeeping, vol 5 (UN 1990), p.8, (hereinafter ‘1990 Blue Helmets’). The three principles that 
Hammarskjӧld listed after the completion of UNEF I were: the consent of the host State, impartiality, and 
prohibition of the use of force except in self-defence. UNGA, 'Summary Study of the Experience Derived 
from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General' (9 October 1958) 
UN Doc. A/3943, (hereinafter ‘Summary Study’). (Hammarskjӧld included another principle in his report: 
that of the non-inclusion of Permanent Members of the Security Council - but this principle was not seen 
as being as important as other three, as the nature and circumstances of operations changed after the 
Cold War.) These three principles became the ‘peacekeeping principles’. During early operations, the 
host States were mostly capable of running their own internal affairs, including law and order functions. 
These functions were thus limited within the Peace Operations. These Operations were conducted by 
military personnel, and not by police. It was also observed that, generally speaking, the mission areas 
had no local population, and there were virtually no law and order problems, except for occasional needs, 
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participated in Peace Operations for the first time in 1960, in the UN Operation in Congo 
(ONUC). Unlike previous missions, there was a complete break-down of law and order 
institutions in the Congo, and this mission was mandated to restore law and order.6 As a 
result, small police contingents were deployed as part of a larger group of ‘law and 
order’ institutions.7 The UN police assisted the military, and came under military 
                                                                                                                                            
in particular in Gaza. Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing Disorder, p.17. Nevertheless, the idea of 
policing in Peace Operations existed from the very early days of the UN. In 1948, the former Secretary-
General Lie proposed that the General Assembly should establish a UN police service of at least 800 
personnel, but the idea was rejected after consideration. UN DPKO, ‘Brief History’ [2011] UN Police 
Magazine 6, p.6.  
6
 UNSC Res 145 (22 July 1960) UN Doc. UNSC/RES/145.  
7
 The Secretary-General’s report on the establishment of ONUC explained the process of deploying 
contingents, ‘including police units’. UNSC, 'First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation 
of Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960' (18 July 1960) UN Doc. S/4389, p.10. The 
discussion was focused more on which contributing States the UN would accept offers from, and not on 
whether they were military or police. The records do not clearly indicate who initiated the move to 
establish the first Ghanaian police contingent. Schmidl, Police in PO, p.8. There is also no reference to 
ONUC in meeting records, speeches made or reports by the Secretary-General, which are available in 
the UN archive. Amongst those, see UNSC, 'Note Verbale Dated 5 August 1960 from the Permanent 
Representative of Ghana Addressed to the Secretary-General' (6 August 1960) UN Doc. S/4420; First 
Report by the Secretary-General in UNSC, 'Security Council Official Records, 15th Year: 873rd Meeting, 
13/14 July 1960' (1 January 1960) UN Doc. S/PV.873, paras.18-29; UNSC, 'Cable Dated 60/07/12 from 
the President of the Republic of the Congo and Supreme Commander of the National Army and the Prime 
minister and Minister of National Defence Addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations' (13 
July 1960) UN Doc. S/4382, on the information on the exchange of communications between the Congo 
and the Secretary-General, where the Congo requested technical assistance with administration, 
particularly in the area of security administration and, separately, military assistance from the UN; UNSC, 
'Second Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions S/4387 
of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960' (6 August 1960) UN Doc. S/4417 and UNSC, 'Second Report 
by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14 July 1960 
and S/4405 of 22 July 1960 - Addendum No 5' (11 August 1960) UN Doc. S/4417/Add.5, where the 
Secretary-General explained his plan for assistance to the Congo as technical assistance plus some 
other forms of assistance at the higher civilian administration level; UNSC, 'Second Report by the 
Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and 
S/4405 of 22 July 1960 - Addendum No 10' (20 August 1960) UN Doc. S/4417/Add.10 on the deployment, 
referring to Ghanaian contingents without mentioning the police; three related resolutions UNSC Res 
4387 (14 July 1960) UN Doc. S/4387, UNSC Res 4405 (1960) UN Doc. S/4405  and UNSC 4426 (9 
August 1960) UN Doc. S/4426. It appears from the record that these police units were seen as part of the 
mission component, driven by appeals and corresponding offers for national contingents. One noticeable 
point gleaned from meeting records was that Ghana, together with some other African States, urged the 
UN to take measures against Belgian troops in Katanga province. Ghana was very keen to offer its 
military for immediate deployment as part of ONUC. It wrote to the Secretary-General, stating that it would 
send its troops to work under the central government of the Congo if its offer was not immediately 
accepted. UNSC, Note Verbale Dated 5 August 1960 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana 
Addressed to the Secretary-General. 
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command.8 In ONUC, the police were tasked with a mixture of roles, including training, 
and contributing directly to public security.9 There were three operations in which the 
UN police were deployed before the end of the Cold War: ONUC, the UN Security Force 
in West New Guinea (UNSF), and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). 
There was no coherent evolution of UN police functions as, in each operation, these 
functions were determined on an ad hoc basis. A feature of early police operations was 
that there was no clear distinction between military and police tasks,10 except that the 
police were mainly concerned with maintaining civil order.11 Although the military was 
also used for riot control, it was observed that they were neither trained nor equipped for 
that role.12    
 
The UN police were recognized as an independent entity when they were deployed 
outside the military command in UNFICYP. In order to respond to communal tensions,13 
                                            
8
 In ONUC, the first Ghanaian police contingents were under military command, and the subsequent 
Nigerian police component was technically outside the ONUC structure. Following a request from Nigeria, 
it was placed within the technical assistance team that was offered to the Congo in parallel with ONUC 
activities. This arrangement was made through a tri-party agreement between the UN, Nigeria and the 
Congo. Schmidl, Police in PO, p.9. 
9
 The UN police functions included assisting local police with law enforcement matters, training them, and 
developing the institution of the police in the host State. Annika S Hansen, Policing the Peace: The Rise 
of United Nations Formed Police Units (ZIF Center for International Peace Operations-Policy Briefing vol 
2, 2011), p.1, (hereinafter ‘Policing the Peace’). They were also engaged in guarding key installations and 
conducting patrols. UN DPKO, ‘Brief History’, pp.6-7.      
10
 Annika S Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 
for the International Institute for Strategic Studies 2002), p.17, (hereinafter ‘From Congo’). It does not 
appear that there was a serious discussion about the functions that ONUC police companies were to 
deliver. William J Durch, United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks (The Henry 
L Stimson Center, Discussion Paper, 2010), p.2, (hereinafter ‘UNPOL Evolution’). Nothing appears in the 
meeting records of the Security Council either. See above n. 5 and 7.    
11
 Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing Disorder, p.17. 
12
 Ibid, p.17.  
13
 Following the independence of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the tensions between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots continued, with the situation becoming violent in 1963. The mission was called on to 
prevent the recurrence of fighting between the two communities, and to contribute to the restoration of 
law and order, and the return to normal conditions. 
55 
 
it was considered necessary to have a police component14 to reinforce the local law 
enforcement institutions,15 and not merely to assist the military.16 The UN police 
monitored and supervised local police, assisted with investigations, and carried out 
other law enforcement tasks in relation to matters with inter-communal aspects.17 At this 
point, the term ‘Civilian Police’ appeared and, since then, all UN police have been non-
military.18  
 
It appears to be no coincidence that the delivery of these early functions by the UN 
police appeared to face no major challenges. One reason is that the benign 
environment allowed them to deliver their functions without much resistance from the 
local police.19 Another reason is that they were generally placed within the less intrusive 
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 The UN police operated as national units, with each contingent assigned to a district. Although they 
were deployed as national units, they were not delivering the same functions as the national units which 
had been deployed as Formed Police Units since 1999. On Formed Police Units, see section 1-6. They 
worked as individual police experts who assisted the local police force in specialized areas. They did not 
work as cohesive units to react to situations that potentially involved a higher risk, nor were they 
specifically assigned to the guarding of personnel or installations that needed special protection.        
15
 It was decided that a small detachment of around 30 officers was necessary to reinforce the local law 
enforcement institutions. Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing Disorder, p.18.  
16
 In response to the situation in 1964, when U Thant’s Special Representative suggested including a 
military police element in the new force, U Thant’s military advisor opposed the idea on the basis that 
military police normally only function in support of the military. Ibid, p.18. In fact, military police normally 
conduct policing functions in cases against military personnel only. There may be some exceptions, such 
as Egypt and Indonesia, whose military police also plays gendarme-like roles. Schmidl, Police in PO, p.10. 
The Force Commander suggested including a civilian police component outside the military command. 
Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing Disorder, p.18. The suggestion was incorporated into the plan of 
the mission.      
17
 UN DPKO, ‘UNFICYP Background’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/background.shtml> accessed 24 August 2014. 
“[I]ncidents where Greek or Turkish Cypriots are involved with the opposite community” and cases of 
missing persons were directly investigated by the UN police. Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing 
Disorder, p.17. However, the UN police in UNFICYP did not bring investigated cases to prosecution. 
Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, p.379.  
18
 At this stage, police matters were dealt with within the military component of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations. Later in 1993, a Civilian Police Unit was formed. UN DPKO, ‘UNPOL’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/division.shtml > accessed 12 December 2014. 
19
 For example, see the reception of the UN police by the local population, as described by several police 
officers who served as UN police in UNFICYP. In Gerald Hesztera, 30 Jahre Polizei - Kontingente im UN - 
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‘Capacity Building’ operations.20  The modest nature of early operations was due to the 
strict adherence to the principle of consent, which meant that there was no need to 
resort to a Chapter VII mandate.21        
 
1-2. Post-Cold War 
The dramatic changes wrought by the end of the Cold War may have had several 
different implications for the issue at hand.22 After it ended, the UN intervened in more 
                                                                                                                                            
Einsatz (BMI 1994), pp.10-18, cited in Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing Disorder, p.34. However, 
the environment in ONUC was an exception. 
20
 ‘Capacity Building’ operations can be divided into two different types: ‘advising and supporting 
operations’, which take the least intrusive approach and provide technical assistance or strategic support 
to build the capacity of the local police; and ‘training and mentoring’, in which the international police are 
directly involved in the delivery of capacity building measures. Thaddeus Lin and Patrick Law, ‘Objective-
Based Policing Typology’ (The Oceanic Conference on International Studies, 2-4 July 2008), p.17, 
(hereinafter ‘Policing Typology’). This is with the possible exception of the second Peace Operation that 
had a police component: the UN Security Force (UNSF). In 1962, the UNSF was deployed primarily as a 
military component in West New Guinea during the handover of the territory from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia. Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing Disorder, p.17. It had a dual role of observing the 
compliance of the parties with provisional agreements pending the transfer of authority from the 
Netherlands to the UN transitional administration (UNTEA), and acting as a temporary internal security 
force during UNTEA’s mandate (UN DPKO, ‘Brief History’, pp.7-8.), supplementing the existing Papuan 
police (as stipulated in Article VIII of the Indonesian-Netherlands agreement). The UNSF was initially 
planned as being an exclusively military operation, but for the role of the chief of police. UN, Annual 
Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization 16 June 1962 - 15 June 1963 (UN 1963), 
p.36. The plan was to rely on existing administrative and police structures, both local Papuan and Dutch, 
regarding law enforcement. However, due to the early departure of Dutch officers and the lack of capacity 
of the Papuan police, the UN needed to deploy police from the Philippines on a temporary basis. Oakley, 
Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing Disorder, p.18. It was considered necessary for policing functions to be 
delivered by civilian police, and not by the military. It was thought that the military would react in a military 
manner to situations not amounting to large-scale civil disorder, which would not be an adequate 
substitute for having police stations throughout the country. Ibid, p.18. This was the first time that the UN 
hired police to carry out law enforcement tasks instead of assisting or training the local police. The UN 
perceived this as an unusual example of the UN police taking up law enforcement tasks themselves, and 
this did not happen again during the next four decades. UN DPKO, ‘Brief History’, p.8. However, that 
perception is debatable as, in some subsequent missions, the UN police also conducted law enforcement 
tasks alongside the local police (for example, in UNFICYP). It may be more correctly stated that it was 
unique, in that the UN police took a lead on law enforcement tasks, assisted by a few local counterparts. 
A British police officer was put in charge of the Papuan police (Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing 
Disorder, p.18), but this may have been due to the particular circumstances of the transfer of authority of 
a territory from one State to another in the process of decolonization.   
21
 Hammarskjöld called these “Chapter Six-and-half” operations. UNGA, Summary Study. 
22
 None of the Peace Operations established between 1967 and 1988 had a police component. This was 
mainly because the effectiveness of the Security Council was severely undermined by the Cold War. 
Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, p.88. Only three operations, with limited mandates, 
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non-international armed conflicts than international armed conflicts.23 This meant that 
the environment in the host State was often volatile, characterized by continuing fighting 
and dysfunctional governmental institutions.24 The policing and judicial institutions were 
often severely impaired. Infrastructure was frequently destroyed, and populations 
displaced. Hostilities often took place outside the traditional battlefield, directly affecting 
civilians, and resulting in heavy civilian casualties.  
 
The UN approach to Peace Operations also changed.25 This included an increase in the 
number of such operations that were established.26 Dramatic changes also took place in 
                                                                                                                                            
were established between 1970 and 1987. Political fallout in ONUC, due to the conflicting political 
interests of the US and the Soviet Union, resulted in a financial crisis, which had a negative impact on the 
Operation. Ibid, pp.85-87. In 1967, Egypt withdrew its consent for UNEF I and, based on the principle of 
the consent of the host State, the mission had to be withdrawn. This controversial termination of the 
mission created a loss of faith in the effectiveness of UN intervention. Marten Zwanenburg, Accountability 
of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005), p.14. 
23
 This was related to the emergence of many claims to self-determination based on ethnicity, religion, 
culture and language. This arose from the fact that many small and newly emerged States had lost their 
backing by Cold War superpowers. Bellamy and Williams criticize the argument that the ethnic rivalries 
and ‘roguish’ behaviour previously held in check by the superpowers exploded into civil war. They argue 
that, in fact, the majority of the conflicts into which Peace Operations were deployed between 1988 and 
1993 addressed conflicts that predated 1988. According to them, it is more appropriate to state that this 
period saw the conclusion of many civil wars that had been provoked and sustained by the Cold War’s 
ideological struggle. With the withdrawal of the patronage of the superpowers, local clients faced 
difficulties in maintaining their ‘fighting effort.’ Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, pp.94-
95. 
24
 For example, in UNAVEM II, the fighting parties lacked commitment to the peace process, and the 
fighting continued during the mission. Ibid, pp.104-111. Likewise, UNPROFOR was deployed into a 
situation of on-going hostilities. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Introduction’ in UN (ed), The United Nations and 
Cambodia, 1991-1995 (UN, 1995), section 600. Other examples are: Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Liberia, 
Haiti, Zaire, and Albania. Michael J Dziedzic, ‘Policing the New World Disorder: Addressing Gaps in 
Public Security during Peace Operations’ in Max G Manwaring and John T Fishel (eds), Toward 
Responsibility in the New World Disorder - Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations (Frank Cass 
1998), p.134, (hereinafter ‘Addressing Gaps’). This was recognized by the UN, which stated that, 
‘[p]eace-keeping today can involve constant danger’. UN GA and UN SC, 'Supplement to an Agenda for 
Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations' (January) UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, section 15, (hereinafter ‘Supplement to Agenda for Peace’). 
25
 At this point (1992), the Secretary-General established a department dedicated to peacekeeping: the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). UN DPKO, ‘Department of Peacekeeping Operations’  
<https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/> accessed 7 August 2014.  
26
 More operations were authorized during these five years than during the previous four decades put 
together. Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, pp.93-94.   
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relation to the concept of Peace Operations. The mandates not only monitored the 
status quo, but also included work on good governance in an attempt to create and 
sustain peace.27 The UN also began undertaking more comprehensive and complex 
tasks.28 New operations were multifunctional, with political, humanitarian, social and 
economic components alongside that of the military.29 At this point, the UN started 
relying on the powers laid down in Chapter VII of the UN Charter,30 marking a clear 
departure from the original absolute requirement of consent.31 In subsequent 
operations, the consent of the host State was sometimes either obtained through 
pressure, or was not granted. In some situations, there were many national actors 
involved, but it was not clear which actors’ consent mattered.32 
 
The UN police faced a difficult working environment, not only because of the fragility in 
the host State, but also because the indigenous police, with whom they were supposed 
                                            
27
 This move was backed by the optimism of and confidence in the UN of powerful States. Ibid, pp.93-94.  
28
 Ibid, pp.93-94.  
29
 The new and transformed operations are often called ‘new types of operations’ or ‘robust 
peacekeeping’, in contrast to earlier ‘traditional peacekeeping’. The optimism is reflected in the Agenda 
for Peace, which called for different methods to respond to issues of international peace and security, 
including peacemaking and peacekeeping. The latter was backed by new and increased demands for 
peacekeeping, emphasizing the need for the UN’s involvement in the actual implementation of peace 
settlements and for a flexible response. UN GA and UN SC, Supplement to Agenda for Peace, paras.44-
50.  
30
 The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), deployed in 1988, was the first mission to be 
based on a specific reference to Articles 39 and 40 of the UN Charter. 
31
 UNGA, Summary Study. The concept of the non-use of force was interpreted more widely than before, 
allowing the use of force for the defence of the mandate. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali took the 
position that broader rules of engagement could be called on in order for peacekeepers to react to the 
use of force against them, and to use force to forestall an escalation in violence. UN GA and UN SC, 
Supplement to Agenda for Peace, p.120. 
32
 For example, UNAMEM II was deployed into situations where the consent and cooperation of fighting 
parties vacillated. Somalia is another host State where the lack of meaningful consent of national actors 
caused severe difficulties to the mission.
 
Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, pp.104-
111, 196-197. Missions that depart from the principle of consent of the host States are called Peace 
Enforcement Operations. “Peace Enforcement is generally considered to be synonymous with activities 
sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.” Ibid, p.214. The reliance on Chapter VII had the biggest 
influence on the military, but there was a ripple effect on the UN police. 
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to work, were often involved in the original conflict.33 In addition, post-conflict societies 
are often characterized by a surge in crime, which places an additional burden on both 
the national police, and the UN police assisting them. 34 These difficult working 
environments may have had an adverse impact on the behaviour of the UN police.35  
 
Around this time, instead of working alongside military contingents, the UN police were 
given a distinct role of their own.36 This made it easier for the local population to identify 
which acts were carried out by police, and which acts were carried out by military 
contingents.  
      
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, there were only minor changes in the 
functions of the UN police. In operations established between 1988 and 1991 (the UN 
                                            
33
 In such situations, the indigenous police forces did not willingly act as counterparts to the UN police. 
For a discussion of the lack of cooperation by indigenous police, see sections 1-3 and 1-4.  
34
 Therefore, the law and order requirements of the host State may differ from that of peaceful societies. 
Hansen, From Congo, pp.88-89. 
35
 For the actual rate of alleged criminal conduct by the UN police, see Chapter 3, section 2-2. 
36
 For example, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG, 1989 - 1990), which had a mandate to 
supervise the ceasefire between Namibia’s South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and 
South African forces, and to assist in the electoral process and the country’s transition to independence, 
created the first ever Police Commissioner to lead the police component directly under the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). During the following five years, missions with 
increasing mandates and police components were established in Western Sahara (UN Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara [MINURSO], 1991-current), Angola (UN Angola Verification Mission 
[UNAVEM II], 1991-1995), El Salvador (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador [ONUSAL], 1991-1995), 
Cambodia (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC], 1992-1993), Mozambique (UN Operation in 
Mozambique [ONUMOZ], 1992-1994), Former Yugoslavia (UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], 1992-
1995), Somalia (UN Operation in Somalia [UNOSOM II], 1993-1995), Rwanda (UN Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda [UNAMIR], 1993-1996), and Haiti (UN Mission in Haiti [UNMIH], 1993-1996). Bellamy and 
Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, pp.237-242. In part, the deployment of police was promoted 
because they were a cheaper and lower-profile option for sending States at the time. Although they are 
not cheaper per person, sending States can second a handful of police officers, whilst an equivalent 
military contribution would consist of hundreds of soldiers. Renata Dwan, Executive Policing: Enforcing 
the Law in Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 2002), p.70, (hereinafter ‘Executive Policing’).  
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Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG),37 UN Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO)38 and the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II),39 the UN 
police essentially carried out monitoring functions.40 In these operations, the UN police 
were not involved in conducting law and order functions, nor were they involved in 
capacity-building functions, as they did not play a direct role in training and reforming 
the host State’s police service. These early operations also differed from those taking 
                                            
37
 UNTAG was established in 1989 to assist the SRSG to ensure the independence of Namibia through 
UN-led free and fair elections, and to deliver a number of other functions. UN DPKO, ‘Namibia - UNTAG’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htm> accessed 27 June 2013. 
38
 MINURSO was established in 1991 following the settlement by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la 
Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). The mission is on-going, and is 
mandated to prepare a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara choose between 
independence and integration with Morocco. UN DPKO, ‘MINURSO -United Nations Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara’  <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/> accessed 8 
December 2014. 
39
 UNAVEM II was established 1991 to verify the arrangements agreed to by the Angolan Government 
and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), for monitoring the ceasefire and 
the activities of the indigenous police during this time, and to monitor elections in accordance with the 
Peace Accords. UN DPKO, ‘Angola - United Nations Angola Verification Mission II’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm> accessed 8 December 
2014. 
40
 Lin and Law describe traditional operations as the ‘deployment of unarmed police officers to monitor 
and oversee implementation of police reform and/or relevant aspects of peace agreement’, Lin and Law, 
‘Policing Typology’, p.13. On monitoring missions, see also: Joshua G Smith, Victoria K Holt and William 
J Durch, Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law (Henry L 
Stimson Center, 2010), p.17, (hereinafter ‘Enhancing Capacity’); Bellamy and Williams, Understanding 
Peacekeeping, p.390. The subject of monitoring may vary in this type of police function, such as: the 
verification that the local police forces’ actions are consistent with the terms of peace agreements; 
monitoring the local police’s compliance with human rights norms; and the verification of important 
processes, e.g. disarmament, demobilization and elections. Lin and Law, ‘Policing Typology’, p.13. In 
UNTAG, the UN police accompanied and monitored the conduct of the national police during patrols, 
political gatherings and investigations. Their focus was to ensure impartial law enforcement by the 
national police but in reality, that meant following the South Africa-controlled Southwest African Police 
(SWAPOL) patrols in an attempt to reduce police intimidation of the local population. Durch, UNPOL 
Evolution, p.5. MINURSO had only six UN police officers to oversee the ‘safe passage of flights 
facilitating family visits between refugees and their families’. Lin and Law, ‘Policing Typology’, p.14. In 
UNAVEM II, UN police were tasked with validating the national monitoring team's work on the verification 
of impartiality of the Angolan National Police (ANP); and monitoring and verifying the impartiality of ANP 
in their work. UN DPKO, ‘Angola - UNAVEM II Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIF.html> accessed 22 August 
2014. The ONUMOZ police, although established in 1992, also had a monitoring mandate. They had the 
task of monitoring ‘all police activities in the country’ to determine whether they were in compliance with 
the General Peace Agreement. James L Woods, ‘Mozambique: The CIVPOL Operation’ in Robert B 
Oakley, Michael J Dziedzic and Eliot M Goldberg (eds), Policing the New World Disorder: Peace 
Operations and Public Security (DIANE Publishing 1998), p.153. 
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place later, in that they lacked the authority to enforce the law, and were limited to 
monitoring, recording and reporting infringements.41  
 
The UN appears not to have made a distinction between the earliest operations, which 
essentially carried out capacity-building functions, and those taking place around the 
end of the Cold War, which carried out monitoring functions. The tasks of the UN police 
were conceptualized as ‘SMART’: 
 Supporting human rights; 
 Monitoring local policing; 
 Advising the local police on best practice; 
 Reporting on incidents to the UN; 
 Training local police on best practice and human rights.42 
 
It appears that this concept was based on pre-1991 UN police operations.43 UN police 
operations before 1990, and those in the early 1990s, had in common the fact that the 
UN police were not as visible to the local population as they would have been had they 
been involved in actual policing. Thus, their behaviour was not as critical to the success 
of the local police as it would have been had they been building or reforming the 
indigenous police force. 
 
                                            
41
 Lin and Law, ‘Policing Typology’, p.14. 
42
 The ‘SMART’ concept featured in the training booklet for UN police personnel, and was developed by 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Centre for Human Rights in 1995.  
 Halvor Hartz, ‘CIVPOL: The UN Instrument for Police Reform’ (1999) 6 International Peacekeeping 27, 
p.31, (hereinafter ‘CIVPOL’). 
43
 The concept, for example, does not appear to sit comfortably with the UN police conducting arrests and 
detentions, as it had in UNTAC since 1993. See section 1-3.   
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1-3.  From monitoring to reform  
The change in the functions carried out by the UN police in the mid-1990s was 
significant because it may have changed the impact of their behaviour. Their 
engagement in different kinds of tasks may also have had an impact on their behaviour. 
The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) provided the first turning point. 
UNTAC’s aim was to ‘supervise and control’ local police forces, among other State 
institutions.44 The training of local police became an explicit part of UN police tasks.45 
More importantly, the environment surrounding the UNTAC police revealed the 
limitations of the SMART framework.46 For example, initially, they were not authorized to 
carry out arrests and detentions, but in order to respond to the law and order problems 
in the host State, they needed that authority.47 Another example is that the mandate 
lacked any provision for reforming the local police forces.48 This became problematic, 
particularly when faced with a lack of cooperation by the local police.49 Because the 
UNTAC police were heavily involved in advising the local police, their behaviour could 
                                            
44
 UNTAC learnt lessons from UNTAG, but the UN police in UNTAC were authorized to do more than 
those in UNTAG. Hansen, From Congo, p.18. Lee Kim, M Cheryl and Mark Metrikas, ‘Holding a Fragile 
Peace: The Military and Civilian Components of UNTAC’ in M Doyle, I Johnstone and Robert C Orr (eds), 
Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge University 
Press 1997), p.108, (hereinafter ‘Holding Peace’). 
45
 In earlier missions, the UN police were tasked with assisting or working alongside the local police in 
restoring law and order (ONUC), or undertaking investigations into inter-communal matters (UNFICYP). 
However, UNTAC had an explicit training mandate.  
46
 Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping p.379. 
47
 In January 1993, UNTAC was authorized to arrest and detain criminal suspects. However, this did not 
result in the prosecution of major human rights violations, mainly because of the restrictive interpretation 
of the mandate. Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, ‘Cambodia’ (1991) 1994 The New Interventionism 25, 
p.45. 
48
 Kim, Cheryl and Metrikas, ‘Holding Peace’, p.108. See also Hansen, From Congo, p.18. The resistance 
met by the UN police when attempting to monitor local police forces in UNTAC also raised the question 
as to whether civilian police should be armed. Ibid, p.19. 
49
 Cambodia’s police were unwilling to maintain law and order in an impartial manner, or to allow UNTAC 
police to monitor their conduct. There were also problems encountered due to the unwillingness of 
SWAPOL to cooperate with the UNTAG mission. Hansen, From Congo, p.19. This usually derived from 
the lack of consent by fighting parties, and the fragility of any peace agreements. See also section 1-2, 
above. Ibid, pp.18-19. 
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be witnessed and copied by local police. The mandate’s effectiveness thus depended 
on the behaviour of UN police personnel to a greater extent than heretofore.50  
 
This was magnified when police reform eventually became a central function of the UN 
police in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). One of the ONUSAL 
police’s functions was to select and train a new police force.51 The UN Mission in Haiti 
(UNMIH) was also tasked with military and police reform. This period thus involved a 
shift from simply monitoring and supporting the local police, to having a wider role.52 
 
 
1-4. Multi-dimensional policing  
Within a few years, the UN police began to be tasked with a much wider range of 
responsibilities and, most significantly, to carry out some law enforcement tasks 
themselves, including investigations, searches, arrests, detention, and crowd and riot 
control.53 The UN police also engaged more directly in delivering capacity-building 
activities, with the aim of reforming domestic police behaviour through training and 
mentoring.54 This corresponds with the new multi-functional Peace Operations model, 
which has the establishment and maintenance (or reform) of public security and local 
                                            
50
 Ibid, p.19. 
51
 The UN police were tasked with selecting and training the new Policia Nacional Civil (PNC). The former 
police force was left in place until the new one became functional. The UN police also monitored the 
compliance of the old National Police (PN) with human rights standards. Ibid, pp.20-21. 
52
 Bethan K Greener, ‘The Rise of Policing in Peace Operations’ (2011) 18 International Peacekeeping 
183, pp.185-6, (hereinafter ‘The Rise of Policing’). See also Hansen, From Congo p.20. 
53
 Other tasks involved mentoring, advising and training local police forces, and building institutional 
capacity through restructuring, reforming and rebuilding national police forces. Bellamy and Williams, 
Understanding Peacekeeping, p.379. 
54
 This is in contrast with the earlier, more modest model of capacity-building presented in section 1-1. Lin 
and Law, ‘Policing Typology’, p.17. 
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law enforcement capacity as its central aim.55 The institutional acknowledgement of the 
pivotal role played by the UN police resulted in the creation of the Civilian Police Unit in 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1993.56  
 
The International Police Task Force (IPTF), which formed a major part of the United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), can be seen as a turning 
point.57 Two main functions of the UN police became more apparent as a result of this 
operation.58 The first function was that of actual policing, including investigation, arrest 
and detention, assisting in bringing prosecutions, and road management. The UN police 
constituted the only police presence during the transition period.59 The second function 
was the simultaneous training of the new local police force, and assisting in the building 
of a new justice system.60 Its significance lies in the fact that the UN police became 
involved for the first time in developing a democratic and multi-ethnic local police force 
by selecting, vetting and training the local police.61 Since the IPTF, these dual functions 
have been pursued in subsequent police operations.62  
 
                                            
55
 Multi-dimensional operations are defined as those to ‘help establish and maintain public security and to 
reform, restructure and/or rebuild indigenous law enforcement capacity’. 
 
Smith, Holt and Durch, 
Enhancing Capacity, p.19. 
56
 The Civilian Police Unit was tasked with planning and coordinating all matters in relation to the activities 
of the UN police. Hansen, From Congo, p.21.  
57
 It was established in 1995. UN DPKO, ‘UNMIBH’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/> accessed 16 August 2014. 
58
 Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, pp. 380-381. 
59
 Carrying out such a wide range of policing tasks is sometimes called ‘executive policing’. For example, 
Bellamy and Williams considers the IPTF as conducting ‘executive policing’. Ibid, pp.379-380. Other 
authors consider ‘executive policing’ in more limited circumstance. See section 1-5. 
60
 Ibid, pp.379-380. 
61
 UN DPKO, UN Police Magazine (6 edn, 2011), p.13. 
62
 Among them were UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and 
UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, p.392. 
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At first sight, one would assume that there would be an increase in the number of 
criminal acts committed. Separately, where the police were involved in carrying out 
actual policing duties, the local population would be witness as to how they were 
performing. If they were involved in the commission of serious crimes, the local 
population would see that. Any criminal behaviour on the part of the UN police would 
thus have had a direct impact on the local population. If the UN police engaged in 
training the local police, those being trained would also be aware that the UN police had 
committed crimes, even if these were not committed in the course of their duties. This 
would have set a bad example, and would have had a severely adverse effect on the 
cultivation of respect for the rule of law, including accountability. 
 
These changes appear to have derived from the UN’s recognition that ensuring peace 
and stability requires prioritizing the establishment of the rule of law.63 In turn, the rule of 
law requires that the reformed or newly-established local police force be held 
accountable for their conduct. It is expected that this will affect the content of the 
capacity-building which is provided by the UN police. It would have a negative impact on 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN police’s work if the very UN police officers 
responsible for inculcating the accountability of the police force were not themselves 
held accountable for their behaviour.   
 
The UN’s review of its approach after the catastrophes in the military operations in the 
mid-1990s had an effect on the mode of operation of the UN police. In Angola, partly 
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 UN GA and UN SC, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping' 
(17 June 1992) UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, para.57, (hereinafter ‘Agenda for Peace’). 
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due to severely limited resources, UNAVEM II failed to disarm ex-fighters and stop the 
fighting that claimed up to 300,000 lives.64 Similar events occurred elsewhere, most 
notably the genocide in Rwanda in 1994,65 and the mass killings of civilians in the UN 
‘safe area’ in Srebrenica in 1995.66 One key cause appears to be a mismatch between 
ambitious goals and limited principles, mandates and resources.67 These catastrophes 
primarily concerned the military, but they had a ripple effect on the UN police’s 
operational planning. Around this time, a debate arose as to whether the UN police in 
general should be armed.68 This probably resulted from the recognition of the severe 
challenges faced by the UN in maintaining public safety and order.69 Subsequently, in 
the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), a formed unit of armed UN police 
were deployed as a Special Police Unit (SPU) in order to deliver specific tasks, mainly 
that of  assisting mission personnel, and protecting mission property.70 The UN’s re-
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 In order to oversee the demobilization of ex-fighters and to monitor elections, UNAVEM II was provided 
with 350 military observers, 90 police observers and 400 civilian election monitors. 
65
 About one million people were killed in the genocide. 
66
 About 7,600 Bosnian men and boys were killed in Srebrenica. 
67
 Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, p.104. This failure was recognized by the 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on multiple occasions. “[…] the vast increase in field deployment has to 
be supported by an overburdened Headquarters staff that resource constraints have held at levels 
appropriate to an earlier, far less demanding, time. Meanwhile, there is continuing damage to the 
credibility of the Security Council and of the Organization as a whole when the Council adopts decisions 
that cannot be carried out because the necessary troops are not forthcoming.” UN GA and UN SC, 
Supplement to Agenda for Peace : Section 99. “[T]he Organization has come to realize that a mix of 
peace-keeping and enforcement is not the answer to a lack of consent and cooperation by the parties to 
the conflict.” Boutros-Ghali, ‘Introduction’, Section 600.  
68
 Hansen, From Congo, p.59. Early deployments of small groups of armed UN police took place in 1992-
95, when contingents from Spanish Guardia Civil and the Argentinian Gendarmeria Nacionale were 
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evaluation of its approach to interventions gave birth to a more flexible model, that of 
UN Peace Support Operations. However, this did not result in any major changes in UN 
police functions.71 
  
1-5. Executive policing 
The context in which the UN police were deployed changed fundamentally in 1999 with 
the birth of ‘executive policing’.72 ‘Executive policing’ is where the power and practice of 
law enforcement within a particular territory derives from the assumption that the UN is 
the sovereign authority in that territory.73 Two such operations - one in Kosovo and 
another in East Timor - were established in the same year with full authority over all 
aspects of civil administration.74 As part of the administration, the UN police carried out 
all policing tasks themselves. This included: carrying out investigations, making arrests 
and detaining people, controlling traffic, conducting patrols (including borders patrols), 
                                                                                                                                            
security backing’. UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti’, 
UN Doc S/1997/832/Add.1, 20 November 1997, paras.7, 8.  
71
 Peace Support Operations were designed to undertake a variety of civilian and military tasks, ranging 
from the maintenance of law and order to the mentoring of security forces, infrastructure reconstruction 
and national reconciliation. The peace support model allows flexibility for the actors involved, based on 
the idea that the mission should have the space to adapt its posture between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement, depending on the parties’ compliance. Peter Nadin, ‘Peace Support: A New Concept for UN 
Peacekeeping?’ (United Nations University, 29 May 2013) <http://unu.edu/publications/articles/peace-
support-a-new-concept-for-un-peacekeeping.html> accessed 22 August 2014. See also Bellamy and 
Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, pp.279-284. 
72
 Hansen, From Congo, p.25. 
73
 Dwan, Executive Policing, p.1. This is different in Multi-dimensional Operations like the IPTF, where the 
authority of the UN police to conduct policing tasks derives from the consent of the host government. 
Therefore, the local authority can withdraw or modify the authority to arrest, detain and carry arms. Smith, 
Holt and Durch, Enhancing Capacity, p.21. 
74
 UNMIK was established alongside the Kosovo Force (KFOR), following the intervention by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the conflict between the government and the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA). Tasks included: maintaining law and order, protecting human rights, distributing 
humanitarian aid, reconstructing infrastructure, developing democratic institutions, and ensuring the 
return of refugees and the displaced. UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc. S/RES/1244. UNTAET 
was established to provide governmental functions during the transitional period, and to build State 
institutions to lead East Timor to independence from Indonesia. UNSC Res 1272 (25 October 1999) UN 




gathering and analyzing criminal intelligence and forensic evidence, and managing and 
administering the police as an institution.75 It is possible that some of these functions 
provided more of an opportunity for criminal behaviour by the UN police than others. 
Carrying out policing tasks meant that the UN police needed to engage with local 
communities to familiarize themselves with their needs.76 This meant that police officers 
had more daily contact with local communities than ever before. Thus, their behaviour 
was more visible to the local community than it had previously been.  
 
The UN police were also part of the effort to build or re-build local institutions, including 
the local police. They built up the local police by selecting, vetting, training, transferring 
skills, supervising and mentoring them. In doing so, the UN police were required to act 
as role models.77 Therefore, their behaviour was vital, not only to the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the UN missions,78 but also for the effect they had on the local institutions 
they were building.   
 
1-6. Formed Police Units 
A new type of UN police unit was introduced when executive policing mandates were 
brought in, that of FPUs.79 An FPU is a cohesive national unit of 140 police officers,80 
which is given specific tasks requiring a formed response and involving a higher security 
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risk.81 FPUs emerged partly to fill the perceived ‘security gap’ between the police and 
the military.82 This gap became apparent in multi-dimensional operations, in which local 
environments were characterized by fragile public security. The FPUs’ strength lies in 
the fact that they are armed, better and more heavily equipped,83 and able to act as a 
cohesive unit, giving them a ‘heightened robustness’.84 As such, they specialize in the 
harder edge of policing, such as riot control, protection roles, countering organized 
crime, counter-insurgency, border-patrols, and intelligence collection.85 FPU officers 
undertake tasks distinct from those carried out by individual UN police officers deployed 
on an individual basis (IPOs),86 as FPUs generally lack the powers to arrest people or 
engage in law and order tasks.87  
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It is important to note that FPUs are distinct from earlier deployments of national police 
units. Hansen described ONUC police as the first FPU, and the deployment of FPUs in 
UNMIK and later missions as a ‘return’ to the first model.88 However, ONUC police were 
not deployed in response to identified needs, nor were they a distinct component within 
the mission.89 In fact, the SPU deployed in Haiti90 was much closer to the FPU model, in 
that they are both formed national units and undertake only specific tasks. However, the 
functions of FPUs are more defined and distinct from the SPU. FPUs have a different 
mode of deployment, which is based on an agreement between the UN and the sending 
State,91 while the SPU was still a group of IPOs.  
 
In Kosovo, in fact, there were two kinds of FPUs. One was the SPU within the UNMIK 
police. The SPU was intended to contribute to protecting UN staff, providing 
operational support and back-up to other UN police units, dealing with threats to public 
order, and assisting the emerging Kosovo Police Service with crowd control.92 The 
other unit was the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), which was deployed under 
the Kosovo Force (KFOR) command. The MSU was charged with law enforcement 
tasks, in particular, gathering intelligence on organized crime, and responding to civil 
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disturbances.93 UNTAET also had an FPU component called the Rapid Response Unit 
(RRU). They dealt with major security threats and large-scale disturbances.94  
 
1-7. A holistic ‘rule of law’ approach 
Along with the steady increase in the demand for UN Peace Operations,95 a 21st century 
development appears to be the recognition of, and explicit focus on, the rule of law.96 In 
2000, a high-level panel on UN Peace Operations, appointed by the Secretary-General, 
recommended that the UN police and other elements should take a holistic approach to 
upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights.97 It was acknowledged that the 
police play a central role in Peace Operations, and recommendations were made that 
the UN police should focus on restructuring, training and reforming local police forces.98 
The UN considers the ‘rule of law’ to be a: 
 
[…] principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities […] are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
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independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards.99 
 
The UN has increasingly recognized the ‘rule of law’ as the key to developing lasting 
peace,100 and that the judiciary, the penal system and respect for human rights are 
important components of the rule of law.101 In these circumstances, the behaviour of 
individual UN police officers is likely to have a much longer-term impact on the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN than ever before.102 
 
Since 2001, all Peace Operations have been given an explicit mandate to engage in 
rule of law and policing activities.103 The UN police have increasingly engaged in the 
‘three Rs’ – reform, restructuring and rebuilding.104 This is entrenched within a broader 
rule of law approach that incorporates reform in the judicial and corrections sectors.105  
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This transformation can clearly be seen in successive missions deployed in the same 
places. In Haiti, earlier missions (UNMIH106 and MIPONUH107) focused on policing, and 
not on the sustainable reform of the police. Later, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) was given a broader mandate to support the establishment of the rule of 
law, including the reform of judicial and corrections systems.108 
 
In response to their rapidly growing importance and increasing functions, the 
institutional framework of the UN police has also been adapted. In the DPKO, the Police 
Unit was upgraded to a Police Division in 2000. In 2005, the official name of the UN 
police was changed from Civilian Police (CIVPOL) to UN Police (UNPOL), following the 
decision that the name CIVPOL did not reflect the fact that more than half of the UN 
police were armed.109 In 2007, when the Office of the Rule of Law and Security 
Institutions (OROLSI) was established in order for there to be a more coherent and 
coordinated approach across various related components, the Police Division was 
placed within it. The Standing Police Capacity (SPC) also became operational in 
2007.110 This indicates that the UN has a vision for establishing a firm place for the UN 
police in future Peace Operations.111  
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As the UN itself recognizes, the tasks required of the UN police have become far more 
intertwined with the aim of Peace Operations.112 The Secretary-General stated that the 
work of the UN police is indispensable in establishing long-term law and order. He 
emphasized that the focus on police reform has shifted from merely ‘mentoring and 
monitoring national forces’, to ‘building capacity through training [and] advising’ and, 
more importantly, ‘leading by example’.113 If the UN police officers are there to lead by 
example, any crimes committed by them, whether or not these are related to their 
official work, would have a significant impact on the UN mission. Addressing 
accountability for criminal conduct committed by UN police officers, then, should be a 
significant priority for the UN.114 
 
2. The growth in size of the UN police 
The evolution of the functions of the UN police may be reflected in the shift in size of the 
UN police force, both in absolute terms and in comparison to that of the military. Size 
may be indicative of whether they have acquired more functions and, separately, 
whether these functions are being seen as more important. There is also a question of 
visibility. If there are more UN police, the local population is likely to be both more aware 
of their behaviour, and of whether they are held accountable if they commit a crime. 
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Whether the UN police’s expansion in size has anything to do with the rate of reported 
crimes, either on its own or when taken together with their functions, also needs to be 
considered. 
 
Until the end of the Cold War, the UN police force was very small, consisting of fewer 
than 1,000 officers globally.115 Around the end of the Cold War, the UN police rapidly 
began being deployed in greater numbers per mission. UNTAG is a good example: it 
had an authorized strength of 360 in 1978; 500 in January 1989;116 1,500 in August 
1989; and 2,000 in September 1989.117 This increase was more than simply 
proportional to the growth in the total number of UN personnel.118  
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Even in operations with a military focus, a larger number of police were deployed.119 For 
operations with more comprehensive mandates, there were even bigger police 
components. For example, UNTAC was authorized to deploy 3,500 UN police, together 
with 15,547 military contingent personnel and 893 military observers at its peak.120 For 
operations with a focus on the rule of law, the UN police had considerable strength. 
ONUMOZ had 1,444 UN police personnel, compared to 6,625 troops and military 
support personnel, and 354 military observers.121  
 
UN police were deployed in the largest numbers in executive policing operations.122 
UNMIK was initially authorized to have 4,718 UN police officers, the biggest force to 
date.123 Similarly, UNTAET had a maximum strength of 1,640 UN police officers.124 
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Operations since 2000 have seen a further increase in the number of the UN police 
deployed. It has become normal to have a police component with more than 1,000 
officers.125 The comparative size of the UN police has also grown, the police:military 
ratio frequently being one: four or five.126 In MINUSTAH, the ratio reached one:two.127 
Amongst current operations, UNAMID deserves a special mention. In this first joint 
operation with the African Union, 6,432 UN police officers, the largest number ever, 
were authorized for deployment. The police:military ratio was one:three.128  
 
Overall, the global size of the UN police force has grown from 35 in 1988,129 to 4,613 in 
January 2000,130 7,300 in August 2006, and almost 14,000 in September 2010.131 As of 
December 2014, there were 12,442 UN police officers.132  
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The UN police are the fastest growing component in Peace Operations. As the UN 
Police Advisor acknowledged, this growth in numbers comes together with an increased 
demand for the integration of the rule of law, in particular reforms and institution-building, 
in Peace Operations.133 The growth in size is influenced by the evolution of the 
functions of the UN police. It appears that some newer functions, such as the actual 
carrying out of policing tasks and reforms, restructuring and rebuilding, require larger 
UN police components.  
 
The rapid increase in FPUs is responsible for a large part of the increase in the number 
of UN police.134 Fifteen years after the creation of FPUs, 8,363 police officers were 
deployed as FPUs, consisting of about 67 percent of the total UN police personnel.135 
This is significant, given that FPU personnel are only assigned specific functions. This 
may indicate that the nature of FPU functions requires significant numbers, or that the 
environments in which FPUs are deployed require significant numbers, or both. It may 
also be related to their mode of deployment, which will be discussed in the following 
section.136 
 
3. Ensuring the deployment of the required types of personnel 
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In order for the UN to minimize the likelihood of criminal behaviour by UN police 
personnel, it needs to ensure that it has the appropriate people. This requirement has 
two aspects.  
 
One is that they need to be equipped with the specific expertise necessary to deliver 
their functions properly. Their incapacity may cause unintended criminal behaviour. For 
example, if FPU officers have no expertise in controlling a violent crowd, they may be 
more likely to resort to lethal force in a situation where it is unnecessary. This 
requirement is only relevant to crimes that are committed in the exercise of their 
functions. 
 
Another requirement is that UN police officers have the right personal qualities. This 
relates to their behaviour, and the policing cultures they come from. Accordingly, this 
requirement is relevant to all crimes, regardless of any link to the functions of the UN 
police.  
 
The following section first identifies the expertise and personal qualities required of UN 
police personnel and, second, examines how the UN attempts to meet this requirement. 
 
3-1. Expertise required of UN police officers 
No requirement  
80 
 
It is unsurprising that no particular expertise was formally required of UN police officers 
early on, because their deployment was ad hoc,137 and their functions were unclear.138 It 
was up to each sending State to select officers for deployment.139 The general thinking 
was that ‘a policeman is a policeman is a policeman’.140 Insofar as the deployment of 
the UN police was not widespread, and was infrequent, this arrangement did not pose a 
serious problem.  
 
General minimum requirements 
Two problems relating to UN police surfaced after they became a standard element in 
Peace Operations. The first was that many UN police officers did not appear to be 
properly qualified. The second was the incidence of misconduct committed by individual 
UN police officers during the course of their deployment.141 UNTAC was the first 
mission for which the UN specified recruitment standards.142 At a minimum, they were 
required to have a command of the mission language (often English),143 the ability to 
operate four-wheel drive vehicles, and five years’ policing experience.144  
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It is interesting that the UN appears to be more concerned that UN police officers have 
policing experience, than simply knowledge of policing.145 A 1997 document specified 
that they must be ‘a sworn member of the police force’.146 This appears to exclude 
voluntary police officers, and reserve police officers who serve in some police forces on 
an irregular basis. It was also clarified that even where an officer was a sworn member 
of a police force, that officer should not be included if he did not have policing 
experience, unless he was specifically selected by the UN.147 Later, it was also 
stipulated that the required five-year period should exclude any time spent being 
trained.148 Arguably, monitoring roles could have been played by someone with 
theoretical knowledge, but without practical experience. This would not be the case with 
actual policing duties, and even less so when mentoring, reforming, rebuilding or 
restructuring the local police. 
 
The UN also stipulated that those who had retired from the police within the previous 
five years would be eligible.149 Being retired for more than five years may have meant 
that the person would have been out of touch with the necessary skills. This seems to 
indicate that what the UN is seeking is not so much the existing institutional link 
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between the individual officer and the sending State,150 but rather that the officer 
concerned has the necessary policing skills.  
 
Requiring that UN police personnel have policing experience indicates that the UN 
recognizes policing as an expertise.151 This experience is considered to be the most 
important criterion for delivering the functions of the UN police. The Guidelines state 
that ‘personnel assigned to their national police and other law enforcement agencies’ 
may be accepted.152 This may be a reference to States which have both State and 
Federal police, in an attempt to ensure that both types are eligible to be UN Police 
officers.153  
 
Evidence shows that people other than police officers occasionally join a mission.154 
Some States, most notably the US, recruit personnel through contracting companies.155 
American UN police are private contractors, and not police officers, at least for such 
time as they work for a UN Peace Operation. Although it was claimed that a large 
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number were retired police officers,156 there were also claims that at least some were 
over 66 years old,157 or had never been police officers.158 This matters for two reasons. 
One is that the requirement that UN police personnel be serving or recently retired 
police officers is an important way of ensuring that the necessary expertise is delivered. 
The other is that, in addition to the laws, regulations and codes that apply to ordinary 
nationals abroad, police officers are normally subject to additional laws, regulations and 
codes. The implications of a UN police officer not being a national police officer will be 
discussed later.159   
 
It is reported that the three basic requirements are often not met. A majority of 
candidates for the UNMIL police were apparently unable to drive, and could not speak 
the mission language.160 Many UNPROFOR police officers reportedly had the same 
problems,161 as well as no knowledge of basic monitoring skills.162 In Sierra Leone, a 
review of the UN police was critical of the lack of experience of some UN police 
officers.163 Language can be an obvious challenge for police officers, given that many 
                                            
156
 Hansen, From Congo, p.48. 
157
 Lynch, ‘Misconduct, Corruption by US Police Mar Bosnian Mission’. 
158
 Ibid. See also Hansen, From Congo pp.57-58, where she claims that DynCorp selection is resulting in 
too many unqualified and unsuitable officers being selected. 
159
 See Chapter 5, section 4-2-3. 
160
 Durch and Ket, Police in UN Peacekeeping, p.80. 
161
 48% of incoming monitors did not speak English, according to a 1992 quality review. Halvor A Hartz, 
‘Experiences from UNPROFOR – UNCIVPOL’ in Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset (eds), UN 
Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia (Ashgate 1998), p.311. 
162
 43% of the UN police were not able to handle a motor vehicle. Ibid, p.311. If UN police have problems 
with driving skills, it would not be surprising if there were more motoring offences. See Chapter 3, section 
2-2-2. 
163
 It assessed that some UN police officers had less professional experience and competence than the 
local police, to whom they were supposed to provide advice. J G Smith, Victoria K Holt and William J 
Durch, From Timor-Leste to Darfur: New Initiatives for Enhancing UN Civilian Policing Capacity (The 
Henry L Stimson Center, Future of Peace Operations Programe Issue Brief, August 2007, 2007), p.6, 
(hereinafter ‘From Timor-Leste to Darfur’). 
84 
 
different States, using many different languages, are now contributing police officers.164 
There have been a number of Police Commissioners and senior police officers who 
acknowledged that the quality of police personnel was a major problem.165 
 
It is acknowledged that there are multiple reasons for the difficulties experienced in 
securing good quality UN police personnel. First, police officers joining UN Peace 
Operations are generally not a standing reserve force waiting to be deployed.166 If 
deployed to a UN Peace Operation, they may not easily be replaced at home. This 
makes sending States hesitant to deploy their most qualified officers abroad.167  They 
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also either do not specialize in, or are not trained in, international policing.168 These 
factors, when taken together, mean an almost permanent shortfall of available officers. 
This has resulted in some unqualified, inexperienced or underperforming officers being 
deployed.169 A dilemma arises in attempting to balance these two needs: that of being 
able to deploy a certain number of UN police personnel rapidly,170 and that of being able 
to ensure their quality. Procedural issues in securing compliance with the required 
standards will be discussed later.171 
 
Additional general criteria 
Additional criteria focus on operational skills. First, investigation and reporting skills 
were required in the mid-1990s.172 This appears to correspond to the needs generated 
by monitoring operations.173 Second, more policing and practical skills were listed as 
desirable in 1997.174 It may be that the UN Secretariat realized the importance of 
making operational skills an explicit requirement. This may have been particularly 
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important because of the very different policing cultures in sending States. A former 
Police Commissioner stated that, ‘[p]olice forces of the world sometimes only have the 
name ‘Police’ in common’.175 However, possibly influenced by the difficulties in securing 
police personnel who met these requirements, they were subsequently reduced. By 
2007, only a handful of required skills remained: interviewing techniques, negotiation, 
mediation and conflict resolution skills, and first aid.176 Previous mission experience with 
a UN Peace Operation was explicitly mentioned.177 This may suggest that the UN 
recognized that international policing is different from domestic policing.  
 
Specific expertise requirements 
In the early missions, the need to specify the required kinds of policing expertise was 
not recognized.178 The lack of specification, beyond general policing skills, caused 
problems.179 Early missions focused on advising and monitoring,180 but it was observed 
that police officers deployed for monitoring purposes were not trained in monitoring.181  
 
With the dramatic increase in the variety of tasks required of UN police, the need for 
specific expertise began to be recognized in the late 1990s. The UN began specifying 
                                            
175
 Hartz, ‘Experiences from UNPROFOR’, p.312. 
176
 Knowledge of land navigation and global positioning systems has replaced map-reading skills. UN, 
2007 Guidelines, para.53. The current desired skills are identical to the ones set out in 2007.
 
UN DPKO, 
‘UN Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml> accessed 12 August 2014, 
(hereinafter ‘Minimum Requirement’). 
177
 UN, 1995 Handbook; UN DPKO, 1997 Selection Standard; UN, 2007 Guidelines. 
178
 See above, section 3-1, entitled ‘no requirement’.  
179
 Hansen, From Congo, p.53. In UNTAC, the level of required police experience was too general, as 
there were substantial differences among various national police forces. UNITAR and IPS, UNTAC 
debriefing, p.17. 
180
 See section 2-1-1. 
181
 Hartz, ‘Experiences from UNPROFOR’, p.312. UNTAES suffered from a severe shortage of police with 
training experience. Hansen, From Congo, p.53.  
87 
 
these requirements, which included: traffic management, monitoring, criminal 
investigation, training, managing or administration, the number of years of professional 
experience, and the desired ranks for specific missions.182 A recent example is that the 
UN sought UN police officers for UNOCI to:  
 
[…] assist in building the capacity of the Ivorian law enforcement agencies in 
such specialized areas as crowd control, community policing, judicial policing, 
communication, criminal investigation, sexual and gender based violence, 
organized crime and border management.183  
  
Filling positions requiring specific expertise has been even more challenging than 
securing the requisite numbers of officers. In particular, specialized policing capabilities, 
such as forensic specialists or police trainers, are also in heavy demand at home.184 For 
example, despite the fact that ‘police development’ was intended to be a major part of 
UNTAET and UNMISET, none of the 1,270 UNTAET officers were recruited to be 
trainers or institution-building experts, while none of the 150 UMISET police advisers 
had development or capacity-building expertise.185 Frequent rotation of UN police 
personnel also poses a challenge, as experience can be lost.186 The needs in the field 
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are not well understood by UN headquarters or sending States, which exacerbates the 
problem.187  
 
One recent significant change is that the ability to use firearms has been added as a 
general requirement for all UN police personnel. Until around 2010, proficiency in 
firearms use was only required in relation to missions in which police were armed, or 
was limited to those positions requiring the use of firearms.188 However, the most recent 
criteria include the mandatory command of firearms, and all police personnel must be 
tested in this regard.189 This could be a reflection of the new environments in which UN 
Peace Operations operate,190 but considering that there are still traditional monitoring-
type operations,191 it is difficult to explain why all UN police personnel require this skill. It 
is hard to imagine that all police personnel who normally operate unarmed at home are 
capable of, or are comfortable with, using firearms. It is also difficult to imagine that it is 
the UN’s intention to exclude those officers from unarmed monitoring missions. 
 
Requirements for FPU personnel 
It has been clearly established that FPU personnel must have a particular form of 
expertise. Responding to heightened security situations requires disciplined group 
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action.192 This in turn requires more than just a group of police officers capable of using 
firearms. The demand was for a group of police officers who have a similar approach to 
dealing with situations which require significant numbers of officers. Although officers 
within a FPU may never have worked together,193 they should come from the same 
legal and policing culture, and be trained to respond to a situation in the same way. In 
addition, as members of an armed police unit, they obviously need to be able to use 
firearms, but they also need to be ‘trained in and have the flexibility to use either less-
than-lethal or lethal force, as circumstances dictate’.194 On the other hand, as they work 
in a national unit, they are not operating in a setting which requires them to 
communicate on a daily basis with the local population to the same extent as individual 
officers.195 In 2012, the requirement for FPU officers was lowered to two years of 
experience,196 and the requirement that they have a command of the mission language 
has been dropped for ordinary FPU members. Only half of senior FPU officials are 
required to have a command of the mission language, whilst other senior officers must 
have a command of English.197   
 
3-2. Personal qualities required 
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Equally, or arguably more importantly, the UN needs to ensure that UN police officers 
have particular personal qualities, such as integrity, as they are increasingly operating 
as role models.198 Some personal qualities have been included in the requirement and 
selection criteria for UN police personnel. These relate to mental and physical health, 
personal and professional integrity, and other personal qualities.199 Over time, these 
requirements have not changed much, and have focused on good judgement, an 
objective attitude, polite manners, self-discipline, inter-cultural skills, and leadership.200 
This appears to indicate that UN police officers are expected to use their discretion to 
solve difficult problems, interact with colleagues and communities with different cultural 
backgrounds, and work in difficult conditions.  
 
There is also an exclusion criterion. Those officers who have been convicted of a crime 
are excluded from becoming UN police officers. This is one of the ways in which the UN 
seeks to uphold professional integrity amongst UN police personnel. However, therein 
lies a paradox. In sending States which struggle to hold their police to account, a clean 
criminal record may not mean that a police officer has never committed a crime. Instead, 
in these States, crimes committed by police officers may either not be addressed at all, 
or may be addressed only within the police disciplinary system.  
  
By 2007, the UN added a further criterion for disqualifying police candidates. No police 
officer against whom any disciplinary charge has ever been upheld, or who is under 
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investigation, or who is being prosecuted for any disciplinary or criminal offence (except 
for minor traffic offences) can join the UN police (for this purpose, driving while 
intoxicated, or dangerous or careless driving, are not considered minor traffic 
offences).201 There are two issues to consider with this approach. One is the same as 
the question of a record of criminal conviction, as described above. The other is related 
to the variety of disciplinary offences in different police forces. For example, disciplinary 
offences can include disobeying superior orders, or leaving a post without prior 
approval. In terms of ensuring professional integrity, such offences are arguably 
insufficiently serious to disqualify a police candidate. Moreover, a candidate may be 
working in an authoritarian or undemocratic police force, for example, one in which 
superior orders are given that do not conform to human rights standards.  202 If a 
candidate disobeys an order to commit a human rights violation, such an offence should 
not disqualify him from serving as a UN police officer.  
 
The 2012 development relating to exclusionary criteria is interesting. The requirements 
for IPOs have remained the same.203 However, the exclusion criteria for FPU personnel 
have been modified to include investigation, prosecution or conviction for criminal 
offences, violations of human rights law (IHRL) or international humanitarian law (IHL), 
as well as serious misconduct in previous UN missions.204 The UN has dropped 
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disciplinary offences from the exclusion criteria, but only for FPU personnel. It is difficult 
to understand why IPOs are not also required to certify that they have not been involved 
in violations of IHRL or IHL.  
 
A particularly important issue is the quality of personnel in FPUs. A number of UN police 
personnel come from States in which democratic standards are not upheld.205 It creates 
a problem if these officers conduct themselves on a mission as they would back home, 
but it is arguably even more problematic in relation to FPUs, as ‘they are more heavily 
armed, play a more confrontational role and can therefore have a greater destabilizing 
effect’.206  
 
3-3. The UN’s efforts in securing adherence to the required criteria  
Due to the increasingly vital role that the UN police play,207 one would expect the UN to 
strengthen its measures to control the quality of the UN police personnel, both through 
obtaining the necessary expertise, and through excluding those with questionable 
integrity. This expectation necessitates an examination of the procedural guarantees put 
in place prior to the deployment of UN police. 
 
3-3-1. Selection 
Currently, there are two different categories of UN police personnel, and three different 
ways for a police officer to join the UN police. 
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Individual Police Officers (IPOs) 
The first category of UN police personnel is that of IPOs. IPOs include all UN police 
officers, except FPU officers. In principle, IPOs are selected and seconded by sending 
States.208 In the planning phase, the UN Police Division may informally consult with 
member States.209 The sending States are then required to select and nominate police 
officers with the required skills and profiles.210 There may also be offers from some 
sending States to match stand-by personnel through an established system called the 
Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS).211 Thus, sending States play a central role in 
the selection of personnel. It appears that the UN was not involved in the nomination 
and selection process at all until the early 1990s.212 By 1997, the UN Secretariat, which 
assisted in the selection of officers at the request of sending States prior to their 
deployment, had established a selection assistance team.213 In 2005, this was called 
the Selection Assistance Team (SAT), but, in 2012, it was renamed the Selection 
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Assessment and Assistance Team (SAAT).214 In the beginning, the selection process, 
including the necessary tests, was essentially left to the States concerned.215 Over time, 
the selection assistance team has become more involved in the actual assessment of 
candidates. The roles and procedures followed by this team have become more 
institutionalized. While the SAT’s assessment focused on the minimum requirements, 
the SAAT has widened these criteria to include the general suitability of the IPOs for the 
positions that they are nominated to fill.216 This represents significant progress. 
However, the SAAT assessment is still very focused on the minimum standards,217 and 
it appears that, ambitiously, all the criteria are assessed in a short interview.218 Above 
all, the involvement of assessment teams in the selection process is not mandatory. In 
2010, it was reported that about 45 out of 100 sending States requested visits by the 
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team,219 and in 2011, SAATs made 29 visits covering 45 countries.220 Apparently, they 
assessed 16,644 police candidates all together. Considering the number of candidates 
to be screened against the very specialized expertise demanded of the UN police, it is 
difficult to imagine that a thorough and accurate assessment of each candidate is 
possible.221 Yet SAAT tests screened out 70 percent of police candidates in 2011.222 
This appears to indicate the difficulty inherent in maintaining a minimum standard of 
personnel, rather than an indication that the UN demands high standards. Since 2012, 
assessment has become mandatory, but can be done after deployment. An internal 
policy stipulates that there should be pre-deployment phone interviews in these 
cases,223 but considering the volume of UN police candidates and the practice pre-
2012, it is difficult to imagine that phone interviews were conducted for half of all 
IPOs.224 Moreover, if IPOs are subject to assessment after their deployment, sending 
them back would be more difficult than not deploying them in the first place. 
 
In relation to the exclusion criteria, when the sending States prepare their lists of pre-
selected police officers for assignment to Peace Operations,225 they have been required 
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since at least 2005 to declare in writing that none of their pre-selected candidates are 
under investigation, facing prosecution or have had charges laid against them for any 
criminal, human rights or disciplinary offences. Since 2012, individual police officers 
have been required to make an additional mandatory declaration.226 However, the UN 
assessment teams do not check whether these declarations have been truthfully 
made.227 In theory, the DPKO, in particular the Police Division, can check each 
candidate’s background for any misconduct in previous missions and beyond, ‘within 
DPKO records’.228 However, the DPKO has only maintained records of misconduct for 
previous missions since the recording system was put in place in the mid-2000s.229 In 
addition, it does not have access to the records of candidates’ performances back 
home. When dealing with tens of thousands of police candidates, it is difficult to expect 
that the UN will in fact check individual candidates’ backgrounds. The only realistic 
possibility is a background check of their possible involvement in gross human rights 
violations. A new human rights screening policy has been developed by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the DPKO, which allows OHCHR 
to screen candidates’ names against its records of human rights violators.230  
 
In considering the selection and deployment process, it may be worth noting that there 
has been a significant change in the kind of States sending police officers to the UN. In 
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the 1990s, Western and North American States provided a large number of UN police 
personnel. Over time and, since 2000 in particular, South Asian and African States have 
become the main sending States.231 Currently, those States sending the greatest 
numbers of both UN police and military contingents are also those States which have 
been criticized for their reluctance to hold their security forces to account.232 Some of 
those States which used to send high numbers of personnel to the UN in the 1990s 
have reduced these numbers. This may partly be because they are now sending their 
police officers to places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, through bilateral or regional 
agreements.233 It is also claimed that Western States stopped sending their police 
officers to UN missions because these officers had become frustrated by working 
alongside less capable police officers.234 To address this problem, it was suggested that 
police officers with the same nationality should be deployed together.235 This suggestion 
was rejected, and may have resulted in some States sending significantly reduced 
numbers of police officers to the UN. The reductions by certain States may have 
implications for the kinds of policing cultures UN police officers now come from.236 
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In addition to recruitment based on the sending States’ pre-selection, a small number of 
IPOs are selected through individual applications made directly to the UN.237 Police 
candidates who go through this process are selected through the UN’s assessment of 
their profiles, experiences and skills based on the information provided by them in their 
Personal History Forms (PHPs) and interviews.238 This process is much more thorough 
when compared to the sending governments’ selection process, as the UN has an 
opportunity to assess detailed accounts of each position the candidate has held. In the 
PHP, candidates are required to divulge whether they have ever been: 
 
[…] arrested, indicted, or summoned into court as a defendant in criminal 
proceedings, or convicted, fined or imprisoned for the violation of any law 
(excluding minor traffic violations).239 
 
 
This question is presumably used for excluding police candidates with insufficient 
professional integrity. The issues raised above (in relation to the disqualification of 
candidates pre-selected by the sending States) apply equally to this process.240 
 
It is also worth pointing out that, not having found specific specialists in adequate 
numbers amongst the seconded police personnel they receive, some Peace Operations 
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have added civilian posts to perform specific functions, such as police officers, project 
managers, procurement specialists and civil engineers.241  
 
Formed Police Units 
Arrangements for FPUs differ from that of IPOs. Here, sending States provide a group 
of police personnel as a unit. Their selection and deployment procedures are the same 
as for military contingents, under what is called a Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) 
system.242 Under this system, the UN enters into a legally binding agreement, a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), with each sending State.243 The MoU stipulates 
that it is the sending State’s responsibility to ensure that the personnel it provides: 
[…] meet the standards established by the United Nations for service with [the 
United Nations peacekeeping mission], inter alia, with respect to rank, 
experience, physical fitness, specialization and knowledge of languages.244 
 
In 2012, the UN put in place an additional assessment procedure,245 but this serves only 
to confirm the identity of individual candidates.246   
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In terms of records of criminal offences, violations of IHRL and IHL, and serious 
misconduct in a previous UN mission, two attestations are now required: one by the 
sending States for all FPU personnel, and the other by the individual officers 
themselves.247 This policy requires that the assessment team ‘verify’ these attestations 
during their visits,248 but considering the time-frame and the number of personnel, it is 
likely to mean that no action is taken other than checking if these forms have been 
signed and submitted. If the UN wished to check the human rights background of each 
FPU officer, it should require each police officer to submit details of their previous work 
at the very least. That would enable the UN to check this information against its 
information on human rights violations, even though this would not save any time on the 
selection process.249  
 
Resorting to FPUs has improved the situation on one front, that is, the speed of 
deployment. As FPUs consist of many officers, it is easier to fill the required number of 
police slots immediately.250 It may also be that they do not require much training in order 
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to ensure the unit works as a cohesive entity, although they may require mission-
specific training. The UN claims that they are ‘self-sufficient and rapidly deployable’.251  
 
This leads to a consideration of possible reasons underlying the recent heavy reliance 
on FPUs. One is that the standard of quality control has been lowered for the sake of 
the speed of deployment.252 As FPUs are deployed as a unit, not only has the required 
level of expertise been lowered,253 but also fewer quality control checks are conducted. 
This may mean that the process is less thorough. Recruiting police officers on an 
individual basis would require enlisting more than 10,000 police officers globally in 
recent years.254  
 
Another possible reason is financial. As the UN’s payment/reimbursement schemes for 
IPOs and FPUs differ, deploying the same number of FPU personnel costs half of what 
it costs to deploy IPOs.255 For sending States, this acts as an incentive, as they receive 
reimbursements for FPU members at the same rate as for military contingents, as well 
as payments for the wear and tear of equipment.256  
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This raises an important question : is the UN using FPU personnel for positions for 
which they are not designed? While acknowledging that there is an increased need for 
FPU-type functions, the use of FPUs cannot be seen as a solution to filling IPO 
positions, as FPUs have distinct functions. Over-reliance on FPUs would cause 
problems, not least the unnecessary militarization of the police.257   
 
3-3-2. Training 
Training is another means by which the UN can ensure the necessary expertise among 
UN police personnel. There are two main stages of training. First, the UN requires 
sending States to ensure their officers have the necessary expertise, including the 
provision of training.258 Since at least the mid-1990s, the UN has provided guidance on 
the content of generic pre-deployment training.259 More recently, the UN has also 
started providing more precise modules and training materials in an attempt to 
standardize training.260 These provide more information of the type of policing required 
in Peace Operations, the applicable laws and codes of conduct,261 as well as assisting 
the sending States to conduct training.262 Second, the UN also provides training on the 
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deployment of UN police in the host States, mainly on mission-specific content,263 and 
any applicable codes and policies.264 Some missions conducted training after police 
officers were deployed to their duty stations, but the constant in-theatre needs proved to 
be too immediate to call officers back for training.265 One fundamental point regarding 
training is that policing in UN Peace Operations requires not only very specialized skills, 
but also the right kind of policing culture.266 A few weeks of training cannot be expected 
to bring about the required expertise. Nonetheless, it may be a useful means for 
informing the UN police about the mission-specific operational settings, as well as any 
relevant policies and codes, including those dealing with prohibited behaviour. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter shows that, as an institution, the UN police have rapidly acquired additional 
functions. They have also gained more importance in UN Peace Operations, as these 
missions have shifted focus. The functions of the UN police have been transformed 
from monitoring and advising indigenous police forces, to carrying out policing 
themselves, to reforming, rebuilding and restructuring the local police forces and judicial 
systems. In particular, the UN police have played a central role since the focus of Peace 
Operations has shifted to the rule of law. Accordingly, UN police officers have become 
much more influential in relation to the behaviour of the local police, as well as future 
rule of law institutions in the host State. The significant increase in the scope of the 
functions the UN police must carry out is also demonstrated by the UN polices’ increase 
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in size. They have become the fastest-growing component of Peace Operations, going 
from only a few dozen personnel to over 12,000 officers.267 This has gone hand-in-hand 
with dramatic changes in the environments into which they are deployed.  
 
As their functions have evolved, so too has the relationship between the UN police and 
the host population. Recent policing involves a much closer relationship with the host 
population.268 In a host society that has experienced a fragile rule of law, insecurity, and 
law enforcement actors who are detached from the community, re-building national 
institutions and providing training is not enough. Often it is much more challenging to 
gain the trust of the local population, to whom the UN police are increasingly visible. 
The UN is expected to provide role models for democratic, impartial and professional 
policing. Misconduct by a UN police officer has a serious and negative impact, and can 
thus undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of a UN operation.269 Problems of 
misconduct do not remain just that. Rather, they significantly impede an operation’s 
ability to fulfill its mandate.270 It is also important to remember that once the opportunity 
to gain the trust of the local police and population is lost, it is difficult to regain it. This 
may be the case particularly in respect of a population which has suffered from a lack of 
police professionalism and integrity before the UN police were deployed. 
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It is therefore vitally important that the UN ensures that the quality of its police personnel 
is kept to the required standard. In many situations, the UN needs to be able to rapidly 
deploy a sizeable number of police personnel. If all such personnel are properly trained 
prior to deployment, this would not be problem. In practice, however, the UN has to 
spend time and effort providing training for officers, and pairing less competent officers 
with those who are better qualified for the job. These problems prevent rapid 
deployment.271 
 
Since the quality of personnel is so important, one would expect that the UN would not 
only require sending States to select officers with the required expertise and qualities, 
but also that the UN would check that this is the case. In this regard, an increasing effort 
is being made by the UN, but the above analysis shows that this check is not thorough. 
It also raises the possibility that the UN may be resorting to FPUs more frequently than 
its functional needs require.272 If that is the case, it suggests that the quality control of 
UN police personnel is not a sufficiently high priority. Thus, the most important 
challenge for the UN is to recruit an adequate number of suitably qualified personnel.273 
 
The UN is faced with a genuine dilemma: if it is to carry out the mandates established 
by the Security Council, it requires a significant number of UN police officers. However, 
it is difficult for the UN to recruit sufficient numbers of personnel. There appear to be 
limitations both with regard to the actual number of personnel being made available by 
States, and in relation to range of States from which they come. If, in order to minimize 
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the risk of criminal wrongdoing, and to protect the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
mission, the UN were to insist on the necessary expertise and personal qualities, there 
is a risk that it would not obtain the numbers of personnel required. 
 
This chapter has established that the institutional policing functions within Peace 
Operations have changed dramatically and how, as well as how the environments in 
which they are deployed have also undergone significant changes. Before looking at 
how the members of the UN police can be called to account for criminal behaviour, and 
whether there are any barriers to this, it is necessary to consider if there is any evidence 





CHAPTER 3: EVIDENCE OF THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES BY UN POLICE  
 
Against the backdrop of the functional importance of the UN police, and the increasingly 
public role that they play, this chapter examines whether there is any evidence of UN 
police officers committing serious crimes and, if so, whether there is evidence which 
suggests that they are called to account for these crimes.  
 
The first problem faced in attempting to research issues relating to crimes committed by 
UN mission personnel, including the UN police, and the extent to which they are 
individually called to account for their acts, is the significant lack of information. This 
also has a considerably adverse effect on the UN’s own ability to address the issue of 
the criminal accountability of its personnel. 
 
It is submitted that the UN should do two things: the first is to collect information in a 
systematic way, so that the UN itself has an accurate and comprehensive picture of the 
problems it faces. As suggested in the previous chapter,1 any failure on the part of the 
UN to address the criminal accountability of its personnel in Peace Operations would 
severely undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of its missions. Having a picture of 
the nature and extent of the problems is a necessary step in tackling the issue of 
accountability. If it wishes to maximize its use of resources in order to pursue its mission 
effectively, it must be able to identify anything that undermines this aim. The information 
collected should be in a suitable form, and should be appropriately disaggregated, so 
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 See Chapter 1, sections 1 and 7.  
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that it is useful for combating impunity.2 This would enable the UN to ascertain the 
relationship between each of these variables and the misconduct in question. In order 
for the data to be comprehensive, the collection of information should be triggered by 
the alleged commission of criminal misconduct, and not a complaint about such 
behaviour. Clearly, where the information does not reach the UN, it is difficult for the 
organization to record it. Nevertheless, the need for a comprehensive picture requires 
the UN to be proactive in seeking out relevant information. Reliance on the submission 
of a complaint as the trigger would not meet the UN’s needs. There is only one entity 
that is able to collect comprehensive data regarding misconduct, and that is the UN. If 
the UN were to hold accurate and comprehensive data, this would enable it to identify 
which crimes are most prevalent, and to concentrate on deterring the commission of 
these crimes. If the data were to reveal any trends regarding which nationalities were 
responsible for the most allegations of misconduct, this would also be useful in terms of 
planning which States to approach to send personnel. 
  
The second action the UN should take is to make this information available to the 
public. Currently, the only available information concerns the total number of allegations 
made annually, which is disaggregated into the category of personnel committing 
alleged crimes, the type of misconduct committed, and the mission in which the act was 
committed.3 However, this information is both insufficient and is not the right kind of 
                                            
2
 Possible categories might be: the type of misconduct committed, the category of personnel the suspect 
falls into, the nationality of the suspect, the mission in which the misconduct was committed, and whether 
or not the act was committed in the performance of the officer’s official functions. In particular, if it is 
argued that the complexity of new UN police functions and/or the increased challenges of the situations in 
which they find themselves have contributed to increased rates of criminal behaviour, one would expect a 
higher proportion of the crimes to be committed in the course of official functions in such missions. 
3
 See Chapter 3, introductory section; Chapter 4, sections 3-2 and 3-5. 
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information which is required for obtaining an accurate overall picture of the problems. 
As a result, the author needed to look elsewhere for information.4  
 
It is in the UN’s interest to make this information public. First, this will improve the 
transparency of the organization. As the UN is attempting to inculcate in the host State 
values that increase the prospect of sustainable peace, including good governance,5 it 
should recognize that transparency is a vital part of this process. Therefore, making 
sufficient information public is beneficial in its own right. Second, by making information 
available to the public, the UN can equip the public to pursue issues of criminal 
accountability. For example, if it is the case that the UN police from certain sending 
States are committing crimes at a disproportionately high rate, and if that information is 
available to the public, it may enable them to place pressure on those States to address 
the criminal accountability of those officers, or to advocate for police officers from States 
with better systems of accountability. Both of these would give impetus to addressing 
criminal accountability. One might wonder if this would lead to sending States indicating 
that they would not send any more personnel to Peace Operations if the information 
regarding the suspects’ nationalities were to be made public.6 Separately, the UN may 
fear that sending States could withhold personnel.7 However, it is uncertain whether 
many sending States would be deterred from sending their police officers to serve in UN 
missions, considering the economic interest that may be involved in the arrangement.8  
                                            
4
 See later section on the author’s data, section 1. 
5
 See Chapter 1, section 2; Chapter 2, section 1. 
6
 Information suggests that some large contributors have expressed concerns about their countries being 
named for the abuse of a few officers. Michael Fleshman, Tough UN Line on Peacekeeper Abuses (Africa 
Survival, April 2005, 2005).  
7
 For further details, Chapter 4, section 3-5. 
8




It is necessary to state at the outset that there is no way of knowing what proportion of 
misconduct is officially complained of, and what proportion of complaints is officially 
recorded. In the type of situations in which Peace Operations are established, there 
may be multiple obstacles to laying a complaint. There are difficulties in relation to 
physically making a complaint, including difficulties in travelling to the point where 
complaints can be made, in particular where victims are based in remote places, or 
where effective communication is hampered by language difficulties.9 In countries 
where many languages are used by different groups of people, this language barrier 
multiplies. In addition, there may be cultural or historical difficulties. Local people may 
lack trust in accountability mechanisms, in particular where they have not experienced 
reliable accountability mechanisms in recent history.10 For a population which may have 
come through a violent conflict with virtually no rule of law, the lodging of a complaint 
will be very unfamiliar and difficult.11 There may also be a cultural reluctance to report 
some types of crimes, for example, those of a sexual nature.12 This chapter is 
concerned only with those allegations which have generated complaints.  
 
                                            
9
 Françoise Hampson and Ai Kihara-Hunt, ‘The Accountability of Personnel Associated with 
Peacekeeping Operations’ in Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric De Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Unintended 
Consequences of Peacekeeping (UNU 2007), p.205. 
10
 Ibid, p.205. Victims may seek economic gain by cooperating with investigations. Local girls (victims of 
SEA) refused to cooperate when they were informed that they would not be paid for information. See also 
UNGA, 'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on its Investigation into Allegations of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in the Ituri Region (Bunia) in the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo' (5 April 2007) UN Doc. A/61/841, para.13, where more reasons for 
non-cooperation are provided. 
11
 Sarah Martin, Must Boys be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping 
Missions (Refugees International, October 2005), p.3. 
12
 John Van Kesteren, Pat Maythew and Paul Nieuwbeert, “Criminal Victimization in Seventeen 
Industrialised Countries: Key Findings from the 2000 International Crime Survey”, The Hague: Scientific 
Research and Development Centre, 2000. 
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In order to make a comparison between the scale of criminal misconduct committed by 
national police and the extent to which these allegations are addressed in a stable 
society, it is useful to cite the rate of both alleged and substantiated crimes committed in 
such a society. If a comparison between the rate of alleged crimes committed by the UN 
police and that of a normal society were to reveal a lower rate for the former, the 
problem is unlikely be the behaviour of the UN police. However, if the rate of allegations 
against the UN police were to be higher but the rate of conviction lower, the problem 
would be what is done about the allegations. As an example of such a society, the rate 
of allegations made against the England and Wales police forces will be cited. It has 
been reported that at least 6,740 allegations of potentially criminal behaviour were 
made against police officers in these places in a one-year period,13 which amounts to a 
rate of 525.1 allegations per 10,000 police personnel. 179 instances of criminal conduct 
appeared to have been substantiated against members of these police forces in the 
three years leading up to mid-2013.14 Taking into account the number of police 
                                            
13
 Serious non-sexual assault, sexual assault and assault are counted as an allegation of potentially 
criminal behaviour. Other categories, such as the breach of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, could 
also entail criminal conduct, but because it is not clear what proportion of breaches of the Act was 
criminal, it was not counted. Independent Police Complaints Commission, Police Complaints: Statistics 
2011/12 (IPCC Research and Statistics Series: Paper 25, 2012), p.17. 
14
 Tom Payne, ‘Brothel-Running, Child Abuse Images, and Selling Firearms Among Nearly 200 Crimes 
Committed by Police in Last Three Years’ Independent (16 January 2014) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/sex-drugs-and-evenin-all--the-police-officers-that-break-
the-law-9065376.html> accessed 1 January 2015. Apparently this was in addition to the 477 officers who 
were fired for misconduct, the 52 officers who were demoted, and the hundreds more who were 
reprimanded or fined. Reports showed that 1,849 sanctions were imposed on police officers for 
misconduct in England and Wales in one year (2007/8 financial year), and that the following year, 1,388 
sanctions were imposed on them for misconduct. Independent Police Complaints Commission, 
Misconduct Sanctions Imposed on Officers 2007/08 (2008); Independent Police Complaints Commission, 
Misconduct Sanctions Imposed on Officers 2008/9 (2009). 
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officers,15 the rate of substantiated criminal conduct per 10,000 police officers per year 
was 4.6. 
 
1. Findings regarding particularized allegations 
In order to evaluate the scale and seriousness of the problem, the author gathered data 
on particularized allegations of serious crimes committed by Peace Operations 
personnel between 1948 and 2014. Information was gathered from official UN reports, 
reports from sending States, reports by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
the media. In order to distinguish this data from any other datasets, it will be referred to 
as the ‘author’s data’. The trigger for the inclusion of information in the author’s data 
was an allegation of criminal conduct. In each case, there was an attempt to identify the 
content of the allegation, whether administrative or criminal proceedings had ensued, 
and what the ultimate outcome of the proceedings was. This was done even if the 
suspected perpetrator was not identified.16 One problem needs to be acknowledged at 
the outset. While effort has been made to identify what constitutes a serious crime for 
the purposes of this work,17 this largely depends on the domestic laws of the host and 
sending States. For example, without precise information as to the alleged victim’s age, 
the content of the host State’s national laws, and those of the suspect’s sending State, it 
is impossible to determine whether consensual sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year old 
                                            
15
 The number was given as 128,351 officers as of September 2013. Alan Travis, ‘Police Numbers Fall by 
Further 3,488 Officers’ The Guardian (London) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/29/police-
numbers-fall-by-3488-officers> accessed 21 August 2014. 
16
 See Chapter 1, section 3, for further details on the methodology used in the collection of the author’s 
data. 
17
 See Chapter 1, section 6. 
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constitutes a crime.18 To that extent, it is possible that the author’s data contains 
offences that are merely disciplinary. The data currently has 545 entries against all 
categories of Peace Operations personnel,19 providing a picture of particularized 
allegations of criminal conduct.  
 
The difficulties inherent in collecting reliable data cannot be overstated. Data collection 
cannot be systematic, as there is no reason to believe that each UN mission has been 
evenly reported on. Some types of criminal conduct may have been more widely 
reported than others. There may also have been a period during which the media and 
other sources were paying special attention to a specific mission or crime. Sometimes, 
the situation in a particular sending State may lead to more attention being paid to a 
mission in which its military contingent is active. Misconduct by police officers from 
some States may be unevenly reported, either due to the States’ own diligence or to 
public scandals. It is possible that the collection of allegations has not been systematic 
or comprehensive within the UN.20 Both UN and State reports may be more focused on 
the allegations over which action was taken, rather than those where no action was 
taken. This is especially true since 2000, as the UN has begun reporting on the actions 
it has taken with regard to select cases.21 For these reasons, the information collected 
                                            
18
 The difficulty is exacerbated because the UN does not reveal the suspect’s nationality. See Chapter 4, 
section 3-5. 
19
 This includes UN civilian staff, including UN Volunteers, members of national contingents, Military 
Observers, UN police personnel, consultants and contractors working for UN Peace Operations, and the 
UN’s implementing partners, such as NGOs working in humanitarian assistance. 
20
 On the mechanism to collect information of wrongdoing by members of the UN police, see Chapter 4, 
section 3-1. 
21
 There are two sets of data made available to public. General information on the number of allegations 
and investigations is provided by the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU). The Office of the Internal 
Oversight Services (OIOS) provides information on select cases, giving some case details. For more 
details, see section 2. 
114 
 
for the author’s data is expected to represent a small proportion of the total allegations 
made. In addition, a lot of criminal behaviour may not result in complaints.22 Taking into 
account the level of awareness of the local population of what should be reported, and 
how it should be reported,23 as well as the power relations that may exist between UN 
police officers and victims, or between the UN and the local population in general, the 
percentage of reporting may be even lower than in other societies.24 It may also be the 
case that the UN’s attempts to investigate misconduct face resistance on the part of the 
suspect’s colleagues and commanders. For example, the UN’s investigatory body, the 
Office of the Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), reported that some UN police officers 
attempted to obstruct an investigation into the sexual abuse of a minor, as well as two 
separate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, all of which were reportedly 
committed by police officers from the same sending State.25 
 
Misconduct entries over time 
Up until 1990, only one case of misconduct, that of UNIFIL military personnel in 1979, 
was located by the author.26 The next cases date from the early 1990s, and relate to the 
                                            
22
 For example, Chile noted in the discussion at the General Assembly that they were not convinced that 
the registered number of allegations reflected the true extent of the problem. UNGA Sixth Committee, 
'Summary Record of the 8th Meeting, Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 12 October 2012, at 10 
a.m.' (5 December 2012) UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.8, para.67. On the issues of the UN’s internal mechanism 
to receive complaints, see Chapter 4, section 3-1. 
23
 On the issue of awareness, see Chapter 4, section 3-1-1 (a). 
24
 It is also possible that complaints are made to other institutions, entities or groups. In that case, 
complaints may not reach the UN police. 
25
 UNGA, 'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Peacekeeping Operations ' (1 March 
2011) UN Doc. A/65/271 (Part II), (hereinafter ‘2011 OIOS Report’), para.98. 
26
 A military member of UNIFIL force was accused of smuggling explosives into Israel to support the PLA. 
The accused was tried at the District Court of Haifa, Israel. UN, 'District Court of Haifa, The Government 
of Israel against Papa Coli Ben Dista Saar: Judgement of 10 May 1979: Question of the Jurisdiction of an 
Israeli Court Regarding a Member of a National Contingent within UNIFIL, Accused of Smuggling 
Explosives into Israeli Territory - Claim of Immunity from Territorial Jurisdiction - Question Whether the 
Accused Could be Considered as a Member of a Foreign Military Force Present in Israel with the Consent 
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UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), and the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC). It is remarkable that the two operations had such different levels of 
reports of criminal conduct. Only one allegation was recorded for ONUSAL, that of 
illegal drugs trafficking by a UN police officer.27 In comparison, in UNTAC, there were 30 
entries of allegations of criminal conduct: six against UN police personnel, and 18 
against members of military contingents. The status of the remaining suspects was not 
identified.28 This indicates that, in UNTAC, there was a higher rate of reported crimes 
per 10,000 officers for UN police personnel than for military personnel.29 
                                                                                                                                            
and Permission of the State - Extent of the Immunity of Jurisdiction of Members of Such Forces in the 
Absence of a Specific Agreement on the Matter between the Host State and the Country of the Military 
Forces Origin - Question Whether the Accused Could be Considered as Enjoying Immunity from 
Jurisdiction as a Member of a United Nations Force ' (1979) 1979 UN Jurid YB 205.  
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 Tor Tanke Holm and Espen Barth Eide (eds), Peacebuilding and Police Reform (Frank Cass 2000), 
p.51. 
28
 Note that some of the information sources have incomplete references. This is because part of the 
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which had a different standard for citing sources. UN ECOSOC, 'Working Paper on the Accountability of 
International Personnel Taking Part in Peace Support Operations Submitted by Françoise Hampson' (7 
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Debriefing and Lessons: Report and Recommendations of the International Conference, Singapore, 
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August 2014; Machel Graça, The Impact of War on Children (Orient Blackswan 2001); B Byrne R Marcus 
and T Powers-Steves, (Report No3);  Washington Post (29 October 1993); The Times (27 August 1993);  
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Thereafter, there was a sudden increase in the author’s data of particularized accounts 
of allegations in relation to the missions in the Balkans. In the United Nations Mission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), 26 allegations appear in the author’s data, 18 of 
which were against UN police members.30 In the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 
seven allegations are listed, six of which were against military personnel, whilst the 
remaining entry concerned a civilian staff member.31 Additionally, five entries were for a 
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, three of which involved military personnel, whilst 
two involved UN police personnel.32 A noticeable trend in the data in relation to 
                                                                                                                                            
UNTAC Facts and Figures’  <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html> 
accessed 10 August 2014. 
30
 Magin McKenna, ‘Sins of the Peacekeepers’ (Sunday Herald, 30 June 2002) 
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UNMIBH and UNPROFOR is that allegations against UN police were made at a much 
higher rate than those against their military counterparts.33 
 
Reports of criminal misconduct by military contingents surfaced in a few other Peace 
Operations around the mid-1990s,34 but there were no reports of misconduct by UN 
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police personnel. No allegations appear in the author’s data in relation to missions in 
Angola, although there were three sizable missions there.35  
 
Unlike in other missions, in the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the UN was the government, and could itself 
bring criminal proceedings in the host States.36 These Transitional Administrations 
faced many more allegations as compared to other operations at that time. In UNMIK, 
43 allegations appear in the author’s data, 26 of which involved UN police personnel.37 
In UNTAET, 17 allegations can be found, including three against UN police personnel.38  
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Other Operations launched around this time were the UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and the UN Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). UNMEE had a modest 
monitoring mandate, while UNAMSIL and MONUC had more wide-reaching ones.39 It is 
remarkable that, for the first two missions, no allegations were entered against UN 
police personnel, probably partly reflecting the small size of the UN police 
components.40 In MONUC, the size of UN police component was much bigger,41 the 
police functions and the mission mandate were ambitious, and the environment was 
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characterized with violence.42 There were 98 entries against all categories of MONUC 
personnel, including five against UN police personnel.43 One observation is that 
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missions with a high number of allegations against UN police personnel also faced more 
allegations against military contingent personnel.44  
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One interesting overall trend illustrated by the author’s data is that the number of reports 
of specific criminal incidents in each mission has decreased slowly since UNTAC.45 
 
Since 2000, the scale of allegations of criminal misconduct may have been influenced 
by a new source of information. Two different UN institutions began centralizing 
information on misconduct by all personnel categories. Since the mid-2000s, it has also 
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 Taking the length of each mission into account, the author’s data show that UNTAC (1992-1993) had 
11.5 allegations per 10,000 UN police personnel per 12 months. The figures mostly decreased over time. 
In missions in Bosnia, the rate of allegations was 10.0; UNMIK recorded 3.7; UNTAET 7.0; and MONUC 
3.8. In comparison, for military contingent members, the allegations per 10,000 personnel per 12 months 
showed the following shift: UNTAC 7.5; UNPROFOR 0.4 and SFOR 0.6 (compared to UN police figures 
for Bosnian missions); UNAMSIL 0.7; KFOR 0.3; UNTAET 2.5; UNMEE 3.2 and MONUC 3.6.  
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begun to make this information partially available to the public.46 What is apparent is 
that allegations continue to be reported, both against the UN police and military 
personnel. According to the author’s data, there were more allegations per head against 
UN police members than against military members.47 The rate of allegations in 
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 See section 1.  
47
 UNMIL had 8 entries against UN police personnel, a rate of 71.7 allegations per 10,000 personnel. 
Military personnel had 12 allegations made against them, making the rate 8.0 per 10,000 personnel. 
Civilian personnel had 6 allegations lodged against them. The rate for civilian personnel was 40.2 per 
10,000 personnel. Likewise, in UNOCI, allegations made against UN police, military contingent personnel, 
civilian staff were 0, 8, and 6 respectively, making the rate per 10,000 personnel 0, 10.1 and 46.4. 
MINUSTAH had 11, 18 and 5 entries against UN police, military and civilians respectively. This was at a 
rate of 25.1, 20.1 and 28.2 per 10,000 UN police, military and civilian personnel respectively. In ONUB, 
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personnel, whilst 7 allegations were made against military personnel. This meant the rate of allegations 
per 10,000 military personnel was 13.0 and the rate of allegations per 10,000 civilian personnel was 11.1. 
UNMIS had 1, 4 and 6 allegations against UN police, military and civilian personnel respectively, making 
the rate per 10,000 personnel 14.2, 4.3 and 14.0. UNMIT had 3 allegations laid against UN police, and 2 
allegations against civilian personnel. This is at the rate of 18.6 and 16.0 entries per 10,000 police and 
civilian personnel. UNMIT did not have a military component. The new UN system has had a distorting 
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proportion to the size of personnel was lower in missions established in the new 
century, compared to earlier missions.48  
 
According to the author’s data, some missions had a higher rate of allegations than 
other missions. Since 2005, allegations against UN police personnel have been entered 
as follows: eleven in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), seven in the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), four in MONUC, two in UNMIK,49 two in MONUSCO, one in 
the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and three in the United Nations Integrated Mission in 
Timor-Leste (UNMIT).50 Most of the missions facing the highest proportion of allegations 
held mandates which were more intrusive, such as the new Protection of Civilians 
(POC) mandates.51 These missions also had large numbers of personnel. Missions 
established in the 20th century do not appear to have had as many allegations made 
against them as have recently established missions. 
 
The author’s data include only a few entries for missions established after 2005.52 This 
may be because of the time-lag between when the misconduct occurred, and when 
                                            
48
 UNMIL had 7.0 allegations made per 10,000 UN police personnel per 12 months, UNOCI had 0, 
MINUSTAH had 2.6, ONUB had 0, UNMIS had 2.3, and UNMIT had 3.0. These rates are for the most 
part lower than earlier missions. (The rates for UNTAC, missions in Bosnia, UNMIK, UNTAET and 
MONUC were 11.5, 11.0, 3.7, 7.0 and 3.8 respectively. See the section above.)   
49
 Only those allegations concerning matters occurring in or after 2005 are counted. 
50
 For allegations against MONUSCO police personnel, see UNGA, 2011 OIOS PKO Report; UNGA, 
OIOS Report 2013. For allegations against UNMIS police personnel, see ibid. For allegations against 
UNMIT police personnel, see UNGA, 2014 OIOS PKO Report; UNMIT, UNMIT Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice Section Report: Report on Human Rights Developments in Timor Leste, August 2006 
– August 2007.  
51
 However, this does not include UNMIT and UNMIK. For the relationship between the mandates and the 
UN police’s functions, see Chapter 2, section 1. As regards crimes of a sexual nature, these can never 
fall within the mandate, and thus are not influenced by the nature of any mandate. 
52
 African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), UN Mission in the Central African 
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUSCO), UN Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNIFSA), United Nations 
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these were publicly reported. Exceptionally, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in 















                                                                                                                                            
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). 
53
 2 allegations were made against UN police personnel, 2 against military contingent personnel, and 3 
against civilian personnel. For allegations against MONUSCO military personnel, see UNGA, OIOS 
Report 2013; UNGA, 2011 OIOS PKO Report. For allegations against civilian personnel at MONUSCO, 
see ibid; UNGA, OIOS Report 2013.  
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Table 1. Number of allegations against members of the UN police and military 





























Nature of alleged crimes 
For reasons to be discussed later,54 the nature of the alleged crimes affects the extent 
of any adverse impact on the UN. One aspect of this is whether the alleged criminal 
conduct was committed during the exercise of UN police functions.55 
 
In the author’s data, 73 of the 89 criminal offences allegedly committed by UN police 
personnel were offences against the person, which might in certain circumstances fall 
within their official functions.56 It is most unlikely that any sexual offences are linked to 
official functions, although being a member of the UN police may provide that person 
with more opportunities to carry out such offences. This may be the case if, for example, 
the alleged conduct occurred during police interrogation, arrest or detention. According 
to the author’s data, there were 40 allegations of sexual offences by UN police officers, 
including four of rape. Others related to sexual slavery, sexual abuse (including 
involving minors), sexual exploitation and sexual harassment. There were also 21 
allegations related to human trafficking. 
 
In addition to allegations of sexual offences, three allegations related to the murder of 
local persons, and four assault or ill-treatment allegations were made which were 
unrelated to UN police functions. In addition, four allegations in the author’s data 
pertained to torture or ill-treatment, which appeared to have occurred during the course 
of the suspects’ work in detaining or interrogating people, or during patrols. There were 
also five allegations of excessive use of force, which injured or killed local persons. Out 
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 See section 2-2. 
55
 This has implications for issues of immunity. See Chapter 6, sections 1-4-1 and 1-4-2. 
56
 See n.28, n.30, n.31, n.32, n.34, n.37, n.38, n.43, n.44, n.47, n.53 for the sources for these allegations. 
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of nine allegations of criminal conduct that appeared to be linked to UN police duties, 
seven occurred in UNMIK, whilst the other two took place in UNTAC and MINUSTAH. In 
all three missions, the UN police were involved in actual policing duties.57 In 
comparison, out of 240 allegations of offences against the person listed in the author’s 
data as having been committed by military contingent personnel, 91 were of a non-
sexual nature, including twelve allegations of murder, 22 instances of assault or ill-
treatment, and 26 allegations resulted from either an excessive use of force or an 
indiscriminate attack. The disproportionately high rate of allegations against military 
personnel may reflect the different nature of the functions carried out by the UN police 
and military contingents.  
 
There were only two allegations of motoring offences by UN police personnel in the 
author’s data. They both concerned hitting and killing a local person while driving under 
the influence of alcohol. When searching for further information regarding traffic 
offences, records of some internal Boards of Inquiry convened in July and August 2010 
were discovered, which were accessible to certain non-UN personnel.58 These records 
came from a completely separate source, and did not form part of the author’s data. 
That Boards of Inquiry were held means that these were incidents in which UN Peace 
Operations personnel were killed, injured or died, or were incidents involving UN Peace 
Operations personnel which caused the death or injury of non-UN personnel, or cases 
in which UN property or equipment above a certain monetary value were lost or 
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 See Chapter 2, sections 1-4, 1-5, 1-6 and 1-7. 
58
 This document is on file with the author. 
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damaged.59 Of these 35 incidents, nine concerned traffic accidents. All nine accidents 
were caused by UN Peace Operations personnel, seven of which involved fatalities, and 
two of which caused injuries to third persons. In only one case was there found to be no 
fault on the driver’s part. Others involved speeding, falling asleep while driving, possible 
drunk-driving, and negligence. Those driving during these incidents included: one 
Military Observer, two military contingent members, three UN police personnel 
(including one FPU personnel), one international civilian staff and two local staff. The 
exact extent of UN traffic offences is unknown, but the BoI records, which appear to 
have been unintentionally made public, show that traffic offences are not uncommon. 
This information contrasts sharply with the complete lack of information officially 
released by the UN regarding traffic offences.  
 
The author’s data have 61 entries regarding alleged economic crimes, a significant 
majority of which were alleged to have been committed by civilian staff.60 Some 
allegations were against military contingent members,61 but only four were made 
against UN police personnel. While most economic crimes alleged to have been 
committed by military personnel concerned theft from local persons,62 cases against UN 
police officers concerned fraud and the embezzlement of UN funds, as well as 
corruption involving local authorities.63 
                                            
59
 This is a list of the circumstances for which Boards of Inquiry are required to convene under the current 
UN internal rules. See Chapter 4, section 2. 
60
 34 allegations were made against civilian staff, including four against UN Volunteers. Some allegations 
concerned both civilian staff and vendors.  
61
 18 allegations were made against military contingent members.  
62
 Ten out of 18 allegations concerned theft from a local person or property. 
63
 One related to entitlement fraud, and another to the embezzlement of training funds. Another case 
concerned corruption involving local authorities. All these three cases were substantiated by the OIOS. 
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Across all categories of crimes, the majority of allegations against UN police officers did 
not directly relate to their official functions.64 The exceptions included a few cases of ill-
treatment of interviewees or detainees, and excessive use of force causing either 
injuries to, or the deaths of, demonstrators. It may not be a coincidence that most of 
these allegations concerned UNMIK.65 It is conceivable that UNMIK personnel 
disproportionately committed crimes directly related to their official functions because of 
                                                                                                                                            
The other case related to the alleged involvement of several UN police personnel in weapons smuggling 
for economic gain. 
64
 According to the author’s data, only 13 out of 89 allegations lodged against members of the UN police 
related to their official duties. However, in three cases, it is unclear whether or not they were related to the 
official functions. 
65
 Ten out of 13 alleged crimes that appear directly related to the official functions were committed in 



























their executive policing functions. It is noteworthy that there is no indication that the 
more complex UN police functions have become, the more crimes these have triggered.  
  
Nationality of suspects 
The author’s data contain some information regarding the nationalities of suspects. The 
largest number of allegations against UN police officers concerned those from the US, 
Pakistan and Jordan,66 and dealt with offences against the person, particularly sexual 
offences.67 All but one had no link with their official functions.68 Members of these 
military contingents were also relatively frequently complained about.69 The kinds of 
alleged offences the military were accused of covered a wider range than those alleged 
to have been committed by UN police officers, but the majority of these were either 
offences of a sexual nature or excessive uses of force.70  
                                            
66
 Eleven entries were against American police officers, nine against Pakistani officers, and five against 
Jordanian police officers. Romanians faced four allegations, whilst three allegations were made against 
Bulgarian police officers, two allegations each against Austrian, Nigerian, Zimbabwean and Filipino 
officers, and one allegation each against Finnish, British, Fijian, Argentinean, Egyptian, Indian, Russian, 
Nepalese, Mexican, Bulgarian, Canadian, Kenyan and Kosovar officers. As to the remaining allegations, 
the nationalities of the suspects are unknown.  
67
 Out of eleven allegations against UN police from the US, six were trafficking-related, one dealt with 
sexual slavery, one with the violation of confidentiality, one with weapons smuggling, one with corruption 
and one dealt with the sexual abuse of a minor. Out of nine crimes allegedly committed by Pakistani 
police officers, three concerned human trafficking-related offences, one dealt with sexual slavery, two with 
sexual abuse involving minors, one with rape and other sexual abuse, and one with weapons smuggling. 
Out of five allegations of criminal conduct by Jordanian police officers, three dealt with sexual crimes, and 
two with allegations of murder and abetting murder.  
68
 One case, concerning an American officer, dealt with a violation of confidentiality. 
69
 In the author’s data, there were five entries against Jordanian military members, 29 allegations against 
American military members and twelve complaints against Pakistani military members. The nationalities 
of military contingents facing more than five allegations of misconduct were: Belgium (21), Morocco (20), 
Canada (19), Uruguay (18), Bulgaria (10), Italy (9), Nepal (8), the United Kingdom (7), France (5), 
Germany (5), India (5), South Africa (5) and Tunisia (5).  
70
 Four allegations against Jordanian military contingent members concerned sexual offences, whilst one 
dealt with excessive use of force. Eight alleged offences by American military members concerned sexual 
offences (three human trafficking allegations, two rapes and one sexual slavery allegation), eleven 
allegations of excessive use of force, two of murder, two of ill-treatment, whilst the remaining allegations 
concerned other types of crimes. Out of twelve allegations against Pakistani military personnel, four 
concerned sexual offences (including a rape allegation), four related to illegal trade and trafficking, one 
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In general, criminal proceedings may be brought in one of two jurisdictions: either the 
host State or the sending State.71 According to the author’s data, some form of criminal 
proceedings has been taken place in the mission’s host State in 12 of the 89 entries 
related to the UN police. This number should be carefully examined. One needs to 
distinguish between UNMIK and UNTAET, where the UN was the government, and 
other missions. In these two missions, the authority to prosecute lay with the UN itself. 
                                                                                                                                            
each of assault and egregious acts, and another allegation dealt with paying witnesses to falsify 
testimony related to criminal allegations. The remaining allegation concerned an indiscriminate attack 
against civilians. 
71
 For jurisdiction, see Chapter 5, sections 3, 4. 














Some of the concerns relating to the standards72 of the host State did not apply in 
respect of these missions. It is therefore natural that more prosecutions took place in 
Kosovo and East Timor.73 All but one of the cases prosecuted concerned offences 
against the person.74 Aside from UNMIK and UNTAET, the host State police only 
launched criminal investigations in two cases: one in MONUSCO, and one in 
MINUSTAH. Both concerned sexual offences and, in both cases, local police initiated 
the criminal investigations, even arresting the suspect in one case. However, no 
prosecutions eventuated in either case in the host State.  
 
Out of 89 entries, there were only five cases in which information suggested that the 
suspect faced criminal proceedings back in their sending States. All of these took place 
after 2000, and all dealt with sexual crimes. Four concerned FPU officers, whilst the 
other concerned an individual police officer. In respect of these five cases, two of the 
suspects were from Pakistan, one was from Argentina, another was from Nepal, whilst 
the nationality of the suspects in the fifth case was not revealed. There are too few 
cases to make any concrete analysis of what types of crimes are more likely to be 
prosecuted, or which States are more likely to prosecute their nationals. Having said 
that, it appears that those cases which were prosecuted mostly involved crimes against 
the person and, in particular, sexual crimes. There is no information to suggest that UN 
                                            
72
 These related mainly to human rights standards, in particular to due process guarantees for the 
accused. For more details, see Chapter 6, section 2-2. 
73
 Three cases were prosecuted in UNTAET, and six cases in UNMIK. In addition, there was one case 
where the suspect was arrested, but was then released on the condition that he report daily to the 
authorities. 
74
 The remaining case related to a motoring offence.  
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police personnel were prosecuted anywhere in relation to fraud allegations.75 As for 
traffic offences, one entry noted an attempt to hold the suspect criminally accountable in 
the host State. However, the suspect did not face court proceedings in the end.76 None 
of the files relating to the UN’s internal disciplinary proceedings on traffic offences were 
referred to the host State.77 This may be because traffic offences may be seen as falling 
within the official functions of the UN police, and thus subject to immunity. 
 
Overall, the author’s data suggest that the majority of criminal offences have not been 
prosecuted. The UN responded internally to at least 41 of the 89 allegations contained 
in the author’s data. However, the most the UN can do currently is to launch an 
administrative investigation and impose administrative sanctions, with the maximum 
penalty being repatriation.78 As argued previously, this is insufficient.79 
 
  
                                            
75
 There was, however, a case in which a high-ranking civilian staff member from UNMIK was prosecuted 
in Germany for fraud and embezzlement. 
76
 The case was investigated in East Timor, by the UN transitional government. 
77
 These are on file with the author. 
78
 The UN refers cases to the authorities of either the host or the national State for criminal prosecution; 
see Chapter 4, sections 3-4 and 3-5. 
79
 See Chapter 1, sections 1, 3 and 4. 
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Table 4. Cases where criminal proceedings were brought against UN police  
 
 
2. Possible patterns of criminal conduct  
Because of the identified shortcomings in the author’s data,80 it is necessary to look 
elsewhere to obtain a better overall picture of the issue. Two sources over and above 
the author’s data were consulted. The first source is that of UN reports. Two systematic 
sets of data have been collected by two different entities. The UN’s Conduct and 
Discipline Unit (CDU) compiles data on the total number of allegations of misconduct, 
disaggregated according to the type of personnel, the type of misconduct and the 
mission concerned.81 The UN’s investigative body, the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services (OIOS), makes limited information public. It has published a list of its 
                                            
80
 See section 1. 
81
 UN CDU, ‘Statistics’  <https://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/OverviewofStatistics.aspx> accessed 6 October 













investigation reports annually since 2004.82 The contents of these reports are sealed, 
but the Office indicates the number and kinds of reports this list contains.83 The OIOS 
lists its investigation reports according to the type of personnel involved, gives a brief 
outline of the alleged misconduct, and states whether or not the allegation was 
substantiated. What is regrettable is that there is no means of knowing how many of the 
cases reported by the OIOS and the CDU overlap,84 which prevents a better overall 
picture of the problems from emerging. In addition to these two sets of information, 
there are other UN reports dealing with specific offences, including sexual exploitation 
and abuse (SEA).85 All these sets of data have only recently been compiled,86 and the 
data cover not only criminal offences, but also disciplinary offences. None of these 
reports group together the kinds of offences in the same way as the author’s data does. 
Nor do these reports reveal whether or not each complaint was substantiated.87 These 
reports also make no distinction between criminal and other offences.88 Therefore, the 
                                            
82
 These reports are available at the OIOS website. UN OIOS, ‘Office of Internal Oversight Services: 




 Nonetheless, one report did indicate the proportion of the cases reported directly to the OIOS. If cases 
are reported directly to the OIOS, this means that the CDU would not have that data. Theoretically, 
therefore, 61% of OIOS data is also held by the CDU. The OIOS’s final report on the pilot project reported 
that about 39% of the reports held by the OIOS were directly reported to the OIOS. UNGA, 
'Comprehensive Report on the Pilot Project Designated by the General Assembly in Resolution 63/287 ' 
(21 February 2013) UN Doc. A/67/751, para.15, (hereinafter ‘Pilot Project Report’). 
85
 Information on sexual exploitation and abuse is compiled annually by the Secretary-General pursuant 
to UNGA Res 57/306 (22 May 2003) UN Doc. A/RES/57/306. 
86
 The CDU has only collected and compiled data since 2007. Since 2004, the OIOS’s annual reports 
have included some information on major investigations conducted by it. 
87
 OIOS reports, by the way in which they are titled, indicate whether or not an allegation has been 
substantiated. ‘Investigation report’ is used for allegations that have been substantiated; ‘contingent 
report’ refers to substantiated reports regarding military members; and ‘closure report’ denotes 
unsubstantiated allegations. See for example the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on 
peace operations for the period 1 January to 31 December 2013, Report of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services 2014. UN doc. A/68/337 (Part II), 25 February 2014, para.11. 
88
 OIOS’ ‘Category I’ misconduct includes criminal conduct. The CDU does not differentiate between 
categories on the basis of the seriousness of the misconduct. 
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CDU and OIOS data, as well as any other UN reports, only provide a partial picture, and 
can only be used as supplementary sources. 
 
The second source consisted of reports by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
academic writings, and insiders’ writings about general problems or their own 
experiences. These reports can be used as supplementary materials, as they tend to 
report on a specific mission, a specific country, or a specific period of time. Because of 
the methodologies used for information collection for the author’s data,89 the information 
derived from these sources overlaps with that of the author’s data. It is also subject to 
the same problems when attempting to grasp the scale and nature of the problems as 
with the other sources, that is, problems of under-reporting and an unsure evidence 
base for allegations.90 Nevertheless, these reports may be helpful in providing a general 
picture of the problems.   
 
Even taking into account all these different kinds of sources, it is impossible to draw 
conclusions as to the exact scale and seriousness of the issue. However, these sources 
may reveal the general scale of the problems and some patterns. A caveat should be 
attached to this statement: any patterns which may emerge will be based on the 
information available. Different patterns might emerge were there to be full disclosure of 
the relevant information. Nevertheless, the patterns sought are likely to be indicative of 
where the problems lie. Four patterns are sought in particular. The first is the balance 
between different crimes, according to the nature of violations. Given that what matters 
                                            
89
 See section 1; see also Chapter 1, section 3. 
90
 See section 1. 
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is the perception of the local police and the population, some crimes may have more of 
a negative impact on the local population than others, particularly if local people are 
directly harmed by the conduct, or if it is visible to them. The second pattern sought is 
the balance between criminal conduct which is directly linked to the discharge of the UN 
polices’ official functions, and that which is not.91 For instance, if a UN police officer 
uses excessive force to control a crowd and kills a person as a result, the conduct is 
directly related to his official functions.92 On the other hand, if a UN police officer rapes 
a person after work in his private accommodation, there is no operational link. There 
may be some criminal conduct which falls between these two poles, such as conduct 
that may be indirectly related to the discharge of official functions, for example  road 
traffic offences. If the data show a high proportion of criminal conduct directly related to 
their functions, this may either call into question what is asked of UN police officers, or 
their professional or personal qualifications, or both.93 The third pattern sought is the 
rate of reported criminal conduct per mission. If certain missions are subject to a clearly 
disproportionate number of allegations, it may be because of the ease of reporting in 
that mission in comparison to other missions. It could also be linked to the local culture, 
or the population’s perception of police accountability. It could even be related to the 
fact that the media have tended to focus their attention on a particular State involved in 
that mission. The final pattern sought is whether there is a disproportionately high 
number of allegations against officers from some sending States. It would be interesting 
to see, for example, if there is any pattern indicating that UN police officers from 
sending States with bad human rights records are also those against whom the most 
                                            
91
 This has implications for immunity; see Chapter 6, sections 1-4-1 and 1-4-2. 
92
 See Chapter 6, sections 1-4-1 and 1-4-2. 
93
 On UN police’s functions, see Chapter 2, section 1. 
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allegations are made, or if UN police officers from countries with a repressive public 
culture are more complained about than those from freer countries. 
 
Each of the four patterns is sought not only as information in its own right, but also for 
how they relate to each other. Along the way, comparisons may be made between 
allegations against members of military and those against UN police, in order to see if 
there is any particular trend in this regard.  
 
2-1. Evidence of the scale of wrongdoing  
First, the general scale of wrongdoing, and any shift in that scale, will be assessed. This 
necessitates a consideration of how, over time, changes in the functions carried out by 
the UN police may have contributed to the number of crimes they are alleged to have 
committed.94 The available information confirms the earlier finding that allegations did 
not surface in the public domain until the beginning of the 1990s.95 
 
UNTAC was the first mission to catch the media’s attention in relation to allegations of 
wrongdoing. Insiders’ reports supported the media’s reports.96 Complaints were made 
                                            
94
 See Chapter 2, section 1. 
95
 See section 1. 
96
 Some examples include: Holm and Eide, Peacebuilding and Police Reform, p.51; Heininger, 
Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia; UNITAR and IPS, UNTAC debriefing; 
International Alert, Gender Mainstreaming in Peace Support Operations: Moving beyond Rhetoric to 
Practice (July 2002), p.42; Mackay, ‘Sex and the Peacekeeping Soldier: The New UN Resolution’ (Peace 
News, June - August 2001) <http://peacenews.info/node/3602/sex-and-peacekeeping-soldier-new-un-
resolution>; Kenneth Cain, Heidi Postlewait and Andrew Thomson, Emergency Sex and Other Desperate 
Measures: A True Story from Hell on Earth (Miramax 2004); Kien Serey Phal, ‘The Lessons of the 
UNTAC Experience and the Ongoing Responsibilities of the International Community for Peacebuilding 
and Development in Cambodia’ (1995) 7 Global Change, Peace & Security 129; Gabrielle Simm, Sex in 
Peace Operations (Cambridge University Press 2013), p.24. 
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by the local population about the general behaviour of international personnel, in 
particular about sexual misconduct.97  
 
In the mid-1990s, during the Peace Enforcement missions in the Balkans, allegations 
increased dramatically, and were subsequently reported in the public domain.98 The 
International Police Task Force (IPTF) in the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) became known not only for the allegedly widespread nature of UN police 
involvement in human trafficking, but also the subsequent dismissal of two 
whistleblowers.99 Reports continued to emerge in the early 2000s, particularly of 
allegations of widespread involvement of Peace Operations personnel in sexual 
offences.100 Most notable were those which triggered a change in the UN’s responses 
                                            
97
 170 people signed an open letter to Yasushi Akashi, calling for measures to redress sexual harassment, 
an advisory committee on gender issues to be set up, and the dissemination of a code of conduct for 
UNTAC personnel. See ‘An Open Letter to Yasushi Akashi’. 
98
 Human Rights Watch, Hopes Betrayed; McKenna, ‘Sins of the Peacekeepers’ (Sunday Herald, 30 June 
2002) <http://www.sundayherald.com/25914>; Walsh and Byrne, ‘UN Peacekeepers Criticized’; Kathryn 
Bolkovac, The Whistleblower: Sex Trafficking, Military Contractors, and One Woman's Fight for Justice 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2011); Lynch, ‘Misconduct, Corruption by US Police Mar Bosnian Mission’. There 
were also a lot of reports on missions in Somalia, for example, ‘Peacekeeper accused’ (Paksearch, 
January 2002) 
<http://www.pakseach.com/br2002/jan/3/un%20peacekeeper%20accused%20of%20assaulting%20congo
%20girl.htm>; Rakiya Omaar and Alexander De Waal, Somalia - Human Rights Abuses by the United 
Nations Forces (African Rights, July 1993). However, it is irrelevant to the UN police as UNOSOM I did 
not include a UN police contingent; and UNOSOM II had a minor UN police presence. The total figure 
included both military and police. UN DPKO, ‘Somalia - UNOSOM I Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1facts.html> accessed 22 August 2014 UN 
DPKO, ‘Somalia - UNOSOM II Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2facts.html> accessed 22 August 2014. 
99
 Bolkovac, The Whistleblower: Sex Trafficking, Military Contractors, and One Woman's Fight for Justice  
O'Meara, ‘DynCorp Disgrace’ (Insight Magazine, 14 January 2002) 
<http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11119>; Jamie Wilson and Kevin Maguire, ‘American Firm in 
Bosnia Sex Trade Row Poised to Win MoD Contract ’ The Guardian (London, 29 November 2002) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/nov/29/military.politics> accessed 6 October 2014.  
100
 Holt and Hughes, ‘Sex and the UN: When Peacemakers Become Predators’; Wallis, ‘UN Staff in 
Congo Face Child Sex Claims’; Bowcott, ‘Report Reveals Shame of UN Peacekeepers’; Neil 
MacFarquhar, ‘Peacekeepers’ Sex Scandals Linger, On Screen and Off’ New York Times (New york, 7 
September 2011 ); Martin, Must Boys be Boys; Corinna Csáky, No One to Turn to - The Under-Reporting 
of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Aid Workers and Peacekeepers (Save the Children - UK, 
2008); Charlotte Rachael  Proudman, ‘Charitable Rape: Peacekeepers’ Dirty Little Secrets’ The 
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and mechanisms. These reports mostly concerned military personnel, but also UN 
police in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).101  
 
A significant difference regarding reports of alleged crimes is the availability of 
additional information from the UN since 2000.102 The list of reports of investigations by 
the OIOS indicates that 433 investigations were concluded between 2010 and 2013.103 
Out of 245 substantiated investigations, 22 involved UN police personnel. This 
amounted to 9 percent of the substantiated investigations, whereas the UN police 
comprised about 11.7 percent of all mission personnel. In comparison, substantiated 
reports against the military contingent amounted to 52.2 percent of the total number of 




                                                                                                                                            
Independent Blogs (22 May 2012) <http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2012/05/22/charitable-rape-
peacekeepers-dirty-little-secrets/> accessed 24 May 2012. 
101
 UNGA, OIOS Bunia Report; UNGA, 'A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (24 March 2005) UN Doc. A/59/710. 
On the subsequent changes in the UN system, see Chapter 4, Section 2 
102
 See the introductory section in Section 2. 
103
 UN OIOS, ‘Office of Internal Oversight Services: Annual Reports’  
<http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/annual_reports.html>. 
104
 Numbers of personnel are calculated as an average over a  4 year period, when taking the December 
figures given by the DPKO in UN DPKO, ‘Peacekeeping Fact Sheet Archive’  




Table 5. The number of investigations undertaken by the OIOS in the years 2010 - 2013 
 
However, this number represents the tip of the iceberg, as the OIOS did not investigate 
all allegations, not even instances of serious misconduct. Between 1 July 2009 and 30 
June 2012, there were 1,026 case intakes, and 117 serious cases were referred to 
missions for investigation.105 To put that into the context, data provided by the CDU is 
useful. The CDU provides the total number of allegations since 2007, disaggregated 
into categories, including types of personnel and allegations. According to its annual 
data, from 2007 until 2013, the number of allegations of serious misconduct106 against 
UN police personnel ranged from 28 to 44, except for 2013 when this number dropped 
to 15.107 Since 2007, the equivalent figures for military personnel108 have ranged from 
                                            
105
 These were ‘Category I’ cases, which were referred to missions. 216 less serious cases (‘Category II’ 
cases) were also referred to missions. UNGA, Pilot Project Report designated by the General Assembly 
in UNGA Res 63/287 (21 February 2013) UN Doc. A/RES/63/287, Annex I.  
106
 For a consideration of the categorization of the type of allegations, see Chapter 4, section 2. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it suffices to note that all allegations of criminal conduct are categorized as 
Category I cases. 
107
 The annual numbers were 44, 42, 31, 47, 28, 43, and 15 respectively (based on data as of 1 May 
2014). These numbers included serious misconduct (Category I) allegations plus allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse. UN CDU, ‘Statistics’  <https://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/OverviewofStatistics.aspx>. 
108
 Note that CDU data for military personnel includes data covering Military Observers. 
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204 to 313 annually.109 These figures indicate an average of 28 allegations per 10,000 
personnel per year between 2007 and 2013 for UN police personnel, while the 
equivalent rate for the military is 30.5 allegations per 10,000 personnel per year.110 The 
CDU figures do not include allegations made directly to the OIOS without the knowledge 
of CDU.111 The scale of the allegations is thus larger than the CDU figures indicate. 
 
Table 6. Number of allegations made against UN police and military personnel between 
2007 and 2014 according to the CDU112 
 
 
These two figures are interesting for several reasons. First, they provide a more 
accurate picture of the sheer magnitude of misconduct. Because it is possible that 
people are making more complaints as they become more aware of the existence of 
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 The annual numbers were 246, 313, 237, 295, 236, 204 and 216. 
110
 The number of personnel is based on the number as it stands in December each year at UN DPKO, 
‘Fact Sheet archive’  <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml>. 
111
 UN CDU, ‘Statistics’  <https://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/OverviewofStatistics.aspx>. 
112
 The number of allegations are calculated as the addition of alleged Category I misconduct and 
allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.  









Allegations of Serious 
Misconduct against UN 
Police Personnel 





complaint mechanisms,113 the current figures cannot be extrapolated so as to attempt to 
gain an indication of the actual number of crimes committed before 2000. However, 
comparing all the data assists in obtaining a better picture of the problem. For example, 
if one takes UNTAC, the mission with the highest number of allegations in the 1990s, 
the rate of allegations is about 11.5 per 10,000 UN police personnel per year.114 This is 
less than half of the total number of allegations listed by the CDU.  
 
The rate of allegations against the England and Wales police forces, as cited above,115  
was much higher as compared to the rate of allegations against UN police personnel,116 
but the rate of substantiated allegations against the England and Wales police forces 
was similar to the rate of allegations against UN police personnel substantiated by the 
OIOS.117 The rate of cases in which a conviction was obtained in respect of these 
allegations is much lower in the case of the UN police.118 This could be because people 
are more confident about making complaints in England and Wales, or because these 
police forces respond to complaints; the two appear inter-related. It could also be due to 
the extent of disclosure about the rate of criminal and other misconduct by police 
officers. It is impossible to draw firm conclusions from the limited information available. 
                                            
113
 This was suggested in the UNGA, Zeid Report, para.8. 
114
 See section 1 for the allegation rate per 10,000 personnel (17.3). This figure is the result of 17.3 
divided by the duration of UNTAC (1.5 years). In the same way, for military personnel, the rate per 10,000 
persons per year comes to 7.5. 
115
 The rate of allegations was 525.1 per 10,000 officers per year. See the introductory section to this 
chapter. 
116
 See text accompanying n.13 and n.14. 
117
 OIOS substantiated 22 allegations against UN police personnel over 4 years, which gives an average 
of 5.5 substantiated allegations per year. In September 2013, there were 12,705 UN police officers across 
all missions. UN DPKO, ‘Fact Sheet archive’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml>. This means there 
were 4.4 substantiated instances of criminal conduct per 10,000 UN police personnel per year. 
118
 It is impossible to present an accurate rate of prosecution. There are five entries in the author’s data, 
in which suspects have been convicted. However, for one case, criminal proceedings took place in 




Second, both the OIOS and CDU figures indicate that more allegations are made 
against military personnel than UN police personnel.119 However, the author’s data 
consistently showed that there are broadly similar numbers of allegations made against 
these two groupings, with a slightly higher rate of allegations lodged against the UN 
police.120  
 
Third, the OIOS and CDU figures indicate that even though military personnel are 
subject to more allegations than UN police personnel, those against the UN police are 
more likely to be substantiated.121 This can mean many things. It may be that 
allegations are more difficult to substantiate against members of military contingents 
than against members of the UN police. This may indicate that, once the stage of an 
investigation is reached where the identification of a suspect is required, it is more 
difficult for a victim to identify a member of the military contingent, as they all wear the 
same uniforms and stay in the same compound.122 It could also mean that military 
contingent members have a greater tendency to cover up their colleagues’ 
misconduct.123 It could also mean that military contingents tend to initiate their own 
                                            
119
 See above within this section. 
120
 See section 1.  
121
 The UN police make up 11.7 percent of the Peace Operations personnel. 9.0 percent of the 
substantiated allegations were made against them. The military contingent personnel constitute 70.7 
percent of the personnel, and 52.2 percent of the substantiated allegations were lodged against them. 
This rate of substantiated allegations, when translated into the same number of personnel is about 172 
(UN police):165 (military contingent). This was calculated using figures cited above.  
122
 UNGA, OIOS Bunia Report. There may be a similar problem for FPU personnel, as they are national 
units which are deployed together. 
123
 Ibid. Whether or not this applies to FPUs is unknown. However, it is possible that it does, given the 
nature of their deployment. It may be worth noting that, in one case in MONUSCO, when two FPU officers 
were arrested by the local police for alleged sexual abuse of a local woman, the FPU commander made 
an armed intervention and relieved the two arrested officers without negotiating or resorting to diplomatic 
channels. UNGA, OIOS Report 2013, para.60.   
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investigations,124 or that the UN trusts that that is the case. The lower rate of 
substantiated reports of allegations against the military may mean that the OIOS 
prioritizes investigating allegations against UN police members, either because it 
expects sending States to investigate their military members’ misconduct, or for other 
reasons. For whatever reason, it appears that allegations concerning military 
misconduct are not less frequently made, as appears from the author’s data. 
 
The two supplementary datasets confirm that some missions have been subject to a 
much higher rate of allegations. Of the allegations listed by the OIOS in 2006 and 2007, 
about 85 percent were made against MONUC, UNMIL, MINUSTAH, UNMIS and 
UNOCI. These missions made up one third of the total operations running during that 
period.125 Data from the CDU indicated that allegations of serious misconduct (Category 
I) against UN police personnel had been reported at disproportionately high rates in 
MINUSTAH,126 UNMIL,127 UNMIT,128 UNMIS,129 and UNOCI.130 During this time, the six 
missions against whom the most allegations of serious misconduct by military personnel 
were reported were: MONUC, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNMIL, UNOCI and 
UNAMID.131  
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 Under the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding, States sending military contingents accept 
responsibility for conducting investigations into their members’ misconduct. UNGA, 'Revised Draft Model 
Memorandum of Understanding, as annexed to UNGA, Report of the Special Committee on 
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2-2. Nature of alleged criminal offences 
The overall scale of criminal misconduct by UN police officers appears to be serious, 
but the problem may be intensified if the nature of some criminal offences is taken into 
account. This is because some offences are more visible to, and have a greater impact 
on, the local population. The categories of offences whose nature may have such an 
impact are:  offences against the person, road traffic offences, and economic offences. 
Each of these categories is examined in turn. 
 
2-2-1.Offences against the person 
Criminal offences against the person generally have a big impact. They are very visible 
to the local population, in particular if the victim is someone from the local community. A 
significant proportion of alleged crimes fall into this category. CDU data cannot be used, 
as they do not distinguish between alleged offences in such a way as to identify how 
many of these offences are offences against the person.132  
 
Of a sexual nature 
The first observable trend is that there have been numerous reports of misconduct of a 
sexual nature.133 As stated, the majority of cases entered in the author’s data fall into 
this category,134 and quite a few media and NGO reports focus on sexual offences.135 
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The Zeid Report stated that sexual exploitation and abuse appeared widespread in the 
DRC, involving both civilian and uniformed personnel.136 
 
CDU statistics show that allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN police 
personnel between 2007 and 2014 amounted to between 7 and 24 annually, averaging 
12.4 per year.137 Interestingly, the average rate of allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse was highest among civilian personnel, with the UN police having a higher rate 
than military personnel.138 This is significant, because, overall, there have been more 
allegations against military contingent personnel than against UN police personnel,139 
but the position is switched when sexual exploitation and abuse allegations are 
examined. 
 
Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN police officers were 
disproportionately reported in some missions. The majority of allegations against UN 
police personnel were made in respect of the following six missions: MINUSTAH,140 
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UNMIL,141 MONUC,142 UNOCI,143 UNMIT,144 and UNMIS.145 With respect to allegations 
of sexual exploitation and abuse by all categories of personnel in these missions, the 
numbers of allegations were largely similar.146 These missions were also those which 
were subject to the highest number of allegations of criminal misconduct in general by 
all categories of personnel.147  
 
In 2012, a report noted an overall improvement for all personnel, but in particular for 
police personnel.148 It commended the UN police for the decrease in the number of 
allegations against them in respect of sexual exploitation and abuse, which dropped to 
4.1 per 10,000 deployed UN police personnel.149 
 
Offences against the person, excluding those of a sexual nature 
Compared to offences of a sexual nature, other offences against the person have not 
been highlighted by the UN, the media or NGOs. The number of reported incidents 
falling into this sub-category has been relatively small. 
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UN sources disaggregate data in such a way that makes it impossible to distinguish 
which offences fall within the category of offences against the person. In other words, 
UN sources do not add anything to the information provided in the author’s data.150 
Even if the number of intentional killings of persons outside the realm of work is small, it 
can nevertheless have an immense impact on the reputation of the mission.  
 
2-2-2. Road traffic offences 
All UN police personnel are required to have certain driving skills,151 which is a reflection 
of their duties. This category of offences is difficult to analyze, as it is hard to determine 
whether a particular offence amounts to a crime, such as one involving dangerous 
driving. In addition, it is difficult to distinguish whether or not an offence was committed 
during the course of duty. This is more problematic than for other crimes. Road traffic 
offences are likely to involve local persons and, as such, are likely to be visible to the 
local population.  
 
It is claimed that road traffic offences, including drunk and other forms of dangerous 
driving, are common in some missions.152 It appears that the records of particularized 
                                            
150
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offences confirm this.153 However, road traffic offences are not well reported by the UN, 
the media and NGOs. 
 
2-2-3. Theft, fraud and corruption 
There are two possible scenarios regarding economic crimes. First, that the offence is 
visible to the local population, for example, theft from a local person. Second, that the 
theft, fraud or corruption is committed against the UN, or during UN business, and thus 
is not visible to the local populace (for example, if a UN police officer takes advantage of 
his position and illegally takes money from the UN, claims illegitimate entitlements, or 
makes use of the Organization’s money for his own benefit). There is no case of the 
former type in the author’s data.154 However, money lost due to theft, fraud or corruption 
is money not spent on achieving the aim of the mission. Thus, indirectly, this type of 
offence has an immense impact on the mission beneficiaries. 
 
It is claimed that theft and corruption are commonly committed by personnel in Peace 
Operations.155 Like the author’s data, the CDU’s data also indicated that the largest 
number of allegations of both fraud and procurement-related offences were made 
against civilian staff,156 while UN police personnel were allegedly involved in entitlement 
fraud, but not offences related to procurement.157 The large number of allegations 
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against civilian personnel may indicate that they are in positions which provide more 
opportunities to engage in fraud or procurement-related offences than are the UN police.  
 
2-3. Analysis in relation to the sending State 
It would be interesting to see if there are any sending States that have a 
disproportionately high rate of allegations against their police officers. However, such an 
analysis is very difficult because the UN does not reveal the nationality of the suspect in 
respect of allegations of misconduct. Whilst the UN has disclosed the nationality of 
suspects in news releases in the past,158 it has generally not done so in recent years, 
even in substantiated cases.159 In fact, it appears that opinions are divided within the 
UN as to whether or not information regarding the sending State should be made public. 
The Zeid Report recommended making the name of the sending State public if it failed 
to submit a case to its national authorities for prosecution.160 While the OIOS may be 
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eager to reveal this information, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
has been reluctant to do so.161  
 
It is significant that the UN does not disclose the nationalities of those against whom 
allegations are made. This could be legitimate if the UN is attempting to avoid 
discrediting sending States merely on the basis of allegations. However, the UN also 
does not reveal the nationalities of those involved in substantiated allegations. It is 
difficult to comprehend the reason for this, other than that the UN does not want to 
reveal the extent to which the preponderance of violations is committed by police from 
certain States, particularly if these States are reliable sources of police officers for UN 
missions.162 The UN may be desperate to secure sufficient UN police personnel, and 
thus may not wish to displease any sending States by naming them.163 
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Therefore, the only information available is that provided in the author’s data. Three 
States – the United States, Pakistan and Jordan - were identified as those whose UN 
police officers were frequently complained about. This is unsurprising, as these three 
States have been important contributors of both UN police and military contingents.164 
Even if a disproportionately large number of allegations were in fact made against 
officers from these three countries, it is impossible to draw any conclusions as to why 
these officers have received the most allegations, due to the limitations of the available 
information. More generally, it is wondered if UN police from States with poor human 
rights records have a higher rate of engaging in criminal conduct, or whether the 
professional pride that police officers from some States have may tend to assist in 
preventing criminal conduct. It is also possible that UN police officers from countries 
with repressive public cultures may be more likely to seize the opportunity to engage in 
criminal conduct of a sexual nature when abroad.165 If police officers from certain 
sending States are subject to higher rates of allegations of misconduct, and if some of 
these States are among the primary contributors of police officers, it may be possible 
that the major shift in sending States has resulted in an increase in the number of 
allegations made.166 
 
2-4. Possible reasons for the patterns 
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The number of allegations of criminal conduct in early operations by the UN police was 
low. There may be a several reasons for this. First, it could have been lower because 
the number of UN Peace Operations and UN police personnel were also low. Second, it 
may have been because the actual rate of misconduct was low. If so, this may be due to 
the fact that the UN police were mostly limited to carrying out monitoring and advising 
functions.167 Third, it is also possible that the real rate of misconduct was higher, but 
that these rates were not made public by the UN. In addition, the absence of media 
reports of misconduct may have added to the impression that the UN police were not 
committing many crimes. Fourth, it may be because the UN was not equipped to handle 
complaints in a systematic manner, and/or it had limited machinery for doing so. Fifth, it 
may be because general awareness amongst the local population of what to do in the 
case of misconduct was low, or that victims did not lodge complaints for some reason. 
Finally, it may be a combination of all of these possibilities.  
 
Where increased numbers of reports of alleged criminal conduct surface, there may be 
a number of possible causes for this increase. One factor is the size of the mission. For 
example, in relation to the disproportionate reporting on UNTAC when compared to 
ONUSAL,168 UNTAC had about ten times more UN police personnel and 43 times more 
military personnel compared to ONUSAL.169 This, and the different durations of 
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missions, could partially explain the difference in numbers of reported misconduct 
between UNPROFOR and missions in Angola.170  
 
Another factor may be the functions carried out by the UN police. For example, UNTAC 
police and, in fact, the mandate for the UNTAC mission in general, had much broader 
functions than ONUSAL.171 It is also observed that relatively limited monitoring 
missions, such as the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 
were not subject to any public allegations of misconduct by Peace Operations 
personnel.172 On the other hand, the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) 
had many reports of misconduct laid against its personnel,173 despite the fact that it was 
a very limited mission in terms of its size.174 A military presence or general lawlessness 
could also contribute to a high rate of reported misbehaviour. 
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The rate of reporting may also be linked to the size of the military. UNTAC and 
ONUSAL had significantly different military presences.175 This may or may not be linked 
to the general lawlessness in the host States. This may also have been triggered by the 
lack of preparedness and planning of the mission,176 which in turn may have 
exacerbated a sense of lawlessness.        
 
In some missions, it is possible that complaints about the behaviour of the UN police 
were better publicized than those against the military, possibly because complaints 
against military may have been handled within the contingent. It may also be the case 
that different complaint handling mechanisms in the case of the UN police and the 
military led to different levels of public reporting.  
 
One convincing reason for the disproportionate reporting on allegations of criminal 
conduct appears to be the similarly disproportionate attention paid to certain missions or 
areas. Missions in the Balkans, Somalia and Sierra Leone attracted the most reports 
during the mid-1990s. In the Balkans, there were reports of human trafficking.177 In 
Somalia, a few cases of severe ill-treatment of local persons by military members were 
widely reported.178 UNOMSIL operated in an area where widespread sexual exploitation 
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and abuse by humanitarian workers was reported.179 It is probably partly due to the fact 
that data collection and information provided by the UN were not systematic in the 
1990s. The UN typically responded to public scandals on an ad hoc basis.180 In the 
missions mentioned above, it was alleged was that those cases were not isolated; 
rather, they were part of a widespread problem.  
 
A comparatively high number of allegations against UNMIK and UNTAET personnel 
may be related to the very particular executive policing functions181 the UN police 
carried out. It may also be proximity to the local population that resulted in a larger 
number of reports of criminal conduct. It is also possible that there were better 
complaint mechanisms in place for those missions. In other words, because the UN 
police were required to deliver all policing functions, they may have had more 
opportunities to commit crimes. Another possible explanation is that the record-keeping 
of allegations had improved. Alternatively, it could have been due to the fact that the UN 
was exercising governmental functions in these States. This meant that the pressure 
the UN was under to establish appropriate complaints intake and response machineries 
was greater than in other missions. If the establishment of these machineries is 
identified as the main reason for the high number of allegations, this may indicate that 
                                                                                                                                            
(Shire) <http://www.shire.net/big.brother/unatroc.htm> accessed 25 August 2006 Donald Charles Daniel 
and Bradd C Hayes, Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises (US Institute of 
Peace Press 1999) Omaar and Waal, Somalia - Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces 
Walsh and Byrne, ‘UN Peacekeepers Criticized’ Zacarias, The United Nations and International 
Peacekeeping. 
179
 UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, Note for Implementing and Operational Partners on Sexual 
Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone based 
on Initial Findings and Recommendations from Assessment Mission 22 October - 30 November 2001 
(February 2002), pp.6-7; UNGA, OIOS West Africa Report. 
180
 See Chapter 4, section 2 for the evolution of the system within the UN.  
181
 See Chapter 2, section 1-5. 
163 
 
the scale of criminal misconduct in UNMIK and UNTAET reflect the actual scale of 
wrongdoing in other missions.   
 
Since 2000, a few factors have emerged which may have a significant distorting effect 
on the numbers of complaints. One is that the UN’s internal mechanisms for receiving, 
recording and responding to complaints have been rapidly developed,182 which may 
have a big effect on the actual rate of complaints. If victims are more aware of, or more 
confident in, the internal mechanisms, it may be more likely that people would actually 
report misconduct. It could also mean that the characteristics of missions established 
after 2000 are such that Peace Operations personnel are likely to have more 
opportunities to engage in criminal conduct, or that people have gained more 
confidence in making complaints in the new missions. It is also possible that the cultural 
setting in States hosting these new missions is such that people are more likely to 
complain. Perhaps it is a combination of some of the potential reasons identified. 
However, it is impossible to identify reasons with any precision. 
 
Care also needs to be taken in concluding that crimes of a sexual nature are the biggest 
problem for Peace Operations. As a result of public reports beginning to focus on sexual 
offences,183 especially reports about sexual exploitation and abuse,184 the UN started 
paying special attention to preventing sexual misconduct.185 This may have distorted the 
information in many different ways. There may be more complaints about offences of 
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this nature. The UN may respond to sexual offences more vigorously than other crimes 
if it considers sexual offences a priority. It may also be the case that the greater the 
attention paid to sexual offences, the greater the number of reports there would be of 
this category of offence. 
 
The different rates of allegations of sexual crimes against different categories of 
personnel may be related to the extent of the contact they have with the local 
population. It is also a possibility that, where sexual misconduct is concerned, there is 
an increasing tendency amongst uniformed personnel to close ranks.186 It is also 
possible that the new arrangements for investigating military contingent members have 
been working effectively, as there have been fewer reports made to the UN.  All cases 
of sexual exploitation and abuse, no matter which category of personnel the suspect 
belongs to, are to be reported to the UN.187 Thus the CDU should have a complete 
record of these, except for those reported directly to the OIOS.188  
 
In relation to traffic offences, the low rate of reports may be an indication that the UN 
does not consider these to be sufficiently serious, or does not prioritize these. It may be 
because at least some of the cases may be subject to different internal proceedings.189 
It may be that the UN compensates the victim for any injury or damage to his property 
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(or the victim’s family in case of the victim’s death),190 and conducts no other 
proceedings, even where there was fault on the driver’s part. It may also be that 
motoring offences are not well reported by the media and NGOs. 
 
3. Evidence of prosecution 
If it is difficult to find information regarding misconduct, this difficulty is multiplied when 
attempting to find out what happened to the suspect.  
 
During the mid-1990s in the Balkans, the problem was not only the type of crime 
committed, but also the ineffective action taken by the UN in response to these crimes. 
One prime example is the summary dismissal of whistleblowers, who suggested that 
human trafficking was not only widespread, but also that it took place with the 
acquiescence of some parts of the institution.191 There were accounts of dismissals of 
UN police officers on disciplinary grounds, but there was little recognition by the sending 
States that they should develop standard procedures for bringing criminal proceedings 
against UN police personnel who committed criminal offences.192  
 
                                            
190
 Claims for compensation are normally dealt with by the Civil Claims Unit. On available mechanisms, 
see Chapter 4, section 2. 
191
 Bolkovac, The Whistleblower: Sex Trafficking, Military Contractors, and One Woman's Fight for Justice  
192
 A report states that, by the end of 2002, 57 UNMIK Police were repatriated or dismissed. Amnesty 
International, 'Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro): "So Does It Mean That We Have the Rights?" Protecting 
the Human Rights of Women and Girls Trafficked for Forced Prostitution in Kosovo', (2004). Those 
officers who were found to lack required skills were also repatriated. See, for example, for ONUMOZ, Ali 
Mahmoud, ‘UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)’ in Nassrine Azimi (ed), The Role and Functions of 
Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer Law 
International 1996), p.49; for UNAVEM, Muhammad Anwarul Iqbal, ‘An Overview of the CIVPOL 
Operations in Angola (UNAVEM)’ in Nassrin Azimi (ed), The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer Law International 1996), 
p.98; Kjell Johansen, ‘Civilian Police in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)’ in Nassrine Azimi (ed), The 
Role and Functions of Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing and 
Lessons (Kluwer International 1996), p.119. 
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As demonstrated, attempts to bring criminal proceedings against mission personnel in 
the host State were made in those missions where the UN acted as the government.193 
Elsewhere, it appears that prosecutions were much less likely to occur. Prince Zeid 
suggested that the perception of impunity was widespread among the population, and 
that this perception was well-founded.194 Where criminal proceedings were not brought 
in the host State, it could have been because the suspect was not present in that State: 
either he could have fled the host State, or finished his tour of duty, or has been sent 
back to his sending State as a disciplinary sanction, or been withdrawn by his sending 
State from the host State. It could also be because the host State could not gather the 
information necessary for prosecution. It could be because the capacity of the national 
legal system was weak or non-existent. In some cases, there may have been no legal 
system at all, or, if there was a legal system in place, it was not functional. Another 
possibility is that immunity worked as a barrier to bringing criminal proceedings. In some 
cases, immunity may have affected the host State’s access to a witness, if the witness 
was one of the UN personnel. Even if immunity did not apply in a particular case, the 
national prosecutor may nevertheless have assumed that it was not possible to bring 
proceedings against a UN police officer on this basis.  
 
In recent years, in particular since the new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was 
signed between the UN and the sending States of FPUs,195 the UN has increasingly 
aimed for UN police personnel to be held to account by their sending States. Currently, 
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 See section 1. 
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 UNGA, Zeid Report, para.38. 
195
 UN, 'Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the xxx Contributing 
Resources to the xxxx' UN Doc. (on file with author). 
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the UN refers a case to the sending State, and occasionally follows up with it as to what 
may have happened to the suspect. Information dealing with these follow-ups is very 
limited. The CDU publishes the number of follow-up communications that the UN has 
with sending States. The UN appears to have been more likely to follow up on 
allegations of crimes other than those dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse. With 
regard to sexual exploitation and abuse cases, the UN has sent between 47 and 82 
items of correspondence to sending States every year between 2007 and 2014.196 
However, this information does not reveal what type of communication was sent or what 
the nature is of the information included in the correspondence. The UN has received 
widely differing numbers of responses to such inquiries.197 Again, the type of 
communications sent to the UN, and the nature of the responses is not revealed.198 The 
information shows only that 45.8 percent of follow-up correspondence relating to sexual 
exploitation and abuse cases precipitated some kind of response from States, whilst 
41.6 percent of follow-ups in relation to other allegations were responded to by States. 
The fact that more than half of the inquiries were ignored is worrying. It may indicate 
that the UN is not sufficiently persistent in asking for information regarding measures 
taken against repatriated UN police personnel. If the UN requires sending States to 
prosecute their police officers upon repatriation, it needs to put more effort into checking 
whether this occurs. If the UN does not go further than sending a letter about 
substantiated offences, it cannot be said to be sufficiently serious about prosecution.  
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 Between 2007 and 2014, the UN sent 67, 69, 82, 74, 60, 47, 70 and 61 items of correspondence 
respectively. 
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 Between 2007 and 2014, the UN received 23, 8, 14, 29, 26, 27, 64 and 52 responses respectively. 
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 In these instances, between 2007 and 2014, the UN sent 72, 109, 74, 14, 84, 106, 78 and 102 items of 





If it is the case that the UN only seeks to ensure prosecution in relation to crimes 
against the person, it may indicate that the UN does not consider other crimes to be 
equally serious, or that it may have decided not to prosecute other types of crime, given 
its priorities and resources. It may also be that some types of crimes are more 
appropriately responded to using other forms of proceedings. It may be that fraud or 
theft of property or money from the UN is seen by the UN as an internal matter. If the 
UN fires the personnel and recovers the property or money, it may consider this 
sufficient. Where the local population is not aware of an offence, they do not stand to 
lose as much as where there is a lack of criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the 
prosecution of such crimes may work as a deterrent for future offences of a similar kind.  
 
Likewise, criminal proceedings do not appear to be instituted for traffic offences across 
the board. The UN normally convenes an internal administrative inquiry into the facts 
and, for UN police personnel, facts can be sent to the sending States.199 At the same 
time, the Claims Unit – the internal body within each UN mission that deals with third-
party claims of a civil nature – may deal with compensation matters.200 This may be a 
sign that the UN does not consider traffic offences sufficiently serious, even where 
personnel were negligent or at fault. This is problematic. Traffic offences in which local 
persons are either injured or killed are very noticeable to the local population. If these 
offences become public knowledge, but no action is taken against the offenders, this 
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 See Chapter 4, sections 3-4 and 3-5. 
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 See Kirsten Schmalenbach, ‘Third Party Liability of International Organizations - A Study on Claim 
Settlement in the Course of Military Operations and International Administrations’ (2006) 19 Journal of 
International Peacekeeping 33, p.43. 
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may cause serious damage to the mission’s reputation. Furthermore, it may set a bad 
example for the accountability of the police in the host State. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The scale and nature of allegations of criminal offences by UN police personnel have 
been shown to represent a threat to the legitimacy of missions. Where no action is 
taken, the damage is even greater, and there is a danger that irreparable harm may be 
caused not only to the mission, but also to the host State. 
 
After the rapid increase in the number of allegations of misconduct in early 1990s, in 
particular in respect of UNTAC, allegations of misconduct continue to be made. The 
mid-1990s were particularly bad in this regard, mainly in relation to Transitional 
Administrations. It was also shown that allegations have been concentrated in certain 
missions. No determinative correlations between the functions and the scale of 
allegations could be found, but many of the missions subject to large numbers of 
allegations had ambitious mandates, as well as police functions related to carrying out 
or reforming the local police. 
 
Offences against the person constitute a high proportion of criminal conduct. According 
to the author’s data, about 82 percent of allegations fall into this category, with offences 
of a sexual nature being the most commonly reported.201 This may indicate that the 
personal qualities of UN police officers may have the greatest impact on the rate and 
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 73 of 89 entries fell into this category.  
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nature of the crimes committed.202 According to the CDU’s data, about half the 
allegations of serious misconduct relate to sexual exploitation and abuse. In addition, 
traffic offences affecting third persons appear to be frequent. Offences affecting the 
local population directly or indirectly include theft and fraud. These offences are 
problematic, as they impact on the effectiveness of the mission, but the rate of these 
offences by UN police personnel has been low. 
 
The information located indicates that only a handful of cases have reached the stage of 
criminal prosecution in a legal forum. According to the author’s data, criminal 
proceedings in a host State have taken place in only two cases, excluding those dealt 
with by Transitional Administrations. For the rest, information was either not readily 
available, or it may be that nothing happened to the suspect. 
 
It was established that a majority of offences have nothing to do with the functions 
carried out by the UN police.203 This finding necessitates research into what else could 
be done to reduce the likelihood of crimes occurring. In addition to operational 
measures, if individuals are effectively called to account, this might introduce a deterrent 
effect.  
 
The uncertainty as to the existence of a standardized and proactive system for 
registering complaints, the lack of disaggregation of allegations into different categories 
of crimes (whether the acts were part of official functions, or by the suspect’s nationality), 
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 On the personal qualities required, see Chapter 2, section 3-2. 
203
 This has implications for the applicability of immunity for the UN police officers concerned. See 
Chapter 6, sections 1-4-1 and 1-4-2. 
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all made it difficult to evaluate the scale and nature of the problem. Given the 
importance of the issue for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the missions and the 
reputation of the UN, greater transparency might have the beneficial effect of reducing 
the incidence of criminal behaviour. The sending State might be motivated by 
embarrassment to take more effective action, both before deployment and after 
repatriation. The same would be true in relation to follow-ups conducted by the UN. It is 
not clear whether the fear of the impact on recruitment is well-founded, or whether it is a 
pretext on the part of States, or the UN itself. 
 
Thus, the next step is to consider what system the UN has in place for collecting, 
registering and centralizing information regarding allegations of misconduct committed 





CHAPTER 4: CURRENT UN MACHINERY FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION 
REGARDING ALLEGED CRIMES FOR DOMESTIC CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
The previous chapter revealed evidence of crimes committed by UN police officers, and 
an apparent lack of criminal proceedings against the alleged offenders. Obviously, the 
UN does not simply ignore all these allegations. It has internal mechanisms for dealing 
with complaints of misconduct. It is thus essential to consider these mechanisms, even 
though their proceedings, as such, and the penalties they impose are not relevant 
because of their administrative and disciplinary nature. As a result, this Chapter does 
not provide a general description of the existing UN mechanisms. Rather, it will consider 
these mechanisms in light of the roles they play in assisting in the collection of evidence 
on the basis of which States may bring criminal proceedings. What matters is that they 
collect sufficient evidence of the right type so as to enable domestic courts to institute 
proceedings. It is also important for the UN to conduct proper follow up with States in 
order to secure criminal proceedings. 
 
Since the crimes are committed in the host State, problems surrounding access to 
evidence, victims and witnesses do not normally arise for that State. If the host State is 
willing to investigate, and is capable of doing so,1 it can investigate independently of the 
                                            
1
 That is, in instances where the conduct is not carried out in the course of the official functions as, in that 
case, UN immunity does not prevent the host State from investigating. Where the host State is unsure 
about whether the conduct in question is covered by immunity, it may be reluctant to conduct an 
investigation. In addition, if, for example, it takes time to determine whether the conduct is related to the 
suspect’s official functions, it may be problematic if the host State authorities have no access to the 
suspect during that period. This is primarily the case in relation to determining whether the suspect has 
immunity, or whether that immunity is to be waived. For details, see Chapter 6, section 1-5. In addition, 
States hosting recent operations typically have no functioning legal system. In that case, the host State 
may not be able to investigate an allegation. See Chapter 2, section 1. Moreover, if part of the role of UN 
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UN. It is more of a problem for sending States, as they are peculiarly dependent on the 
evidence collected during the UN’s investigation process. For that reason, this Chapter 
will focus on sending States. 
 
1. Benchmarks 
The ultimate goal is to ensure that an individual UN police officer, who has allegedly 
engaged in criminal behaviour while on a UN operation, is subject to criminal 
proceedings and, if convicted, is given an appropriate criminal penalty. This work 
therefore examines whether the existing mechanism within the UN, and the 
arrangements between the UN and the States concerned, constitute an appropriate 
vehicle for facilitating that goal. In other words, if any step in the process - from the 
alleged commission of a crime to its potential prosecution and subsequent proceedings 
- is not designed and does not function in a manner that enables States to prosecute 
the personnel concerned, it will increase the risk of impunity. In order for the system that 
is currently in place to meet the desired goal, there appear to be four main benchmarks 
that should be met.2   
   
Benchmark 1 
First, the mechanism needs to investigate all matters that should be referred for 
domestic proceedings. In order for this to happen, the information needs to reach the 
Organization. For that to happen, persons both external and internal to the Organization 
                                                                                                                                            
police is to assist in the establishment of a functioning legal system, it may be in the UN’s interest not to 
overburden the system with too many cases. See Chapter 6, section 1-4. 
2
 The benchmarks identified below do not derive from the UN’s internal rules or policies, or any legal 
provisions of international law. 
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need to know that certain conduct may amount to a crime, and that there are means for 
making a complaint. Those places where complaints may be made must be practically 
accessible to the public, without posing direct or indirect difficulties for any group of 
individuals, for example, illiterate and/or vulnerable people. The mechanism must be, 
and must be perceived as being, fair and effective, as people would be unlikely to lodge 
a complaint if they were not confident that their complaints would be taken seriously. 
When a complaint is lodged, the information must be centralized and properly 
registered. The information must be sent promptly to the appropriate bodies. Where 
criminal conduct is suspected, the relevant information must be sent promptly to an 
investigative body that deals with misconduct of a criminal nature. Determining whether 
or not an allegation contains criminal elements may require a preliminary investigation. 
 
Benchmark 2 
Second, alleged crimes must be properly investigated. Here, International Human 
Rights Law (IHRL) provides guidance as to what qualifies as an effective investigation. 
Where an allegation of criminal conduct is made, an investigation needs to be 
commenced as soon as possible by professional investigators, so that all the potential 
evidence can be gathered effectively. The investigation should be conducted 
thoroughly, and by sufficiently independent investigators.3 This means that the alleged 
offence cannot be investigated by a UN police officer working under or alongside the 
alleged offender. Given the way UN police personnel are deployed,4 there may be a 
problem if the investigation is conducted by UN police personnel sharing the same 
                                            
3
 For more details on the requirements under IHRL, see Chapter 7, section 3-1. 
4
 For the process of selection and deployment of UN police personnel, see Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
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nationality.5 This would mean that allegations against FPU personnel should not be 
investigated by members of the same FPU. It would be desirable if investigators were 
appointed from outside the UN police, but where the UN police have only a small 
mission presence, this may be unrealistic. In such cases, those UN police officers 
tasked with investigating misconduct by the UN police should do just that. A thorough 
and effective investigation is required, leading to a determination of the facts and the 
identification of the perpetrator.6 This can only be achieved with sufficient resources. 
For this reason, it would be desirable for the mission to have investigators who are 
assigned solely to investigate any alleged misconduct. An investigation must include the 
collection of physical evidence. This necessitates access to technical resources such as 
forensics, finger-print identification tools, autopsies, and crime scene investigation 
facilities.7 In certain types of cases, information technology forensics may also be 
useful.  
 
The second strand of this benchmark concerns the kind of information collected. In 
order for evidence to be used in criminal proceedings, it must be collected in such a way 
that it conforms with the rules of evidence in the jurisdiction where prosecution may take 
place. Where the overall procedure is not considered fair, there may be issues under 
IHRL.8 There could be additional complex issues, as different States have different rules 
                                            
5
 On the other hand, if the evidence is collected by investigators with the same nationality, this may help 
in the provision of appropriate evidence for use in their State’s domestic criminal courts. For problems 
relating to the evidential standard, see sections 3-3-1 and 3-3-2. 
6
 On the requirement under IHRL that an investigation be effective, see Chapter 7, section 3-1. 
7
 Erling Grimstad, Final Report, Review of the OIOS Investigations Division, United Nations, Submitted to 
the Under-Secretary-General of Office of Internal Oversight Services, 2007 , pp.65-66, (hereinafter ‘ID 
Review’). 
8
 Issues relating to the due process rights of the personnel alleged to have committed a crime were raised 
in relation to the host State by the UN in its determination of the applicability of immunity, and the 
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and standards of evidence. It is particularly problematic for proceedings in sending 
States, as their rules vary.9 Evidence collected in a way which does not meet the 
prosecuting State’s domestic legal requirements may not be useable. For example, 
some States only allow evidence gathered by specifically authorized persons to be 
presented in court.10 Only some States allow hearsay to be used as evidence in court.11 
Some do not accept evidence that is collected in an unlawful manner.12 There may also 
be issues in relation to the requirement that the chain of custody of evidence be 
properly recorded, in order for it to be usable in criminal proceedings.13  
 
Benchmark 3 
Benchmark 3 requires that the evidence gathered be made available to relevant States. 
This is because States, in particular sending States, are reliant on the information 
collected by the UN.14 Thus, the procedure for referring or providing information about a 
case to the State concerned needs to be systematized. Many issues, such as those 
concerning the methods of investigation and evidential rules, may not arise in relation to 
                                                                                                                                            
consideration of waiver. See Chapter 6, section 1. Similar issues can also arise in relation to the sending 
State. See Chapter 6, section 3-2. 
9
 In this regard, it was observed that ‘[c]omplying with the criminal investigative requirements of all UN 
staff contributing countries, particularly where criminal investigations are the prerogative of an 
investigating judge, could prove quite difficult for even the most professional of UN investigators’. William 
J Durch et al, Improving Criminal Accountability in United Nations Peace Operations (Stimson Center 
Report, 2009), p.10, (hereinafter ‘Improving Criminal Accountability’). 
10
 UNGA, 'Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on Mission' (15 April 2008) UN Doc. A/63/54, para.17. 
11
 Hearsay evidence consists of statements made by witnesses outside a court setting. More States are 
excluding this evidence from being presented in court. David Alan Sklansky, ‘Hearsay's Last Hurrah’ 
(2009) 1 Supreme Court Review 1, p.2.  
12
 For example, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is applied in the United States. This rejects the 
use of evidence gathered by unlawful means, including by unlawful search. US v Rey 663 F 2d 1086 
DNM (2009); Wong Sun et al v US 371 US 471 (1963), 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441; 1963 US LEXIS 2431.  
13
 For example, under the US Federal Rules of Evidence, the establishment of the chain of custody is a 
requirement in order for evidence to be admissible. Jefferson L Ingram, Criminal Evidence (Elsevier 2011), 
pp.582-584.    
14
 See introductory section above. 
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the host State. 15 While it is legitimate to prioritize some criminal cases over others, 
decisions regarding referral must be subject to oversight at the point of referral to 
ensure that no serious criminal cases are neglected.  
 
Benchmark 4 
The last benchmark concerns issues arising after a case has been referred to the 
national authorities. The UN should conduct an effective follow-up with the relevant 
authorities to ensure that criminal misconduct is prosecuted, because there is a risk of 
impunity if it fails to do so. The risk would be higher if the State concerned were not 
willing to prosecute the accused personnel .16 This means that the UN should check 
systematically with the State concerned regarding its decisions to prosecute or not to 
prosecute, its reasons for non-prosecution, the findings by any national inquiry into the 
alleged criminal conduct, and any sanctions imposed. It is foreseeable that sending 
States may need additional information, or evidence that is collected in a different way. 
The host State is able to do these things for itself, subject to any limits on its capacity to 
investigate an allegation, and issues of immunity.17 The UN needs to create a 
mechanism to respond to requests for additional evidence or information.18   
 
                                            
15
 In relation to the host State, the investigative phases from information collection to investigation can, in 
principle, be independently conducted by the host State authorities parallel to the UN proceedings. See 
the text accompanying n.1. 
16
 UNGA, 'Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission with Respect to 
Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations' (16 August 2006) UN Doc. A/60/980, para.84 (i) 
17
 See section 3-3; Chapter 6, section 1-4. 
18
 The need for a policy on how to deal with national authorities regarding criminal prosecution was 
identified earlier. In the early 2000s, such a policy did not exist. UN, 'Comprehensive Review of All 




Central to these benchmarks is how effective each identified step is in ensuring that the 
individual UN police officers alleged to have committed crimes face criminal 
proceedings and, if convicted, face appropriate criminal penalties. The issue which 
arises is the degree to which virtually the only system19 there is for investigating crimes 
committed by the UN police is capable of collecting evidence for criminal proceedings. 
 
2. Evolution of the approach to, and the mechanisms for, dealing with criminal 
misconduct 
Prior to 1990, the means to process complaints against UN police personnel was not 
systemized.20 An interesting field mechanism established in the 1970s was the Board of 
Inquiry, whose sole task was to collect facts regarding fatal or serious accidents 
involving UN staff members ‘in the mission area’.21 This mechanism was quite different 
from the later Boards of Inquiry, which were tasked to investigate misconduct. There 
was virtually no need for a complaint mechanism as very few allegations surfaced.22 At 
that time, the only mode of recruitment of a UN police officer was through secondment 
by the sending State. This meant that sending States had relatively strong control over 
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 This does not include cases where the host State investigates parallel to the UN’s investigation. See 
the text accompanying n.1. 
20
 The Field Administration Handbook of 1974 dealt with Military Observers, but not UN police officers. As 
an administrative category of personnel dealt with in the Handbook (Staff members, locally hired staff 
members, Representatives of States and Military Observers), Military Observers are the closest to the UN 
police. For Military Observers, the Handbook described disciplinary procedures as coming under the 
authority of the Chief of Staff or Chief Military Observer. There was no set mechanism to conduct 
investigations of misconduct by UN police or Military Observers. UN, 'Field Administration Handbook' 
(January 1974) UN Doc. ST/OGS/L.2/Rev.3, p.F-5 (hereinafter ‘FAH’).  
21
 Ibid, p.D-59. This had nothing to do with criminal misconduct by UN police officers, but was a tool for 
investigating vehicular accidents. The Handbook did not specify that the Board was only established for 
that purpose, but that sub-section followed another sub-section which dealt with vehicular accidents 
(“Classification of Vehicle Accidents”, p.D-58). Both sections came within the section dealing with General 
Services. Ibid, pp.D-58, D-59. 
22
 See Chapter 3, sections 1 and 2-1. 
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individual UN police personnel.23 The limited number of both UN police personnel and 
sending States may also have contributed to the lack of alleged misbehaviour.24 
 
In the 1990s, there began to be a more significant military and police presence,25 and 
the UN began developing internal mechanisms.26 This occurred around the time that 
Peace Operations changed their mandates from monitoring to a more robust type of 
action.27 The development of internal mechanisms may have come in response to 
reports of misconduct.28 It may also have been due to the shift in the kind of allegations 
made, from those of a predominantly internal management type to individual 
misconduct complaints, which became more visible externally.29 The UN needed to 
develop a field-based complaints system. In the mid-1990s, the UN started to use 
different ad hoc mechanisms to deal with the increasing number of complaints. The 
disciplinary measures for UN police personnel, although still ad hoc, were clarified to 
some extent, including confirmation that the Police Commissioner had the authority to 
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 Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
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 See Chapter 2, section 1. 
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 As described in Chapter 2, section 1. 
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 There is a record showing that the “UN Field Administration Manual (FAM)” had relevant information on 
how to deal with complaints of misconduct. The FAM was reportedly transmitted to the Office of the Legal 
Affairs (OLA) for comments by the Director of Field Operations Division on 22 October 1992. However, 
apart from some excerpts in other materials, its content is not available. FAM was referred to in UN, 
'Liability of the Organization for Claims Concerning Loss of or Damage to Personal Property of the 
Members of the Peacekeeping Contingents - Report of the Secretary-General Entitled "Review of the 
Background and Development of Reimbursement to Member States Contributing Troops to 
Peacekeeping Operations" (A/44/605/Add.l) of 12 October 1989 - Financial Arrangements with States 
Contributing Troops for UNIFIL and UNFICYP - Reimbursability of Extra and Extraordinary Costs as They 
are Incurred by the States as a Result of their Soldiers' Participation in UNIFIL and UNFICYP - Loss and 
Damage to Personal Property Fall within the Category of Extra and Extraordinary Costs (15 July 1993)' 
(1993) 1993 UN Jurid YB 346, p.346, (hereinafter ‘Liability for UNIFIL and UNFICYP contingents’).  
27
 As analyzed in Chapter 2, section 1. 
28
 In 2005, the OIOS found that the establishment of disciplinary mechanisms in the UN field missions 
had taken place in response to negative reports. UNGA, 'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services on the Global Review of Discipline in Field Missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations' (8 March 2006) UN Doc. A/60/713, Summary, p.2 (hereinafter ‘OIOS Discipline Report’). See 
Chapter 3, sections 1 and 2-1 for the details of these allegations. 
29
 As analyzed in Chapter 3, sections 1, 2-1 and 2-2. 
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discipline UN police officers. Around this time, it appears that the UN expanded its use 
of the Board of Inquiry (BoI).30 At this stage, though, the rationale for BoI was the 
protection of the UN’s financial interests.31 
 
In the absence of standardized information collection procedures, complaints were 
lodged with different components. It appears that no personnel were assigned solely for 
the purpose of receiving or recording complaints,32 or investigating misconduct 
allegations.33 In general, little information is available on the details of the mechanism at 
that time. The issue of whether UN police personnel can and should be criminally 
prosecuted in the host State or in their sending States did not really surface during this 
period. It was assumed that, if such a situation arose, prosecution would take place in 
the host State.34 
 
                                            
30
 FAM, as cited above, has a chapter on the Board of Inquiry. Chapter 16, FAM, as cited in UN, Liability 
for UNIFIL and UNFICYP contingents, p.346. The expanded model appears to be based on an earlier BoI. 
See the text accompanying n.21. 
31
 The rationale for BoI in the FAM is found to be ‘clearly financial’. UN, BoI Review.  
32
 The UN’s internal directives are also silent on who should receive complaints. UN DPKO, ‘Directives for 
Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers’ (2003) UN Doc. 
DPKO/CPD/DDCPO/2003/001, DPKO/MD/03/00994, paras.9-10, (hereinafter ‘2003 Directives’). It set out 
that any such allegation shall be reported to the Head of Mission directly or through a Personnel Conduct 
Officer. See also Françoise Hampson and Ai Kihara-Hunt, ‘The Accountability of Personnel Associated 
with Peacekeeping Operations’ in Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric De Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Unintended 
Consequences of Peacekeeping (UNU 2007), p.206, (hereinafter ‘PKO Personnel Accountability’).  
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 See section 5-3-3. 
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 The UN’s legal office (Office of Legal Affairs: OLA) concluded that the host State is able to prosecute 
UN police officers for criminal offences. UN, 'Letter to the Acting Chair of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, Regarding Immunities of Civilian Police and Military 
Personnel' (2004) 2004 UN Jurid YB 323 (hereinafter ‘OLA letter’.) OLA also held the opinion that the 
host State could prosecute UN police officers, thus repatriation is not provided for in the status-of-forces 
agreement (SOFA) or status-of-mission agreement (SOMA). UN, 'Legal Status of Certain Categories of 
United Nations Personnel Serving in Peacekeeping Operations - Civilian Police and Military Observers - 
Military Members of Military Components (3 May 2002)' (2002) 2002 UN Jurid YB 466, para.6. 
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Around the year 2000, those ad hoc measures began to be more systematized,35 
except for the complaints intake and registration, and the centralization of information. 
Instead, efforts were focused on clarifying disciplinary proceedings. The BoI was further 
developed as a primary vehicle for addressing misconduct in Peace Operations.36 It was 
re-affirmed as an administrative body composed of three senior staff members. Its role 
was also clarified as being one which reviewed the findings of investigators and made 
recommendations regarding disciplinary action, if any, in individual cases of misconduct. 
Investigations were conducted by appointed investigators prior to Board proceedings, or 
by the Board members themselves,37 which in reality often meant UN police 
personnel.38 It is unknown how often UN police personnel who shared the suspect’s 
nationality were involved in such investigations. 
 
                                            
35
 Parallel to the standardization of procedures, the UN also set up ad hoc codes and sections or offices 
within the mission. For example, UNMIK set up a Trafficking and Investigation Unit in 2001. Bruce Oswald 
and Sarah Jane Finnin, ‘Combating the Trafficking of Persons on Peace Operations’ (2006) 10 
International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations 1, p.22. This ad hoc 
response resulted in new mission appointments. In 2004, the first Personnel Conduct Officer was 
appointed to MONUC. Durch et al, Improving Criminal Accountability, p.7. 
36
 UN DPKO, 'Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers' 
(2003) UN Doc. DPKO/CPD/DDCPO/2003/001; DPKO/MD/03/00994, in particular, paras.15-22 
(hereinafter ‘2003 Directives’). The rationale for BoI in the FAM was ‘clearly financial’. UN, BoI Review, 
para.15. However, over time, ‘BOI reports have come to serve as the historical record of events and the 
rationale extends to assisting in determination of disciplinary measures that can be taken by the 
appropriate authorities, pursuance of criminal cases against individuals […] among others’. Ibid, para.16. 
37
 For Preliminary Investigations, see UN DPKO, 2003 Directives, para.11 and Annex B, para.2. The 
Board itself can seek expert advice. Ibid, Annex A, para.2. In addition, ‘[i]n some instances, the BOI is 
asked to serve as the investigation that establishes the facts’. UN, BoI Review, para.28. 
38
 A UN report stated that many missions took advantage of police expertise in dealing with investigations, 
even though it was not referred to in the FAM. UN, BoI Review, para.27. An independent report stated 
that excessive use of force cases are normally investigated by the internal affairs unit of the UN police. 
Annika S Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 
for the International Institute for Strategic Studies 2002), p.30. Another UN report in 2008 confirmed that 
the Internal Affairs Unit conducts investigations into disciplinary matters. UNGA, 'Report of the Secretary-
General on the Comprehensive Report of Conduct and Discipline Including Full Justification of All Posts' 
(20 March 2008) UN Doc. A/62/758, paras.23–28 (hereinafter ‘2008 Discipline Report’). Another 
independent study mentioned that the OIOS provides feedback on investigations to the relevant mission 
components. For UN police, the relevant component is its internal affairs unit. Durch et al, Improving 
Criminal Accountability, p.13.  
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While the BoI system had advantages,39 its major problem was resources. Investigators 
and Board members were selected and appointed by the Head of the Mission to carry 
out tasks for BoIs in addition to their normal functions. A BoI dealing with a UN police 
misconduct case was convened by the Head of Mission, and was composed of at least 
three senior staff members, including someone from the UN police.40 The appointment 
of senior managers to the Board, in particular when allegations were frequently made, 
stretched their capacity.41 These senior managers did not welcome having to perform 
the additional tasks sitting on BoIs required, and missions often had difficulties finding 
people to sit on the Boards.42 This, along with confusion regarding the rules, may have 
contributed to BoI procedures being lengthy.43 Neither the investigators conducting the 
preliminary investigation nor the Board members were professional investigators, which 
raised issues about the quality of their investigations.44 As a result, the effectiveness of 
BoIs was questioned. In addition, the composition of some BoIs raised questions where 
their members were drawn solely from one mission component.45 Independent, prompt 
and thorough investigations, especially when faced with an increasing number of 
allegations, were not achieved with the BoI mechanism.  
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 See section 3-3-1 for details. 
40
 UN DPKO, 2003 Directives, paras.17, 19-20. 
41
 It was documented that some members of BoIs were unwilling to serve on another Board. UN, BoI 
Review, para.7. 
42
 Ibid, para.7.  
43
 Ibid, para.34. In 2011, with the new standing operating procedure (SOP) on Boards of Inquiry, a two-
week time limit was set for the initiation of a BoI. UN DPKO/DFS, 'Standing Operating Procedure ‘Board 
of Inquiry’ (1 March 2011) UN Doc. Ref.2011.15, (hereinafter ‘2011 BoI SOP’). 
44
 The phrase “enthusiastic amateurs” was used to describe those investigators in: UNGA, 'A 
Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations' (24 March 2005) UN Doc. A/59/710 (hereinafter ‘Zeid Report’).  
45
 The lack of transparency was also raised. UN, BoI Review, para.32. 
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Parallel to the BoI system, the Office of the Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was 
established in 1994. This Office was created as an oversight mechanism to assist the 
Secretary-General in delivering his internal oversight responsibilities, in order to 
increase the accountability of the UN as an organization.46 The OIOS’s initial remit was 
reviewing managerial responsibilities, auditing operations and evaluating the 
implementation of policies. The Investigation Division existed from the time the OIOS 
was created, but its focus was on managerial misconduct, misconduct involving 
personal disputes, and misconduct related to the management of funds, assets and 
procurement.47 At the time the OIOS was established, BoIs constituted the main 
mechanism dealing with misconduct in Peace Operations.48 With the publicity attracted 
by sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) allegedly carried out by members of UN field 
presences in the early 2000s,49 the UN’s practice was severely criticized, most notably 
in the Zeid Report.50 The Zeid Report highlighted the shortcomings of the UN’s 
response at different stages of its investigations. One shortcoming which was 
addressed was the way investigations were conducted in the BoI system, which did not 
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 UN OIOS, ‘About Us’ <http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/about_us.html> accessed 8 October 2014. 
See also: UN, 'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Establishment of the Office of the Oversight Services' 
(7 September 1994) UN Doc. ST/SGB/273, para.10.  
47
 UNGA Res 48/218 B (12 August 1994) UN Doc. A/RES/48/218 B, op. para.5 (c); and UN, 'Reporting of 
Inappropriate Use of United Nations Resources and Proposals for Improvement of Programme Delivery' 
(7 September 1994) UN Doc. ST/AI/397.  
48
 Internal Directives on disciplinary proceedings clearly stated that, within the mission, the BoI was the 
sole mechanism for dealing with serious misconduct, including criminal offences, by UN police officers. 
UN DPKO, 2003 Directives, para.15.
 
 The Zeid Report noted that, where the OIOS was requested to 
investigate alleged misconduct, its investigations were to be considered as preliminary investigations for 
disciplinary purposes. UNGA, Zeid Report, para.35. 
49
 UNGA, 'Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa' (11 October 
2002) UN Doc. A/57/465 (hereinafter ‘OIOS West Africa Report’); UNGA, 'Investigation by the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (5 January 2005) UN Doc. A/59/661 
(hereinafter ‘OIOS Congo Report’); UNGA, 'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on its 
Investigation into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Ituri Region (Bunia) in the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (5 April 2007) UN Doc. A/61/841 
(hereinafter ‘OIOS Bunia Report’). 
50
 UNGA, Zeid Report. 
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provide sufficient bases for criminal prosecutions in States willing to undertake these.51 
The Report further noted that the criticism that the Organization and its managers were 
unaccountable even when they failed to tackle the SEA problem was well-founded,52 as 
UN efforts were ad hoc and inadequate.53 It suggested a number of recommendations, 
including a change in the BoI system so as to entrust investigations to a more 
professional and independent body.54 This worked as a major trigger for change.55 The 
disadvantages of the BoI system became increasingly apparent: BoIs were time-
consuming and resource-heavy,56 and their procedures were assessed as unnecessary, 
and as duplicating other efforts.57  
 
The UN took multiple steps in response to these criticisms. With the GA’s 
endorsement,58 the OIOS’s investigative capacity was re-visited in 2005. Under the new 
arrangement, all serious misconduct, including criminal conduct and all SEA cases, 
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 UNGA, Zeid Report, para.28. 
52
 Ibid, para.37. 
53
 Ibid, para.11. 
54
 Ibid, para.32. 
55
 Elizabeth F Defeis, ‘UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity’ (2008) 
7 Washington University Global Study Law Review 185, p.186. Most of the Zeid Report’s 
recommendations were accepted by the Secretary-General, and were followed up, including the 
standardization and clarification of rules, the use of professional investigation capacity, and the creation 
of oversight mechanisms for alleged misconduct and disciplinary issues.  
56
 Long delays in completing cases were identified as one of the problems related to BoIs. The average 
number of days needed to complete BoI proceedings for misconduct cases was 86.25 days. UN, BoI 
Review, paras.2, 11.  
57
 Ibid, paras.18-19. The Zeid Report also pointed out that the BoI procedures, which involved preliminary 
investigations, duplicated the work down in the BoI investigations. UNGA, Zeid Report, para.29.  
58
 UNGA Res 59/287 (13 April 2005) UN Doc. A/RES/59/287; UNGA Res 59/300 (30 June 2005) UN Doc. 
A/RES/59/300; together with recommendations by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 
as contained in the Official Record (UNGA, 'Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
Operations and its Working Group' (GAOR 59th Session Supp no 19, 31 January-25 February 2005; 4-8 
April 2005) UN Doc. A/59/19/Rev.1). It was decided that cases of serious misconduct and/or criminal 
behaviour should be investigated by independent, professional investigators, and that the OIOS should 
be ‘the internal body entrusted with investigations in the UN’. UNGA Res 59/287, op. para.3. 
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were to be investigated by the OIOS Investigation Division.59 Along with that change, 
the BoI system was streamlined. The use of BoIs was brought closer to their original 
administrative role, in that the Board did not itself conduct investigations.60 As of 2011, 
BoIs are only mandatory in specific circumstances, that is, an incident or accident 
resulting in the death or serious injury of a mission member or a third party when a 
member of a mission personnel is involved; major loss or damage of UN property or 
third-party owned property when a mission member is involved; and major loss or 
damage of military/FPU contingent-owned equipment.61 It is significant that all the 
circumstances in which BoIs are currently mandatory could involve criminal behaviour. 
Other cases were to be investigated by the OIOS, and followed up by the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).62 The authority of the BoI to recommend any action 
related to discipline, legal liability or compensation was removed.63 It still retained fact-
finding power (including making findings on the presence of personal fault), and to 
determine whether the act was committed as part of the official functions.64 Parallel to 
that, a significant step was taken in 2005 with regard to the centralization of allegations, 
and the registration thereof: the creation of the Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT)/Unit 
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 UN, 'Code Cable on the Guidance on Cooperation with OIOS on Investigation' (22 November 2005) UN 
Doc. (on file with author) (hereinafter ‘Nov 2005 Code Cable’), para.2; and ‘[a]uthority and responsibility 
for investigating all allegations of misconduct on the part of all UN personnel for high risk and complex 
cases has, in effect, been given to OIOS by General Assembly resolution 59/287’. Ibid, attached ‘Interim 
procedures to implement General Assembly resolution 59/287 on investigations into misconduct in 
peacekeeping missions’, para.6. 
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 The UN’s internal directive stated in 2008 that BoIs are not ‘an investigative nor judicial process’, and 
they do not ‘consider questions of compensation, legal liability or disciplinary action’. UN DPKO/DFS, 
'Policy Directive on the Boards of Inquiry' (27 May 2008) UN Doc. Ref. 2008.23, para.3 (hereinafter ‘2008 
BoI Directive’). 
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 A new Standard Operating Procedure for BoIs entered into force in March 2011. UN DPKO/DFS, 2011 
BoI SOP, para.6. 
62
 Even where a situation is one which demands a mandatory BoI, that is, where serious misconduct is 
involved, it is generally the OIOS that investigates. If this is the case, no other investigation is conducted. 
E-mail communication with senior UN official, 16 September 2014. 
63
 UN DPKO/DFS, 2011 BoI SOP, para.35. 
64
 Negligence/gross negligence, wilful misconduct or wilful intent of any individual. Ibid, paras.61, 63.E.(b). 
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(CDU).65 The CDU is located at the UN Headquarters, and provides “overall direction for 
conduct and discipline issues” in Peace Operations, including policies, training, 
outreach activities and dealing with allegations. CDTs operate in the field as principal 
advisers to Heads of Mission on conduct and discipline issues for all mission 
personnel.66 Most importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, they constitute the 
central point for receiving complaints, registering all complaints received in a web-based 
database, and referring them to the appropriate bodies for investigation and action.67 
  
The new arrangement had advantages, but also disadvantages.68 It soon became 
apparent that the biggest problem was resources, given the volume of cases it had to 
deal with. The OIOS suffered from a large backlog of pending cases.69 As the OIOS 
was not primarily based in the field, it experienced difficulties in conducting 
investigations promptly, and gaining access to victims, witnesses and crime scenes.70 
                                            
65
 ‘The Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) was formally established in the Department of Field Support in 
2007, following the initial formation of a Conduct and Discipline Team in the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations in 2005.’ UN CDU, ‘Conduct and Discipline Unit’  <https://cdu.unlb.org/> accessed 6 October 




 The tasks include: advising personnel and mission leadership on all matters of conduct and discipline; 
ensuring coherence of administrative and disciplinary procedures; leading a process of reviewing existing 
policies and developing strategies for addressing problems; acting as a central repository of information; 
undertaking awareness-raising activities for mission personnel and the host population; ensuring remedial 
actions are taken; and liaising with complainants and victims. Ibid;
 
Durch et al, Improving Criminal 
Accountability, pp.13-14. See also UNGA, 'Comprehensive Report Prepared Pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 59/296 on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, Including Policy Development, 
Implementation and Full Justification of Proposed Capacity on Personnel Conduct Issues' (24 May 2006) 
UN Doc. A/60/862, (hereinafter ‘2006 SEA Report’).  
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 A detailed analysis of these advantages and disadvantages is included in section 3-3. 
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 For example, see UNGA, 'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services' (19 September 2001) UN 
Doc. A/56/381. It shows the shift in the number of pending cases. In 1994, there was one open case at 
the end of the reporting period, and the number increased every year. At the end of June 2001, there 
were 274 open cases. 
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 UNGA, 'Comprehensive Report on the Pilot Project Designated by the General Assembly in Resolution 
63/287 ' (21 February 2013) UN Doc. A/67/751, paras.17, 43, (hereinafter ‘Pilot Project Report’). See also 
Durch et al, Improving Criminal Accountability, p.11, discussing the fact that the OIOS investigators’ 
presence in missions increased, following an increased demand for OIOS investigations, but that the 
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This was a new problem, which arose with the shift from BoIs to the OIOS. On the 
whole, the new arrangements solved some, but not all the problems.  
 
Eventually, the UN modified these arrangements. The OIOS started to send some of the 
less complicated cases back to the mission for investigation. These cases were given to 
mission personnel, such as police investigators and Security Officers, to investigate. 
Security Officers are civilian mission personnel primarily tasked to ensure the safety and 
security of the mission and its personnel.71 It is more likely that the response will be 
prompt where the OIOS sends cases back to the mission immediately,72 but the earlier 
issue of an independent and professional investigation would emerge again with this 
arrangement. Once more there is a risk that misconduct will be investigated by police in 
the same unit as the suspect.73 
 
One significant shift occurred in the early 2000s. As already noted, prior to that, it was 
assumed that criminal proceedings would be brought in the host State.74 The UN has 
been consistent in stating that UN police personnel could face criminal proceedings in 
the host State if the conduct in question did not occur while they were carrying out their 
                                                                                                                                            
innovation of concentrating the OIOS in regional hubs would not meet the needs of prompt investigations 
into serious crimes. For more details, see section 3-3. 
71
 The OIOS provides training to those involved in investigations in the mission. See the account of 
investigation training for Security Officers in UNGA, 'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services' 
(11 September 2003) UN Doc. A/58/364, para.138. 
72
 For example, OIOS’ reports show the reduction of long-pending cases between 2010 and 2013. At the 
end of each year, there were 71, 58, 67 and 52 such reports respectively. UNGA, 'Report of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services on Peacekeeping Operations' (13 March 2012) UN Doc. A/66/286 (Part II), 
para. 9 (hereinafter ‘2012 OIOS PKO Report’); UNGA, 'Report of the Office of the Internal Oversight 
Services on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Peace Operations for the Period 
1 January to 31 December 2013' (25 February 2014) UN Doc. A/68/337 (Part II), para.14, (hereinafter 
‘2014 OIOS PKO Report’). The main increase in the number of OIOS investigators took place before 
2010. Durch et al, Improving Criminal Accountability, p.11. 
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 See section 3-3-1. 
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 See n.34.  
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official functions.75 For example, in UNMIK and UNTAET,  the SRSGs repeatedly 
clarified that Peace Operations personnel with functional immunity, such as the UN 
police,76 could be subject to criminal proceedings in the host State should they commit 
criminal acts, and that the SRSGs indeed agreed to such proceedings in the host 
State.77 While the UN has maintained this theoretical approach, it has faced 
dramatically different and unexpected conditions in host States in the newer 
Operations,78 namely either the complete lack of a legal system, or the lack of a system 
meeting IHRL.79 In such situations, the UN’s interests are not protected if it has to 
subject its personnel to criminal proceedings that fail to meet required standards.80 
Where no functional legal system existed, it was impossible to expect any proceedings 
to occur. As a result, the UN has started to look into the possibility of criminal 
prosecution in sending States.81 Two studies were undertaken by two different groups of 
legal experts. Of the two, the first considered the host State as the primary forum for 
criminal prosecution, while the second focused on the possibility of criminal prosecution 
in sending States.82 It is understandable that the UN is not ready to submit its personnel 
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 For example, see UN, OLA letter, p.324; UN DPKO, 2003 Directives, para.8. 
76
 The majority of personnel working for UN Peace Operations, including the UN police with the exception 
of the Police Commissioner, enjoy immunity only in relation to their official acts. See Chapter 6, section 1-
4. 
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 See the cases cited in Chapter 3, section 3. On immunity, see Chapter 6, sections 1-4 and 2-2-2. 
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 See Chapter 2, section 1. 
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 UNGA, Zeid Report, paras.67(b), 83. 
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 Ibid, para.83. It was acknowledged that it was simply not ‘feasible’ to subject UN personnel to the host 
State’s criminal justice system where it was dysfunctional. Ibid, para.29. 
81
 Some claimed that the UN police are now subject to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the sending 
State. William J Durch, United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks (The Henry L 
Stimson Center, Discussion Paper, 2010), p.18, (hereinafter ‘UNPOL Evolution’). This is inaccurate. 
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 The first group, appointed in October 2005, looked into ‘the best way to […] ensure that […] United 
Nations staff and experts on mission would never be effectively exempt from the consequences of 
criminal acts committed at their duty station, nor unduly penalized, in accordance with due process’. The 
report was made public in August 2006, after a long review of the language used in it. UNGA, 2006 Legal 
Experts Report, (hereinafter ‘2006 Legal Experts Report’). The second group was appointed in 
September 2006, and reported on ‘ways of standardizing the norms of conduct applicable to all 
categories of peacekeeping personnel’ with particular attention paid to SEA, which is relevant to this 
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to a host State’s judicial system where that system has collapsed or is dysfunctional, or 
suffers from long delays.83 In relation to FPU personnel, their sending States have 
agreed in recent years to take the action necessary for bringing criminal proceedings.84 
In relation to IPOs, this is not the case.  
 
These arrangements, and their evolution, are highly complicated. In order to assess the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms in facilitating criminal proceedings, each vehicle will 
be assessed from the point of the collection of information, to the UN’s facilitation on 
criminal proceedings, to any follow up it conducts. 
 
3. Analysis of the mechanisms’ performance  
Benchmark 1 
3-1. Information collection  
The first step in facilitating any potential criminal proceedings is ensuring that all 
available information is gathered about the alleged criminal conduct. The most common 
way an allegation is made is through a report or complaint by someone either outside or 
inside the mission. It is also possible that the UN receives some general information or 
                                                                                                                                            
research. UNGA, 2008 Ad Hoc Committee Report. The second group also examined (b)‘[…] whether, and 
if so how, the standards in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin […] could bind [military] contingent members 
[…] prior to the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding’ with a troop contributing State, according 
to the mandate. While this is intended for military contingents, the MoU was also concluded between the 
UN and the sending States of FPUs. UN, 'Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United 
Nations and the xxx Contributing Resources to the xxxx' UN Doc. (on file with author), (hereinafter ‘FPU 
MoU’). 
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 Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sudan could be prime examples. It was 
observed in a study that ‘rule of law institutions have ceased to operate’ in the DRC, Liberia and Cote 
d’Ivoire, and ‘are largely dysfunctional’ in Haiti. Scott N  Carlson, Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in 
Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons-Learned Study (UN DPKO, 2006), Section 2. An 
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 UN, FPU MoU, Article 7.19. 
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reported suspicions from different sources. These sources of information are analysed 
separately to assess how effectively information is collected. 
 
3-1-1. Reporting 
This chapter will deal first with reports by persons external to the mission. 
 
(1) External reporting 
Complaints may be brought to the attention of the mission by victims, witnesses or third 
parties who have information about alleged misconduct. Third party reporters can be the 
victim’s family members, representatives of civil society organizations (including those 
representing women or youth), representatives of religious institutions, staff of 
international or national NGOs,85 personnel of inter-governmental organizations such as 
the UN High Commission for Refugees, representatives of the local administration, 
chiefs of clans, or traditional local leaders. 
 
a. Awareness 
In order for anyone to report criminal misconduct, he or she must be aware that a 
particular act contravenes a criminal code, or at least some code,86 that it can be 
reported, and how and where to report it. In addition, it should be assumed that for 
someone to make a report, they need some awareness of what to expect when lodging 
a complaint. Until the end of the 20th century, there was not much information regarding 
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 The OIOS recommendations on the application of wider protection and detection measures included 
the ‘designation of local officials or nongovernmental organizations to receive reports of sexual 
exploitation and abuse’. UNGA, OIOS Bunia Report, para.56. 
86
 It may be that the reporter does not know whether the alleged conduct constitutes a crime, but knows 
that the conduct is wrong in light of some other code, rule or custom. 
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the extent to which the local population and persons external to the Organization were 
aware of either the criminal code or complaint mechanisms.  
 
The early 2000s heralded many changes in the system. During this period, the SEA 
reports focussed attention on the lack of awareness, as well as the insufficient outreach 
done by the UN to raise awareness. For example, in 2005, there were no public 
information programmes designated specifically to inform local women about their 
rights, and how to report a crime in Haiti and Liberia87 – two of the missions where 
serious misconduct was most frequently reported. An NGO report criticized the fact that, 
too often, information on how to report abuse, and on what would happen to the 
perpetrator, was unclear to the local community.88 The reporting mechanism was 
apparently also unclear to some international third parties.89   
 
Awareness of where to report misconduct has become less important for external 
persons since the early 2000s, because internal reform has clarified that misconduct 
can be reported to any mission member.90 In relation to SEA, additional outreach 
activities have been conducted, using alternative methods. Mission websites also often 
have posts on codes of conduct and how to report misconduct, in particular SEA 
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 Sarah Martin, Must Boys be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping 
Missions (Refugees International, October 2005), p.21. 
88
 Ibid, p.iii. 
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 The report quoted a UN government representative: “[i]f we get credible information, we’ll get 
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 See section 3-1-1 (1). However, in that case, they need to be under an obligation to pass the 
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pass on information, see section 3-2. 
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incidents.91 Reporting of SEA by personnel working for other organizations has also 
been made easier through the coordinated approach of UN agencies and a network of 
NGOs.92  
 
There are two issues with this approach. One is that the focus has been almost entirely 
on SEA, and not on other criminal conduct.93 The other is that a large proportion of 
awareness raising methods has been dependent on literacy, as a result of which 
important messages may fail to reach a vulnerable population.94 Some reported 
activities involving local actors, such as holding meetings with local government 
officials, liaising with educational institutions, or carrying out information sessions with 
the local population,95 may have mitigated the barrier of illiteracy to some extent. The 
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 These activities were conducted by missions, using methods such as radio broadcasting, distribution of 
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UN observed that such activities had raised awareness amongst the local population, 
and that this improved awareness had resulted in more complaints being made.96 It is 
not clear how effective this has been, as there are too many variables in determining the 
number of complaints. It is probable that the increased awareness of the local 
population has been responsible for some of the increase in the number of allegations, 
but it could also be argued that the newly developed complaint system failed to deter 
criminal behaviour in the first place. 
 
The problem of poor awareness, however, is deeper than simply informing the 
population that they can make a complaint. Surveys in refugee camps in Kenya showed 
that the majority of the population believed that there were cases of SEA, yet about half 
of those interviewed said that SEA incidents were the victims’ own fault.97 Staff turnover 
further confused the population, as this made it unclear with whom to lodge a 
complaint.98 In another survey, conducted in Kenya, Thailand and Namibia, the 
respondents indicated that they were not able to lodge a complaint because they were 
not invited to participate in designing the complaint mechanism, and there was no 
feedback mechanism available for suggesting improvements to the system. The vast 
majority of the interviewees also indicated that they would not complain.99 Although the 
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interviewees were not part of the host population of Peace Operations, but rather were 
beneficiaries of humanitarian aid, these surveys showed that awareness-raising 
activities must be carefully planned in order to be effective. Compared to humanitarian 
aid agencies, Peace Operations generally operate within a shorter time-span with more 
categories of staff,100 who operate on rotation.101 This further complicates matters for 
the host population of Peace Operations. The issue is also related to empowerment. 
People might be aware of the code of conduct and where to report misconduct, but may 
not believe that they are entitled to make complaints or that the complaint process is 
effective. This may be a larger problem for vulnerable people.102  
 
Current mechanisms appear to fall short of meeting the desired benchmark. The UN 
has made significant efforts to raise awareness since the early 2000s, but the methods 
used have insufficiently targeted vulnerable groups. It is difficult to know the extent to 
which awareness-raising activities have reached the targeted population, apart from an 
indication that the number of complaints rose after 2003-4, when two major SEA reports 
were released.103 Furthermore, it is unknown at this stage whether or not awareness 
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amongst the local population has increased due to having a realistic picture of what to 
expect after lodging a complaint. 
 
b. Practicality 
Even where awareness is not an issue, if it is not easy for a victim or witness to come 
forward, a complaint may not be lodged.  
 
In earlier missions, the means and methods for receiving allegations of misconduct 
were ad hoc.104 The weakness of complaint mechanisms underlined in the Zeid 
Report105 also applied to other forms of misconduct.106  
 
In recent missions, reports can be made in writing (including by dropping a written 
complaint in a locked drop-box, or sending electronic mail), verbally in person, or by 
telephoning a hotline.107 This has widened the means of lodging a complaint, although 
most of these require access to electronic equipment, and still require that the 
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complainant be able to write. A complainant is not required to identify him/herself.108 
Furthermore, a pattern of behaviour, without specifying a particular incident, or a 
genuine suspicion, can also be reported.109 In terms of a contact point, anyone can 
directly lodge a complaint at the OIOS, not necessarily in written form.110 In addition, 
Peace Operations commonly use multiple contact points, including the CDT, focal 
points on SEA and Gender,111 managers and commanders, and human resource 
personnel.112 Reports may also be made to any mission personnel, who then report 
these to relevant focal points.113 Corresponding to this, it is now an obligation for all 
mission personnel to pass on any allegations which are made to them, using the 
relevant channels.114 The internal rule clarifies that the failure to do so will result in 
disciplinary action against the personnel concerned.115  The SEA Task Force has also 
provided guidance on the complaint mechanisms accessible to the host population.116 
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By 2011, all missions had established complaint mechanisms for accusations against 
UN mission personnel.117  
 
Therefore, it appears that complaint mechanisms are now more physically accessible to 
the population than ever before. The new system requires only that the potential 
complainant have access to any mission personnel. By virtue of being a victim or 
witness to a case of criminal behaviour by UN police, they are likely to have access to at 
least some personnel. The OIOS reported that its presence in mission areas appeared 
to have facilitated the better receipt of complaints.118  
 
Nonetheless, some barriers remain due not to inaccessibility, but rather the cultural 
acceptability or appropriateness of the means available for complaining. These barriers 
may be particularly difficult for the rural population, illiterate people and girls or women. 
Child victims of SEA stated that they had particular difficulties using the reporting 
mechanisms.119 Even though the UN acknowledged that having regular contact with 
civil society groups is useful,120 two of the three missions (in Kosovo, Lebanon and 
Haiti) studied for a research project had no regular or extensive contact with women’s 
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groups in those countries.121 In cases of a sexual nature in particular, it may be difficult 
for a victim to come forward without the support of such a local organization. Generally, 
problems continue to be experienced by victims and witnesses in remote places, and 
these are exacerbated where language poses additional barriers.122  
  
c. Insufficient victim and witness protection    
Another factor that may hinder complaints from being lodged is the fear of retaliation, 
often accompanied by a lack of confidence in the protection scheme.123 In societies in 
which Peace Operations typically operate, in particular where they are deployed to build 
or rebuild the judicial infrastructure, the real and perceived danger of retaliation may be 
more acute. 
 
The OIOS found that victims of SEA in Bunia (DRC) and West Africa were often 
frightened.124 A survey in a humanitarian setting indicated the extent to which the fear of 
retaliation and lack of safety deters reporting. A primary reason given for not reporting 
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SEA incidents was fear of revenge by the perpetrator.125 Beneficiaries of humanitarian 
aid worried about their security were they to complain.126 Some child victims were 
concerned about being punished by their parents or other family members for falling 
victim to SEA, or for reporting on behalf of others.127 Fear of retaliation is closely linked 
to the actual or perceived lack of confidentiality.128 The UN attempts to secure 
confidentiality by having private rooms for hearing complaints, and using telephone 
hotlines and secure e-mail addresses to receive complaints.129  
 
However, victim protection goes further than securing confidentiality. The stigma 
attached to being a victim of a crime, particularly those of a sexual nature, is so great in 
some societies130 that victims will not come forward without better protection. The lack 
of such measures cannot be overlooked if the UN is serious about facilitating criminal 
accountability. Retaliation can occur not only in respect of victims and witnesses, but 
also third parties who may be in a position to report misconduct or support victims.131 
The UN is aware of the need to ensure that alleged victims are provided with support, 
including psycho-social assistance through coordination with humanitarian 
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organizations.132 In 2011, however, a survey indicated that the strategy was yet to be 
fully operationalized. Only two of the thirteen missions which responded to the survey 
have referred a victim for medical assistance, counselling or legal services, and only 
one mission referred a victim to a safe shelter. Ten missions did not even have a safe 
house, secure shelter or community centre to which to refer victims.133  
 
Again, efforts made to protect victims and witnesses have almost exclusively focussed 
on SEA. This focus is justified to some extent by the particularly sensitive nature of 
sexual crimes, and the burden these place on the victims.134 Nevertheless, the 
protection of victims, witnesses, and the third parties who assist them, should not be 
forgotten no matter what type of crime is alleged to have occurred. 
  
d. Lack of expectation/perception of ineffectiveness 
The decision not to report a crime may be related to the lack of expectation that 
anything will happen following such a report. In some cases, this may be influenced by 
one or more of the factors discussed above.135 This lack of expectation is rooted in a 
lack of trust that the UN will address the misconduct appropriately. The vast majority of 
the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance in the above-mentioned surveys said they 
would not complain, partly due to the lack of a relationship of trust.136 In 2005, many 
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Haitians were apparently not convinced that the UN took the issue of SEA seriously,137 
and victims refused to give evidence.138 Following a series of SEA cases in Bunia, the 
OIOS investigation also faced a serious problem, in that victims and witnesses were 
unwilling to come forward. In that investigation, only one case out of 217 SEA 
allegations was fully substantiated, largely due to a lack of cooperation by the victims.139 
As these reports indicate, the lack of trust can be a real deterrent to making complaints. 
It is possible that this is more of a problem with SEA allegations than with other crimes. 
It may also be that part of this distrust results from a perception of authorities in general 
or during a time of conflict.140 Part of it, however, is driven by the observation that 
nothing had happened in respect of previously reported cases.141 In such communities, 
the UN has additional work to do to nurture a culture of accountability. Providing 
information to the victims on the progress and outcomes of investigations is one way to 
ensure some trust in the system.142    
 
 (2) Internal reporting 
In order for the UN to ensure full disclosure, another source of information needs to be 
secured, that of a member of a UN Peace Operation, military, police or civilian making a 
report about another member of the mission. Reporting can be done by a victim of or 
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witness to a particular criminal conduct, or by a third party who becomes aware that a 
colleague is involved in criminal misconduct.143  
 
a. Awareness 
The first requirement is that the personnel working for Peace Operations be aware of 
the codes that they and other mission personnel are bound by,144 and that they know 
where and how to report an allegation. In addition, there presumably needs to be 
awareness of what to expect when reporting alleged misconduct. Evidence cited in an 
OIOS report issued in the early 2000s indicates that a significant number of those 
working for a Peace Operation were unaware of how to lodge a complaint.145 A large 
number of survey respondents indicated that they had not received a briefing or had not 
otherwise received information on the UN Standard of Conduct.146 The report found 
varying degrees of a lack of discipline in all missions, partly due to the inadequate 
guidance provided by the UN Headquarters. That is, the UN Headquarters had not 
informed mission personnel of the terms of policies, procedures and guidelines, and had 
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not properly enforced these policies and procedures at Headquarters or in the field.147 
Around the same time, an NGO observed that UNMIL employees were confused as to 
who to report to, and that UNMIL lacked a clear and transparent process for reporting 
SEA incidents. Apparently, no two people interviewed in 2004 could identify the correct 
focal person.148  
 
Since the reforms made following the SEA reports, awareness amongst mission 
personnel has become critically important, as the new system permits external persons 
to report misconduct to any mission personnel.149 This requires all mission personnel to 
be aware not only of where they must go to report a complaint, but also what to do if 
they receive a complaint from non-UN personnel. Since the new system became 
operational, the UN’s awareness-raising efforts have been conducted by CDTs. This 
includes messages regarding the prevention of misconduct and SEA, as well as the 
behaviour expected of UN personnel. It is delivered through e-mail messages, 
broadcast messaging, posters and administrative instructions.150 A number of missions 
use Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for reporting suspicions of misconduct, 
including those regarding acts of a sexual nature.151 Mandatory induction training for 
newly-recruited personnel includes a session on the prevention of SEA, and these 
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training materials have been made available on-line.152 Additional training modules have 
been developed, targeting senior and middle managers.153 The UN’s efforts in 
disseminating information on reporting mechanisms are significant.154 However, 
whether or not the level of awareness has reached the desired level as a result of these 
improvements is difficult to measure. The OIOS reported that there is no clear cause 
and effect relationship between the number of personnel in mission areas and the 
number of complaints, but that it is probable that the visibility of the OIOS presence may 
increase awareness of, and accessibility to, the OIOS for mission personnel.155 On the 
one hand, reports of SEA incidents have decreased in recent years, but on the other, 
they persist albeit at a lower frequency. 
 
In fact, the issue of awareness needs to be further addressed. In Peace Operations, 
especially in uniformed components, the majority of personnel are men. As of 
November 2014, only around nine percent of UN police officers were female,156 and this 
was after the UN prioritized the deployment of women police officers.157 Combined with 
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the actual or perceived lack of functioning legal systems, the acceptance of sexual 
misconduct by previous national authorities in some areas,158 and issues relating to the 
national culture and expectations of a group of uniformed personnel deployed from the 
same sending States, misconduct of a sexual nature is to some extent condoned.159 
Where this is the case, a tradition of silence has evolved alongside this attitude.160 It is 
difficult to make a complaint or to report a colleague for misconduct against this 
backdrop. Even in the US, where making a complaint is much more common in 
everyday life, female military officers at military academies reported only one-third of the 
incidents that they experienced.161 Members of the CDT reported problems regarding 
the culture of masculine privilege.162 An OIOS survey in 2005 found that many 
uniformed personnel were deterred by a “code of silence” in reporting misconduct. 
Some of the respondents noted that the work environment was not always conducive to 
reporting misconduct.163 This attitude was described by a member of a Peace Operation 
as ‘a culture of boys protecting boys’,164 both in military and civilian groups.165 While this 
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attitude may slowly be changing,166 encouraging reporting in this environment requires 
extra effort on the part of the UN.  
 
b. Duty to report 
One measure taken by the UN was to make it a duty for all personnel in Peace 
Operations to report any information regarding misconduct, or any suspicion of 
misconduct.167 Managers have an additional duty to respond to such information.168  
 
All personnel 
In the 1990s, it was not clear if there was a legal obligation for all categories of mission 
personnel to report misconduct. Since 2003, the UN has made it a duty for all 
personnel, including UN police personnel, to report suspected misconduct.169 Reports 
may be made to officials further up the chain of command, or to the OIOS.170 Since the 
establishment of the CDU/T, all misconduct information, if not directly reported to the 
OIOS, must be referred to the CDU/T.171 Currently, the obligation to report is contained 
in multiple internal regulations and documents, but confusion may result from the fact 
that there are many reporting channels, and it may be difficult to know which one to 
                                                                                                                                            
from the problem. Jane Rasmussen, 'MONUC: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, End of Assignment 
Report' (25 February 2005) UN Doc. (on file with author), (hereinafter ‘Rasmussen Report’).  
166
 Martin, Must Boys be Boys, p.iii. 
167
 See section 3-1-1 (2) b “All personnel”. 
168
 See section 3-1-1 (2) b “Managers”. 
169
 ‘Any member of the field mission who becomes aware of such acts shall report them to the Head of 
Mission’, UN DPKO, 2003 Directives, para.9. With regard to UN Secretariat staff members, the duty is 
also stipulated in the UN, IC on Reporting, para.5. 
170
 UN, IC on Reporting, para.5. Allegations can be reported to the OIOS, CDTs or to other authorized 
mission personnel, including the Head of the Mission, Military Provost Marshall, or the Security 
Investigation Unit. UN, 'Code Cable on the Clarification of Conduct and Discipline Issues' (1 February 
2006) UN Doc. (on file with author), para.7, (hereinafter ‘Feb 2006 Code Cable’).  
171
 The Mission CDT works as ‘the focal point for conduct and discipline matters within missions’, and 
‘shall receive’ allegations of misconduct. UN, Feb 2006 Code Cable, para.3. 
208 
 
use.172 In addition, in relation to SEA, all personnel associated with Peace Operations 
have a duty to report concerns about, and suspicions of, a fellow worker through the 
established reporting channels.173 As with all factors behind under-reporting, it is difficult 
to know the exact extent to which this duty is carried out.  
 
Managers 
The requirement that all personnel must report misconduct will be meaningful only if 
managers are aware of what they are supposed to do. The UN has made it clear in 
recent years that, when an allegation of misconduct is reported, the head of department 
or office has the responsibility and the obligation to review the information. If there is 
reason to believe that a staff member has engaged in misconduct, the head must 
undertake a preliminary investigation, including fact-finding.174 In recent years, it has 
also been made clear that the performance of managers is assessed partly through 
taking their responses to reports of suspected misconduct into account. Managers 
appear to understand their duties well in this respect.175  
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However, in reality their enforcement of the rules appears inconsistent. Taking into 
account the reports of managers’ acquiescence in the face of SEA misconduct,176 in 
order for the rules to have some effect, there needs to be action taken against those 
managers who fail to enforce these rules. In this respect, the Department of Field 
Support (DFS) is reportedly developing an accountability framework for conduct and 
discipline, in order to hold both individuals and leaders personally accountable for failing 
to carry out their duties.177 The UN confirmed that where managers encouraged or 
condoned SEA, this would be reflected in their performance appraisals.178 However, 
current SOPs do not make specific mention of this aspect of these appraisals.179 How 
many such instances are missed at this stage is unknown, but, taking into account 
earlier reports of the totally arbitrary manner in which allegations were handled,180 and 
the apparent tendency to return UN police personnel to their sending States,181 it is 
difficult to imagine that this trend has been reversed. Given that there is so little 
evidence in the public domain on this issue, it is impossible to determine whether or not 
that the policy requiring that managers who fail to act on a report be disciplined is being 
implemented.  
 
c. Inadequate protection of whistle-blowers 
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Mission personnel in possession of relevant information may fail to come forward if 
there is, or is perceived to be, inadequate protection of whistle-blowers. In fact, a major 
deterrent to internal personnel reporting suspected misconduct is the fear of 
retaliation.182 The fear of retaliation can exist in a normal work environment, but certain 
aspects of the environment within Peace Operations function may exacerbate these 
fears. Furthermore, arguably, uniformed personnel need better protection than civilian 
personnel, given that uniformed personnel may work in a more closed environment.183 
For security and operational reasons, as well as cultural and linguistic ones, UN police 
personnel are likely to congregate together both during and after work. In the case of 
FPUs, this likelihood is even greater. FPU personnel come from the same State, bring 
their national command structure with them, and work and live together. That particular 
behaviour is condoned in some parts of Peace Operations184 would further isolate any 
potential whistle-blower. In such an environment, especially if a superior is implicated,185 
or if more than one person in the Unit is implicated, the chances of the whistle-blower 
becoming isolated are high. One factor that may provide some encouragement is their 
ability to report misconduct directly to the OIOS. Nonetheless, to overcome the 
reluctance to report misconduct, there must be further protection provided to whistle-
blowers. The mere prohibition of retaliation against whistle-blowers is not likely to have 
the desired effect.  
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The UN has, thus far, not managed to protect whistle-blowers effectively. A survey 
conducted in 2004 confirmed that UN personnel fear retribution for reporting 
misconduct.186 Another OIOS survey also indicated that, across all missions, a lack of 
protection against reprisals for reporting misconduct was the main reason that many 
personnel are unwilling to report misconduct.187 The Zeid Report also highlighted that 
there is a perception amongst mission personnel that whistle-blowers are not protected, 
and that little is done to address this problem.188 In fact, the fear is not only about 
retribution by the alleged wrongdoers, but discrimination by their managers for reporting 
misconduct.189 International civilian staff in Bunia were unwilling to report misconduct by 
colleagues because of the fear of being stigmatized and punished as ‘whistle 
blowers’.190 In December 2006, the European Parliament expressed “serious concern 
over reports of a ‘culture of silence’ in some U.N. missions, stemming from the fear of 
punishment and retaliation”.191  
 
There is some evidence to suggest that these fears are grounded in reality. More 
significantly, the main problem appears to be that whistle-blowers are discriminated 
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against for reporting misconduct by their managers.192 For example, two contractors 
working as UN police in a mission in the Balkans were fired for reporting serious 
misconduct by their colleagues. One of their claims for compensation for summary 
dismissal was upheld by the tribunal.193 Other accounts of retaliation have also been 
reported.194 In another UN office at OIOS, when an investigator repeatedly asked about 
the way her supervisor dealt with an important piece of evidence for an investigation, 
the supervisor threatened to give her a negative performance appraisal.195 Considering 
that this incident took place in the very office that investigates misconduct, it is logical to 
presume that retaliation against whistle-blowers is a very real problem.  
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What the UN did in response was merely to set out a clear policy to protect staff who 
report misconduct in UN Peace Operations.196 It prohibits any “direct or indirect 
detrimental action recommended, threatened or taken”197 as a result either of staff 
reporting misconduct, or co-operating with an investigation/inquiry. The Secretary-
General’s Bulletin on Whistleblower Protection protects UN staff members, but the UN 
has undertaken to apply the same protection to Experts on Mission who are serving in a 
Peace Operation.198 While there are many written policies dealing with the matter, there 
is little evidence to support the argument that the UN is making a serious attempt to 
protect whistle-blowers. The UN may be concerned about how its reputation might be 
adversely affected by reports of misconduct.199 There is no evidence that any UN Peace 
Operations personnel were subject to disciplinary action as a result of his or her actions 
against a whistle-blower. The OIOS is responsible for investigating cases of retaliation 
against whistle-blowers, with a possible reference from the Ethics Office, but OIOS has 
no data on how frequently the whistle-blower scheme is used.200 Separate reports 
indicated in September 2014 that the Ethics Office had managed to protect less than 
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one percent of the 343 staff who came to it for help since its establishment in 2006.201 
The UN’s own tribunal held that the Organization’s protection mechanisms for whistle-
blowers were ‘fundamentally flawed.’202 Given the extent of the fear of retaliation, the 
effectiveness of whistle-blower protection policy reveals a significant shorfall in its 
capacity to ensure reporting.  
 
d. Perception of ineffectiveness 
The mistrust of a disciplinary mechanism can significantly discourage the reporting of 
misconduct, either in its own right, or combined with other concerns. This does indeed 
appear to be behind the under-reporting of misconduct by mission personnel. For 
example, a lack of confidence in the disciplinary process, accompanied by the actual or 
perceived lack of support from managers who are meant to enforce the disciplinary 
process and take corrective action, were commonly indicated as reasons for not 
reporting misconduct.203 Women, in particular, were apparently dissatisfied with the 
UN’s ability to deal with conduct and discipline issues.204 The concerns that no action 
will be taken against a suspect, and the fears that reporters may suffer retribution for 
reporting misconduct, appear to discourage mission personnel from reporting 
misconduct. 
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3-1-2. Initiation of an investigation/inquiry where no complaint is lodged 
Another way a mission may gain information about alleged misconduct is for it to 
proactively search for information. It is encouraging that, in theory, there is nothing that 
prohibits the initiation of an investigation/inquiry by the relevant authorities without 
having received a specific allegation of misconduct. In fact, such authority is explicitly 
conferred on the following actors in UN internal documents: the Heads of Police 
Components in Peace Operations are authorized to conduct investigations205 with or 
without an allegation being made; the OIOS is explicitly authorized to initiate 
investigations without hindrance;206 and CDU/Ts can take the initiative to look into 
matters of conduct and discipline without having received a specific complaint, and can 
recommend areas for investigation by the appropriate authorities.207  
 
However, all of the above entities are facing resource shortages. The investigative 
capacity of missions is frequently reported as being inadequate.208 The OIOS has been 
struggling with a heavy investigative load, and has tried out different ways of dealing 
with the backlog of investigations.209 Given that the number of allegations is well over 
                                            
205
 They are authorized to “conduct investigations, make inquiries and request information, reports and 
consultations” in order to discharge their responsibilities in respect of maintaining good order and 
discipline within the UN police. UN DPKO, Directives for Heads, para.41. 
206
 UN, SGB OIOS Establishment, paras.3-4. See also UN OIOS, ‘OIOS Brochure’ (November 2008) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/id_brochure.pdf>, p.2, which highlights that the OIOS may 
undertake proactive investigations. 
207
 E-mail communication with a senior UN official, 20 February 2013. 
208
 UN, BoI Review, paras.6-8. Rasmussen, Rasmussen Report, pp.3-4. UNGA, Pilot Project Report, 
paras.25-28.   
209
 Among other OIOS reports, see UNGA, Pilot Project Report, para.18. 
216 
 
800 per year,210 and given that the CDT has extensive involvement in a wide range of 
tasks,211 it is difficult to imagine that CDT members have much time to proactively seek 
information regarding misconduct. It is probably appropriate to view the power of these 
entities to initiate investigations proprio motu as one that is rarely used in reality.  
 
3-2. Centralization of information 
An effective system is necessary to centralize the information following a report of 
misconduct. This is even more essential where various focal points of complaints exist. 
An effective system would provide clear guidance for all those involved in implementing 
it, as well as what type of information should be sent where, and within what time-frame.  
 
Prior to the establishment of the CDU, the information flow was not systematized. There 
was no repository of information,212 nor were there any set tools or procedures.213 
Gender Advisers and Child Protection Advisers were involved in providing advice within 
their respective area of expertise.214 Administrative personnel, such as the Director of 
Administration, the Chief Administrative Officer and the Head of Police Component, 
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typically supported this work by collating and forwarding documentation on serious 
misconduct cases involving UN police officers to the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations.215  Some cases were dealt with within the UN police structure,216 and some 
were taken up by different focal points or units,217 including by the SEA focal points.218 
Because there were many avenues for making complaints, but no system to centralize 
them, there were various points at which complaints could potentially be dropped.219 
There was also a possibility of duplication, if complaints were made simultaneously at 
different contact points. Where data existed, some of it was either incomplete, or 
significantly flawed.220  
 
Since the establishment of the CDU and its teams (CDT), it has functioned as the 
central repository for this information. The CDT has a presence in a dozen missions.221 
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Acting as a repository, it keeps misconduct records on a central database.222 This works 
well with one exception. The CDU does not have access to complaints that were made 
directly to the OIOS.223 Separately, the OIOS records and assesses all allegations 
reported to it, including those referred to it from the CDU.224 It is positive that, for the 
first time, the UN has gained some idea of the scale and nature of misconduct through 
the data provided by the CDU. However, because the extent of duplication of recording 
between the two agencies is unknown, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of 
cases of misconduct.225 In order to reduce this duplication, it would be better if the 
‘central repository’ role was shifted to the OIOS. The OIOS is better able to maintain its 
independence, and to provide a better overall picture of misconduct. 
 
The CDU does not itself perform any investigative functions. Rather, it collects 
misconduct allegations, allocates them to Categories I or II according to their 
seriousness, makes recommendations for onward investigation by the OIOS, and hands 
over all allegations and information on potential serious misconduct to the OIOS.226 At 
this stage, allegations of a less serious nature are forwarded to the relevant mission 
components, such the police’s Internal Affairs Unit.227 The CDU thus plays a vital role in 
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receiving, assessing and referring allegations of all kinds of misconduct for appropriate 
action.228  
 
The involvement of the CDUs provides some safeguards for ensuring that complaints 
are responded to, as compared to earlier procedures. As the information on misconduct 
by UN police personnel is now assessed by CDUs as to where it should be referred, this 
is an improvement when compared to the earlier practice whereby the UN police itself 
assessed whether alleged conduct was serious.229 CDTs report directly to the Head of 
the Mission,230 which increases the likelihood that misconduct allegations against UN 




Effective investigation is critical if the results of these investigations are to be used to 
institute criminal proceedings. Early investigative practice does not permit a proper 
assessment to be made of the effectiveness of these investigations. Investigations by 
the UN police were not always carried out.231 Where allegations were responded to, 
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some investigations were halted before they were completed.232 Records indicate that 
some instances of misconduct were responded to without any formal procedures having 
taken place,233 some with a large degree of arbitrariness.234 Some were dealt with within 
the UN police, whilst some were dealt with through different focal points or units.235 
Given this situation, it would have been impossible for each unit involved to see patterns 
emerging, or to gain a picture of the broad context within which alleged misconduct was 
committed. After the clarification of the role of the BoI,236 it was the BoI which conducted 
or facilitated investigations in relation to serious misconduct.237  
 
3-3-1. The BoI system 
The BoI system had some flaws. One problem was finding qualified investigators to staff 
it. Preliminary investigations were conducted by persons appointed by the Head of 
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Mission, which could include any civilian personnel.238 This meant that preliminary 
investigations were often conducted by ‘enthusiastic amateurs’, even sensitive cases.239 
When presented with the findings of a preliminary investigation, a BoI would examine 
the case, and might conduct an additional investigation.240 For matters involving the UN 
police, investigations were often referred to the police’s internal unit for investigation.241 
There was no requirement that the investigators be appointed from outside the pool of 
normal UN police personnel. This raised questions regarding the independence and 
impartiality of investigators.242 Another problem was the thoroughness of investigations, 
as investigators were tasked with conducting investigations for the Board on top of their 
normal jobs.243 On the other hand, where UN police investigators were assigned, 
provided they had investigatory skills and experience,244 the quality of their 
investigations was likely to have been better. Some investigations were conducted by 
Security Officers, Human Rights monitors or Child Protection advisors.245 Overall, this 
mixed practice meant that the quality of investigations varied tremendously, and was 
often unsatisfactory, meaning that the Board was unable to use it.246 For example, 
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MONUC struggled to conduct investigations for the BoI to use in relation to numerous 
SEA allegations.247 The lack of qualified investigators also caused delays in BoI 
proceedings,248 so that the ‘prompt’ test failed to be met in providing an effective 
response.249 This lack of promptness posed a serious problem in relation to misconduct 
committed by UN police, as UN police personnel rotate. They often only perform one 
year of service, sometimes the period is even shorter.250 Once the suspect leaves the 
mission, it is virtually impossible for the UN to gain access to him or her without the 
close cooperation of the sending State.251 
 
There was also insufficient means to conduct a thorough investigation. Investigative 
tools, such as forensics, autopsies, DNA sample checks and other crime scene 
investigation facilities, were not available to investigators under the BoI system.252 For 
example, the lack of a mechanism for securing evidence at the same time as providing 
medical care for victims was problematic.253 
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Another problem was the standard used for evidence collection. BoIs use a different 
evidential standard from that of criminal investigations.254 Under the most recent rule, 
‘reasonable inference’ is the standard used for establishing facts, although assumptions 
are prohibited.255 Moreover, this standard was only clarified in 2011 amidst the 
comprehensive review and reform. Prior to that, the standard was unclear.256 Where 
information was gathered for the use of BoIs, the standard of this information would 
have meant that a large portion of it did not meet the evidential standards for criminal 
prosecution.257  
 
There is an additional difficulty relating to the standard of evidence. Rules of evidence 
differ to a great extent from one State to another, and thus it is inherently difficult to 
provide the right type of evidence collected in the right way, in particular to sending 
States’ authorities.258 These evidential requirements cannot be met even if the UN 
investigative bodies make the utmost effort to do so. 259  
 
3-3-2. The OIOS system 
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The OIOS system must be analysed in two stages. The first stage concerns situations in 
which the OIOS conducts the investigations, and the second stage concerns the OIOS’ 
referral of certain cases back to the mission concerned. 
 
(1) Investigation by OIOS investigators 
The starting point is that after the review of the system, the OIOS Investigation Division 
has become the main investigative authority for serious misconduct, including criminal 
conduct.260 All serious misconduct must be referred to the OIOS.261 After their initial 
assessment of the information, allegations that are prioritized for investigation will then 
undergo a preliminary fact-finding inquiry to decide whether the available evidence 
warrants further investigation.262 
 
Some problems have been solved through the introduction of the OIOS investigations. 
Falling outside the mission structure, the OIOS reports directly to the Secretary-
General.263 This means it is free to investigate any cases it sees fit, even those involving 
institutional problems within a mission, or those implicating senior mission personnel. 
Although the OIOS is not completely independent in terms of its budget and human 
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resources,264 it has not been deterred from publishing reports which are highly critical of 
the UN’s internal organs.265  
 
It appears fair to state that the OIOS is capable of conducting a better quality of 
investigation than other entities. This is firstly due to the quality of its investigators. 
Unlike managers and Security Officers, OIOS investigators are specifically required to 
have investigative skills, including evidence collection skills, as well as knowledge of 
criminal investigations.266 A second reason relates to the OIOS’s division of labour. The 
OIOS employs professional investigators, who are assigned solely to investigating 
misconduct.267 There is thus a better chance of thorough investigations. Third, the OIOS 
has established a formal quality control mechanism for draft investigation reports. Each 
report is assigned to a reviewer who reviews it to ensure that facts described are logical 
and make sense, that the allegations concern acts which indeed come within the 
category of either crimes or misconduct, and are well-written.268 If reports are reviewed 
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in terms of their quality, it may be more likely that they will be used as a basis for 
prosecution. Fourth, the OIOS is better equipped with investigative tools. It has access 
to technical investigative tools in the field, such as facilities to take and check finger 
prints, information technology forensics, and equipment to take and test DNA 
samples.269 Assistance is also available from the Digital Forensics Unit based in the UN 
Headquarters, Nairobi and Vienna. This Unit provides services for forensic recovery, the 
analysis of digital information, and related training.270 
 
However, some problems remain. Above all, OIOS investigations are also an 
administrative process ‘irrespective of the type of conduct being investigated’.271 OIOS 
Investigation Reports only establish the facts, and are conducted in order to support a 
decision on whether or not to initiate disciplinary proceedings.272 This means that, 
notwithstanding these improvements, the methodology and standards of investigation 
required  for criminal prosecution are not met.273 One cannot expect the evidence 
collection to be conducted so as to meet the higher standards imposed for the purposes 
of criminal prosecution simply by requiring that investigations must be conducted in a 
manner that can ‘withstand the rigour of criminal prosecution’.274 The OIOS, for 
example, cannot and does not secure crime scenes for the purposes of criminal 
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investigation.275 The OIOS is authorized to conduct criminal investigation in cooperation 
with national authorities and,276 if it does so, may address some of the shortcomings for 
collecting evidence. However, where the OIOS collects evidence, the standard of proof 
it uses for evidence is that of reasonable inference, which is lower than that required for 
criminal prosecution.277 OIOS investigators themselves are not required to be criminal 
investigators, and apparently the quality of their investigations reflects this.278 The OIOS 
investigation processes, including procedures for the collection of evidence and the 
unreliable electronic case management system, have also been subject to criticism.279  
 
The problems experienced in meeting the varying evidential requirements set by 
national laws are the same as those for BoIs.280 For example, where the domestic laws 
of some States place restrictions on who can gather evidence, evidence collected by 
the OIOS cannot be used as it stands.281 
 
New problems have also arisen. The biggest problem relates to access to victims, 
witnesses and physical evidence. The OIOS has investigation offices sited in only five 
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operations. Other missions are covered by headquarters or regional centres.282 In some 
cases between 2008 and 2009, one investigator was shared by four missions, while the 
maximum was four investigators in one mission.283 The frequent turnover of 
investigators, and the failure to deploy investigators in a timely manner, accelerates the 
resource problems.284 On top of that, investigations into misconduct in those operations 
without an OIOS presence pose a serious difficulty.285 If immediate access to victims, 
complainants and witnesses cannot be secured, it will make it very difficult to secure 
evidence. Even where OIOS investigators are stationed in the mission, they are 
normally based in the mission headquarters in capital cities, which may also hinder 
prompt access to the scene of incidents. In such circumstances, the OIOS must rely on 
other investigators on the ground.   
 
Two separate trends can be seen when considering the issue of the promptness of 
investigations. One is that, in the new system, there is a clear time limit for taking the 
initial steps, such as the seven day limit within which the OIOS must decide whether to 
investigate the matter itself, or refer the case to the mission.286 The second is that, in 
addition to complaints made directly to the OIOS, it was also given a new load of 
alleged serious misconduct cases. Thus, it suffered a severe backlog of 
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investigations.287 Furthermore, the OIOS’s procedures for initiating investigations, and 
its decisions regarding which investigations to prioritize, were criticized as complicated 
and time-consuming.288 For these reasons, the OIOS exercised its right,289 which 
appeared to have initially been set out as an exception,290 to refer cases back to the 
mission.  
 
(2) Investigations by mission personnel 
When the OIOS refers cases back to missions, investigations are conducted by mission 
personnel. Who investigates a case varies.291 Some confusion remains as to who can 
investigate, who is no longer authorized to investigate, and who investigates in practice. 
Internal guidelines for the investigation of misconduct appear to contradict each other. 
The 2003 Directives stated that preliminary investigations shall be conducted by 
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persons appointed by the Head of Mission, including civilian personnel.292 However, the 
UN’s internal Codes Cable293 instructed that the components that were previously 
responsible for conduct and discipline issues (including the heads of administration and 
human resource sections within the police components) could no longer play any role in 
receiving, handling or tracking misconduct issues.294 According to one Code Cable, they 
are required to cooperate with CDT as appropriate.295 A separate Directive states 
clearly that the Head of Police is authorized to carry out investigations and inquiries, 
and to request information, reports and consultations with regard to all disciplinary 
matters.296 In order to deliver that obligation, the Police Component is required to 
establish an “internal investigation unit” to assist in preliminary investigations as 
anticipated in the Directives dealing with disciplinary matters.297 Investigations can be 
initiated by the Head of the Police, but the Head of the Mission needs to be involved to 
some extent – either to appoint the persons to such an investigation team, or to 
coordinate with the OIOS and CDU/T.298 Mission investigators have two roles: the first 
consists of making preliminary findings on the facts; the second consists of conducting a 
full investigation with regard to cases of criminal misconduct that have been referred 
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back to the mission by the OIOS.299 All completed investigation reports dealing with 
misconduct belonging to both categories, substantiated or not, are transmitted to the 
OIOS.300 The current practice seems to be a practical compromise based on the various 
requirements for effective investigation. In fact, in 2007 and 2008, the OIOS 
investigated less than 30 percent of allegations itself, referring most investigations back 
to the missions.301 The very fact that there is some confusion regarding the investigative 
responsibility for criminal matters is a cause for concern. Additionally, where allegations 
of serious misconduct are sent back to the missions for investigation, earlier problems 
with investigations within those missions would persist.302 
 
In fact, Security Officers in the field are still asked to conduct full formal investigations 
into serious misconduct cases in parallel to OIOS investigations.303 This confusion, and 
the conducting of investigations by non-professional investigators, remains an obstacle 
to achieving the goal of all investigations of alleged crimes being conducted by 
competent investigators. An independent report concluded that investigations 
conducted by non-professional investigators and/or entities, which are part of the 
management structure, can result in conflicts of interests, improper handling of 
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information, inconsistent application of standards, and problems with due process, as 
well as cases being dropped or taking undue time to complete.304  
 
It is difficult to justify the OIOS’s practice of continuing to refer the majority of cases to 
entities within the missions, in particular because it was the very concern about 
investigations conducted by non-professionals that triggered the shift from 
investigations within the mission to those by the OIOS.305 Indeed, senior mission 
personnel have voiced concerns that the OIOS is referring too many cases back to the 
missions for investigation, for which the missions have inadequate resources.306 The 
OIOS nonetheless intends to continue this practice. In 2009, it introduced investigation 
training programmes to raise the awareness and improve the technical know-how of UN 
personnel involved in investigations, and to transfer the skills of Investigation Division 
personnel to non-professional UN personnel.307 It also published an Investigation 
Manual for managers and mission components with investigative roles.308 Practically 
speaking, while amateur investigators with some training are better than those without 
training, the standards of investigation cannot be improved through a “quick fix” 
involving brief training or being given a manual to read. The Manual has also been 
criticized as lacking sufficient instructions on conducting an investigation.309 Considering 
that criminal investigation requires highly specialized skills, it is submitted that 
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investigations conducted by non-professional investigators may pose a serious 
problem.310 
 
The OIOS maintains that the cases referred back to the missions remain OIOS cases, 
and that the OIOS stands by as an available resource.311 However, considering that the 
reasons behind referring cases back were largely linked to a lack of resources, this may 
not be practically achievable in reality. 
 
3-3-3. Question of access to the suspect 
The UN’s ability and willingness to facilitate proper criminal accountability is tested 
during investigations if the suspect leaves the host State before an investigation is 
completed.312 This could happen if the suspect either flees or completes his or her tour 
of duty, or where the sending State withdraws its personnel before the UN investigation 
is completed. The absence of a suspect may prevent the investigations from being 
thorough. If the host State had initiated criminal proceedings, this would make 
prosecution virtually impossible.313 If the suspect becomes unavailable before the UN’s 
investigation is complete, or at least during the period in which the suspect is required to 
answer to the investigatory authorities, this will result in the UN having no grounds to 
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press for that suspect’s prosecution by the sending State.314 This may result in impunity 
if the sending State is therefore not willing to prosecute its returned personnel.315 The 
UN requires that the UN police officer under investigation remain in the host State until 
the investigation against him is complete,316 but it is not very successful in ensuring this 
happens. Some UN police suspects have fled the country during investigation,317 or 
have been given the option of ‘voluntary’ resignation even after evidence emerged to 
support the claim of serious wrongdoing, instead of being subject to disciplinary 
sanctions.318 Sometimes sending States appear to be involved in the repatriation of 
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personnel before an investigation is complete.319 It was suggested  that this practice 
may be de facto encouraged by the time and energy-consuming process that the UN 
and the related personnel must go through, which may make them consider that it 
would be much easier to send the suspect back without proper proceedings.320 
 
Benchmark 3 
3-4. Decision making process on referral of cases 
After an internal investigation has been completed, the UN must decide whether or not 
to refer a case to a State for possible criminal prosecution. In most cases, a referral 
would entail the UN sending information to the State concerned so that the latter can 
seek prosecution based on that information. However, in some cases, in particular 
where the UN is the victim of the crime (such as where that crime concerns fraud or 
theft), the UN may refer that case to the State concerned’s national court for 
prosecution.321  In the case of the host State, criminal proceedings may start before the 
completion of the internal investigation.322 In the case of the sending States, the UN 
decides what to do with the result upon the completion of the investigation.323  
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Amnesty International, ‘News’ <http://news.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur700052002?open&of=eng-
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For the purposes of this work, how the UN decides on disciplinary or administrative 
sanctions is irrelevant. The pertinent decision is how the UN decides whether to refer a 
case to a State for potential criminal prosecution, and what it does to ensure that 
proceedings are brought in that State. That said, normally only those cases in which an 
allegation has been substantiated will be referred to the national authorities for possible 
criminal proceedings.324  
 
(1) The BoI system 
In the case of the BoI system, where the host State sought criminal prosecution, the 
SRSG was vested with the authority to agree whether such proceedings could take 
place.325 The decision as to whether proceedings could continue had two phases: the 
first was whether the act concerned was covered by immunity; the second was where 
an act was covered by immunity, whether it  should be waived.326 The SRSG’s decision, 
together with the BoI file, was then sent to Headquarters along the departmental 
reporting line. The decision to refer a case to the sending State presumably rested with 
the SG,327 although this was not normal UN practice.328 Legal advisors were involved at 
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different stages, from the review of BoI proceedings,329 to the decision to refer a case to 
national authorities.330 
 
After the Board had completed the process and had made recommendations, there 
appeared to be a lack of management support and follow-up within the UN.331 
Confusion persisted as to who was responsible for the review and monitoring of the 
implementation of BoI recommendations at UN Headquarters, with many 
recommendations being forgotten about.332 There was no clear policy on how the BoI 
process was to interface with either the host or sending State’s national authorities 
regarding the criminal investigation.333  
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The situation has been improved to a large extent by the reforms, and by streamlining 
the BoI system. Some requirements are more clearly set out in the new BoI rules.334 In 
the new and limited BoI system, while BoI findings do not provide advice on the action 
needed, procedures to be followed after the BoI has completed its work have largely 
remained unchanged.335 One role played by the BoI remains significant. It determines 
whether or not the misconduct took place in the course of the performance of official 
duties, or whether a death or injury was connected to the performance of official duties 
in any way.336 This determination has a significant influence on the ability of a State to 
prosecute UN police personnel using information collected by BoI.337 One advantage of 
the new system is that the CDU tracks all misconduct, except for cases that are only 
known to the OIOS. For those cases, there is additional oversight to ensure that they 
are not forgotten. 
 
A potential problem regarding the system of referral of BoI cases to national authorities 
is that the UN maintained that BoI reports were confidential documents. Even where 
reports were shared with a sending State, it was stipulated that the report could not be 
used as a basis for criminal proceedings.338 This is not a problem for the purposes of 
bringing criminal proceedings if evidence is shared and is available to the State 
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concerned to use. Where the “raw” information was also to be used, the evidence 
provided by the UN could only act as a trigger for the State concerned to conduct its 
own investigation. This means that that State would have to collect the same evidence 
all over again. 
 
(2) The OIOS system 
OIOS investigation reports contain recommendations for the relevant managers.339 All 
investigation reports are transmitted to the DPKO and the respective managers or 
commanders for follow-up action.340 Cases are tracked by the CDU except for those 
exclusively reported to the OIOS.341 The Permanent Mission of the sending State of the 
UN police officer concerned is informed of the outcome of the investigation through the 
CDU at Headquarters, after consultation with the Police Division and the Office of Legal 
Affairs, as appropriate.342  
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UNGA, 2008 
Discipline Report, para.29. In cases of less serious misconduct, police supervisors in the mission assess 
the findings in consultation with mission CDUs. Each case is formally transmitted to the Assistant 
Secretary-General of the Office of Human Resources by the USG of DPKO, following which the 
headquarters of CDT interfaces with Field Personnel Division in the Department of Field Services (DFS). 




The OLA will be consulted in cases in which UN police officers have been identified as 
having been involved in a criminal activity,343 primarily to give advice on providing 
information on the case to the appropriate national system for prosecution. As with the 
BoI system, the decision to refer a case to a national jurisdiction is made by the USG of 
DPKO,344 but the final decision in all referrals is taken by the Secretary-General.345 
Where the host State initiates criminal proceedings by requesting that a suspect’s 
immunity either be clarified or waived, the SRSG will make the decision in the SG’s 
name.346 
 
It is ultimately the SG who takes a decision on: i) whether or not a particular action 
constitutes misconduct; and ii) the action to be taken against the personnel 
                                                                                                                                            
be involved, but since 2005, there has been a reform of the offices and units supporting Peace 
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concerned.347 The result of the investigation, or recommendations of actions based 
thereon, are not final. Legal advice on the propriety of any action falls within the 
mandate of the Legal Counsel and the Office of the Legal Affairs.348   
 
It is problematic if the SRSG’s decision (taken in the name of the SG) to refer a case to 
the national authorities of the sending State for criminal prosecution is made not purely 
on legal grounds, but also takes account of political considerations. It is reported that 
the SG considers both the political implications and the UN’s interests before he makes 
that decision. 349 In relation to cases in which the UN has been the victim of financial 
loss caused by its personnel or contractors, the SG himself has reported that referral to 
national authorities for legal action must be made after “a careful evaluation process 
which encompasses an analysis of policy considerations”.350 Examples of factors to be 
considered in such cases include:  
 
[...] the impact on privileges and immunities; the likelihood of the success of the 
claim if pursued; the impact upon the reputation of the Organization caused by 
becoming party to a lawsuit; an evaluation of the expected cost and benefit of 
entering into such action in view of the high costs and uncertainties of litigation; 
the exposure of the Organization to financial and other risks; and the potential 
impact on the internal justice system of the Organization.351 
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While this statement was made in relation to cases in which criminal and civil legal 
actions are both in view, where a crime is involved, political considerations should not 
prevent the criminal prosecution of an alleged wrongdoer. In an independent report, the 
inspectors concluded that executive heads of UN Secretariat offices were given an 
excessive degree of discretion when dealing with the findings of, and recommendations 
made in, investigation reports, and that this could include “concealing evidence and/or 
burying the findings”.352 This is a weighty observation about actions that could block 
individual criminal accountability, and appears to be contrary to the UN’s obligations. 
These obligations are set out in the new MoU, and include notifying the sending State 
about any well-founded allegations of misconduct by FPU personnel, accompanied by 
the findings of the UN’s internal investigation.353 
 
The other issue is time. The aforementioned procedures for determining both sanctions 
and referral to national authorities mean that decisions are made after a considerable 
amount of time has passed. These lengthy procedures mean that it would be difficult to 
respond to the requirements of a time-sensitive criminal prosecution.354 Considering the 
short tours of duty undertaken by UN police,355 the requirement of promptness is more 
pressing than in normal domestic circumstances.  
 
Benchmark 4 
                                            
352
 UNGA, JIU Report, para.35. 
353
 UN, FPU MoU, Article 7.21. 
354
 Durch et al, Improving Criminal Accountability, p.33. 
355
 For the military contingent, Military Observers and UN police, the average tour of duty is one year, but 
depending on the length of the mandate, sending States and other variables, it can be shorter. See 
Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
243 
 
3-5. Follow-up of cases referred to the sending State 
Following the referral of a case to the State concerned, there needs to be systematic 
follow-up. As it poses particular problems for the sending State, and as the current 
practice is to make more referrals to sending States,356 the following analysis focuses 
on sending States.  
 
One of the most obvious issues is the lack of transparency regarding follow-ups. While it 
is acknowledged that there has been some improvement on this front, the improvement 
is from revealing no information to little information. Unlike before 2007, the UN now 
publishes the numbers of cases referred to national authorities, and the number of 
cases in which it received some kind of response from those authorities.357 While the 
UN is clearly facing challenges in receiving responses from sending States,358 
information on follow-up action stops there. The data are not disaggregated according 
to the category of personnel. Therefore, it is not known whether the UN follows up more 
frequently on misconduct committed by military personnel, or that committed by UN 
police personnel. There is also no means of knowing whether States are more likely to 
respond to the UN’s queries in relation to misconduct by military personnel or UN police 
personnel. There is no information as to which States cases were referred to, how long 
these States took to respond after they received the referrals, or what type of responses 
the UN received. Partial information is available on what in fact happened to the alleged 
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offenders.359 The lack of information about what kinds of responses particular States 
have sent prompts one to wonder, for example, if the UN includes in its figures letters 
that simply state that the State concerned has decided that there is no foundation to the 
allegations, and that the alleged UN police offender has been cleared of all charges. If 
the UN is satisfied with such a response and makes no further inquiry, it would show a 
lack of political will on the UN’s part. In fact, there is an account regarding cases of 
sexual abuse and exploitation in which some States’ responses were not satisfactory.360 
 
The rates of response indicate that States’ bureaucratic competence or political will is 
generally weak. The overall rate of response was about 30 percent between the years 
2007 and 2012.361 In 2013, there was a sudden increase in the rate of response to 
around 91 percent. It is almost impossible to provide an explanation for this sudden 
rise,362 although it may partly be due to new ways of seeking responses,363 or it may be 
influenced by the new MoU regarding military contingents, which requires sending 
States to act as primary investigative authorities. However, the MoU also stipulated that 
the UN would conduct an investigation where the States concerned chose not to 
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investigate.364 One piece of progress is that the new MoU, regarding FPU personnel, 
sets out the sending State’s obligation to pursue the prosecution of its FPU personnel 
where the host State fails to do so.365 It is submitted that there should also be a legally 
binding agreement between the UN and sending States that the latter would take the 
action necessary for bringing criminal proceedings against those IPOs who are alleged 
to have committed criminal conduct while on mission.  
 
There is in fact one regressive tendency in relation to information made public by the 
UN. Previously, for example in the 1990s, the UN seemed to have had no problem in 
revealing the nationality of those accused of misconduct.366 In recent cases, however, 
show that the UN appears not to reveal the nationality of alleged perpetrators. This 
applies to criminal, disciplinary and civil cases across the board. The nationality of 
suspects is not revealed in the OIOS’s annual reports, annual reports on sexual 
                                            
364
 UNGA, 'Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding, as annexed to UNGA, Report of the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on the 2007 Resumed Session' 
(12 June 2007) UN Doc. A/61/19 (Part III), (fereinafter ‘2007 MoU’).  
365
 UN, FPU MoU, Article 7 quinquiens, Section 7.18. 
366
 The information was made public through media releases and daily briefings by the mission and UN 
headquarters. Amongst them, see UN Press Release, ‘Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
Begins  (New York)’ (4 April 2005) <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gapk186.doc.htm> accessed 8 
October 2014; UN, ‘Jordanian Civilian Police Indicted on Rape Charges’ (24 August 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/DB/db240801.htm> accessed 8 October 2014. 
Reports of some cases were also found through UN sources, and contained the nationalities of UN police 
suspects. UNTAET, ‘Media Release: Jordanian Civilian Police Indicted on Rape Charges’ (24 August 
2001) <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/DB/db240801.htm>; UN, ‘Police Officers 
Suspected of Rape Will Enjoy No Immunity UN Official Says’ (6 July 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/01jul06.htm>; UN, ‘Police Officer Serving with UN Mission in East 
Timor Charged with Rape’ (24 August 2001) <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/01aug24.htm>; 
UNTAET, ‘Media Release’ (6 July 2001) <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db060701.htm>; UNTAET, 
‘Media Release’ (3 August 2001) <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db030801.htm> accessed 25 July 
2005; UNMEE, ‘SG Annan Responds to Eritrean Allegations against UNMEE’ (May 2004) 
<http://www.unmeeonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=935&Itemid=53> accessed 
15 July 2008; UN, ‘Probe Closed of Police Officers Connected to Deadly Shootings in Kosovo’ (19 May 
2004) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10794&Cr=kosovo&Cr1=&Kw1=unmik&Kw2=miscond
uct&Kw3=> accessed 26 August 2006; UN Wire, (20 April 2004) 
<http://unwire.org/UNWire/20040420/Current_Print.asp> accessed 26 August 2005. . 
246 
 
exploitation and abuse, or statements by the UN in response to particular incidents.367 
There is some indication that opinion within the UN is divided on whether to reveal the 
nationality of suspects against whom an allegation has been substantiated. The UN is 
also divided on revealing the nationality of suspects where the States concerned fail to 
cooperate in holding suspects to account for the crimes they have committed.368 It 
makes analyzing the following issues virtually impossible: the relationship between the 
nationality of the suspect and the rate of criminal conduct; identifying which States 
continuously fail to respond to follow-up inquiries from the UN; and which States have 
undertaken proper proceedings and applied appropriate sanctions against individual UN 
police personnel. It is regrettable that, even if suspects come from States with very poor 
records of tackling misconduct, the UN does not reveal their nationalities. There may be 
political considerations for keeping the information internal,369 in particular if there may 
be negative implications in terms of sending States’ willingness to send more personnel 
for future missions. In this regard, an observation was made that the UN has an internal 
culture of reluctance, close to being a taboo, about speaking out about differences 
between national contingents, and that this results in the ‘fear of offending particular 
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member states by comparing their behavior with others, particularly, in this case, by 
suggesting differing degrees of criminality’.370  
 
In addition, where an allegation of a crime is substantiated, it is necessary for the UN to 
agree with the sending State that the suspect must go back to the sending State. If the 
suspect is free to leave the host State to go to a third State, this will lessen the chance 
that he will be prosecuted. This agreement could be included in MoUs in relation to FPU 
personnel, and in Notes Verbales in relation to IPOs. In order to ensure that this can be 
achieved, the UN requires the authority to hold the suspect until he is sent back to the 
sending State, and the mechanisms for doing so. This can be done through detaining 
the suspect, or in other ways, but these will all involve the modification of the agreement 
between the sending and host States. When the suspect is sent back to the sending 
State, his return should be accompanied by any information generated by the UN’s 
investigation into the alleged crime. This transfer of information is required in relation to 
FPUs,371 and should be replicated in relation to IPOs. In order to maximize the prospect 
of prosecution, information should be sent to a particular contact point, preferably a 
prosecutor in the sending State. In fact, when a State sends its police officers to join a 
UN mission, there should be an agreement between the UN and the sending State as to 
who should act as the particular contact point on the issue of individual accountability, 
so that the follow up on each case is made smoother. 
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It is not known whether or not there is a routine procedure the UN and States follow for 
cooperating on additional investigations and other judicial procedures. In the early 
2000s, there was no such system.372 Judicial cooperation between States and the UN 
has been encouraged,373 but there are few details available as to either side’s legal 
obligations.374 One exception is that States sending FPU personnel are obliged to 
cooperate with the host State’s criminal proceedings where these take place.375 Where 
an agreement results in a legally binding obligation,376 there is no prescribed procedure 
for what should happen if the obligation is breached by either party. Where mechanisms 
are subject to ad hoc responses, they may not exert sufficient pressure to ensure that 
criminal accountability is enforced. There is an urgent need for the UN to consider a 
more established mechanism for follow-up and post-investigation cooperation. 
 
3-6. Conclusion 
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alleged offences, they nevertheless have an obligation to assist each other in carrying out ‘all necessary 
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375
 UN, FPU MoU, para.7.18. This is presumably only where the host State has a functioning legal system 
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The UN’s internal proceedings have not been effective in facilitating individual criminal 
accountability. The UN is in a difficult position: it has neither the authority nor the 
mechanisms necessary to address individual criminal accountability itself. This is not 
likely to change.377 The best the UN can do is to attempt to facilitate criminal 
proceedings in one State or another.  
 
In order for the UN to effectively facilitate the criminal accountability of individual UN 
police personnel, its administrative and disciplinary proceedings need to be carefully 
designed. The system needs to effectively receive information on potential criminal 
misconduct, and each subsequent stage - from the centralization and registration of 
such information, to investigation, to decision-making on what to do with the 
investigation results, to following up substantiated cases with States - must be tailored 
to maximize the chances of criminal accountability taking place. In addition, an 
independent oversight of the UN’s dealings on misconduct would result in greater 
effectiveness. 
 
The UN has made a significant effort since the mid-1990s, and it continues to do so. 
Disciplinary codes, as well as the rules and procedures to be followed in administrative 
and disciplinary proceedings have been clarified. Awareness-raising activities have 
been conducted to raise both internal and external awareness about what constitutes 
criminal misconduct, and how and where to lodge a complaint. The time-consuming BoI 
system has been reviewed, streamlined and largely replaced with a new system 
involving the OIOS and CDU. This has addressed the quality of investigation to some 
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extent.378 Most notably, a significant improvement is the introduction by the UN of a 
centralized record and tracking system.379  
 
One general observation is that the overall effort regarding personal accountability is 
heavily focused on SEA. For example, in response to the OIOS’s recommendation that 
there should be a formal coordination mechanism for all relevant components on 
conduct and discipline, the DPKO stated that it would make these mechanisms clear 
through SEA directives.380 In terms of awareness-raising, the UN’s efforts have almost 
exclusively centred round SEA.381 Data on the status of investigations is only available 
for SEA cases.382 While it is an important issue, the UN also urgently needs to address 
other types of misconduct. According to the data collected by the CDU between 2007 
and 2012, SEA allegations included in Category I misconduct allegations ranged 
between 24 and 40 percent for all categories of personnel, and between 15 and 53 
percent for UN police personnel.383 Other misconduct, such as theft, corruption, and 
drunk and other dangerous ways of driving, is also common in some missions.384 
Reports of SEA allegations against UN police officers have steadily decreased since 
2007, from 24 allegations in 2007 to 2 in 2012. Category I allegations385 involving UN 
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police officers, but which exclude SEA cases, do not show a similar decrease.386 The 
proportion of all reported misconduct cases which is SEA cases does not justify leaving 
aside other types of serious misconduct.387  
 
There remain multiple flaws in the system. One part of the solution is to ensure that all 
allegations are properly recorded, and result in investigations. While awareness and 
access to complaint mechanisms have been improved, lodging a complaint is still 
heavily reliant on the complainant being literate.388 The protection of victims, witnesses 
and internal whistle-blower appears in the code, but all available information indicates 
that implementation is problematic.389 The code must be properly implemented, 
including taking disciplinary action against personnel and managers who fail to report 
misconduct or to pass relevant information to the appropriate internal unit, or to respond 
promptly and appropriately. The central repository of allegations should be better 
designed. The UN has created a centralized case database, but due to considerations 
regarding independence and confidentiality, the central repository does not have access 
to OIOS cases.390 It would be better if OIOS were to function as the central repository in 
that case.  
 
A second part of the solution lies with the quality of investigations. Efforts to ensure 
independent and professional investigations into allegations led the UN to refer all 
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allegations of serious misconduct to the OIOS. However, the OIOS’s struggle to carry 
out prompt investigations resulted in it returning many cases to the mission.391 The UN 
needs to find a way to ensure that allegations are investigated by qualified investigators.  
 
Efforts were also made to improve the quality of investigations, but the standard of 
proof, the ways in which investigations are conducted, and the results of investigations 
remain administrative in nature, and do not meet the standard to be used for criminal 
prosecution in States. The evidence collected is not likely to be useful in criminal 
prosecutions. Some barriers in respect of evidential rules are not unique to UN 
investigations. For example, different requirements imposed by domestic rules of 
evidence cannot realistically be expected to be overcome by increasing the 
professionalism of UN investigations. Therefore, States are likely to require information 
over and above that which the UN provides. Currently, there is no set mechanism within 
the UN for obtaining additional evidence or evidence of the type that can be used in 
criminal proceedings. This mechanism needs to be agreed with States as otherwise it 
will be very difficult for willing States to prosecute the UN police personnel. This also 
raises the question of whether States need to harmonize their rules, for example by 
agreeing on the minimum standard for admissible scientific evidence. 
 
The third part of the solution lies with the decision to refer a case to a national authority 
for prosecution. There is an apparent lack of policies dealing with when and how to 
cooperate with national investigatory authorities. It is now mandatory for the UN to notify 
the sending State where an allegation of misconduct by a member of FPU has been 
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established as being well-founded, and to send any findings reached by the UN 
investigation to the sending State. Similar agreements need to be reached between the 
UN and sending States of IPOs.392 In general, the decision to actively refer a case for 
criminal prosecution appears to remain within the discretion of the Secretary-General. 
This is problematic.393  
 
Most significantly, the fourth part of the solution lies in addressing the UN’s failure to 
provide an effective response once it completes an investigation. Where its investigation 
substantiates an alleged crime, virtually all the UN does is to send this information to the 
suspect’s sending State. States are then requested to respond to the UN, disclosing 
information regarding any investigation or proceedings they have undertaken, the 
results of any such investigation and the sanctions imposed and, if not pursued further, 
the reasons for this. States only respond to one third of such requests, and the UN 
appears to accept this rate of response. The UN does not take any further action to 
ensure that States actually do what they claim to do.394 For example, the UN could 
make public the names of States that do not respond to the UN’s inquiries. In such 
circumstances, the efforts exerted in conducting investigations are not also exerted to 
ensure criminal accountability.  The inevitable conclusion is that, for whatever reasons, 
the UN does not put much effort into reaching its aim of “Zero Tolerance”395, in 
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particular in relation to what happens after allegations have been substantiated. There 
is a mismatch between the promises made, and their delivery.  
 
One clear trend has emerged from this analysis, and that is the varying extent to which 
arrangements in relation to IPOs and FPUs are systematized. In relation to FPUs, there 
is an obligation on the UN to send all information regarding substantiated cases of 
misconduct to the sending State.396 The obligation of the sending State to bring the 
case to the prosecuting authorities is also clear only in relation to FPUs.397 The 
obligation of the sending State to cooperate with the host State where the latter seeks 
prosecution is also set out in relation to FPUs.398 It is probable that the difference in 
arrangements regarding IPOs and FPUs has arisen because those regarding FPUs are 
much more recent. The UN may consider the FPU arrangements to constitute good 
practice. In that case, it is necessary to replicate this arrangement in relation to IPOs 
insofar as the difference in the mode of deployment does not affect the content of the 
agreement between the UN and the sending State. 
 
This Chapter has analyzed the ways in which the UN assists in the gathering of 
evidence in order for host or sending States to prosecute a UN police suspect. 
Following the initial collection of evidence, the States concerned are required to take 
action. In order for these States to bring criminal proceedings against UN police officers 
for crimes they have committed, they must first have criminal jurisdiction over the 
matter. Thus, the next Chapter will consider the issue of jurisdiction. 
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Previous chapters have shown that, across all missions, UN police do not appear to 
have been prosecuted when they have committed serious crimes.1 It has also been 
shown that the absence of prosecutions is not because there is no mechanism to 
address serious misconduct.2 Rather, there are mechanisms in place within the UN for 
this purpose. Relying, in part, on the outcome of the investigations carried out by those 
mechanisms, both host and sending States are in a position to bring prosecutions 
against UN police personnel who have been alleged to have engaged in criminal 
behaviour. There is, however, a mismatch between the existence of such mechanisms, 
and the apparent lack of criminal proceedings.3 This necessitates inquiring whether 
there are legal barriers which create difficulties for States, which would otherwise be 
willing to bring criminal proceedings. 
 
The first potential legal barrier is criminal jurisdiction. In discussing this matter, a 
distinction must be made between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. 
Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the legally binding criminal law norms themselves, 
whilst enforcement jurisdiction refers to the enforcement of those norms, which involves 
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the exercise of jurisdiction.4 As this work analyses what may hinder criminal 
prosecution, and seeks ways to encourage prosecution, this chapter mostly focuses on 
enforcement jurisdiction. 
 
First, in order for criminal proceedings to be brought against members of the UN police, 
the police must be legally bound by criminal law. All of those who are to be involved in 
potential criminal proceedings, namely the individual members of the UN police, States 
and the UN, need to have the same understanding of the legal regimes to which the UN 
police are subject. This work thus seeks to clarify whether UN police personnel are 
bound by the criminal law of the host State and/or their sending States and, if they are, 
how this is given effect. In addition, whether the UN ensures a) that the relevant criminal 
codes apply to UN police officers; and b) that States, as well as individual members of 
                                            
4 This theory divides jurisdiction into two categories: legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction, and 
enforcement jurisdiction. The Lotus case distinguished prescriptive from enforcement jurisdiction, holding 
that the former was considered as the jurisdiction required to prescribe rules, whilst the latter was the 
jurisdiction required to enforce these rules. SS Lotus (France v. Turkey) PCIJ Rep Series A No10, pp.18-
19.  Mann describes enforcement jurisdiction as one which concerns the lawfulness of those acts of a 
State which give effect to its national regulation. The existence of legislative jurisdiction is not considered 
sufficient basis on which to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in another State’s territory. F A  Mann, ‘The 
Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revised after Twenty Years’ in W Michael  Reisman (ed), Jurisdiction 
in International Law (Aldershot 1999), pp.139-236. Brownlie, however, claims that there is no essential 
distinction between the limits on legislative jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction. He sees them as 
being two sides of the same coin. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 1979), p.309. According to another theory, jurisdiction is divided into three categories: 
legislative, judicial and executive jurisdiction. See, for example, Michael Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in 
International Law’ in Michael Reisman (ed), Jurisdiction in International Law (pp. 25-138, Ashgate 1999), 
pp.25-138. The Council of Europe has also taken this position. See Council of Europe, Extraterritorial 
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and scope of application of certain national norms and prescriptive rules’. Judicial jurisdiction refers to the 
application of the ‘established jurisdiction in a particular litigation or proceedings’. Executive jurisdiction 
means the jurisdiction to actually enforce orders or prescriptive rules deriving from the judiciary or 
legislature. Ibid, p.18. Akehurst defines legislative jurisdiction as constituting the power of a State to apply 
its laws to cases involving a foreign element; judicial jurisdiction as the power of a State’s courts to try 
cases involving a foreign element; and executive jurisdiction as a State’s power to perform acts in the 
territory of another State. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in IL’, p.59. Thus, the discussion appears to focus on 
extra-territorial jurisdiction, or jurisdiction in relation to cases involving ‘foreign’ elements. 
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UN police, are aware of the binding nature of these criminal codes, and how this is 
done, will also be examined.  
 
Second, whether States can exercise criminal jurisdiction over misconduct by UN police 
officers will be considered. The first issue arising in this regard is whether States are 
free to exercise criminal jurisdiction under international law. Determining this requires an 
analysis of the notion of permissive jurisdiction,5 which grants the authority to prosecute 
an alleged author of criminal conduct. Thus, the type of jurisdiction considered here is 
enforcement jurisdiction.6 The question is whether international law places any 
restrictions on States’ exercise of criminal jurisdiction and, if so, what is prohibited in 
relation to the host, sending and other States.  
 
Even where States are able to exercise criminal jurisdiction under international law, their 
domestic law may place limitations on their ability to bring proceedings against 
suspects. Therefore, national criminal laws need to be examined to see if States are 
able to bring such proceedings under their domestic laws. Where feasible, and where 
these are found to exist, practical barriers to exercising jurisdiction will also be identified. 
 
There is currently no standard criminal code that applies to all UN police personnel, nor 
is there a UN criminal tribunal where the UN can itself bring criminal proceedings 
                                            
5
 The obligation on States under international law to investigate and prosecute a suspect when s/he is 
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6
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against its own personnel.7 Whilst a recent argument posits that the UN should 
establish its own model criminal code,8 create a hybrid criminal tribunal, and exercise 
criminal jurisdiction,9 the evaluation of such a prospect is outside the scope of this work. 
However, if such a tribunal were to be formed, its task would be to consider breaches of 
national criminal law. 
 
The applicability of International Criminal Law (ICL) is not considered in this chapter for 
two reasons. One reason is that it is very unlikely that the UN police would engage in 
international crimes.10 There have not been any allegations thus far that the UN police 
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(25 May 1993) UN Doc. S/RES/827, establishing the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY); UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc. S/RES/955, establishing the UN 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc. S/RES/1244, 
establishing the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); UNSC Res 1272 (25 October 
1999) UN Doc. S/RES/1272, establishing the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET); 
and UNSC Res 1315 (14 August 2000) UN Doc. S/RES/1315, establishing the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.    
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 Piracy, war crimes and slavery are international crimes under customary international law. Antonio 
Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2003), pp.284-285. However, note that 
Cassese observes that piracy has a different nature from war crimes and slavery, and that there is thus 
doubt as to whether piracy is an international crime. However, it is subject to universal jurisdiction. 
Convention on the High Seas (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 
11, Preamble; Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Counterpiracy 
under International Law (Academy Briefing No 1, August 2012), pp.14-15. With the exception of these 
crimes, international crimes are defined by a treaty, which requires States to prosecute a person if there 
is reason to believe that he has committed an international crime. In addition, crimes under the Rome 
Statute are international crimes. On the sources of international crimes, see Cassese, International 
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have, in fact, engaged in international crimes.11 The other is that there is no question of 
the applicability of ICL, as the very notion underlying ICL is that the crimes set out in it 
are so grave that it applies to all persons irrespective of borders.12 Therefore, the 
analysis herein is focused on the domestic criminal laws of States, primarily those of the 
host and sending States. 
 
2. Criminal laws to which the UN police are subject 
2-1. The host State’s criminal law 
One possibility is that members of the UN police are subject to the criminal law of the 
host State. As the host State is the territorial State in which the alleged offence took 
place, it is almost universally accepted that its criminal laws are applicable.13  
 
2-1-1. The obligation to ‘respect’ 
It is not clearly stated anywhere that UN police personnel are bound by the host State’s 
criminal code. The main documents dealing with Peace Operations simply state that UN 
police officers have an obligation ‘to respect’ local laws and regulations. The first legal 
instrument that evidences this is the Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA). A SOFA is a 
legally binding agreement governing the relationship between the UN Peace Operation 
                                                                                                                                            
Criminal Law, pp.25-37. Given how international crimes are defined, it is unlikely that non-military 
members of UN missions would commit such crimes, although they could be viewed as an accomplice 
where a third party commits an international crime.  
11
 See Chapter 3, sections 1 and 2.  
12
 Cassese, International Criminal Law, pp.23-25. Problems may arise in incorporating international 
crimes in domestic criminal law, in defining international crimes in domestic criminal law, and in applying 
domestic law (where it criminalizes international law) extra-territorially. In addition, there may be an issue 
regarding immunity. Ibid, pp.301-311, 321-326. 
13
 The Lotus Court stated in 1927 that, ‘in all systems of law the principle of territorial character of criminal 
law is fundamental’. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10 , para.20.  
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and the host State.14 It sets out the rights, obligations and duties between the two,15 as 
well as the applicable laws, and the status of the Operation and its personnel.16 SOFAs 
can take two different forms: either they are treaties signed by the Secretary-General 
and a representative of the host State, or they consist of letters of exchange between 
the two parties. Both constitute a valid and legally binding SOFA.17 Where an Operation 
does not have a military component, the agreement between the UN and the host State 
is called a Status-of-Mission Agreement (SOMA).18 In most Peace Operations, the UN 
and the host State have agreed on a SOFA/SOMA, but some missions have either been 
established without these,19 or have begun before any such agreements were entered 
into.20 Eventually, the UN began to rely on a model agreement it had drawn up, partly as 
a response to such situations.21 
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The Model SOFA was drafted in 1990,22 and serves as a basis for negotiating and 
drafting specific SOFA agreements.23 In recent Peace Operations, the UN considers the 
Model SOFA provisionally binding on both it and the host State, until such time as a 
mission-specific SOFA has been concluded.24 When a Security Council resolution, 
made under Chapter VII, has been passed which stipulates that it applies on a 
provisional basis, it becomes fully legally binding.25 Inasmuch as the Model SOFA was 
based on SOFAs from previous UN Peace Operations, it reflected the practice of earlier 
operations.26 Whether this practice can be considered as evidence of customary law is 
a difficult question. In part, this is because not much of the content appears to reflect 
customary international law in relation to the status of foreign visiting forces belonging to 
the UN.27  
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September 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1320, op. para.6; UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UNSC Res 
1270 (22 October 1999), UN Doc S/RES/1270), op. para.16; UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), UNSC Res 1542 (30 April 2004), UN Doc S/RES/1542, op. para.11; UN Operation in 
Burundi (ONUB), UNSC Res 1545 (21 May 2004), UN Doc S/RES/1545. op. para.10; UN Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), UNSC Res 1528 (27 February 2004), UN Doc S/RES/1528, op. para.9; and UNSC 
Res 1291 (24 Feb 2000), UN Doc S/RES/1291 expanding MONUC’s mandate, op. para.10. 
26
 United Nations Law Reform Project, ‘UN Peacekeeping and The Model Status of Forces Agreement’, 
para.9. However, at least some parts of the Model SOFA are not reflective of earlier practice, for example, 
those rules governing the status of the Police Commissioner. See Chapter 6, section 1-3. 
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SOFAs often include the obligation of the UN Peace Operation, and its members, to 
‘respect all local laws and regulations’.28 This obligation contains two sets of rules: one 
is that all personnel ‘shall respect all local laws and regulations’, and the other is a 
corresponding obligation on the Special Representative requiring him or her to ‘take all 
appropriate measures to ensure the observance of these obligations’.29 The obligation 
of UN personnel to respect local laws and regulations has also been written into the 
Convention governing the scope of States’ obligations in respect of the safety of 
personnel working for the UN.30  
 
This obligation is also set out in the rules that apply directly to the conduct of UN police 
officers. All UN police officers are required to sign an Individual Undertaking and 
Declaration.31 It appears that this requirement is being met; at least, this has been the 
                                            
28
 (Emphasis added). UNGA, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement 
for Peace-Keeping Operations' (9 October 1990) UN Doc. A/45/594, Annex, para.6, (hereinafter ‘model 
SOFA’). See also the SOFAs for UNAMID, MINUSTAH, UNMIS and the UN Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS): UNSC Res 1769 (31 July 2007) UN Doc. S/RES/1769, op. para.5; UNSC Res 1542 (30 April 
2004) UN Doc. S/RES/1542, op. para.5; UNSC Res 1590 (24 March 2005) UN Doc. S/RES/1590, op. 
para.5; UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc. S/RES/1996, op. para.5. However, it should be noted that 
some SOFAs excluded this provision, for example, SOFAs for the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), 
the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), and the UN Observer Mission in Rwanda-Uganda 
(UNOMUR). See United Nations Law Reform Project, ‘UN Peacekeeping and The Model Status of Forces 
Agreement’, para.187. 
29
 (Emphasis added). The model SOFA refers to ‘those’ obligations’. UNGA, Model SOFA, para.6. This 
formula appears to suggest that the obligation that the Secretary-General is required to ensure is the 
‘obligation to respect’. 
30
 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (adopted on 9 December 1994, 
entered into force on 15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363, Article 61, (hereinafter the ‘Safety Convention’). 
31
 Undertaking and Declaration by Experts on Mission: UN Police Officer/Corrections Officer/Military 
Observers/Military Liaison Officer, (hereinafter ‘Undertaking’); Annex 3 to UN DPKO, 'Guidelines for 
United Nations Police Officers on Assignment with Peacekeeping Operations' UN Doc. 
DPKO/PD/2006/00135, (hereinafter ‘2007 Guidelines’). All UN police officers are required to sign it upon 
deployment, in presence of an authorized witness. 
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case in recent years.32 By signing it, each officer agrees to be bound by all the laws and 
regulations contained therein.33 These include: the Regulations Governing the Status, 
Basic Rights and Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on 
Mission;34 the Directives for Disciplinary Matters involving Civilian Police Officers and 
Military Observers; 35 the Directive on Sexual Harassment in UN Peacekeeping and 
Other Field Missions, aides-memoirs entitled “Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for 
Blue Helmets” (blue cards); and “We are UN Peacekeepers”.36 
   
Amongst these, the only code that sets out the obligation to ‘comply with local laws’ is 
the Regulation governing Experts on Mission.37 This language indicates a stronger 
obligation than merely to respect local laws. It appears, though, that this obligation 
                                            
32
 In 2011, the Police Adviser at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations confirmed that, in the five 
years prior to this, every single UN police officer had signed an Undertaking upon deployment to a 
mission. Ann-Marie Orler, ‘Professionalism: UN Policing 2012’ (2011) 8 UN Police Magazine 3, p.4. 
33
 All Mission Directives, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Mission policies and other applicable 
issuances. UN DPKO, Undertaking, para.10. 
34
 Historically speaking, first, the Secretary-General announced that a UN ‘Code of Conduct’ for staff 
members was to be adopted as part of the development of a transparent and effective system of 
accountability. The Secretary-General released a report in 1997 on the proposed Code of Conduct. 
UNGA, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Proposed United Nations Code of Conduct' (17 October 
1997) UN Doc. A/52/488 In the report, he referred to the status of officials other than Secretariat officials, 
experts on mission, and the Secretary-General himself. The report recommended that the General 
Assembly consider whether these personnel should be subject to a similar code. Ibid, para.2. 
Subsequently, in 1998, the Bulletin on the ‘Code of Conduct’ for staff members was published. UN, 
'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff Members 
(entered into force 1 January 1999) ' (10 December 1998) UN Doc. ST/SGB/1998/19, (hereinafter ‘1998 
Bulletin’). This Bulletin was revised in 2002. UN, 'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Status, Basic Rights 
and Duties of United Nations Staff Members (entered into force on 1 December 2002)' (1 November 
2002) UN Doc. ST/SGB/2002/13, (hereinafter ‘2002 Bulletin’). It is a compilation of the complex rules and 
regulations applicable to UN staff members. The parallel Bulletin on the Status, Basic Rights and Duties 
of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission, entered into force on 1 July 2002. UN, 
'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of 
Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission  (entered into force 1 July 2002)' (18 
June 2002) UN Doc. ST/SGB/2002/9, (hereinafter ‘Regulations’). Oswald, Documents, p.366. For a brief 
history of the development of the Secretary-General’s Bulletins, and details of the rules and regulations, 
see ibid, pp.341-345, 366-369. 
35
 UN DPKO Undertaking, para.2. 
36
 Oswald, Documents, p.368.  
37
 (Emphasis added). UN, Regulations, Regulation 2 (j).  
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applies specifically with regard the Experts’ private legal obligations.38 The remainder of 
the codes all express this obligation as the requirement to ‘respect’ local laws and 
regulations.39 This wording is taken from the Vienna Convention of the Laws of 
Diplomatic Relations.40  
 
The obligation to respect local laws and regulations is doubly stressed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). An MoU is a formal agreement between the UN 
and each sending State, which contains the legally binding rights and obligations of both 
parties during a mission.41 Part of the agreement deals with matters of discipline, 
investigations and UN standards of conduct for the relevant personnel. An MoU also 
                                            
38
 See the commentary to Regulation 2 (j). See also Regulation 1 (e) on privileges and immunities, which 
stipulates that there is an obligation ‘to observe the laws and police regulations’ of the host State in 
relation to private conduct: ‘[…] privileges and immunities furnish no excuse to those who are covered by 
them to fail to observe the laws and police regulations of the State in which they are located; nor do they 
furnish an excuse for non-performance of their private obligations’. 
39
 Directives binding on the UN police state that they ‘shall respect all local laws and regulations’. UN 
DPKO, 'Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers' (2003) 
UN Doc. DPKO/CPD/DDCPO/2003/001; DPKO/MD/03/00994, para.6, (hereinafter ‘Directives’). Rule 2 of 
another set of binding rules stipulates the obligation on the part of the UN police to ‘respect the law of the 
land of the host country’. Rule 4 also prohibits ‘immoral acts of sexual physical or psychological abuse or 
exploitation’, and Rule 6 requires them to account properly for UN money and property. UN DPKO, 'Ten 
Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets' UN Doc. (on file with author), (hereinafter ‘Ten 
Rules’).  Another code requires that UN police officers ‘will always […] respect local laws, customs and 
practices […]’. It also requires that they ‘will never […u]se unnecessary violence or threaten anyone in the 
custody; commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
members of the local population, especially women and children’. It further states that they will not 
‘commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual activity with children under 18, or 
exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex; […] be abusive or uncivil to any member of 
the public; wilfully damage or misuse any United Nations property or equipment […], participate in any 
illegal activities, corrupt or improper practices, attempt to use our positions for personal advantage, to 
make false claims or accept benefits to which we are not entitled’. UN DPKO, 'We are United Nations 
Peacekeeping Personnel' UN Doc. (on file with author), hereinafter ‘We are Peacekeeping Personnel’).   
40
 Article 41 sets out the obligations of those who enjoy privileges and immunities ‘to respect the laws and 
regulations of the receiving State’. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (adopted 18 April 1961, 
entered into force on 24 April 1964) 500 UNTS 95, (hereinafter ‘Vienna Convention’). It is submitted that 
using the convention governing diplomatic relations in this particular UN context may cause problems. 
This is because the two contexts are not identical. Diplomatic missions are not operational within the 
domestic sphere of the host State. If diplomats commit crimes, they can be declared persona non grata 
by the host State, which works to safeguard the system from abuse. See Chapter 6, section 1-1.  
41
 Oswald, Documents, pp.12, 51. 
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includes the administrative, financial, and logistical terms and conditions that govern the 
contribution of personnel by sending States.42 The model for such agreements has 
existed since 1991. It covers a wide range of issues, such as command and control, the 
applicable law, and the accountability of contributed personnel.43 It was drafted primarily 
with military contingents in mind, but its provisions clearly stated that the agreement 
applies mutatis mutandis to civilian personnel, including UN police.44 Most importantly, it 
serves as a basis for the negotiation and drafting of a specific MoU in relation to other 
seconded personnel. Formed Police Units (FPUs) are deployed under an MoU within 
the contingent-owned-equipment system (CoE).45 For IPOs, the arrangement varies. 
Some MoUs cover IPOs mutatis mutandis, as suggested by the 1991 Model.46 For the 
rest, IPOs are not covered by MoUs, but are covered by the content of Codes Cables, 
which is not made public. Revisions of the Model MoU have gradually strengthened it in 
respect of disciplinary issues, investigations, accountability, and applicable Codes of 
Conduct.47 What is significant is that the Codes of Conduct applicable to contributed 
                                            
42
 Ibid, p.12.  
43
 Ibid, pp.51-52. 
44
 UNGA, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Model Agreement between the United Nations and 
Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations' (23 
May 1991) UN Doc. A/46/185, para.18, (hereinafter ‘1991 MoU’); Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of 
International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond, vol 57 (Cambridge University Press 
2008), para.2 
45
 UN DPKO/DFS, 'Policy (Revised) on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' 
(1 March 2013) UN Doc. Ref.2009/32, para.9, (hereinafter ‘2013 FPU policy’). 
46
 UNGA, 1991 MoU, para.18. 
47
 Following the reform of the UN’s reimbursement scheme, the 1991 model was revised, and was 
renamed ‘the Contribution Agreement.’ Later, in 1997, the document was reproduced as ‘the Model 
Memorandum of Understanding’. Most recently, in 2007, the Model MOU was amended following issues 
and concerns about applicable laws, jurisdiction and accountability, including issues surrounding sexual 
exploitation and abuse by Peace Operations personnel. UNGA, 'Revised Draft Model Memorandum of 
Understanding, as annexed to UNGA, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and 
its Working Group on the 2007 Resumed Session' (12 June 2007) UN Doc. A/61/19 (Part III) Annex, 
(hereinafter ‘2007 Model MoU’). The 2007 Model MoU thus incorporated additional articles on discipline, 
investigations, accountability, the exercise of jurisdiction by the sending State, and applicable Codes of 
Conduct, in the form of Annexes. Oswald, Documents, pp.51-52. In the 1996 revised version, there was 
no particular mention of the UN police. UNGA, 'Note by the Secretary-General on the Reform of the 
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personnel have been incorporated as an annex to the Model MoU (entitled ”We are 
Peacekeeping Personnel”),48 which is essentially a combination of the two 1997 aides 
memoires: “Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets” and “We are UN 
Peacekeepers”, and the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse.49 It is apparent that the UN is using the MoU as a further means of ensuring that 
the obligation to ‘respect’ local laws and regulations is fulfilled.50 
 
It is necessary to consider what is meant by “respect”. Is this an obligation to obey, or 
merely an obligation to take account of local law? In considering this issue, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the normative content of local criminal law, and the 
accountability of suspects through the local criminal law enforcement system. The 
obligation to respect local laws does not automatically mean that UN police are subject 
to the jurisdiction of the local courts for breaches of the law, even where immunity is not 
at issue. In fact, the provisions are carefully worded, and avoid specific reference to the 
UN polices’ legal obligation to comply with local laws and regulations. Research found 
that these provisions are a reflection both of a complex reality and the delicate balance 
between the desire that all UN personnel should make their utmost effort to observe the 
local laws and regulations, and the perceived difficulties in doing so.51 On some 
occasions, the UN appears to take a conservative approach. For example, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Procedures for Determining Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent-Owned Equipment' (9 July 
1996) UN Doc. A/50/995, (hereinafter ‘1996 Model MoU’). However, the 2007 version refers to FPUs. 
UNGA, 2007 MoU, Annex A, para.1.  
48
 Annex H to the 2007 Model MoU. UNGA, 2007 MoU. 
49
  Durch et al, Improving Criminal Accountability, pp.22-23. 
50
 However, it should be noted that the main motivation for the UN to incorporate the Code of Conduct 
through a MoU was the need to clarify the prohibitions on sexual exploitation and abuse. See ibid, pp.22-
23 for the background to incorporating the Codes into the MoU. 
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Capstone Doctrine,52 the renewed set of principles and guidelines for Peace Operations 
issued in 2008, considers that a UN operation should show respect ‘to local customs, 
institutions and laws’, and explains that it has a ‘direct effect upon the perception of its 
legitimacy’.53 The tone of this Doctrine is not very strong, and certainly does not indicate 
that local criminal law legally binds the UN police or any other mission personnel. On 
the other hand, a General Assembly document emphasized that the UN’s efforts in 
raising the awareness of its personnel should continue to focus on ‘the obligation of all 
United Nations personnel to observe the laws of the host State’.54 The obligation to 
observe the law is stronger than that of respect for the law.  
 
There are some legitimate reasons for leaving the obligation vague. Some conduct, 
which is in accordance with the functions and roles that the UN police are required to 
carry out, may nevertheless breach local criminal law, for example, carrying arms and 
detaining people.55 In this regard, it is necessary to identify those laws that would hinder 
the UN police from delivering their functions. The UN should then enter into an 
agreement with the host State to ensure that the UN police are exempt from those laws 
from the outset. Separately, some local laws may be contrary to human rights laws, 
norms and standards.56 In such circumstances, the UN needs to negotiate an 
                                            
52
 UN DPKO/DFS, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines' (January 2008) 
UN Doc. -, (hereinafter ‘Capstone Doctrine’). 
53
 Ibid, p.36. 
54
 (Emphasis added). UNGA, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United 
Nations Officials and Experts on Mission' (22 July 2013) UN Doc. A/68/173, para.27. 
55
 See Chapter 2, section 1, for the functions and roles of the UN police. 
56
 United Nations Law Reform Project, ‘UN Peacekeeping and The Model Status of Forces Agreement’, 
p.38, para.188; Durch et al. observed this as ‘the de facto requirement that UN personnel only be subject 
to judicial processes that satisfy basic international human rights standards’. Durch et al, Improving 
Criminal Accountability, p.27.  See also UNGA, 'A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (24 March 2005) UN Doc. A/59/710, 
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agreement with the host State which would exclude these laws from applying to its 
personnel.57 In fact, the UN has taken this approach in some of its documents.58  
 
However, the UN appears to accept that its police are bound by the host State’s criminal 
law, at least in principle. It has repeatedly emphasized that UN police officers can be 
prosecuted in the host State, save for the issue of immunity.59 The fact that the UN 
accepts that criminal proceedings can be brought at all must be an indication that it 
accepts that UN police officers are obliged to comply with the criminal laws of the host 
State. 
 
2-1-2. What can the UN do to ensure that its police personnel are aware of the 
content of local laws and their obligation to respect these? 
Certain documents have been provided to UN police personnel individually, in order to 
make them aware of the possibility that they might be subject to criminal proceedings in 
the host State.60 The most important of these documents is the “Undertaking”, which 
                                                                                                                                            
para.67 (b), 87. The latter paragraph (para.87) deals with the fact that the UN did not anticipate that its 
personnel would be working in places where the legal system is so devastated. 
57
 An example would be a criminal law in the host State that prohibits a consensual same-sex relationship. 
If UN police were to be exempt from this law, immunity would not be applicable should UN police officers 
engage in such acts. Chapter 6, section 1-4.  
58
 UN police officers ‘shall respect the legislation applicable in the mission area insofar as it is not in 
conflict with internationally recognized human rights standards or United Nations Rules, Regulations and 
other issuances’. UN DPKO, 2007 Guidelines, para.36. It is possible that, in relation to operational 
conduct, immunity may be invoked to protect UN police personnel. See Chapter 6, sections 1-4-1, 1-4-2. 
59
 UN DPKO, 2003 Directives, para.8; 2007 Guidelines, para.30; UNGA, UN, 'Secretary-General’s Bulletin 
‘Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse' (9 October 2003) UN Doc. 
ST/SGB/2003/13, (hereinafter ‘SEA Bulletin’). The SEA Bulletin’s Section 5 does not distinguish between 
the host State and the sending State. It simply states that cases may be referred to the national 
authorities for criminal prosecution. ‘Where there is a functional legal system in the host State, a crime will 
be investigated and prosecuted in accordance with the laws, practices and procedures of that State’. 
UNGA, 2006 Legal Experts Report, para.14. 
60
 The documents consist of an “Undertaking”, “We Are Peacekeepers”, Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of Officials 
other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission, among other mission directives and Standard 
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requires that the UN police accept that substantiated cases of sexual exploitation and 
abuse may ‘be referred to the competent national authorities for the purposes of 
criminal prosecution’.61 The Undertaking does not specify which national authorities 
would receive referred cases, thus maintaining the possibility that criminal proceedings 
will take place in the host State. In relation to other conduct, the reference in the 
Undertaking is limited to potential disciplinary action in cases where UN police officers 
are found to have breached their codes of conduct.62 It is not clear why potential 
criminal prosecution is mentioned only in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse. It 
may merely be a reflection of the fact that the UN is focusing on these crimes,63 but it 
would be more appropriate to cover all serious crimes.64 ‘We are United Nations 
Peacekeeping Personnel’ states that, ‘We realize that the consequences of failure to act 
within these guidelines may […] result in administrative, disciplinary or criminal action’, 
thereby making it clear that criminal action may result from any crime committed.65 
 
The question arises as to what the UN is doing to ensure that the UN police are aware 
of the content of local criminal law. The possibility that UN personnel may be unaware 
                                                                                                                                            
Operating Procedures. UN DPKO, 'Undertaking and Declaration by Experts on Mission: UN Police 
Officer/Corrections Officer/Military Observers/Military Liaison Officer' UN Doc. (on file with author), 
(hereinafter ‘Undertaking’). UN, SGB on SEA; UN, Regulations.    
61
 UN DPKO, Undertaking, para.9.  
62
 This is contained in the final paragraph of the Undertaking, the paragraphs of which are not numbered. 
63
 See Chapter 4, sections 2, 3-6. For a discussion of how sexual exploitation and abuse became the 
focus of the revision of the Codes of Conduct for Peace Operations personnel, see Durch et al, Improving 
Criminal Accountability, pp.22-23. 
64
 The reasons for making this argument are given in Chapter 3, sections 1, 2. A similar view was 
expressed in UNGA, 'Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission' (11 
September 2007) UN Doc. A/62/329 in relation to the suggested convention. See para.70(d), (hereinafter 
‘Secretariat Note’). 
65
 See the final point made in UN DPKO, We are Peacekeeping Personnel. 
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of this content has been raised before.66 Such information would be mission-specific, 
and therefore could be expected to be given in the pre-deployment or in-theatre 
training.67 However, there is no evidence that the UN in fact provides this information 
during training.68 It may cause a problem, for example, where the UN emphasizes that 
its police officers are prohibited under its disciplinary rules from engaging in sexual acts 
with persons below eighteen years old, but where it does not inform officers of the age 
of consent according to local criminal law. 
 
2-2. The sending State’s criminal law 
Whether or not the sending States’ criminal laws bind UN police personnel is dependent 
on those States’ criminal codes.69 For the purposes of this work, what is important is 
whether or not sending States can in fact bring criminal proceedings against their 
national police officers who are engaged in UN missions.70 Therefore, whether or not 
the sending States’ criminal laws apply to UN police deployed in UN Peace Operations 
                                            
66
 United Nations Law Reform Project, ‘UN Peacekeeping and The Model Status of Forces Agreement’, 
para.188. 
67
 On the different types of training, see Chapter 2, section 3-3-2. 
68
 The content of the pre-deployment training, as stated in the 1997 guidelines, only touches upon the 
local ‘penal system’ as part of the session on the ‘UNCIVPOL Monitoring in-theatre’. This focuses on their 
monitoring tasks, and not on the content of the local criminal code to which the UN police are subject. UN 
DPKO, Selection Standard and Training Guidelines for UNCIVPOL (UN 1997), pp.20-26, (hereinafter 
‘1997 Selection Guidelines’). Likewise, the content of ‘in-theatre training’ includes Standing Operating 
Procedures, but not criminal codes. Ibid, pp.28-29. There is no information on local criminal law in the 
pre-deployment training kits that are handed out to UN police. To view the content contained in the new 
standardized Core Pre-Deployment Training (CPTM) document, which was developed by the UN in 2009, 
see: 
<http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/SG%20Report%20A%2065%20644.pdf>. 
The UN Pre-deployment Training Standard for Police Officers is available at: 
<http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Training%20Standards%20for%20police%20-
%20Experts%20on%20Mission.pdf>, last accessed 30 September 2014. The content of in-theatre 
training is not accessible to the public. It is tailored to each mission. However, it does not involve training 
which deals with the criminal law or criminal procedural law of the host State. Telephone interview with a 
senior legal officer, 17 September 2014. 
69
 That is, the issue of prescriptive jurisdiction. See n.4. above. 
70
 That is, the issue of enforcement jurisdiction. See n.4. above. 
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will be discussed together with whether sending States’ domestic laws provide for the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction.71 
 
This section has found that the issue which obstructs the prosecution of the UN police is 
not whether or not there is a code to which they are subject; rather, it concludes that 
there may be difficulties in determining which States can exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over the UN police. 
 
3. International law governing jurisdiction 
In order for States to exercise criminal jurisdiction, this must be provided for in 
international law. International law imposes certain limits on a State’s freedom to decide 
on the contents of its criminal law.72 It is therefore necessary to consider whether States 
are free to exercise jurisdiction where this is not prohibited by international law, or 
whether jurisdiction may only be exercised where this is explicitly permitted by 
international law.73 
 
The Lotus decision determined which State can exercise criminal jurisdiction in a 
particular matter. It divided the issue into four categories: prescriptive jurisdiction within 
a territory; prescriptive jurisdiction outside a territory; enforcement jurisdiction inside a 
territory; and enforcement jurisdiction outside a territory. It found that States can apply 
                                            
71
 Section 4-2. 
72
 The Council of Europe observed that any limitations are dependent on the grounds for each extra-
territorial criminal jurisdictional claim. Council of Europe, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, pp.16, 26-27. 
For details, see Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press 2008), pp.102-
104. 
73
 See, for example, States’ various arguments on this point in The Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 238, para.21.  
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their laws both within and outside their territories, unless there is an international law 
rule which prohibits them from doing so.74 In relation to enforcement jurisdiction, States 
are free to exercise jurisdiction within their territories in the absence of a prohibition 
under international law.75 However, they cannot exercise jurisdiction outside their own 
territories, unless there is a permissive rule under international law.76 
 
  
This decision was subject to the criticism that it was too liberal an approach. Many have 
supported a more restrictive approach.77 The Lotus Court deemed it a customary rule,78 
but the current scope of customary law dealing with this issue may be different.79 The 
Nuclear Weapons case emphasized that the Lotus decision needs to be considered in 
light of the particular context at the time.80 Some argue that the content of this 
customary rule is quite different from the way in which it was formulated in the Lotus 
case.81 Others argue that there is another position, which falls somewhere between the 
absence both of prohibition and permission, such as tolerance.82 However, the original 
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 Lotus, pp.18-19. 
75
 Ibid, pp.18-19. 
76
 It ruled that States cannot exercise enforcement jurisdiction outside their territories ‘except by virtue of 
a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention’. Ibid, pp.18-19. 
77
 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), 
pp.235-236; Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction (Dartmouth 
1994), p.319; F A Mann, ‘The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty Years’ (1964) III 
Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye, p.35; Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University Press 1994), p.77; Ryngaert, 
Jurisdiction, p.22; Case concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (New 
Application: 1962) (Second phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para.70.  
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 Lotus, pp.18-19. 
79
 Mann, ‘Jurisdiction after Twenty Years’, p.35; Ryngaert, Jurisdiction, p.21. 
80
 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Declaration of Bedjaoui P) [1996] ICJ Rep 268, 
para.21.   
81
 Ryngaert, Jurisdiction, pp.27-31. 
82
 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo 
(Declaration of Simma J) [2010] ICJ Rep 478, paras.8-10. 
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two approaches do not pose any difficulties for the more established bases for 
exercising jurisdiction.83  
 
Under international law, there are four main bases on which States may exercise 
criminal jurisdiction. These are: territoriality, active personality, passive nationality and 
protective jurisdiction. Territoriality consists of the jurisdiction of the State on whose 
territory the crime was committed. Active nationality is the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
State of nationality of the suspect, whilst passive nationality is exercised by the State of 
nationality of the victim. Protective jurisdiction amounts to an exercise of jurisdiction in 
order to protect the national interests of the State claiming jurisdiction. The first two 
bases are not contested. However, passive nationality is more controversial. Protective 
jurisdiction is much more controversial still.84  
 
3-1. Host State jurisdiction 
The host State is the territorial State in which the criminal conduct was committed. At 
the time of the commission of the crime, the suspect, the victim and witnesses are 
usually all located in the territorial State.85 Territorial jurisdiction is the least contested 
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and most firmly established basis of criminal jurisdiction.86 That is because jurisdiction is 
one of the most tangible forms of the exercise of sovereign power by States.87 
Sovereignty is territorial and, accordingly, jurisdiction is also essentially territorial,88 
although the territoriality of criminal law ‘by no means coincides with territorial 
sovereignty’.89 It is the State’s power to exercise criminal jurisdiction within its territory 
over a person who has committed a criminal offence according to its criminal law which 
is at issue.90 Nothing in international law prohibits the host State from exercising 
criminal jurisdiction.91 
 
There are advantages in relation to the host State’s assertion of criminal jurisdiction. 
Cassese argues that the advantage of the territorial principle is fourfold: the ease of 
evidence collection; the better protection of the rights of the accused; broader 
accountability to the community; and the assertion of the authority of the territorial State 
on its territory.92 The Legal Experts at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly 
cited the availability of evidence and witnesses, as well as the achievement of a greater 
sense of justice for local communities, as favouring the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
host State.93 In the context of criminal conduct committed by the UN police during 
Peace Operations, all these advantages are present, save the protection of the rights of 
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the accused. The argument that the territorial State may provide better protection for the 
accused only works in respect of cases where the accused is accustomed to the State 
in question, either through nationality or long-term residence. UN police personnel are, 
by definition, foreigners, who are not accustomed to the law, custom or language of the 
host State. In addition, in recent missions, host States have typically suffered from a 
lack of an effective legal system.94 As such, in order to protect the accused, it has 
recently become less and less appropriate for them to be tried in the host State. 
However, procedurally, it is still the most convenient place to hold criminal proceedings. 
More importantly, considering the raison-d’être of the mission in the first place, it serves 
the purpose of the Operation better if victims, as well as the whole of the local 
community, can see justice being done.95 
 
In brief, international law allows the host State to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
criminal conduct committed by UN police officers during their service in the host State. 
From the point of view of the rationale behind prosecution, as well as practically 
speaking, it is the best forum in which to bring criminal proceedings. However, two 
issues impede the bringing of criminal proceedings in the host State: first, concerns 
regarding the accused UN police personnel’s due process rights;96 and, second, issues 
relating to immunity.97 
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3-2. The sending State’s jurisdiction 
It is also possible that the UN police officer’s sending State may exercise jurisdiction. 
The sending State is also normally the State of nationality of UN police personnel. 
Depending on the rules which govern who can become a police officer in a State, there 
may be UN police personnel who are sent to a mission by State A, but who are 
nationals of State B. This may happen, for example, if the person concerned is a 
permanent resident of State A.98 Those with dual nationalities would encounter no 
additional issues.99 The percentage of UN police personnel who are residents, but not 
nationals of the sending State, is unknown. The following analysis will focus on 
nationals of sending States. 
 
It is possible that sending States can exercise criminal jurisdiction based on the 
principle of ‘active nationality’. As with most bases of criminal jurisdiction, the active 
nationality principle is based on a link between the conduct and the State claiming 
jurisdiction.100 In the case of the active nationality principle, the link is the nationality of 
the accused. This basis is firmly established in international law, as can be seen from 
discussions at the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee. No State sitting on this 
Committee has challenged the authority of sending States to exercise criminal 
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jurisdiction.101 Scholars have also generally found this principle to be firmly established 
in international law.102  
 
The variation in State practice, it seems, revolves around the requirement of double 
criminality. Some States see the active nationality principle as being applicable only 
where the conduct in question is also a crime under the law of the State where the 
crime was committed.103 The double criminality requirement does not require an act to 
fall into the same category of crime in both States. Rather, it requires the act to be 
punishable under both their laws. The acts addressed by this work are by definition 
criminal in every jurisdiction.104 Therefore, the issue of double criminality is unlikely to 
arise.   
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If jurisdiction is exercised according to the active nationality principle, the UN police 
personnel accused of committing crimes are most likely to be accustomed to the law, 
language and customs of their own States.105 On the other hand, practical difficulties 
with regard to evidence collection would constitute an obstacle to successful 
prosecution. The Sending States’ access to the victims, witnesses, crime scenes, and 
other pieces of evidence, is likely to be severely limited. 106 Even in cases where States 
are in principle willing to prosecute, if they are unable to obtain the necessary evidence, 
there is little chance of a successful prosecution. In these circumstances, national 
authorities are unlikely to proceed with such cases. 
 
3-3. Exercise of criminal jurisdiction by other States 
Other bases of criminal jurisdiction are less well-established. Traditionally under 
international law, a genuine connection was required between the conduct and the 
State claiming jurisdiction for that jurisdiction to be exercised.107 It remains to be seen 
what States consider as being sufficient for establishing the required link, and thus 
permitting the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.  
 
3-3-1. Exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the State of nationality of the victim 
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Where the victim is neither a national of the host State nor the sending State, there is a 
third potential basis for criminal jurisdiction: the passive nationality principle. This 
principle aims to protect nationals living or residing abroad.108 It has been invoked by 
several States109 in relation to a limited number of crimes.110 Taking the Lotus approach, 
there is no general prohibition on States ‘extend[ing] the application of their laws and 
the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory’.111 
When challenging this principle, the nulla poena sine lege principle is sometimes 
raised.112 Presumably the accused must be able to predict that, where he commits a 
certain act in the host State, this would be a criminal offence.113 Non-retroactivity may 
also be an issue if a new form of extra-territorial jurisdiction were to be applied.114 
However, the crimes dealt with here are, by definition, serious crimes that constitute 
criminal offences in virtually all States, so it may be presumed that suspects know that 
their acts are criminal, even though they may not anticipate that the victim’s State of 
nationality might exercise criminal jurisdiction over them, for example, if suspects are 
unaware of the victim’s nationality.  
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This basis for claiming the exercise of criminal jurisdiction remains controversial, as the 
link between the situation and the State concerned may be considered insufficient. This 
is particularly the case in relation to ordinary crimes.115 It may not add much in practice 
in any case. Upon repatriation or completion of service, the alleged offender is likely to 
be present in another State, either the host or sending State. Thus, bringing a 
prosecution may require extradition.116 Witnesses, if any, are likely to be present in the 
host State or in another State, depending on their place of normal residence. Just as 
evidence collection may be very difficult for sending States, so too might victims’ States 
encounter difficulties. Exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the State of nationality of the 
victim would mean that it would be difficult for the community served by the UN mission 
to see justice being served, although the victim would in all likelihood experience this. 
From the point of view of the rights of the accused, this jurisdictional basis does not 
provide an advantage. However, one possible area where the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction has some prospect of success is where the victim is also a UN staff 
member. If neither the host nor sending State has a functioning legal system, or if both 
have a system with significant problems regarding fair trial standards, but the victim’s 
State has a functioning legal system that adheres to human rights standards, that State 
may have the best prospect in bringing fair criminal proceedings.   
 
3-3-2. Universal jurisdiction 
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A possibility open to all States is that of universal jurisdiction. Unlike other bases of 
jurisdiction, there is no connection between the State claiming jurisdiction and the 
conduct itself. It is based solely on the nature of the crime, that is, where the violation is 
so grave that it shocks the human conscience.117 Universal jurisdiction has been 
exercised in respect of piracy since the 17th century, albeit in order to protect the 
interests of States.118 War crimes have been recognized as attracting universal 
jurisdiction and, after World War II, torture and certain acts of terrorism were added to 
the list of crimes that attract universal jurisdiction, in order to safeguard universal 
values.119 The arguments against universal jurisdiction, which are based on the nulla 
poena sine lege principle and non-retroactivity, can be refuted in the same way as in the 
case of passive nationality.120  
 
There are two versions of this principle. The narrower and more widely-accepted 
version is that the State in whose territory the suspect is found may exercise 
jurisdiction.121 The broader version of universal jurisdiction includes situations in which a 
State claims jurisdiction over a foreigner for an act committed outside its territory, while 
he or she is outside its territory. This is termed absolute universal jurisdiction. Except for 
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more recent treaties and draft treaties, universal jurisdiction exists only in the narrower 
sense in international law.122 Exercising universal jurisdiction in the narrower sense is 
obligatory for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, 
and torture under the Torture Convention.123      
 
Even if it is accepted that States may exercise universal jurisdiction where it is not 
prohibited, this may only be done in respect of international crimes.124 The criminal 
offences committed by UN police are not likely to amount to international crimes, 
according to the data collected.125 Moreover, there are difficulties in exercising 
jurisdiction on this basis. First, it must be resorted to with care in order to ensure there is 
no possibility that it could be used to prosecute UN personnel for political purposes.126 
Second, as the link between the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction and the crime in 
question is either non-existent, or involves the mere presence of the suspect in the 
territory, the practical difficulties are considerable.127 Third, it does not immediately 
contribute to a sense of accountability in the local community, nor is a third State best 
placed to protect a suspect’s rights.128 At best, it may work indirectly, through 
encouraging States with firmer links to the situation concerned to bring criminal 
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proceedings.129 If universal jurisdiction were to result in States with links to the conduct 
bringing prosecutions, it would assist in combating impunity, and ensuring that justice is 
served in respect of serious crimes. 
 
3-3-3. The protective principle and the effect doctrine 
There is another principle upon which States may exercise jurisdiction: the protective 
principle. However, this principle is based on the idea that States should be protected 
from offences perpetrated abroad which jeopardize their sovereignty or their right to 
political independence.130 As criminal acts committed by UN police personnel do not fall 
into this category of conduct, this principle is not relevant to this thesis.  
 
Some States invoke the effect doctrine. In terms of this doctrine, a person can be 
convicted of a crime in the State where the effects of his or her act are felt, even without 
the requirement that the act is a criminal offence in the State where it occurred. The big 
difference between the effect doctrine and the protective principle is that, in the case of 
the former, the effect must be felt in the State concerned. However, the effect doctrine is 
controversial.131 One view is that the effect doctrine extends the concept of 
territoriality.132 However, the kinds of crimes committed by UN police personnel are 
unlikely to attract a claim of jurisdiction based on this principle.133 
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4. National laws dealing with jurisdiction 
Another possibility is that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the State concerned 
may be limited by its national laws. Whether or not a State has criminal jurisdiction over 
a person is different from whether or not that person is subject to a particular criminal 
law. In the case of criminal law, the two are claimed to coincide,134 but, in fact, there are 
situations in which there is a breach of a State’s legal regime, but where that State’s 
court does not have the authority to hear that case. For example, where the criminal 
court of State A can only prosecute conduct if an act constitutes a crime under its 
criminal law, as well as under that of the place where the conduct was committed (this is 
the double criminality requirement), there may be conduct that is a crime in State A, but 
not State B. This means that State A cannot bring proceedings in relation to that 
conduct. Thus, although the two differ from each other, there is nevertheless a 
significant overlap between them. 
 
4-1. The host State 
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Under national law, there is no question that the host State possesses the power to 
prosecute suspects. Virtually all national legal systems assert territorial jurisdiction.135 
 
4-2. Sending States 
For the State of nationality of the UN police personnel concerned to able to prosecute 
them, it is necessary that its national criminal law either generally asserts jurisdiction on 
the basis of nationality, or makes specific provision for such proceedings in the case of 
these personnel.136 Criminal prosecution would presumably occur after the suspects 
have returned to their home States, and thus these States would exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction in their own territories.  
 
 
4-2-1. Extra-territorial jurisdiction over nationals for all crimes 
Many States retain criminal jurisdiction over their nationals who are abroad.137 In this 
respect, there is a difference between common-law countries and civil-law countries. 
Traditionally, common-law countries have been reluctant to extend criminal jurisdiction 
to conduct committed abroad. This position has now softened, and many of them have 
established jurisdiction for nationals abroad, at least for certain offences.138 On the other 
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hand, the criminal laws of civil-law countries continue to apply to their nationals, even 
when they are abroad.139  
 
In countries observing Islamic law, this is usually combined with another legal 
tradition.140 The four major sending States with this type of legal system are 
Bangladesh, Jordan, Pakistan and Yemen.141 The criminal laws in these mixed legal 
systems assert that their courts can hear cases in which crimes have been committed 
by their nationals whilst abroad.142  
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In order to analyze the reach of sending States’ criminal laws, a sample of sending 
States from two different time periods was selected. That is, States providing more than 
100 police personnel to UN missions in either April 2001 or April 2013 were chosen. 
There were 22 such States in 2001,143 and 24 in 2013.144 These States provided 82.0 
percent145 and 86.1 percent146 of all UN police personnel respectively, during those 
times. In total, excluding duplications, 37 States form part of this sample. A large 
majority, 29 countries, have jurisdiction for crimes committed by their nationals who are 
abroad.147 17 of the 29 countries require the offence in question to constitute a crime in 
the State where the offence was committed (double criminality).148 There are eight 
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DPKO, ‘Troop and Police Contributors’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>. 
144
 Bangladesh, Jordan, India, Nepal, Senegal, Pakistan, Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Yemen, 
Tanzania, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Zambia, Togo, Turkey, Benin, Burundi, 
the Philippines and Tunisia. UN DPKO ‘Monthly Summary of Contributions (Police, UN Military Experts on 
Mission and Troops), as of 30 April 2013’, ibid. 
145
 This amounts to 6,332 out of a total of 7,724 UN police officers (April 2001). 
146
 This amounts to 10,812 officers out of a total of 12,562 UN police officers (April 2013). 
147
 Bangladesh, Benin, Jordan, India, Niger, Senegal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Yemen, 
Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Togo, Zambia, Turkey, Burundi, Germany, Portugal, Ukraine, France, 
Poland, Argentina, Spain, Malaysia, Russia, Tunisia and Austria. This information was provided by these 
States at the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee, and was cross checked against criminal law and 
criminal procedural laws. UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United 
Nations Officials and Experts on Mission; UNGA, SG Report on Criminal Accountability; UNGA, Report of 
the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission; 
UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on Mission; UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United 
Nations Officials and Experts on Mission; UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal 
Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission; UNGA, Report of the Secretary-
General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission - Addendum; 
UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on Mission - Addendum; UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability 
of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission.  In addition, some have extended the active 
personality principle, so that it covers permanent residents or habitual residents. For example, Malaysia 
and Russia have extended their criminal law to cover their residents or domiciliaries in respect of criminal 
offences committed abroad. IBA, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (IBA 2009), 
p.145. Ukraine has gone further, extending its coverage to stateless persons. Criminal Code of Ukraine 
(entered into force on September 1, 2001), Article 7.  
148
 Rwanda, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Yemen, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Togo, Burundi, Germany, Portugal, 
France, Spain Russia, Tunisia, Benin, Niger and Austria. IBA, ETJ Report. Code Pénal (Niger, tel 
qu’Amendé par la Loi no 2008-18) 2003 . 
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States where criminal law, as a whole, does not automatically apply to their nationals 
abroad.149  
 
Where double criminality is required, there are some acts which a sending State’s 
authorities cannot prosecute even though its criminal law applies. However, this is 
generally not an issue for crimes within the scope of this thesis because they are crimes 
in virtually every jurisdiction.150 
 
4-2-2. Extra-territorial jurisdiction over nationals for particular acts 
Where States lack the power to prosecute their nationals for all acts constituting a 
criminal offence under their criminal laws, they can adopt criminal laws that allow for 
prosecution of certain crimes based on the active personality principle. For example, 
Sierra Leone151 and the US152 have established jurisdiction over human-trafficking 
offences committed abroad by their nationals.153  
 
                                            
149
 Nepal, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, the Philippines, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Australia. Ibid. An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws, Act No. 3815, 8 December 1930, 
The Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. Nepal: Muluki Ain (General Code), 2020 (1963). 
150
 See Chapter 1, section 6. 
151
 ‘A court in Sierra Leone shall have jurisdiction to try an offence under this Act where the act 
constituting the offence has been carried out – (a) wholly or partly in Sierra Leone; (b) by a citizen of 
Sierra Leone anywhere […]’, The Anti-Human Trafficking Act (Sierra Leone, Act Supplement to the Sierra 
Leone Gazette vol CXXXVI, no 44 of 18 August 2005)  2005, s.14.  
152
 UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on Mission, para.25. 
153
 Nepal has criminalized human trafficking against its citizens both in and outside Nepal. Human 
Trafficking and Transportation (Control) Act (Nepal, 2064 [2007], shrawan 8, 2064 [24 July 2007, Act no 5 
of the Year 2064 [2007]), s.1(3). 
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A range of extra-territorial sexual offences are criminalized both in the US and the 
UK.154 In addition, murder, manslaughter, bigamy and perjury can be prosecuted in the 
UK, even if committed abroad by UK nationals.155 Some other types of conduct are also 
subject to extra-territorial jurisdiction in some States, such as fraudulent activities and 
other federal crimes in the US,156 terrorism-related offences in the UK,157 and treason in 
Ghana.158 
 
These act-specific clauses or pieces of legislation have served to remove further 
obstacles to the prosecution of UN police personnel by his or her State of nationality for 
these acts. 
 
4-2-3. Extra-territorial jurisdiction over particular categories of persons 
Some States also claim jurisdiction over all acts prohibited by their criminal law where 
these are committed by certain categories of their nationals. Often these are offences 
committed either by members of a State’s armed forces serving abroad, or by public 
                                            
154
 In the case of the US, it has criminalized sex with minors. Substantial sexual offences can be 
prosecuted under the UK’s laws, which cover UK nationals and residents. UNGA, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission, 
para.25; UK: The Sex Offenders Act (c 51) (UK) 1997, s.7(1); Sexual Offences Act (c 43) (UK) 2003, s.72 
(1). 
155
 Those resident in the UK may also be prosecuted. See The Offences Against the Person Act (UK) 
1861 c 100, ss. 9 & 57(1) (UK); Perjury Act (UK) 1911, c.6, s.8 (UK). 
156
 In addition, the US can exercise criminal jurisdiction over the following conduct if some part of the 
crime is committed in its territory: distributing the proceeds of unlawful activity, the crime of violence in 
furtherance of unlawful activity, and corruption related offences. UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission, paras.26-28; UNGA, 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on 
Mission, para.35. 
157
 See: Michael Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2003), 
pp.50-73. 
158
 These are included in Ghana. See Criminal Code (Ghana, Act 29)  1960 (Consolidated up to 1999); 
The Criminal Code (Amendment) Act (Ghana, Act 646) 2003, s.180(3). Also included is false reporting, 
where it injures the reputation of the State. Ibid, s.185(4). 
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officials in the course of their duties abroad.159 In relation to the sample of States listed 
above, of the eight States which do not have extra-territorial jurisdiction over their 
nationals for all crimes committed outside their borders, two States (Sierra Leone160 and 
the Philippines161) have jurisdiction over their public officials for acts they commit in the 
course of their duties.  While the former category does not include UN police 
personnel,162 the latter ‘public official’ category may include them.163 Australia has made 
a specific amendment to its criminal law to ensure that it has jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by its Federal Police officers who take part in UN Peace Operations.164 The 
question arises as to whether jurisdiction can be exercised with regard to those retired 
police officers who serve as UN police. That is, whether the law covers only those who 
are serving police officers, or whether it also covers those who only act as police 
officers abroad. A separate issue is that of UN police officers who are recruited through 
a private company, as they may not fall into the category of ‘public officials’. A further 
question concerns whether FPU personnel who fall under Ministries of Defence, may be 
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 Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in IL’, p.37. Issues surrounding immunity may arise in such a case. 
160
 Sierra Leone, The Criminal Procedure Acts (Sierra Leone, Act No 32) 1965, s.42 (1). 
161
 Penal Code (The Philippines, as Revised by an Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws, 
Act no 3815, 8 December 1930), Article 2(4). 
162
 Except for any cases in which members of FPU are fulfilling military police functions and serve in the 
armed forces in their home State. The question arises as to whether the law applies to them, if they are 
part of the armed forces back home and are subject to the law applicable to armed forces, even if they 
are not functioning as armed forces in Peace Operations.  
163
 National police personnel are not considered to be carrying out national duties whilst they are serving 
in UN peace operations. A question arises as to whether or not the “public official” category under the 
domestic criminal laws may be applied to UN police members, even if they are considered to be 
performing the functions of the UN mission, and not their national policing duties. 
164
 2003 Amendment to the Crimes (Overseas) Act (Australia) 1964. While not a sample State, New 
Zealand ensures that their police personnel, who serve as UN police abroad, are subject to its jurisdiction 
through two additional pieces of legislation. The United Nations (Police) Act (NZ) 1964, which governs 
police who form part of a UN force; Crimes and Misconduct (Overseas Operations) Act 2004 Crimes and 
Misconduct (Overseas Operations) Act (NZ, Public Act 2004 no 17) 2004, which governs anyone serving 
as part of an 'overseas operations force’. In addition, for example, the Swedish Penal Code provides that 
‘crimes committed outside the Realm shall be adjudged according to Swedish law and by a Swedish 
court: […] if the crime was committed in the course of duty outside the Realm by a policeman […], who 
performs boundless assignments according to an international agreement that Sweden has ratified’. 
Criminal Code (Sweden, 'Brottsbalken') 1965. Chapter 2, section 3-3. 
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subject to a separate body that can bring criminal proceedings against them for acts 
committed during the mission.165  
 
Therefore, at least three sample countries have specific clauses which appear to apply 
their criminal law to certain categories of persons, including their police personnel 
working abroad.166 In total, 32 out of the 37 sample countries (which make up about 
86.5 percent of the States, covering 84 percent of the police personnel from the sample 
countries),167 have criminal jurisdiction in relation to all criminal conduct committed by 
their police personnel abroad.168 In addition, some States have asserted criminal 
jurisdiction over specific offences committed abroad. Overall, a majority of sending 
States can exercise criminal jurisdiction over UN police personnel for the kinds of 
criminal conduct in question.169 There are only five States out of the sample countries 
that may have a problem exercising criminal jurisdiction over their national police 
personnel. This means the problem relating to the lack of criminal jurisdiction on the part 
of the sending State may arise only in relation to 16 percent of personnel amongst 
                                            
165
 On the different kinds of FPU personnel, see Chapter 2, section 1-6. 
166
 Australia, Sierra Leone and the Philippines.  
167
 On 30 April 2013, the total number of personnel coming from those 37 sample States was 11,164 
officers. April 2013 Contributions. Of these, 9,387 officers came from the 32 States where all criminal 
conduct by UN police personnel is subject to their criminal codes.   
168
 Bangladesh, Jordan, India, Senegal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Yemen, Tanzania, Niger, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Togo, Zambia, Turkey, Benin, Burundi, Germany, Portugal, Ukraine, France, 
Poland, Spain, Malaysia, Russia, Australia, Sierra Leone, and the Philippines. As mentioned above, some 
require the conduct to be committed by the UN police in the course of their duties, which, depending on 
the interpretation of the law, may exclude their private conduct. The Philippines and Sierra Leone are 
examples of States in which this is the case.  
169
 For more details on the applicability of the national laws of sending States, see Ai Kihara-Hunt, 
‘Mechanisms of Individual Criminal Accountability of Civilian Police in Peace Support Operations’ (LLM 
thesis, University of Essex 2004) pp.68-74.  
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sample countries.170 This was reflected in the responses by Member States to the UN 
General Assembly’s Sixth Committee. 171   
 
In addition, the rules and regulations which apply specifically to the police in their 
sending States may remain applicable when they are serving in missions. For the most 
part, this is of minor relevance for the present study, but where a national police force 
has its own court which can deal with criminal cases, this issue may become more 
important.172 This may be more relevant for FPU personnel, as some FPU officers are 
members of the military police or of police forces that are institutionally situated within 
Ministries of Defence.173  
 
4-2-4 What actions does the UN take to ensure that sending States’ criminal laws 
apply to the UN police? 
                                            
170
 UN police personnel from these countries represent 14.5 percent of the total UN police personnel. In 
April 2013, there was a total of 12,562 UN police personnel. The number of police personnel coming from 
those five States was 1,842 in total. 
171
 UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on Mission; UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United 
Nations Officials and Experts on Mission; UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal 
Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission - Addendum; UNGA, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Criminal accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission; 
UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on Mission; (31 July 2012); UNGA, SG Report on Criminal Accountability; UNGA, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission.  
172
 For example, the Armed Police Force in Nepal has its own internal court that deals with criminal cases 
committed by its personnel. This Court is similar to the Court established for these purposes for the 
Nepalese Army. UN OHCHR, Nepal Conflict Report (Available at 
<http://wwwohchrorg/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/NepalConflictReportaspx> accessed 10 January 
2015, 2012), pp.190-191, 199-200. 
173
 For example, the Italian Carabinieri belongs to Italy’s Armed Forces, and its personnel are subject to 
courts-martial. See US Department of State, ‘Italy Human Rights Practices, 1995’ (March 1996) 
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_eur/Italy.html> accessed 3 
September 2014, section entitled “Respect for Human Rights”, section a. Other units that deliver law 
enforcement functions within military establishments include: the US Military Police and Special Forces, 
the French Gendarmerie, the Spanish Guardia Civil, the Chilean Carabineros, and the Argentine 
Gendarmes. Michael J Dziedzic, ‘Policing the New World Disorder: Addressing Gaps in Public Security 
during Peace Operations’ in Max G Manwaring and John T Fishel (eds), Toward Responsibility in the 
New World Disorder - Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations (Frank Cass 1998), p.144.  
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An MoU is the obvious vehicle for legal agreements between the UN and the sending 
States regarding FPU personnel. Until 2007, Model MoUs did not stipulate any 
requirements for sending States with regard to the reach of their criminal law.174 The 
2007 Model MoU refers extensively to the sending States’ obligation to apply national 
laws to any members subject to national military law.175 It includes explicit assurances 
by the sending States that they will exercise the required criminal and disciplinary 
jurisdiction over such personnel.176 It has been recommended that each specific MoU 
between the UN and a State sending an FPU should have the same obligation inserted 
in it.177 
 
Where a specific agreement exists between the UN and States regarding IPOs, it 
depends on what is written in it. Where an MoU is considered to apply mutatis mutandis 
between the UN and sending States to both IPOs and FPUs,178 it is unclear what legal 
obligations it gives rise to in relation to IPOs. Where no agreement exists, there is no 
vehicle for the UN to oblige the sending State to ensure that any act that would 
constitute a crime if committed within that State’s territory is treated as a crime by that 
State.   
 
                                            
174
 The 1991 Model MoU required sending States to exercise criminal jurisdiction over military contingent 
personnel, and thus required sending States to subject military personnel to their applicable criminal laws. 
UNGA, 1991 MoU, para.25. However, it was silent on how the UN police were to be dealt with in this 
regard. Neither the 1996 Contribution Agreement nor the 1997 Model MoU refers to criminal law or 
criminal jurisdiction. Contribution Agreement, UN, 'Model Memorandum of Understanding between the 
United Nations and [participating State] contributing resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation] ' UN Doc. (on file with author). 
175
 2007 Model MoU UNGA, 2007 MoU, Article 7, 7.22 in particular. This was done following a 
recommendation by the first experts’ group. UNGA, 2006 Legal Experts Report, para.64 (c). 
176
 UNGA, 2007 MoU, Article 7, 7.22 and 7.23. 
177
 This was recommended to the General Assembly by the UN Secretariat. UNGA, 2007 Secretariat Note, 
para.69 (c). 
178
 As stated in UNGA, 1991 MoU, para.18. 
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Following reports of sexual exploitation and abuse in the DRC, the UN has been 
concerned about the lack of a vehicle for ensuring criminal accountability,179 and the 
issue has been taken up at the General Assembly.180 In the main, two approaches have 
been taken: first, there has been a long-standing attempt to draft a convention dealing 
with establishing criminal jurisdiction over nationals;181 and, second, sending States 
have been urged to extend the applicability of their criminal laws to nationals serving in 
UN Peace Operations, and to establish criminal jurisdiction to enforce these laws.182 A 
Convention has been drafted, but has yet to be adopted,183 and the General Assembly 
resolution simply “strongly urges all States to consider establishing” jurisdiction over 
                                            
179
 UNGA Res 59/300 (30 June 2005) UN Doc. A/RES/59/300 endorsed the recommendations in UNGA, 
'Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group' (GAOR 59th 
Session Supp no 19, 31 January-25 February 2005; 4-8 April 2005) UN Doc. A/59/19/Rev.1, that the SG 
appoint a group of legal experts ‘to advise on the best way’ to ensure the criminal accountability of UN 
staff and experts on mission. Ibid, para.40 (a). A significant part of the discussion in the Special 
Committee centered on the measures required to eliminate SEA.  
180
 See, in general, the discussions held at UNGA Sixth Committee, ‘68th Session and Previous 
Sessions: Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission’  
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/68/CrimAcc.shtml> accessed 1 October 2014. 
181
 It also addresses jurisdiction over habitual residents and those who are found in that State’s territory. 
This is contained mainly in two resolutions: UNGA Res 62/63 (8 January 2008) UN Doc. A/RES/62/63; 
UNGA Res 63/119 (15 January 2009) UN Doc. A/RES/63/119. 
182
 Sending States are “Strongly urge[d …] to consider establishing to the extent that they have not yet 
done so jurisdiction, particularly over crimes of a serious nature, as known in their existing domestic 
criminal laws, committed by their nationals while serving as United Nations officials or experts on mission, 
at least where the conduct as defined in the law of the State establishing jurisdiction also constitutes a 
crime under the laws of the host State” in UNGA Res 62/63, op. para.3; UNGA Res 63/119, op. para.3; 
UNGA Sixth Committee, 'Draft Resolution on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on Mission' (27 October 2011) UN Doc. A/C.6/66/L.16, op. para.3; UNGA Res 64/110 (15 
January 2010) UN Doc. A/RES/64/110, op. para.3; UNGA Res 65/20 (10 January 2011) UN Doc. 
A/RES/65/20, op. para. 3; UNGA Res 66/93 (13 January 2012) UN Doc. A/RES/66/93, op. para.3; UNGA 
Res 67/88 (14 January 2013) UN Doc. A/RES/67/88, op. para.3. 
183
 As of November 2014, neither the Sixth Committee, nor the Working Group it established, has been 
able to agree to begin negotiations based on the draft convention. See the Working Group’s report UNGA 
Sixth Committee, '67th Session: Summary Record of the 24th Meeting' (28 December 2012) UN Doc. 
A/C.6/67/SR24, pp.3, 6-7. Also see UNGA Sixth Committee, 'Report of the Sixth Committee on the 




serious crimes in particular, or at least where double criminality is satisfied.184 In other 
words, the UN lacks any means to oblige sending States to apply their criminal laws.  
 
Even where the MoU obliges sending States to exercise their criminal law over their 
nationals, or where States claim that their criminal laws apply to UN police personnel 
who are their nationals, it is not known whether the UN monitors their legislation in order 
to confirm their claims. Given that it takes the UN several years to collect the relevant 
information, which is in any case by no means complete, it arguably would take the UN 
several more years to confirm all this information.185 Thus, it is difficult to imagine that 
the UN actually checks the information.  
 
The fact that the UN’s efforts to ensure the criminal accountability of its personnel 
stemmed from reports of sexual exploitation and abuse appears to have resulted in the 
UN disproportionately  prioritizing these types of crimes.186 There are two issues raised 
by this approach. The first is that the UN treats crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse 
as a single category and, as a result, does not make it clear that very different forms of 
conduct may thus fall within this category. This leads to a risk that personnel may fail to 
understand that some forms of conduct amount to sexual exploitation and abuse 
                                            
184
 UNGA Res 62/63, op. para.3. 
185
 See the SG Reports, footnote 177. 
186
 For example, the first experts’ report to the GA Sixth Committee recommended that the sending States’ 
jurisdiction should be asserted in relation to ‘serious crimes against the person, in particular those 
involving sexual exploitation and abuse’. UNGA, 2006 Legal Experts Report, para.47. This was also 
recognized in UNGA, 2007 Secretariat Note, para.70(d). The High Panel on Peace Operations, which 
submitted its report in June 2015, also focused on sexual exploitation and abuse. UNGA/SC, 'Uniting Our 
Strength for Peace - Politics, Partnerships and People - Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations' (16 June 2015) UN Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446, paras.258-269. Also see 
Somini Sengupta and Rick Gladsone, ‘Panel Urges Changes in Using UN Soldiers’ The New York Times 
(New York, 16 June 2015) <www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/html?smid> accessed 26 June 2015. 
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crimes.187 The second is that criminal conduct not falling in the SEA category may be 
left unaddressed or ignored.188 
 
As noted above, depending on the domestic laws and practice of their sending States, 
UN police officers may be subject to the criminal law and police code in force in these 
territories. In relation to FPUs, the UN accepts offers for the secondment of their 
personnel from sending States regardless of the type of police forces these FPU 
personnel work for back home, or whether they are part of the armed forces or the 
civilian police forces, armed or unarmed. In light of the severe difficulties experienced by 
the UN in securing the required number of UN police personnel,189 it is difficult to 
imagine the UN basing decisions regarding which police personnel to accept for 
missions on whether or not they are subject to the same laws which are applicable to 
their armed forces. 
 
4-3. The national laws governing the jurisdiction of other States 
States other than that of the State of nationality or the host State may have jurisdiction 
based on the other principles identified above.190  
 
Many States’ laws provide for criminal jurisdiction based on the passive nationality 
principle. For example, Spain,191 Italy,192 France,193 Romania194 and Panama,195 claim 
                                            
187
 This was raised in the UNGA, 2006 Legal Experts Report, para.18. 
188
 In this regard, the Legal Experts Report recommended the adoption of a convention requiring States to 
assert criminal jurisdiction over their nationals abroad for serious crimes against the person. Ibid, para.47. 
However, the UN Secretariat emphasized that such jurisdiction should be asserted in respect of all crimes. 
UNGA, 2007 Secretariat Note, para.70 (d). 
189
 See Chapter 2, section 3-3. 
190
 See section 2-3. 
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jurisdiction on this basis. Burkina Faso,196 Greece197 and Germany198 provide for 
criminal jurisdiction based on the passive nationality principle, subject to there being 
double criminality; and Portugal provides for criminal jurisdiction based on the passive 
nationality principle, but only for certain domestic crimes.199 Poland allows criminal 
jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle only if the suspect is in its 
territory.200 The majority of European States use the passive nationality principle as a 
basis for exercising jurisdiction over acts committed abroad, but only in relation to 
specific crimes.201  
 
                                                                                                                                            
191
 Organic Act 1/2009 (Spain, 3 November 2009), which introduced amendments to Sections 4 and 5 of 
Article 23 of The Organic Law of the Judiciary 6/1985 (Spain, LOPJ - Ley Organica del Poder Judicial) 
1985. 
192
 Criminal Code (Italy, Codice Penale) 1930, Article 10, as cited in REDRESS/FIDH, EU jurisdiction 
study, p.165. 
193
 Penal Code (France) 2005, Articles 113-7.  
194
 Criminal Code (Romania) 1969, Article 5. 
195
 Criminal Code (Panama) 2007, Article 20. As Panama claimed in UNGA, SG Report on Criminal 
Accountability, para.7(b). 
196
 Loi no 043/96/ADP du 13 Novembre 1996 Portant Code Pénal (Burkina Faso) 13 December 
1996, Article 4. 
197
 UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on Mission, para.19; Penal Code (Greece) 1950, Article 7(1). 
198
 Criminal Code (Germany, Version promulgated on 13 November 1998, Federal Law Gazette 
[Bundesgesetzblatt] I p 3322, last amended by Article 3 of the Law of 2 October 2009, Federal Law 
Gazette I p 3214) , s.7(1) and (2). 
199
 Criminal Code (Portugal) 1982, Article 5(1) (b) and (e). As cited in REDRESS/FIDH, EU jurisdiction 
study, p.215. 
200
 Criminal Code (Poland) 1997, Article 110(1), as cited in REDRESS/FIDH, EU jurisdiction study ibid, 
p.210. 
201
 23 States out of 29 EU member States have jurisdiction based on the passive nationality principle in 
relation to at least one crime. REDRESS/FIDH, EU jurisdiction study, p.17. Note that the investigation into 
Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1998 was undertaken on the basis of the passive personality principle. It led 
to a request from the UK for his extradition to the UK and, in 1990, the Argentine officer Alfredo Astiz was 
convicted of the torture and disappearance in Argentina of two French nuns, and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. The trial was conducted in absentia. Cassese, International Criminal Law, p.283. 
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Extra-territorial jurisdiction based on the protective principle and/or effect doctrine is 
provided for in a number of States’ criminal laws. Ukraine,202 the Philippines,203 
Panama,204 Togo,205 Indonesia206 and Yemen207 are examples of States which do this. 
However, there have not been any cases involving a UN police officer that have 
threatened the security of a third State, or otherwise triggered the protective principle 
and/or effect doctrine. These bases, therefore, add little. 
 
Finally, universal jurisdiction is provided for under most States’ national laws for certain 
crimes.208 Normally, acts covered by this type of jurisdiction are international crimes,209 
but some States provide universal jurisdiction for specific and serious domestic crimes, 
such as murder, manslaughter, human trafficking, assault, rape, and the distribution of 
pornography.210 Some of them have additional requirements, such as double 
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 The Criminal Code (Ukraine, entered into force 1 September 2001). See paragraph 1 of Chapter I 
“FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS”), Article 8 as amended by Law No 3316-IV (3316-15) of 
12.01.2006. 
203
 Penal Code (The Philippines, as Revised by an Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws, 
Act no 3815, 8 December 1930), Article 2-2. 
204
 Criminal Code (Panama) 2007, Article 20. As claimed in UNGA, SG Report on Criminal Accountability, 
para.7 (a). 
205
 Penal Code (Togo, Code Pénal) 1980], Article 7. 
206
 Penal Code (Indonesia, Undang-undang RI no 27 Tahun 1999, Tanggal 19 Mei 1999) 1982 , Article 4. 
207
 Penal Code (Yemen, Republican Decree for Law no 12 for the Year 1994 Concerning Crimes and 
Penalties) 1994, Article (3). 
208
 All 29 EU member States exert universal jurisdiction for at least one international crime. 
REDRESS/FIDH, EU jurisdiction study, p.21. 
209
 ‘[T]he crimes over which such jurisdiction may be exercised are of such a gravity and magnitude that 
they warrant their universal prosecution and repression.’ Cassese, International Criminal Law, p.285. 
210
 Germany, Sweden and Norway. Germany: Criminal Code (Germany, Version promulgated on 13 
November 1998, Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I p 3322, last amended by Article 3 of the Law 
of 2 October 2009, Federal Law Gazette I p 3214) , s.6. 15 out of 29 EU member States claim criminal 
jurisdiction based on universal jurisdiction for particular ordinary crimes. REDRESS/FIDH, EU jurisdiction 
study, p.21. Sweden: Criminal Code (Sweden, 'Brottsbalken') 1965, Chapt.2, as cited in REDRESS/FIDH, 
EU jurisdiction study, p.245. Norway: Criminal Code (Norway, The General Civil Penal Code, Act of 22 
May 1902 no 10, with subsequent amendments, the latest made by Act of 21 December 2005 no 131) 
1902, Section 12 (4). As cited in REDRESS/FIDH, EU jurisdiction study, p.202.  
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criminality,211 or the presence of the suspect in their national territory.212 Other States 
will only invoke universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute a suspect if an official request 
is received from the victim or his or her State of nationality.213 Some States invoke 
universal jurisdiction for crimes that attract a particular types of punishment,214 whilst 
others invoke it for any and all ordinary crimes if they meet double criminality 
requirements.215 Some States will reject a request for the extradition of a suspect if the 
requesting State has made the request on the basis of universal jurisdiction.216 
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In short, a number of third States’ national laws would permit the prosecution of UN 
police personnel who are suspected of having committed particularly serious crimes, 
and who then pass through their territories.217 In practice, this is most unlikely to arise 
unless the UN was to seek prosecution. In addition, there may be circumstances in 
which the victim’s State wished to exercise criminal jurisdiction, particularly where the 
legal systems of both the host and sending States may not function in accordance with 
human rights standards. 
    
4-3. Competing bases of national jurisdiction 
The analysis above leads one to conclude that exercising jurisdiction mostly falls either 
to the host State or the sending State. The issue of which of the two States should 
exercise criminal jurisdiction should be addressed in the agreement between the UN 
and the sending States and, in the case of FPU personnel, this should be stipulated in 
the MoU.218 The arrangement in respect of IPOs is less clear, but the practice appears 
to be the same as for FPU personnel, in that the host State has the primary claim to 
exercising jurisdiction, failing which sending States are required to do their best to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over their IPOs.219 
 
Under international law, the system relating to jurisdiction is concurrent jurisdiction.220  
Traditionally, jurisdiction requires a State to have a close connection with the situation 
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concerned, but this connection does not have to be ‘the closest’ connection.221 It is 
argued that there is no obligation to exercise their jurisdiction reasonably.222 On this 
point, it is submitted that the obligation on a State to act in ‘good faith’ under general 
principles of international law223 may mean that jurisdiction needs to be claimed and 
exercised reasonably. Given that these two bases – territoriality and active nationality – 
for criminal jurisdiction are the most established, there may be circumstances in which 
both the host and sending States claim criminal jurisdiction. In such a case, the territory 
in which the suspect is located may have a stronger claim. Thus, the sending State, 
having found a suspect in its territory who is a UN police officer holding its nationality, 
may want to bring criminal proceedings against him. If the host State seeks to 
adjudicate on the same crime, it may be legitimate for the sending State to reject the 
claim for the suspect to be extradited to the host State. 
 
In short, it is theoretically possible that a problem may arise in deciding which State has 
the stronger claim to jurisdiction, if more than one State claims jurisdiction. However, in 
reality, the major problem lies in the lack of criminal proceedings, and not with 
competing claims of criminal jurisdiction.224 
 
5. Conclusion 
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Both international and domestic law have been examined to determine whether they 
constitute a legal barrier to a State’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Under international 
law, the host State has an unchallenged claim of criminal jurisdiction, based on the 
territoriality principle. In addition, the concurrent nature of jurisdiction under international 
law does not prevent other States from exercising criminal jurisdiction.225  
 
Depending on where the suspect is found, the territorial State and the sending State 
have the strongest claim to jurisdiction under international law. Other bases for 
jurisdiction are less well-established, but theoretically, third States have multiple bases 
for claiming criminal jurisdiction. Foremost amongst these are passive personality and 
universal jurisdiction, where relevant.226  
 
At the level of national law, the host State automatically has jurisdiction because the 
crime is committed there. Whether sending States can exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
UN police personnel varies, according to their national laws. For most States, their 
criminal laws apply to all criminal conduct committed by UN police personnel deployed 
in UN Peace Operations, by virtue either of their penal codes or special laws applicable 
to police deployed abroad.227 Some States have adopted laws dealing with specific 
crimes committed by their nationals abroad. 228 Increasingly, the UN’s approach is that 
sending States are responsible for prosecuting crimes committed by their nationals 
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serving as UN police.229 In relation to FPUs, the MoU between the UN and sending 
States makes it clear that these States are obliged to apply their criminal laws to their 
personnel and, in fact, must exercise jurisdiction over them.230 For IPOs, depending on 
the content of a specific MoU or Note Verbale, the exercise of jurisdiction based on the 
relevant criminal law may differ significantly.  
 
The UN has inserted the formula ‘the obligation to respect’ in several documents 
relating to the application of the criminal law of the host State. According to the 
individual undertaking that all UN police personnel sign at the time they are appointed, 
together with internal codes applicable to them, they have a legal obligation to ‘respect’ 
local laws, including criminal law. While the exact content of the obligation to ‘respect’ 
local law is unclear, the fact that the UN accepts that its police personnel can be 
prosecuted in the host State231 indicates that it considers that they are bound by that 
State’s criminal law. This is the same for members of UN police personnel deployed in 
FPUs. 232 UN police officers are provided with information through various codes and 
documents as to the possibility of prosecution in the host State.233 However, there is no 
evidence that the UN in fact makes them aware of the content of the host State’s 
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criminal law. It is particularly important that this should be done, especially where 
criminal codes vary, such as on the age of consent for engaging in sexual acts.234 
 
This leads to the conclusion that there is little evidence that jurisdiction, either at the 
international or national level, constitutes a major legal obstacle to the prosecution of 
crimes committed by UN police officers. Instead, the problem may lie either in the failure 
of States to assert criminal jurisdiction, or in the issues that arise after jurisdiction has 
been asserted. Thus, the next chapter will discuss immunity as a potential legal barrier 
to prosecution.  
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CHAPTER 6: IMMUNITY AS A POTENTIAL LEGAL BARRIER 
 
The previous chapter revealed that jurisdiction poses no major legal barriers to States 
bringing criminal proceedings against UN police officers.1 However, there is another 
possible legal barrier which has often been cited in this regard: the issue of immunity.2 
This chapter examines the extent to which the law of immunity actually acts as a barrier 
to prosecuting UN police personnel. Questions regarding immunity mainly arise in 
relation to: i) the type of conduct by UN police personnel for which immunity is granted; 
ii) the period of time for which immunity from criminal prosecution is granted; and iii) the 
criminal jurisdiction(s) in relation to which immunity is granted.  
 
Other contexts in which immunity may have an adverse impact on the individual criminal 
accountability of UN police personnel are: immunity from its property being searched by 
any State, the inviolability of UN documents and archives; 3 and the immunity of the UN 
police or other personnel from being summoned by a court to give testimony as a 
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witness.4 However, these are auxiliary issues, and thus will not form the focus of this 
chapter.   
 
 A further question relates to the procedure by which immunity is asserted. Even where 
the law does not in principle hinder prosecution and where the scope of immunity is 
clear, if the procedure to assert or deny it is either unclear or open to abuse, it may 
nonetheless prevent prosecution. 
 
In the first instance, law itself will be analyzed with respect to both the scope of 
immunity and the procedure in relation to its application or waiver. Subsequently, insofar 
as the practice differs from the law, this practice will be examined in light of that law.  
 
1. The law of immunity 
1-1. The rationale for immunity  
In order to analyse the exact scope of immunity for UN police personnel, it is first 
necessary to set out the rationale for this immunity, as the scope is closely connected to 
the rationale.  Immunity derives from the needs of the UN. It is aimed at protecting the 
UN from any undue influence or control by a member State,5 to the extent necessary for 
it to fulfil its purposes.6 A strong link exists between the immunity accorded to the UN, 
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and those provided for its personnel; or, rather, the latter derives from the former. As 
such, immunity for UN personnel does not derive from who they are, but from the fact 
that they form a part of the machinery that enables the UN to fulfil its purposes.7 In other 
words, in order for the UN to deliver its functions, not only the Organization but also the 
personnel through which it operates, must be protected from any coercion or threats by 
any State in respect of their performances. Therefore, the rationale for granting 
immunity is not that UN personnel need to be protected, but that they need it to be able 
to do their jobs. This rationale is different from that underlying sovereign or diplomatic 
immunity. Sovereign immunity derives from the agreement amongst States to mutually 
respect each other’s sovereign dignity.8 Diplomatic immunity has two aspects. One is 
the need to protect diplomatic envoys from other States’ courts, in the sense or to the 
extent that they are the personification of their State. The other is that diplomatic envoys 
need to be protected from any undue influence exerted by the receiving State in order to 
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perform their functions.9 The latter point overlaps with the rationale for immunity for the 
UN and its personnel. There are thus some similarities between the immunity provided 
to diplomats and that provided to UN personnel, in particular with regard to the immunity 
applicable in the host State.10 Nevertheless, in the UN’s case, this need to protect its 
functions is the only rationale for granting immunity. This rationale is significant in that it 
provides a test for the geographic scope, duration and subject matter of any specific 
immunity protection.11 This means that immunity should be limited to covering the needs 
of the Organization. Thus, immunity is, generally speaking, not absolute.12 This 
limitation means that if something is not necessary to the effective functioning of the 
organization, immunity should not be given or, alternatively, that it should last only for 
such time as is necessary.  
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) illustrated the principal idea behind the need for 
immunity for personnel working for the UN in the Reparations case:13  
In order that the agent may perform his duties satisfactorily, he must feel that this 
protection is assured to him by the Organization, and that he may count on it. To 
ensure the independence of the agent, and, consequently, the independent 
action of the Organization itself, it is essential that in performing his duties he 
need not have to rely on any other protection than that of the Organization.14 
                                            
9
 Cassese, International Criminal Law, pp.265-267; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 
(3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1979), pp.346-347; Van Dervort, International Law and Organization: 
An Introduction, pp. 289-290; Grant V McCLanahan, Diplomatic Immunity (Hurst & Company 1989), p.82; 
Lewis, State and Diplomatic Immunity, p.2. 
10
 See section 1-4. 
11
 Derek William Bowett and George Paterson Barton, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (The 
Lawbook Exchange 2008), p.432. 
12
 There are some people who are granted absolute immunity, as will be explained in section 1-4-2 (1). 
13
 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations  (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 
174, (hereinafter ‘Reparations’). 
14
 (Emphasis added.) Ibid, para.183. 
309 
 
The issue of immunity is so fundamental that the UN Charter itself specifies the 
immunity protection granted to the Organization and its personnel.15 Article 105 states 
that organizational immunities are provided ‘as are necessary for the fulfilment of its 
purposes’.16 Individual immunities are similarly provided ‘as are necessary for the 
independent exercise of the functions of its personnel in connextion [sic] with the 
Organization’.17  
 
The rationale for immunity - the need to protect the exercise of their functions, or 
‘necessity’ -18 is evidenced in another legal instrument: the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunity of the United Nations (hereinafter the ‘General Convention’).19 As 
articulated later,20 it is an instrument that mirrors the UN Charter. It is therefore not 
surprising that it echoes the rationale provided in the Charter. Individual immunities shall 
be accorded ‘as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions’,21 and ‘in 
the interests of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit [sic]’.22 
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1-2. Sources  
For reasons discussed later,23 the source of a particular immunity may have implications 
for the scope of immunity. The UN Charter provides only the underlying purpose of 
immunity, without giving any further details.24 Subsequently, the General Convention 
was drafted to give effect to Article 105-3 of the UN Charter, ‘with a view to determining 
the details of the application of the privileges and immunity of the Organization and its 
personnel’.25 As such, the General Convention is a legal instrument that interprets or 
‘operationalizes’ the Charter.26 The UN and States are both parties to it. However, 
whereas the States in question all have the same obligations, the UN’s obligations are 
different.27 Issues may arise where relevant States, either the host or sending States, 
are not party to the General Convention. In such cases, the General Convention does 
not apply to those States.28 
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Since neither the UN Charter nor the General Convention refer to the UN police, where 
it is considered that a particular immunity derives from these documents, it is deemed to 
do so by virtue of the nature of their assignment falling either into the category of 
‘Experts on Mission’, or that of high-ranking ‘Officials’ in the case of the Police 
Commissioner.29 
 
Quite apart from the general provision on immunity, there is a bilateral agreement 
between the UN and the host State of a Peace Operation, the Status-of-Forces 
Agreement (SOFA).30 SOFAs provide immunity to the mission and its personnel in 
respect of the host State.31 Where a mission specific SOFA does not exist, the UN 
claims that the model SOFA applies on a provisional basis.32 This has been asserted in 
recent Security Council resolutions establishing missions.33 Were the applicability of the 
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SOFA to be successfully contested, this may have implications for the scope of 
immunity.34 
 
The relationship between the General Convention and the SOFA may be significant 
because the scope of immunity may be different depending upon the interpretation of 
their inter-relationship. There are two possible views on this relationship. The first 
argues that SOFA makes the immunity provisions of the General Convention applicable 
to Peace Operations and, more precisely, in relation to the host State, whether or not it 
has ratified the General Convention.35 This appears to imply that it is the SOFA that 
works as a bridge between UN police personnel and their immunity. In other words, 
without a SOFA, it is not clear whether the UN police personnel and the Police 
Commissioner can claim immunity.  
 
If it is indeed the case that immunity for UN police personnel is reliant on there being a 
SOFA, this means that whatever immunity is granted to these personnel is only 
applicable in relation to the host State. The view that immunity is reliant on there being a 
SOFA would also have a significant impact on immunity for UN police personnel serving 
in missions which do not have a SOFA, or where a mission begins before a SOFA is 
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agreed. In these circumstances, it could be argued that these personnel are not covered 
by immunity, as questions remain with regard to the provisional applicability of the 
model SOFA in such situations.36  
 
The second view holds that immunity exists independently of a SOFA. According to this 
view, it is not the SOFA that gives UN police immunity. Rather, it is the practice of the 
States and the UN that causes UN police personnel to come within the immunity 
category of ‘Experts on Mission’. Thus, the model SOFA simply reflects this practice.37 
The same applies to the Police Commissioner, as he is considered a high-ranking 
Official, which is reflected in the SOFA.38 In this case, the SOFA acts only as a 
complementary instrument for immunity in respect of the host State.39 This seems to be 
the position taken by the UN.40 Given the fundamental nature and vital necessity of 
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 See Chapter 5, section 2-1-1.  
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 UNGA, Model SOFA, para.26. It is claimed that the Model SOFA reflects practice at the point at which it 
was drafted. Ibid, accompanying letter from the Secretary-General, para.1. See also the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, ‘SOFA Workshop Paper’, para.9.  However, note that practice related 
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 UNGA, Model SOFA, para.24. 
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 Where the host State is a party to the General Convention, the mission and its personnel ‘shall enjoy 
the privileges and immunity specified in the [SOFA] as well as those provided for’ in the General 
Convention. Ibid, para.3, in particular footnote d. 
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adopted by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946.’ ibid, footnote to para.3. UN, 'Letter to the Acting 
Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, Regarding Immunities of 
Civilian Police and Military Personnel' (2004) 2004 UN Jurid YB 323, p.324. This supports the view that 
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Commander) as Experts on Mission, as an example of UN practice. Miller, ‘EoM Immunity’, p.29. See 
also Oswald, Documents, p.34. ‘If the model SOFA does not apply and no operation-specific SOFA has 
been concluded between the UN and the host country then the status of the operation and most of the 
members of that operation, except for the military contingent and locally recruited personnel […], will be 
governed by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunity of the United Nations’. 
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immunity,41 it would be most appropriate to consider that immunity exists under the UN 
Charter, as interpreted in the General Convention.42   
 
This would mean that where both the host and sending States and, for that matter, any 
other States that may seek to exercise criminal jurisdiction, have ratified the General 
Convention, there are two separate sources of immunity granted to the UN police 
personnel (including the Police Commissioner). These two kinds of immunity may vary 
in their scope. Where a State is not party to the General Convention, it is important to 
establish whether the whole of the General Convention, or only some of its provisions, 
are deemed to have acquired customary status. 
 
The status of the General Convention 
There are some who consider the entire General Convention to have become 
customary. The UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) has suggested that the provisions of 
the Convention became a ‘part of the general international law governing the relations 
of States and the United Nations’ in 1967.43 It has near-universal ratification, as it has 
been ratified by 160 States.44 However, this issue is still open to debate.45 Nevertheless, 
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 See section 1-1 above. 
42
 On the application of the General Convention, see section 2. 
43
 UN, Question of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, of Representatives of Member States 
and of Officials of the Organization - Statement Made by the Legal Counsel at the 1016th Meeting of the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on 6 December 1967, pp.311-14. See also Ralph Zacklin, 
‘United Nations Management of Legal Issues’ in Jessica Howard and Bruce  Oswald CSC (eds), The Rule 
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University of Melbourne,11–13 November 2002, Kluwer Law International 2002), p.119. 
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 This was the situation as of 7 November 2014. The ratification status is available at UN, ‘United Nations 
Treaty Collection’  <https://treaties.un.org/> accessed 7 November 2014. On the relationship between the 
large number of ratifications and customary status of this Convention, see Raphaël Van Steenberghe, 
‘The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute Clarifying its Nature’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1089, p.4. In North Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ explicitly endorsed the idea that 
ratification of a treaty by a large number of States may lead to the transformation into customary law of its 
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the UN Charter itself requires all member States to give effect to Article 105-2 of the 
Charter. The UN has taken the stance that the Charter itself obligates all member 
States to give effect to the privileges and immunities set out therein, ‘whether or not 
they have acceded to the Convention’.46 However, because the obligations enshrined in 
the UN Charter are very vague, it is unclear where the details of these obligations 
should be sought.  
 
1-3. Status of UN police personnel in terms of immunity 
The type and scope of immunity are determined according to the status of the UN 
personnel concerned. Thus, it is essential to clarify their status.  
 
UN police personnel in general 
The UN Charter refers only to ‘Representatives of Members’, and ‘officials of the 
Organization’.47 However, people who are not ‘officials of the Organization’, but 
nonetheless deliver the Organization’s functions, were recognized and included in the 
                                                                                                                                            
provisions through its influence on the practice of non-State parties. North Sea Continental Shelf case 
(Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/The Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 , pp.43-44. 
45
 For example, in a case heard by the International Tin Council (ITC), a judge stated that, ‘International 
organizations such as the ITC have never, so far as I know, been recognized at common law as entitled 
to sovereign status. They are accordingly entitled to no sovereign or diplomatic immunity in this country 
save where such immunity is granted by legislative instrument, and then only to the extent of such grant’. 
Standard Chartered Bank v ITC and Others [1987] 1 WLR 641, 648 (Bingham J), pp.647-8. 
46
 UN, Question of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, of Representatives of Member States 
and of Officials of the Organization - Statement Made by the Legal Counsel at the 1016th Meeting of the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on 6 December 1967, para.9. See also the International Law 
Commission (ILC), which considers that the obligation to give effect to the privileges and immunity to 
officials derives directly from the UN Charter. Ibid, p.313, para.9; ILC, 'The Practice of the United Nations, 
the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning their Status, Privileges 
and Immunities: Study Prepared by the Secretariat' (1967) ILC YB vol 2 154, p.265. para.246. 
47
 UN Charter, Article 105-2. 
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discussion of who constitutes ‘officials’.48 Subsequently, at the time the General 
Convention was drafted, the view was taken that the UN needed to assure the 
privileges and immunity for those experts who were not UN staff members.49 For this 
reason, where early instruments and documents, including the UN Charter, refer to 
‘officials’, it is clear that the term was intended to include experts who are not officials, 
but who are nevertheless entrusted by the UN to deliver some of its functions.  
 
This category of persons is referred to as ‘Experts on Mission’ in the General 
Convention, as distinguished from ‘Officials’.50 Officials are those personnel appointed 
as staff members who are bound by Staff Rules and Regulations,51 while ‘Experts on 
Mission’ are defined as those who are not ‘Officials’, but who are, nonetheless, 
‘performing missions for the UN’.52 This definition of Experts on Mission is ambiguous, 
and has left member States confused concerning the difference between the two 
categories.53 The UN has provided its interpretation of this definition on multiple 
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 The Sub-Committee to the Sixth Committee on Privileges and Immunity in submitting a draft of the 
future Article 105 noted that ‘officials’ include ‘the agents (functionaries, etc.) of the Organization and of 
its organs, authorities or agencies’. UN, 'Report Submitted by Subcommittee to Committee IV, UN 
Conference on International Organization, vol 13' (18 May 1945) UN Doc. 412 IV/2/A/2 (2) P.779.  Also 
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UN Conference on International Organizations, vol 13' (11 May 1945) UN Doc. 228, IV/2/10, p.74, which 
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 Miller, ‘EoM Immunity’, pp.17-19. 
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 General Convention, Article VI.  
51
 UN, Question of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, of Representatives of Member States 
and of Officials of the Organization - Statement Made by the Legal Counsel at the 1016th Meeting of the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on 6 December 1967, p.284, para.340. 
52
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members on the UN Pension Board. They were considered Experts on Mission while performing functions 
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occasions.54 According to the UN, an expert is assigned a specific task, often based on 
a contract.55 A person’s status as an Expert on Mission is determined at the time of his 
appointment according to different contractual conditions, chiefly the nature of his 
contractual relations and his terms of service with the UN. These matters are decisive in 
categorizing someone.56 The Secretary-General (SG) has authority over an expert only 
in relation to a particular assignment, unlike the case of Officials. Furthermore, Experts 
on Mission cannot be assigned to any other activity.57 
 
The ICJ examined the elements of ‘Experts on Mission’ in two cases. In the Mazilu 
case, the Court was asked to rule on whether the applicability of privileges and 
immunity granted to Experts on Mission should be granted to a person who was 
appointed as a Special Rapporteur of the UN’s Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in respect of his own State of nationality.58 
The ICJ held that Experts on Mission are those assigned to a mission by the 
Organization. The experts: 
[…] may or may not be remunerated, may or may not have a contract, may be 
given a task requiring work over a lengthy period or a short time. The essence of 
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 ILC, 1967 ILC Immunities Study, p. 284. See also UN, 'Question of Whether Contractors’ Personnel 
Could be Considered as “Experts on Mission” – Article VI, Section 22, of the 1946 Convention on the 
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 Miller, ‘EoM Immunity’, p.21; ILC, 1967 ILC Immunities Study, para.340. 
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 ILC, 1967 ILC Immunities Study, paras.340-341. 
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the matter lies not in their administrative position but in the nature of their 
mission.59 
 
The ’mission’ often includes travel, but ‘embrace[s] in general the tasks entrusted to a 
person, whether or not those tasks involve travel’.60 In the Cumaraswamy case, the ICJ 
considered whether a Special Rapporteur at the UN Commission on Human Rights was 
immune from legal proceedings in his State of nationality, in relation to what he had said 
during interviews he had given.61 The Court followed its finding in the Mazilu case, 
stating that, ‘what is decisive is that [the Experts on Mission] have been entrusted with a 
mission by the [UN]’.62 The word ‘experts’ suggests that there are professional skills 
they can offer.63 While the Court noted that some Experts on Mission have participated 
in peacekeeping forces,64 it did not include UN Police in the list of examples of Experts 
on Mission.65  
 
That notwithstanding, UN police personnel are considered to be ‘Experts on Mission’ by 
the UN, whose practice it is to classify as such a person who is entrusted to perform a 
specific and important task for it, even if that person is neither a staff member nor a 
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 Ibid, para.48. 
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61
 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
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representative of a member State.66Based on their professional skills, UN police officers 
are specifically called on to provide their services to the UN for a certain period of time. 
They are assigned a mission by the SG. IPOs hold individual contracts with the SG, 
while members of FPUs are deployed as units. The description of IPOs fits neatly into 
the ‘Experts on Mission’ category of personnel, as expanded upon by the ICJ in the 
cases cited above. As FPU personnel are also employed to perform duties based on 
specific professional skills, they also appear to match the requirements for being 
‘Experts on Mission’. However, their mode of employment does not reflect the typical 
character of Experts on Mission.67    
 
Separately, SOFAs explicitly categorize UN police personnel as Experts on Mission in 
relation to the host State. For example, the model SOFA provides that UN police 
personnel ‘shall be considered as experts on mission within the meaning of Article VI of 
the Convention’.68 Mission-specific SOFAs do not modify this provision.  
 
The OLA has observed that both mission-specific SOFAs and the model SOFA 
consistently place UN police officers in the same category and, even where an 
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 Immunities accorded to persons on the basis of their link with the UN are divided into different 
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individual SOFA has not been agreed or where a model SOFA is not made applicable to 
a specific mission, the UN police’s status remains governed by the General Convention 
as being Experts on Mission.69 There has not been any challenge to the categorization 
of UN police officers as Experts on Mission, at least since the mid-1990s. Therefore, it is 
submitted that UN police personnel are Experts on Mission because the nature of their 
assignment with the UN corresponds to the nature of the work conducted by Experts on 
Mission, as defined in the General Convention.70 
 
Since the recruitment and deployment process of FPU personnel,71 as well as their 
command structure,72 are similar to those of military contingents, there were 
suggestions that FPUs should be subject to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their 
sending States, as are the military contingents.73 If that were the case, FPU personnel 
would be immune from all host State criminal proceedings, but not immune to criminal 
proceedings instigated by their sending States. Since the UN is increasingly reliant on 
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 The UN has consistently claimed that the immunity provided for in the General Convention applies 
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FPUs, discussions on the criminal accountability of Experts on Mission in peace 
operations have been held at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. It was 
clarified that both IPOs and members of FPUs are considered to be Experts on 
Mission.74  
 
UN Police Commissioner 
The status of a UN Police Commissioner differs from that of other members of the UN 
police. For reasons which are discussed below, the Police Commissioner is considered 
to be a high-ranking Official in the Organization. 
 
The Police Commissioner is selected and appointed by the SG, with the consent of the 
Security Council, and reports directly to the SRSG, unlike the other members of the UN 
police.75  While some ambiguity remains regarding the difference between Officials and 
Experts on Mission, this selection and appointment process, as well as the direct 
employment relationship between the UN and the Police Commissioner, indicate that 
the position of Police Commissioner shares more characteristics with those of an 
Official.76 Thus, the Police Commissioner position differs from those of Experts on 
Mission, who lack a direct employment relationship with the UN.77  
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Within the category of Officials, there is a sub-category containing a limited number of 
high-ranking Officials, whose duties and responsibilities are so vital that they require a 
different type of immunity.78 The General Convention provides that this category is 
limited to the SG and Assistant Secretaries-General (ASGs),79 but since it was drafted, 
there have been new developments in the Organization. For example, during the 
reorganisation of the UN structure, a new category of Under Secretaries-General 
(USGs) were created. They are deemed to be in the same immunity category as the 
SG, because: 
[...] the magnitude and importance of their functions and operations are such that 
the privileges and immunity envisaged in Section 19 of the General Convention 
are as necessary for their independent exercise of their functions as they were to 
the Assistant Secretaries-General.80 
 
Whether the Police Commissioner’s functions can be considered to have the same 
magnitude and importance so as to require protection under Section 19 of the General 
Convention is questionable. Just like the USG, at the time the Convention was drafted, 
Police Commissioners did not exist in any mission, so it is the reasoning that matters in 
such a consideration. Guidance provided by the UN states that the protection offered by 
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Section 19 of the General Convention is based on the principle that ‘the officials ranking 
immediately below the executive’ should enjoy the same level of protection as the SG.81 
While the Police Commissioner certainly leads one of the core functional groups of the 
Peace Operation,82 he reports to the SRSG, which means that the internal ranking of 
the Police Commissioner is at least twice removed from the SG. In some missions, the 
Police Commissioner reports to the Deputy SRSG.83 In smaller missions, some heads 
of police are appointed at a lower professional rank. Those lower-ranking heads are 
called Senior Police Advisors,84 and they may not enjoy the same immunity as the 
Police Commissioner.  A question remains as to whether all heads of UN police 
components can be considered to be equally high-ranking Officials by virtue of the 
nature of their appointments.   
 
The model SOFA places the “head of the United Nations civilian police”, normally the 
Police Commissioner, in this category of high-ranking Officials.85 Mission-specific 
SOFAs have followed this method of categorization since at least the 1990s.86  
 
If it can be established that, under customary law, the UN Police Commissioner is a 
high-ranking Official within the meaning of Section 19 of the General Convention, he 
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would be assumed to have the same immunities which are accorded to that category of 
personnel independently of the SOFA. The UN has taken the position that the model 
SOFA reflects its practice.87 This would mean that the Police Commissioner is 
categorized as a high-ranking Official by virtue of the nature of his appointment. It is 
difficult to find any authority for this interpretation of the UN Police Commissioner’s 
immunity coverage, as the issue has never been pursued in the courts.88 Where a 
SOFA is non-existent or, more precisely, is considered to be non-existent, it is possible 
that the Police Commissioner’s status is less than that of a high-ranking Official, and is 
possibly that of an ordinary Official or an Expert on Mission.89   
 
The immunity categories to which ordinary UN police personnel and the Police 
Commissioner belong determine the scope of their immunity. 
 
1-4. Scope of immunities for UN police personnel  
There are two issues which need to be distinguished. The first relates to the acts which 
are covered and, depending on this, immunity can be absolute or functional. Absolute 
immunity applies in respect of all acts, regardless of whether or not the act was carried 
out in an official capacity or in the performance of an official mission.90 Functional 
immunity, on the other hand, only applies to official acts.91 Private acts having nothing to 
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do with official functions, such as committing rape in private accomodation after working 
hours, would be covered by absolute immunity, but not by functional immunity.  
 
The second distinction relates to what the relevant immunity shields the person from. 
The main immunity provided to Peace Operations personnel concerns their arrest and 
detention92 and, separately, any legal proceedings against them.93 For UN police 
personnel, immunity from legal proceedings can arise where they are considered to be 
either a suspect or a witness to a crime. Where a UN police officer commits a crime, 
and another UN police officer is a witness to that crime, two separate immunity claims 
can arise in relation to any resultant legal proceedings. 
 
1-4-1. UN Police personnel in general 
Conduct covered 
As some types of immunity only cover certain acts, it is necessary to consider what 
types of conduct are covered by immunity. Article VI of the General Convention 
provides two different types of immunity to Experts on Mission, as far as criminal 
proceedings are concerned: immunity from personal arrest or detention,94 and immunity 
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from criminal proceedings, if these arise in respect of their official statements and 
functions.95  
 
Section 22 of the General Convention states that: 
Experts […] performing missions for the United Nations shall be accorded such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their 
functions […] In particular, they shall be accorded: 
a. immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal 
baggage; 
b. in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of 
the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every kind. 
  
The first form of immunity is not accorded to Officials,96 and reflects the circumstances 
in which Experts on Mission are likely to operate, which requires an additional 
safeguard.97 In relation to the second form of immunity, UN police officers are immune 
from proceedings only in respect of acts committed as part of their official functions,98 
and not in respect of acts performed in their private capacities. This means that there is 
a possibility that, with regard to some private acts, a UN police officer can be 
prosecuted, but cannot be arrested or detained during his mission. If criminal 
proceedings are to be brought against a person, arrest is a necessary step. If he can be 
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prosecuted, but cannot be arrested or detained, immunity from arrest may, in practice, 
also prevent criminal proceedings from taking place.  
 
This immunity from arrest and detention may have been adapted from diplomatic 
immunity, as diplomatic immunity enshrines personal inviolability.99 Because part of the 
rationale for immunity is similar, i.e. the need to secure the smooth functioning of 
personnel in the receiving/host State,100 the scope of immunity is arguably also 
comparable. As such, the immunity of UN personnel was initially developed in an 
analogous fashion to that of diplomatic immunity.101 However, there is an important 
difference between the two, in that the immunity which protects UN personnel is not 
attached to the personnel themselves, but rather to the functions they carry out.102 In 
addition, diplomatic immunity is only applicable in relation to the receiving State,103 while 
the immunity of UN personnel also applies elsewhere, as will be examined later.104 If a 
diplomat commits a crime and his immunity is not waived, the receiving State can 
declare him persona non grata and expel him. Moreover, he does not enjoy immunity in 
his own State. This system works to safeguard against the abuse of immunity.105 An 
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equivalent system does not exist in respect of immunity granted by the UN. In absence 
of safeguards, it may be argued that immunity from arrest and detention is problematic. 
The fact that there is no safeguard may strengthen the argument that UN personnel 
should only have immunity for official functions, and not from arrest or detention.106 This 
chapter will deal later with how the UN applies this immunity in fact.107 
 
In relation to immunity from criminal proceedings, the essence of UN immunity is 
functional, in that it only covers official acts. However, diplomatic immunity is different, 
as it also covers criminal proceedings in the receiving State, regardless of the character 
of the conduct in question.108 The limitation of immunity to ‘official acts’ is also reflected 
in the SOFA.109 The key, then, is identifying what comes within ‘official acts’. 
Substantively, there are no detailed guidelines as to what constitutes an ‘official’ act, 
and determining what constitutes an official act is based on the facts of a particular 
case.110. The closest the UN has come to clarifying the scope of an ‘official’ act was its 
opinion regarding the difference between ‘on-duty’ and ‘off-duty’ acts. It stated that: 
The primary factor of determining an ‘off-duty’ situation [… is] whether the 
member of a peacekeeping mission was acting in a non-official/non-operational 
capacity when the incident occurred, and not whether he/she was in military or 
                                                                                                                                            
safeguard against the abuse of immunity depends on the likelihood that the sending State will bring 
criminal proceedings. 
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civilian attire at the time of the incident or whether the incident occurred inside or 
outside the area of operations.111    
 
In addition, both the Security Council resolution establishing the mission and the SG’s 
report, which provides a detailed mission design, may be taken into account in 
determining what is ‘official’,112 as they define the roles and functions of UN police 
personnel.113 The determining factor is whether the UN police member concerned was 
acting in an official capacity, or not. This is ambiguous at best, and leaves a large space 
for different interpretations. This guidance makes it easier to assert that an allegation of 
rape after working hours in a private residence falls outside the ‘official functions’ 
demarcation, but it may be more difficult to determine whether an allegation of rape, 
which is claimed to have occurred during an investigation at a detention centre by a UN 
police officer, falls within the category of official functions. Difficulties such as this have 
arisen more frequently in recent and complex Peace Operations, as UN police officers 
become more involved in actual policing tasks.114  
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However, one important element can be gleaned from this guidance: the determination 
of whether the conduct concerned is official is made at the time of the incident. The 
mere fact that a UN police officer is present in the area of operations does not mean 
that he is on duty by virtue of being there. Rather, the official character of his conduct is 
determined by whether he is actually on duty at the time he committed the offence. This 
appears to reject the argument that UN police officers are on duty ‘24/7’ while they are 
on a mission.115 However, whenever UN police officers are required to be on stand-by 
by virtue of their roles in the mission, this determination may be more ambiguous.  
 
Two cases warrant discussion in this context. The first was a civil case, in which redress 
was sought in relation to allegations of sexual harassment and battery by Officials. The 
sexual misbehaviour was alleged to have been committed in a UN office while the 
alleged offenders were performing their official functions. The US courts upheld the 
defendants’ claim that those acts were covered by functional immunity. In particular, the 
Appeals Court found that whether or not the alleged acts of sexual harassment or 
battery were of an official nature was irrelevant. It found that what matters is whether 
the act was performed whilst delivering official functions, regardless of how improper the 
behaviour may have been.116 This finding contrasts with the decision in the second 
case, that of Ranollo. Mr. Ranollo was a driver for the SG, and was caught speeding 
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whilst driving the SG back from a meeting. The UN’s claim that Mr. Ranollo was 
performing his official functions was rejected by the court.117 These two cases show that 
the determination of what comes within the term ‘official act’ is not well established.   
 
SOFAs merely confirm the UN police personnel’s immunity category in respect of the 
host State,118 and do not provide any further guidance on the scope of immunity. Some 
argue that a criminal act is per se excluded from being considered part of the UN 
police’s official functions.119 There is no text in any legal instrument which clarifies this 
point. However, it seems strange to suggest that a criminal act is automatically excluded 
from constituting an official function. If this were the case, the issue of immunity from 
criminal proceedings would not have arisen in the first place.  
 
There are a number of elements that must be taken into account in determining what 
constitutes an official act. The Guidelines for UN Police officers deal with all criminal 
offences, and state that UN Police officers are subject to the jurisdiction of the host 
State in respect of any criminal offences committed by them in that State.120 Some 
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mission-specific guidelines contain a similar statement.121 However, the guidelines are 
misleading, as official conduct, even if criminal in nature, may be covered by 
immunity.122 Even where potential criminal liability arises in relation to an ultra vires act, 
for example, the excessive use of force by UN police officers while legitimately 
controlling a crowd, the act cannot immediately be considered as falling outside their 
official functions. However, there is nothing stopping the UN from waiving immunity in 
circumstances such as these.123 
 
When the crime under consideration is an international crime, the case for annulling the 
effect of immunity is stronger.124 It then becomes a question of which law is more firmly 
established: the law of immunity, or the law prohibiting international crimes. As yet, no 
case has been heard regarding the applicability of the immunity of UN personnel in 
relation to an international crime. For this reason, cases dealing with other types of 
immunity in relation to international crimes are examined briefly. In Jones and Al-Adsani 
cases, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that immunity shielded both 
the respondent States and State officials from the applicants’ civil claims in relation to 
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alleged acts of torture.125 In Italy v Germany, the ICJ upheld the immunity of the State 
from civil proceedings in relation to war crimes.126 Another case that dealt with this issue 
was the Arrest Warrant case.127 Here, the Court upheld the immunity of an incumbent 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in respect of a third State’s attempt to exercise judicial 
jurisdiction for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.128 A contrasting case is 
that of Pinochet, in which the UK House of Lords denied  immunity to a former Head of 
State for a series of criminal proceedings relating to  alleged acts of torture.129 In 
addition, domestic courts have begun finding the immunity of State officials inapplicable 
in relation to specific international crimes.130 This different approach by different courts 
appears to have been justified by distinguishing immunity for criminal proceedings from 
that of immunity from civil claims.131 However, the ICJ and ECtHR’s approach, which is 
that immunity is procedural in character and does not conflict with the unlawful nature of 
the conduct,132 appears to support the claim that immunity is applicable in criminal 
proceedings in domestic courts. However, this may be handled differently by 
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international tribunals.133 In any case, it is extremely unlikely that a situation such as this 
will come before a court in the near future, as this situation requires: i) that a UN police 
officer commits a war crime, a crime against humanity, the crime of genocide or another 
international crime (e.g. torture) during his service with the UN; and ii) that the SG either 
finds that the act falls within the official functions of UN police personnel and refuses to 
waive immunity, or, in the case of a Police Commissioner, he refuses to waive 
immunity.  
 
In summary, UN police personnel are given functional immunity. It is generally accepted 
that this means that they are immune both from arrest and detention, and from criminal 
proceedings in relation to acts carried out in the performance of their official functions. 
In relation to other acts, the law provides that they are immune from arrest and 
detention while on mission. However, questions remain as to whether this is 
appropriate. It is important that where UN Police personnel have immunity in one State, 
that should not mean that they can act with impunity. This will largely depend on 
whether or not they can be prosecuted in another State. Thus, the next section analyses 
the geographical scope of immunity.   
 
Geographic scope  
The need for immunity is based on ensuring that States do not prevent the UN from 
carrying out its functions.134 The most likely place the UN can be prevented from doing 
so is in the territory of the host State. For this reason, it is apparent that UN police 
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personnel need immunity for official acts in relation to the host State’s courts. A 
separate question is whether they need immunity from the courts of other States. In 
other words, immunity is dependent on a consideration of whether the possibility of 
prosecution in any other State, including the sending State, would pose a barrier to the 
UN delivering its functions. It is also a question of whether the possibility of arrest and 
detention of UN police officers may adversely affect the UN’s smooth functioning, even 
in States other than the host State.  
 
The geographical scope of UN police officers’ immunity must be analysed separately: 
first, the immunity accorded through the General Convention must be examined and, 
second, immunity bestowed via SOFAs must be scrutinized. In considering the scope of 
the former, the status of the General Convention is significant. The General Convention 
applies to all State parties. There appear to be two different views in respect of a State 
party’s obligation to give effect to immunity under the Convention. One is that the effect 
is limited to the bilateral relationship between the UN and each State party, which 
means that every State is obliged to give effect to immunity in relation to acts committed 
in its territory.135 This view does not necessarily contradict the ICJ’s findings in cases 
dealing with Special Rapporteurs belonging to UN human rights bodies. In these cases, 
the Court ruled that immunity was also applicable to the States of nationality of the two 
Rapporteurs, as they were considered partly to be delivering official functions in their 
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States of nationality.136 If this view is taken, immunity for the conduct of the UN police 
will not be an issue in their sending States.  
 
The second view holds that all States are bound to give effect to immunity in relation to 
acts regardless of where they were committed. It appears that a number of States 
consider that immunity applies globally to acts of the UN police. For example, in their 
submissions to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, Portugal, Switzerland, 
Australia, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Paraguay expressed their understanding that, under the 
General Convention, immunity also applies in sending States.137 Occasionally, the UN 
also appears to have indicated that immunity applies globally. In relation to Military 
Observers, who belong to the ‘Experts on Mission’ category for immunity purposes and 
who serve in Peace Operations, the UN made it clear that they should not face criminal 
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proceedings when they return home.138 A report on criminal accountability written by a 
panel of legal experts, which was established by the Secretary-General, also took the 
position that immunity is relevant to States other than the host State.139 The logic 
underlying this position is that the UN’s global functions must be protected in all States. 
If the geographical scope of immunity is interpreted in this way, immunity for UN police 
officers would apply equally in their sending States.140  
 
It is submitted that the immunity from criminal proceedings accorded to the UN police 
should be interpreted as applying in all States which have ratified the General 
Convention. This is because the fact that the UN has declared immunity applicable to 
an act committed by a UN police officer in relation to the host State necessarily means 
that that act came within his official functions. Because the rationale for immunity is to 
protect the UN so that it can deliver its functions smoothly without any hindrance by 
States, this protection must be accorded by all States. In a State which is not party to 
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the General Convention, the obligation does not arise, unless the Convention, or some 
of its provisions, are considered to be customary.141 
 
A SOFA only provides immunity in relation to the host State.142 If one holds the view 
that the SOFA provides the basis for the status of UN police officers, then the existence 
and scope of their immunity is dependent on that SOFA. This means either that there is 
no immunity for UN police personnel outside the host State, or that there may be 
immunity for personnel outside the host State which derives from the UN Charter. 
However, the Charter’s scope is ambiguous, and must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. It would be detrimental to the smooth functioning of the UN if its personnel 
could not rely solely on the protection provided by the Organization.143  
  
Neither the General Convention nor SOFAs distinguish between the two different kinds 
of immunity – immunity from legal proceedings, and immunity from arrest and detention 
- in terms of their geographical scope. This leads one to draw the provisional conclusion 
that UN police personnel are granted immunity both from legal proceedings and from 
arrest and detention in all States party to the Convention.144 
 
This global applicability of immunity has significant implications for the consideration of 
the appropriate application of immunity to UN police personnel and, more generally, to 
UN personnel. It is this aspect which distinguishes the immunity of UN personnel from 
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the immunity of State officials or diplomats. As regards the latter, immunity before the 
courts of foreign States does not mean global immunity and therefore impunity. At least 
theoretically, these officials can be tried in their States of nationality.145 The UN and its 
personnel do, however, have global immunity. When the UN invokes immunity or 
considers the use of waiver, this should be taken into account. What the UN actually 
does in practice will be discussed later.146  
 
Temporal scope 
It is necessary to consider the temporal scope of immunity because this determines 
whether or not some crimes can be prosecuted after the UN police officer in question 
has completed his work. Immunity shields UN police officers from legal proceedings in 
relation to official acts carried out during the time they hold office, but does that 
protection cease when they leave office? In light of the rationale for immunity, two 
arguments arise: one is that, although their actual performance cannot be interfered 
with, UN police personnel can be subjected to proceedings after they have completed 
their tours of duty. Another argument is that if they know that they may be subject to 
legal proceedings, it may cause them to act in a more restrained fashion at the time. 
 
The General Convention provides different temporal scopes for different types of 
immunity. The immunity from arrest and detention is accorded ‘during the period of their 
missions, including the time spent on journeys in connection with their missions’.147 The 
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immunity from legal proceedings in relation to official acts is accorded not only during 
the mission, but it ‘shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the persons 
concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United Nations’.148 The SOFA 
merely repeats that immunity for the official acts of all Peace Operations personnel 
continues after the mission has ended.149 Since UN police personnel are deployed from 
their sending States to the host State for their missions, this has implications for the 
geographical scope of immunity, in that immunity from arrest and detention would not 
apply once they are back in their sending States after the missions, but would apply to 
acts performed as part of official functions, even after the missions have ended.  
 
1-4-2. UN Police Commissioner 
A UN Police Commissioner enjoys a different type of immunity. Because there is only 
one Police Commissioner in each mission, it is arguable that it is not critical to clarify the 
scope of his immunity. However, it is important to do so because he is granted a 
particularly wide scope of immunity, as will be demonstrated, and it is possible that this 
type of immunity is more open to abuse. 
 
As shown above, some uncertainties remain as to how the provisions of the General 
Convention apply to the Police Commissioner if there is no applicable SOFA.150 
However, if the provisions of the General Convention apply either by virtue of the 
importance of his position, or via a SOFA, the determining provision states that: 
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In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in Section 18, the 
Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General shall be accorded […] 
the privileges and immunities […] accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance 
with international law.151 
 
First, the Police Commissioner is accorded functional immunity under Section 18 of the 
General Convention. The scope of that immunity is that of ‘Officials’, which means the 
same scope of immunity accorded to UN police officers (as analyzed above), without 
immunity from arrest and detention.152 On this basis, the Police Commissioner enjoys 
global immunity in relation to acts he committed in the performance of his official 
functions, which endures even after he leaves office.153 However, the Police 
Commissioner also has the ‘privileges and immunities […] accorded to diplomatic 
envoys’. 154 
 
Conduct covered  
The scope of immunity accorded to diplomatic envoys is provided for in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and states that, ‘A diplomatic agent shall enjoy 
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State’.155 This article has codified 
theory and practice of States over more than two centuries.156 There is no exception to 
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this rule. It is therefore an absolute immunity attached to a person, which covers all their 
conduct. In addition, this diplomatic immunity also shields the Police Commissioner from 
giving evidence in court, as well as from any execution measures in relation to any 
potential criminal acts.157 A diplomatic agent is inviolable, and thus shall also not be 
liable to any form of arrest or detention.158 However, it is important to note that the 
immunity of diplomats is limited to the receiving State.159 A diplomat can be declared 
persona non grata, which works as a safeguard against the abuse of diplomatic 
immunity.160 This is not the case for high-ranking UN Officials. This may have 
implications for the consideration of what is an appropriate application of immunity to 
the Police Commissioner.  
 
SOFAs do not provide any additional guidance on the scope of immunity granted to the 
Police Commissioner.161 By virtue of this, the Police Commissioner’s immunity shields 
him from arrest, detention, and all other forms of legal proceedings in relation to his 
entire conduct. 
 
Geographical scope of absolute immunity 
The geographical scope of the absolute immunity provided to the Police Commissioner 
must be examined in order to clarify which States may be able to prosecute him.  
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The Vienna Convention clearly states that immunity applies in relation to the receiving 
State.162 In particular, it makes it clear that diplomatic agents are not exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the State of nationality.163 In the context of Peace Operations, this means 
that immunity applies only in the host State. However, ‘[I]nviolability and such other 
immunity as may be required to ensure his transit or return’ is additionally granted to 
him.164  
  
Accordingly, it may be possible to argue that the absolute immunity enjoyed by the 
Police Commissioner via the General Convention applies in respect of the host State 
and the transit State, and that the scope of immunity in the latter may be narrower than 
that in the host State. As the courts have not yet heard a case dealing with the issue of 
the scope of absolute immunity of a Police Commissioner, or a diplomatic agent in a 
transit State, its exact scope is unclear.  
 
However, considering that there is a fundamental difference between the functions of 
the UN Police Commissioner and those of diplomats, it is necessary to take a step back 
to examine what the appropriate geographical scope would be. Diplomatic immunity 
applies as between two States. The rationale for UN immunity is the need to protect the 
global functioning of the UN, particularly from interference by any State.165 Therefore, 
the UN Police Commissioner is a high-ranking Official of an international organization 
that discharges its functions globally, whilst diplomats represent their State in its 
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relationship with the receiving State. Diplomats enjoy immunity in the places they travel 
to, and in the places where they exercise diplomatic functions. The equivalent of this for 
senior members of the UN - those who qualify for absolute immunity - is immunity in any 
UN member State. It follows that, in order for the Police Commissioner to receive 
protection which is equivalent to that held by diplomats, he also needs global immunity.  
 
As discussed, there are two ways of including the Police Commissioner in the category 
of high-ranking Officials for the purposes of the application of absolute immunity.166 If 
absolute immunity is provided to the Police Commissioner by virtue of the General 
Convention, this means that immunity should apply in all States which have ratified the 
General Convention. If the General Convention is considered customary, immunity 
should apply in all States. 
 
If, on the other hand, one considers that the status of the Police Commissioner as a 
high-ranking Official is dependent on SOFA, the geographical scope of immunity is 
limited to the host State. As indicated above, this is problematic. Given the nature of the 
protection required for the UN to carry out its functions,167 the Police Commissioner is 
likely to require absolute immunity in all UN member States. Alternatively, if one takes a 
more restrictive view, it is possible to argue that his absolute immunity is limited to the 
host State, and that a narrower scope of immunity should be granted in the transit 
State.168  
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The Police Commissioner’s absolute immunity may cease either at the time he leaves 
office, or it may continue afterwards. The temporal scope of his immunity depends on 
what is necessary to guarantee the smooth functioning of the UN, and has implications 
for the way in which the Police Commissioner may deliver his functions. If there is a 
possibility that the Police Commissioner may later be subjected to legal proceedings in 
relation to his private conduct during his mission, this may lead him to deliver his official 
functions in a more restricted way. Preventing this may require that absolute immunity 
should continue even after his mission. If this is not the case, his absolute immunity will 
cease at the end of his mission.    
 
As the General Convention links the scope of immunity for the Police Commissioner to 
the immunity accorded to diplomats, it is necessary to consider the Vienna Convention, 
which sets out a clear temporal boundary. Absolute immunity applies ‘from the moment 
he enters the territory of the receiving State on proceeding to take up his post’, or ‘from 
the moment when his appointment is notified’ to the relevant ministry of the receiving 
State.169 It shall cease when he leaves the country, or after a ‘reasonable period’ 
following the end of his official functions. After that, his immunity subsists only with 
regard to acts performed in the exercise of his official functions.170 In other words, he 
cannot be arrested and detained, or criminally prosecuted, for acts performed as part of 
his official functions even after he ceases to hold office. However, he can be prosecuted 
after he leaves office for acts performed in his private capacity during his official term of 
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office.171 The underlying reasoning must therefore be that the possibility of prosecution 
after he leaves office in relation to private acts committed during his tenure is not likely 
to restrict the way in which he performs his official functions whilst in office.   
 
The Police Commissioner is therefore likely to have absolute immunity in respect of all 
conduct committed during his mission, from the moment of his appointment to the end 
of his appointment, in relation to all UN member States. His immunity for acts committed 
in his private capacity ceases when his term in office ends.172 
 
1-5. Determining the scope of immunity, and when it may be waived 
1-5-1. Who determines what comes within the scope of immunity 
As the scope of immunity is dependent on whether or not the act was committed ‘in the 
course of the performance of the mission’,173 or ‘performed by them in their official 
capacity’ in the Police Commissioner’s case,174 the procedure to determine what comes 
within the ‘official’ category is a key issue. This determination does not affect the 
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immunity from arrest and detention granted to both UN police personnel in general, and 
the Police Commissioner in particular.175 
 
The SG has the authority to deliver this determination:  
The Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, 
has the primary responsibility to safeguard the interests of the Organization; to 
that end, it is up to him to address whether its agents acted within the scope of 
their functions and, where he so concludes, to protect these agents, including 
experts on mission, by asserting their immunity.176 
 
The UN claims that the SG has the exclusive power to make this determination, and has 
taken the position that this power is conferred on the SG by the General Convention.177 
The Regulations governing Experts on Mission provide that, ‘the Secretary-General 
should inform and may take into account the views of the legislative bodies that 
appointed the officials or experts on mission’,178 but they do not actually require the SG 
to follow these views. The only body which may review the SG’s decisions is the ICJ, 
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which provides a dispute settlement mechanism in this respect.179 Where differences 
arise in the interpretation or application of the General Convention, the matter shall be 
referred to the ICJ, whose opinion shall be accepted as decisive by the parties.180 
 
If the chief administrator of the UN has the sole authority to determine what comes 
within the scope of the supposedly ‘functional’ immunity, this raises the question as to 
whether, in practice, there are some situations in which the SG, or someone to whom 
he has delegated this power, claims immunity where it is clear that immunity should not 
be applied to him.181 If there is no mechanism to challenge this decision, the 
determination is not rebuttable. If there are circumstances in which immunity is 
inappropriately invoked, machinery for safeguarding it from abuse becomes important.   
 
The question, then, is whether the SG’s authority is exclusive in deciding whether 
immunity applies.182 The UN itself considers his authority to be exclusive. The OLA 
confirmed that, ‘the competence to determine what constitutes an ‘official’ or ‘unofficial’ 
act performed by a staff member is vested solely in the Secretary-General’. The OLA 
further stated that the UN had neither recognised nor accepted that national courts, or 
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any other authorities of member States, have jurisdiction for making this 
determination.183 UN Staff Regulations confirm this position:   
In any case where an issue arises regarding the application of these privileges 
and immunity, the staff member shall immediately report the matter to the 
Secretary-General, who alone may decide whether such privileges and immunity 
exist […].184 
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The ICJ, however, does not consider that the SG has exclusive power in this regard. 
Rather, the court issued a caveat: 
When national courts are seized with a case in which the immunity of a United 
Nations agent is at issue, they should immediately be notified of any finding by 
the Secretary-General concerning this immunity. That finding, and its 
documentary expression, creates a presumption which can only be set aside for 
the most compelling reasons and is thus given the greatest weight by national 
courts.185 
 
There is no explanation as to what such ‘compelling reasons’ are, and opinion regarding 
the interpretation of this paragraph is divided. In the same case, Judge Koroma found 
that the SG’s findings on the applicability of the General Convention should be ‘given 
due weight and respect’,186 but that the Convention ‘does not stipulate that it is 
conclusive, let alone binding’.187 He cited the various views of different States 
participating in the proceedings, none of which confirmed that the SG’s views are 
exclusive and final.188 
                                            
185
 (Emphasis added.) Cumaraswamy (Advisory Opinion), para.61. 
186
 The same applies to his decision on the maintenance or waiver of immunity. 
187
 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights (Diss Op Koroma) [1999] ICJ Rpt 111, para.13. 
188
 ‘According to the United States, ‘the views of the Secretary-General in a given case are highly 
relevant’; the United Kingdom takes the position that it is ‘essential that all due weight is given to [the 
views of the Secretary-General] by the national courts’. Italy had expressed the following viewpoint on the 
issue: ‘once [. . .] a decision has been adopted, both the government and the judicial authorities of the 
State where the issue of immunity has been raised are nonetheless obliged to give immediate and careful 
consideration to the delicate problems of immunity, and they must take due account of the weight to be 
accorded to the determination made in this regard by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It 
would be going too far to say that this imposes a legal duty on the courts of the State where the issue of 
immunity has been raised to stay all proceedings until the issue of immunity has been settled at the 
international level. But, at the very least, it is to be expected that those courts would display caution by 
avoiding hasty decisions which might entail responsibility on the part of that State.’ (Emphasis added.) 
Ibid, para.19. On the other hand, this information needs to be balanced against the fact that the US and 
Italy are the two of the few countries whose courts have ignored the UN’s claim for immunity in relation to 
UN premises and personnel. See August Reinisch, International Organizations Before National Courts 
(Cambridge University Press 2000). See also Reinisch, ‘Privileges and immunities’, pp.143-146. See also 
Bekker, who observes that the ‘most compelling reasons’ approach in the Cumaraswamy case is 
inconsistent with the idea expressed in the Reparations case  that the UN must be able to protect its 
staff.”. Peter H E Bekker, ‘Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of 




In the context of Peace Operations, the SG’s power to define whether the act in 
question is related to that person’s official functions has been delegated to the SRSG.189 
SOFAs contain a provision to the effect that either the SRSG or the Commander of a 
military contingent shall agree with the host government as to whether or not criminal 
proceedings should be instigated.190 This appears to include the process of determining 
whether the act in question was carried out in the performance of the functions of the 
said personnel.191 Furthermore, the SG’s report containing the model SOFA sets out 
that, where agreement cannot be reached between the SRSG and the host government 
on this point, a panel of three arbitrators is to be established, whose finding is then final 
and binding.192 The position in the Convention, wherein the SG has sole authority to 
decide what comes within a grant of immunity, and the position in the SOFA, wherein 
immunity issues must be agreed between the UN and the host State, appear 
contradictory. The arbitration panel provided for in the SOFA can be considered 
‘another mode of settlement’, which has been agreed to by the parties concerned, and 
is provided for in the General Convention.193 There is a tension between the claim that 
the SG has the exclusive authority to determine the scope of immunity, and the 
existence of these dispute resolution mechanisms, but in order to safeguard against 
abuse, such mechanisms are desirable.  
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Where a person prima facie qualifies for immunity, there is nevertheless a possibility 
that immunity can be waived. It does not apply where there is no immunity in the first 
place. As provided for in the General Convention,194 the process of waiver is 
theoretically identical for the Police Commissioner and other UN police officers.195 The 
relevant section states that: 
The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of 
any official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the 
course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the 
United Nations.196 
 
Immunity does not have to be waived all together. Where both civil and criminal 
proceedings are sought against a UN police member in relation to one act, immunity 
could be waived only in relation to the civil claim. For example, this can happen in 
relation to a traffic offence.197 Immunity from arrest and detention, and immunity from 
judicial proceedings, must be waived separately.198  
 
Who waives? 
The Convention is clear that it is the SG’s opinion that matters. The UN has also 
consistently stated that the waiver decision falls within the SG’s exclusive authority.199 
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The agent whose immunity is in question is not permitted to waive his or her own 
immunity.200 The only body which can review the SG’s waiver decision is the ICJ, which 
acts as a dispute settlement mechanism.201 The consideration of the appropriateness of 
the SG’s exclusive authority to decide the scope of immunity also applies in respect of a 
decision to waive immunity.202  
 
While there is no formal delegation of the authority to waive immunity,203 in the Peace 
Operations context, the SRSG takes up this role in the name of the SG.204 The 
requirement in the model SOFA that the SRSG must reach an agreement with the host 
Government on ‘whether or not criminal proceedings should be instituted’,205 would 
involve a waiver decision. There thus remain some uncertainties with regard to the 
claimed exclusivity of the SG’s authority to waive immunity. It remains to be seen how 
these additional mechanisms may work to safeguard the system from the potential 
abuse of immunity. 
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Circumstances in which immunity must or may be waived 
The General Convention stipulates that the SG can and must waive immunity, ‘where 
[…] the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without 
prejudice to the interests of the United Nations’.206 This formula suggests that the 
decision to waive or not to waive immunity is not entirely within the discretion of the SG, 
but rather, where certain circumstances arise, it must be waived. It was the intention of 
the Preparatory Commission that, not only can the SG waive immunity in the specified 
circumstances, but that the SG will indeed do so in each case that satisfies this two-fold 
test.207 
 
The first strand of this test concerns where the maintenance of immunity may impede 
the course of justice. A related obligation on the UN to cooperate with member States in 
facilitating the proper administration of justice is provided for in the General 
Convention.208 There is little further guidance on when this threshold has been met.209 
Rawski suggested that affirming immunity for crimes that amount to serious breaches of 
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international law would be an example of a circumstance where immunity not only can 
be waived, but must be waived.210 Even in relation to serious crimes that do not amount 
to international crimes, it is possible that the same argument can be made, in particular 
because of the UN police’s important role in building respect for the rule of law.211 A 
further potential consideration is the rights of the victims, and whether maintaining 
immunity may lead to impunity, or be perceived as leading to impunity.212  
 
The second strand is whether immunity can be waived without prejudice to the UN’s 
interests, which are multifaceted. On the one hand, presumably the UN wants to 
continue operating, so it may not be in its interest for its personnel to be subject to 
proceedings, fair or otherwise. At the same time, it is in its interests to be seen to be 
adhering to the rule of law. If UN personnel are alleged to have engaged in criminal 
behaviour, the UN may be prejudiced if these personnel are seen as having ‘got away 
with it’. There may be circumstances, however, in which cooperating with a national 
court entails the disclosure of confidential materials. In such circumstances, it is 
possible that the UN would wish to maintain immunity from proceedings.213 However, it 
may be more appropriate to maintain immunity only in relation to those materials.  
 
There may be circumstances where proceedings in the host State would be 
fundamentally flawed.214 Examples of these include the host State’s failure to comply 
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with human rights standards, in particular those related to a fair trial.215 Where the local 
judicial system is not functioning properly,216 or is overburdened with cases, or has 
severely under-staffed courts, there may be a practical issue of whether or not justice 
would be delivered. These factors can be considered as forming part of the UN’s 
interests, and may justify the UN not waiving immunity.  
 
2. Application of immunity in practice  
It has become clear that, theoretically, immunity should not be a major barrier to the 
prosecution of UN police personnel by a willing State, at least for the majority of 
incidences of criminal conduct.217 Where the alleged crime was committed outside 
someone’s official functions, there is no immunity. Where prima facie immunity is 
applicable, it should usually be in the interests of the UN to ensure that proceedings 
take place in relation to serious crimes. Immunity should therefore be waived in relation 
to many of the offences that the UN police are committing. However, evidence shows 
that there are barriers to criminal prosecution.218 It is possible that immunity is applied 
differently in practice. Thus, it is necessary to ask whether either an inappropriate 
assertion of immunity, or an inappropriate refusal of waiver of immunity, is blocking the 
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criminal prosecution of UN police personnel by those States who are willing to 
prosecute them. 
 
Before examining these two questions, it is necessary to consider the unique formula 
identified in the previous section in relation to immunity from arrest and detention, in 
order to determine whether or not immunity is invoked in practice.219 Because immunity 
from arrest and detention theoretically applies to a broader category of acts than acts 
performed solely within the exercise of the UN police personnel’s functions, granting 
immunity in these circumstances runs the risk of leading to impunity.220  
 
The UN mostly appears to have applied immunity from arrest and detention in respect 
of UN police personnel only in relation to acts committed within the performance of their 
functions.221 The UN’s OLA seemed to have taken this position in 2004, when it stated 
that:  
As experts performing missions for the United Nations, civilian police officers 
enjoy “functional immunity”, that is, immunity for purposes of the official acts 
done by them in the course of the performance of their official functions. Their 
privileges and immunity, which include immunity from personal arrest and 
detention, are granted solely to enable them to perform their official functions [...] 
United Nations civilian police officers may therefore be made subject to local civil 
and criminal jurisdiction for acts committed by them in the host country that are 
done by them otherwise than in the performance of their official functions.222  
 
This statement is carefully worded, but it appears to indicate that the OLA considers that 
all privileges and immunities held by UN police officers, including immunity from arrest 
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and detention, to be limited to official acts.223 This reinforces the OLA’s earlier position 
with regard to UN police personnel and, more precisely, with regard to those in UNMIK 
and UNTAET.224 Some writers also support this position.225 The UN has, in some cases, 
indicated that it will follow this limited interpretation with regard to immunity from arrest 
and detention. For example, in a case in which two UN police officers were alleged to 
have committed rape in a hotel room after working hours, their immunity was declared 
inapplicable, because rape was considered to be outside the scope of their official 
functions.226 
 
The UN is certainly free not to invoke immunity from arrest and detention in respect of 
UN police officers. It is unfortunate, however, that its practice in this regard varies 
greatly,227 which makes it difficult to determine the UN’s position on this issue. At the 
very least, it would be helpful if it was easily foreseeable what the coverage of immunity 
is likely to be, in particular if immunity from arrest and detention for UN police officers is 
considered to apply with regard to acts other than those performed in the exercise of 
their official functions. This is important because this uncertainty may cause national 
authorities to avoid seeking prosecution and, as a result, may contribute to impunity.228 
In some cases in which UN police officers were allegedly involved in serious crimes 
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which were completely unrelated to their official functions, immunity was considered to 
apply prima facie. These examples will be discussed later.229 However, this work will 
assume that the UN’s interpretation of the immunity from arrest and detention granted to 
UN police personnel is that it applies only with regard to acts performed within the 
exercise of their functions.    
 
It is unclear what the practice of the application of immunity from arrest and detention is 
in reality with regard to the Police Commissioner, who is covered by absolute immunity. 
No case has arisen in any national court which has questioned this immunity, nor has 
the issue been raised at the UN, at least in the public domain. It could be argued that 
the Police Commissioner has a stronger case for the global protection of his personal 
inviolability due to the vital nature of his position for the UN’s delivery of its functions.230  
 
Another issue that warrants a brief mention is immunity from legal proceedings, as it 
applies to UN personnel who are required to appear in front of a national court to give 
testimony. In such circumstances, for example, in the case of international tribunals, the 
UN provides a waiver of immunity for the personnel concerned to provide witness 
statements.231 However, it is not known to what extent this has been done in practice in 
relation to crimes committed by the UN police in Peace Operations.  
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2-1. Inappropriate assertions of immunity 
2-1-1. Does the UN claim immunity where it should not? 
On the assumption that the UN considers the immunity accorded to the UN police 
officers, including their immunity from arrest and detention, to apply only in relation to 
acts performed during the course of their official functions,232 any claim of immunity for 
an act which is unrelated to these functions would be inappropriate.  
 
There are examples in which the UN has invoked immunity in relation to acts committed 
by UN police officers in their private capacities. For example, in a case in which a UN 
police officer allegedly engaged in the sexual abuse of a trafficked minor in a private 
house, the suspect’s immunity was invoked and maintained.233 There were apparently 
ten cases in UNMIK, involving UN police officers, for which immunity was asserted for 
serious crimes in potentially inappropriate circumstances.234 In such cases, the issue is 
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not that UN police officers are accorded functional immunity, but, rather, that their 
immunity is inappropriately invoked.  
 
No case has been brought against a UN Police Commissioner to date. It is therefore not 
known what the UN would do in these circumstances. The Police Commissioner enjoys 
absolute immunity during the period of his mission.235 Therefore, the issue will only arise 
where immunity is invoked in respect of any acts committed by him in his private 
capacity after his assignment as Police Commissioner has ended.  
 
2-1-2. Availability of the means with which to challenge an inappropriate claim of 
immunity 
Where immunity is claimed in apparently inappropriate cases, it raises a secondary 
issue as to whether that claim can be challenged. If not, there is a real risk that it will 
lead to impunity. Bearing in mind that the consequence of asserting immunity is that 
immunity should be given effect globally,236 this would be the case where the coverage 
of immunity was determined essentially by what falls within the official functions. 237  
 
There are two dispute resolution mechanisms, as identified above.238 The first is the use 
of the ICJ to challenge the SG’s decision, as provided for in the General Convention.239 
In practice, the SG’s determination of the applicability of immunity in relation to UN 
police personnel has never been placed before the ICJ. The ICJ has only been 
                                            
235
 Section 1-4-1. 
236
 Section 1-4. 
237
 Section 1-4. 
238
 Section 1-5. 
239
 General Convention, Article VIII, Section 30. 
362 
 
requested to provide advice on whether two UN Special Rapporteurs fell within the 
‘Experts on Mission’ category.240 Taking into consideration the situation of the host 
State, it may be difficult for this State to challenge the UN’s decision at the ICJ.241 In 
relation to the sending State, immunity does not appear to pose a major barrier to 
prosecution. However, States may hesitate to start proceedings if they think that the UN 
will invoke immunity. Rather, the practical issues identified previously may pose 
problems for sending States.242 In recent years, the problems faced by sending States 
have been discussed in the context of the UN’s attempt to ensure that they are able to 
criminally prosecute suspects under their domestic law.243 
 
The second mechanism in relation to the host State is a three-person arbitration 
tribunal.244 Information suggests that an arbitration tribunal has never been utilized in 
Peace Operations.245 Thus, in the host State, even in cases where that State’s 
authorities have demanded prosecution, no resort has been made to this tribunal for 
formally challenging immunity. The demand for prosecution has sometimes been made 
through political contacts.246 
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As a result, the SG’s power in relation to the determination of immunity for Peace 
Operations personnel has never been challenged. This poses a serious problem in 
practice. Because the SG’s powers have not been challenged, he is able to use his 
power in any way he sees fit.  
 
2-2. Inappropriate use of waiver 
2-2-1. The decision not to waive immunity 
When an act committed by a UN police officer is prima facie covered by immunity, it 
should still be waived by the SG if the two-pronged test (‘in his opinion, the immunity 
would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests 
of the United Nations’)247 is satisfied.248 It would, for example, be obligatory for immunity 
to be waived if there is an allegation of serious ill-treatment by a UN police officer during 
an interrogation, or of indiscriminate shooting during a peaceful demonstration, with a 
fatal outcome. The author’s data contain illustrations of both examples, in relation to 
which criminal proceedings were not brought, and where it appears that waiver was not 
sought by any national authorities.249 Although some traffic offences appear to be 
criminal in character, it appears that national authorities often do not seek prosecution 
for these.250 It remains a theoretical possibility that waiver could be inappropriately 
refused for official acts that are performed in a markedly unacceptable manner. 
However, the evidence indicates that this is not a problem in practice.  
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2-2-2. Inappropriate use of waiver   
One issue that appears to lie in between these two positions (an inappropriate assertion 
of immunity which is not waived, and the inappropriate refusal of waiver of appropriate 
immunity), is the inappropriate use of waiver where immunity does not apply. It appears 
that the UN frequently assumes that immunity exists, when, in fact, it does not.  
 
In 2002, in Kosovo, a UN police officer was alleged to have murdered his language 
assistant. His immunity was waived, rather than being found to be inapplicable,251 
although apparently this only took place after a serious discussion among the senior 
mission leadership regarding the necessity of the waiver.252 In relation to two separate 
allegations (one of rape and one of murder) in Kosovo, immunity was waived instead of 
being considered inapplicable.253 Since the suspects were eventually prosecuted, this is 
only a theoretical problem. However, it would be better if the scope of immunity, as well 
as the procedure for applying it, were to be appropriately implemented. This is important 
because this practice could give national authorities the impression that the decision 
whether or not to bring criminal proceedings in relation to conduct not falling within the 
official functions remains solely in the hands of the SRSG. That may prevent national 
authorities from prosecuting this criminal conduct. However, it would also be helpful for 
the sake of clarity if the law were to be appropriately applied. 
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The UN’s practice in relation to the host State is that it assumes immunity exists in 
relation to all acts. This means that the UN considers whether it should waive immunity 
without first determining whether immunity applies at all. It also fails to specify what type 
of immunity, immunity from legal proceedings, or immunity from arrest and detention, it 
is waiving. In other words, the two separate steps which examine whether or not 
immunity prima facie exists, and whether or not to waive immunity if it does exist, are 
mixed together. As a result, the term ‘waiver’ is used, both by the UN itself and national 
courts, in two ways: to indicate a finding of the non-existence of immunity, and to 
indicate a decision to waive immunity.254 
 
In relation to sending States, unlike the practice with regard to host States, the question 
of waiver of immunity has not arisen. The issue, then, is whether the UN has clarified 
whether immunity applies to the act in question and, if it waives immunity in cases 
where it is found to exist, in what circumstances the UN will refer a case to a sending 
State for possible prosecution. Information regarding these matters is extremely limited, 
in particular considering that the active referral of allegations of criminal conduct to 
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The starting point for determining the scope of immunity accorded to UN police 
personnel and the Police Commissioner is the unique rationale for granting immunity to 
the UN and its personnel. Unlike sovereign or diplomatic immunity, it exists solely to 
enable the UN to pursue the aims entrusted to it by its member States, and in order to 
do that, it must enable its personnel to deliver their functions without undue hindrance 
by any States. This means immunity for the UN police and the Police Commissioner is 
limited to what is necessary for them to perform their duties. 
 
3-1-1. UN Police personnel 
There are two main sources of immunity for UN Police personnel: the General 
Convention and the SOFA. The former grants immunity in the territory of all States 
which are party to the Convention and, depending on the status of the Convention, it 
can be considered to apply globally.256  
 
UN police personnel enjoy functional immunity. The General Convention shields UN 
police personnel from arrest and detention in relation to all acts committed during the 
mission, and from all kinds of legal proceedings, but only in relation to official acts. The 
former protection ends when their mission ends, whilst the latter protection continues 
even after the completion of the mission. Theoretically, therefore, immunity does not 
work as a barrier to prosecuting a UN police officer for crimes such as a rape committed 
after working hours in private accommodation. However, no State can arrest or detain a 
suspect during his mission without a waiver of immunity. In other words, UN police 
personnel can be prosecuted anywhere, but the courts cannot exercise their 
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enforcement jurisdiction. Immunity does not bar a suspect from being prosecuted for 
acts not related to his official functions after he ceases to serve as a UN police 
officer.257  
 
SOFAs confirm the immunity provided for in the General Convention in relation to the 
host State. This means that while a UN police officer is on a mission in the host State, 
he cannot be arrested or detained, but he can be prosecuted for acts he commits 
outside his official functions.258 
 
Where immunity exists, it is still possible for it to be waived. The waiver can and must 
be granted if the course of justice would otherwise be impeded, and where waiving 
immunity does not prejudice the interests of the Organization. Therefore, where 
maintaining immunity would lead to impunity for a serious crime, theoretically, it is 
expected that immunity would be waived.259 
 
The decision as to what comes within the official functions of the UN police officer in 
question, and whether to waive his immunity, if it is found to exist, is for the SG alone to 
make.260 His decision cannot be set aside by national courts, unless ‘most compelling 
reasons’ exist to do so.261 There is an ad hoc dispute resolution mechanism – the 
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arbitration panel. Where disagreement arises with regard to the interpretation of the 
General Convention, the matter can be referred to the ICJ.262  
  
3-1-2. UN Police Commissioner 
The same sources provide the Police Commissioner with absolute immunity. The Police 
Commissioner is shielded from both legal proceedings, and from arrest or detention in 
relation to all acts committed by him during his assignment in the territory of all States 
party to the Convention. Depending on the status of the General Convention, the 
geographical scope of his immunity may be global. After the Police Commissioner 
leaves office, his immunity only protects him in relation to his official acts. SOFAs 
confirm the same scope of immunity in respect of host State authorities. The option of a 
waiver also exists in relation to Police Commissioners, and the decision-maker and the 
procedure is the same as those for ordinary members of the UN police.  
 
This conclusion shows that the law works as a barrier to criminal prosecution by States 
to some extent, but mostly only in respect of official acts. There is an additional 
protection from arrest and detention in relation to all acts carried out by a UN police 
officer during the mission, but his immunity for unofficial acts ceases at the end of his 
tour of duty. If this is the legal position, and if this is properly applied in practice, 
questions are unlikely to arise regarding the lack of prosecution for criminal acts that do 
not have the required link with the official functions of the person in question.  
 
The scope of immunity can be presented as follows: 
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Table 1. UN police officers 
 Legal basis During the mission After the mission 












GC immunity Functional immunity  
(and personal 
inviolability, but this is 
unlikely to be useful) 
Functional immunity 
Transit State SOFA 
immunity 
- - 




Other States SOFA 
immunity 
- - 
GC immunity Functional immunity  
(and personal 
inviolability, but this is 






Table 2. UN Police Commissioners (UN PCs) 
  Legal basis During the mission After the mission 






GC immunity Absolute immunity 
including personal 
inviolability (if he 











Transit State SOFA 
immunity 
- - 




Other States SOFA 
immunity 
- - 








However, in practice, there are situations in which immunity acts as a barrier to criminal 
prosecution, in particular with regard to host States. The UN applies immunity from legal 
proceedings for UN police personnel and the Police Commissioner in almost the same 
way as absolute immunity. That is, it applies it regardless of whether or not the act was 
performed within the exercise of their functions, while appropriately disregarding the 
separate immunity from arrest and detention for acts committed outside their official 
functions. An independent study recognized that one of the barriers to prosecution is: 
[...] the broad-spectrum nature of functional immunity as applied to experts on 
mission “during the period of their missions”, without distinction between 
behaviour on and off duty.263  
 
This practice raises the question as to what causes the UN to apply immunity law in the 
way that it does. It may be that the explanation lies in the state of the legal system in the 
host State.264 The UN may be trying to protect its own personnel from legal proceedings 
in places without a functioning legal system, or where the legal system fails to meet 
human rights standards.265 It is of legitimate concern that the UN does not and should 
not hand over its personnel to be subject to such criminal proceedings, in particular in 
                                            
263
 Durch et al, Improving Criminal Accountability, p.xii. 
264
 See Chapter 2, section 1; Chapter 6, section 1-5-2. 
265
 Miller, ‘EoM Immunity’, p.47; Oswald, Documents, p.36. ‘Whilst the general position is that civilian 
members are subject to the jurisdiction of the host country in respect of any criminal offences that may be 
committed by them in the host country, the SRSG may not give permission for criminal proceedings to be 
commenced if there are concerns with the human rights standards of the local justice system or if the host 
country does not have a well-functioning court system’. The UN has also been attempting to secure fair 
trial standards in the host State by inserting new clauses in individual SOFAs in recent missions. For 
example, the SOFA for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) contains a clause that states  that ‘the courts 
and authorities of Sudan shall ensure that the member of UNMIS […] is brought to trial and tried in 
accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as set out in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Sudan is a party.’ Agreement between the 
Government of Sudan and the United Nations concerning the Status of the United Nations Mission in 
Sudan, (adopted and entered into force 28 December 2005), 2005 UN Jurid YB 44, para.51(a). See also 
Oswald and Bates, ‘Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Police’, p.183. 
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light of the UN’s obligation to ‘uphold, promote and respect human rights’.266 It becomes 
an even more serious matter because sending States are concerned about subjecting 
their personnel to the host State’s criminal proceedings and, in turn, the UN is 
concerned about receiving fewer personnel if it allows the host State to prosecute UN 
police officers.267 This must be seen within the bigger picture of the UN’s constant 
struggle to secure personnel to serve in UN Peace Operations.268  
 
However, for reasons of clarity, it would be helpful to address that concern separately, 
because it is clear that the SG’s power does not extend to creating a new form of 
immunity.269 Leaving the scope of immunity unclear, or its application inconsistent, 
seriously increases the risk of impunity, unless the UN ensures that the sending State 
brings proceedings. It also makes it difficult to predict how it will be applied.  
 
The complexities of the immunity scheme also mean that there are additional practical 
barriers that victims of UN police misconduct must negotiate in order to lodge 
                                            
266
 UNGA, Zeid Report, para.87. 
267
 A senior UN police officer summarized the perception of the waiver of immunity well when he said, 
‘[w]aiving immunity is a very difficult thing to do. We are hard pressed to get police to serve here’. Human 
Rights Watch, Hopes Betrayed - Trafficking of Women and Girls To Post-Conflict Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution (November 2002, vol 14, no 9 (D), 2002), p.60. See also Oswald and 
Bates, ‘Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Police’, p.183, where they argue that, ‘[a]t the very 
least it must be in the interest of successfully recruiting UNPOL to serve in UN peace operations to 
ensure that any UNPOL member receives a fair trial and, if convicted, the member is not imprisoned in 
facilities that do not meet minimum international standards. From the time of UNEF I, it was already 
acknowledged that shielding the host State from criminally prosecuting UN personnel was an essential 
principle to ensuring that the UN is able to successfully recruit personnel to serve in its operations’. Note, 
though, that this was in relation to national military contingents. UNGA, 'Summary Study of the 
Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General' 
(9 October 1958) UN Doc. A/3943, para.163. 
268
 Chapter 2, section 3-3. 
269
 See sections 2-1-1 and 2-2-2.  
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complaints. These complexities may also prevent States from proceeding with criminal 
cases.  
 
If the UN is trying to balance the need to protect its functions with its own actual or 
perceived accountability, it needs a separate mechanism to deal with these matters. 
Misuse or abuse of immunity is not only problematic under international law, but also 
detrimental to the interests of the UN.270  
 
The UN must also consider another factor in relation to immunity. The assumption that 
UN police officers who have been repatriated for alleged misconduct will face fair legal 
proceedings back home is false. Most of the sending States have, in recent years, been 
subject to criticism by human rights bodies in relation to fair trial standards, including 
due process guarantees. For example, out of the top ten sending States in 2013, nine 
have been subject to clear criticism for failing to meet fair trial standards in the most 
recent review by the HRC, and in the Universal Periodic Review process.271 If the UN’s 
                                            
270
 UN, Prep Commission Report, para.7. 
271
 See UN Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Bangladesh' (8 July 2013) UN Doc. A/HRC/24/12, paras.129.73, 129.74, where the right of defence, the 
impartiality of judges, and access to fair trial for all detainees are questioned; UN Human Rights 
Committee, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Jordan' (18 November 2010) UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/JOR/CO/4, paras.9, 11 where the Human Rights Committee criticized the denial of access 
to lawyers for detainees, resort to detention without charges, and absence of effective access to 
guarantees of trial; India, UN Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: India' (4 August 1997) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.81, para.27, where the Human Rights 
Committee recommended making court reforms necessary for conducting speedy trials; UN Human 
Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Nepal' (10 November 
1994) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.42, para.18, where it calls on Nepal to take appropriate measures to give 
effect to the independence of judiciary; UN Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Senegal' (28 December 1992) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.10, paras.5, 14 
where incommunicado detention, and a lack of access to lawyer for detainees, as well as some forms of 
pre-trial detention outside the scope provided by law and lack of access to counsel by detainees are 
questioned; UN Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
Nigeria' (24 July 1996) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65 paras.12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, where Nigeria’s 
revocation of normal constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights, including fair trial rights in particular, 
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commitment to promoting ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ is to make sense, 
the UN must have a mechanism which elicits a formal assurance from sending States 
that repatriated personnel would face a fair trial.272 Otherwise, this would not only 
infringe the fundamental principles of the Charter, but would allow UN personnel to be 
subject to differing standards of justice, depending on their nationality. 
 
In fact, the other side of the coin is that there is no guarantee that UN police personnel 
who are repatriated will face any criminal proceedings, fair or otherwise, even if the 
alleged criminal conduct is referred to the sending States. In addition, if they do, there is 
no assurance that the proceedings or sentences would be appropriate. It should be 
noted that major sending States have recently been subject to the criticism that they do 
not hold their national police officers to account for the crimes they commit within their 
domestic contexts. In 2013, out of the same top ten sending States, nine have been 
clearly criticized in this regard by the most recent review by the HRC, or in the Universal 
Periodic Review session.273 In such circumstances, a question arises as to who might 
                                                                                                                                            
and the power of special tribunals was questioned; UN Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Rwanda' (7 May 2009) UN Doc. CCPR/C/RWA/CO/3, 
para.17, where a local justice system was observed to be failing to operate in accordance with the basic 
rules pertaining the right to a fair trial; UN Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Egypt' (28 November 2002) UN Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY, para.16 (b), where it 
was criticized that terrorism-related offences by civilians are tried in military and security courts without 
any guarantee of the courts’ independence, and the right to appeal; and UN Human Rights Council, 
'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Burkina Faso' (8 July 2013) UN Doc. 
A/HRC/24/4, paras.135.68, 135.69, 135.111, 136.3, where the denial of prisoners’ legal rights including 
due process rights, as well as independence of judiciary, was questioned. In relation to Pakistan, 
observations were made as to the improvement of fair trial guarantees, but not with respect to the initial 
lack of such guarantees. UN Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review: Pakistan' (26 December 2012) UN Doc. A/HRC/22/12.    
272
 Durch et al, Improving Criminal Accountability, p.46. 
273
 See UN Human Rights Council, UPR Bangladesh report, paras.129.33, 129.68, 129.75, 129.76, 
129.78, 129.79, 129.80, 129.81, 129.82, 129.83, 129.84, 129.85, 129.86, where multiple comments were 
made with respect to the reported impunity in relation to extrajudicial executions, torture and brutality, as 
well more generally with regard to human rights violations by law enforcement agencies; UN Human 
Rights Committee, HRC Jordan Concluding Observations, para.9, where practice of torture by public 
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have an obligation to ensure that: i) criminal proceedings are brought against UN police 
officers; ii) proceedings are appropriate; iii) sanctions are appropriate; and iv) 
proceedings are conducted in accordance with human rights standards.   
 
It is clear that the legal barriers hindering the criminal prosecution of the UN police are 
minor. Jurisdiction is not a major barrier, nor is immunity, if appropriately invoked and 
appropriately waived. Practical issues do exist, but they do not explain all the problems 
encountered. In other words, it has been established that, in most cases, States are free 
to bring criminal proceedings against UN police members. If it is the case that States 
are in fact not willing to bring criminal proceedings, it is necessary to consider how this 
unwillingness can be addressed.
                                                                                                                                            
officials and the lack of a genuine complaint mechanism was noted; UN Human Rights Committee, HRC 
India Concluding Observations, paras.18, 21, 23, 24, where it was stated that special powers afforded to 
security forces and armed forces in some areas, coupled with the alleged failure of police and other 
security forces to respect the rule of law, including their resorting to torture or ill-treatment and arbitrary 
detention, are resulting in a climate of impunity, and the denial of victims’ right to remedies in relation to 
those members; UN Human Rights Committee, HRC Concluding Observations Nepal, para.10, where it 
was stated that members of security forces have not been brought to justice, or punished for arbitrary 
executions, enforced or involuntary disappearance, torture, and arbitrary or unlawful detention; UN 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Senegal, paras.5, 
11, where the Human Rights Committee criticized the government’s passivity in conducting timely 
investigations into the ill-treatment and torture of detainees, and extrajudicial executions in light of the 
allegations of indiscriminate killing of civilians by army and police, disappearance, torture and ill-
treatment; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Pakistan, paras.122.111, 122.114, 122.115, 122.116, where the working group recommended that the 
current impunity for enforced disappearances, abduction and human rights violations should be dealt 
with; UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Nigeria, 
paras.17, 18, where the lack of investigation, prosecution and punishment of those responsible for 
extrajudicial and summary executions, disappearances, torture and ill-treatment and other human rights 
violations was criticized, and where it was observed that this was resulting in a state of impunity; UN 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Rwanda, paras.12, 
13, where the apparent impunity enjoyed by the police forces in particular in relation to enforced 
disappearances, summary or arbitrary executions was criticized; UN Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt, para.13, where Egypt was criticized for 
the systematic pattern of torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment by law-enforcement personnel, 
and the general lack of investigations and punishment of those responsible, as well as reparations for 
victims; UN Human Rights Council, UPR Burkina Faso report, paras.42, 135.67, where it was 
recommended that investigations be conducted into allegations of torture and ill-treatment. The 




CHAPTER 7: IS THERE AN OBLIGATION TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE? 
 
Previous chapters established that the legal and practical obstacles which potentially 
impede the prosecution of UN police personnel do not explain the extent to which they 
are not prosecuted for crimes they have committed. It is often difficult to distinguish 
between the genuine difficulties a State may face in bringing criminal proceedings, and 
its unwillingness to do so. Where States are unwilling, it may be useful to identify the 
ways in which they can be pressured into bringing prosecutions. If a State’s failure to 
prosecute were to constitute a breach of international law, would this motivate it to bring 
a prosecution? This chapter seeks to clarify whether the failure by States to prosecute 
an alleged UN police suspect amounts to a violation of international law.  
 
This chapter does not deal with the responsibility for the original criminal conduct. This 
is because imputing conduct to a State does not normally arise in relation to the UN 
police, as they are not ‘State agents’ belonging to the sending State.1 It is clear that 
States are free to bring criminal proceedings against members of the UN police, subject 
to considerations of immunity. However, this chapter considers whether there is a 
                                            
1
 This is reflected in the agreements between the UN and the individual UN police personnel, and 
between the UN and sending States of Formed Police Units (FPUs). See the Undertaking and 
Declaration by Experts on Mission: UN Police Officer/Corrections Officer/Military Observers/Military 
Liaison Officer, Annex 3 to UN DPKO, 'Guidelines for United Nations Police Officers on Assignment with 
Peacekeeping Operations' UN Doc. DPKO/PD/2006/00135 (hereinafter ‘Undertaking’). There is an earlier 
and simpler Undertaking: the DPKO, Text of Undertaking to be signed by Civilian Police Officers. (On file 
with author.) Even where the individual who carried out the conduct in question does not come within the 
category of a State organ, it is possible that that conduct may be attributed to the State in certain limited 
circumstances. This may be relevant in exceptional cases in relation to FPUs. This is discussed in section 
5 below. UN, 'Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the xxx 




potential obligation on States to bring criminal proceedings for such conduct.2 This is 
primarily a question under international human rights law (IHRL). This chapter examines 
first, whether States are under an obligation to investigate and prosecute a serious 
crime committed by a UN police officer and, if so, what the scope of that obligation is. 
This is followed by a similar consideration of the UN’s obligations in this regard.  
 
In seeking to establish, first, that an obligation exists and, second, what its scope might 
be, it is important to note that there may be exceptional rules for international crimes. 
International crimes are those crimes that are subject to international jurisdiction under 
a treaty, or are subject to universal jurisdiction, or are listed in the Rome Statute.3 
However, it is highly unlikely that UN police officers would engage in such grave 
crimes.4 Therefore, this chapter does not discuss whether international crimes affect 
either the existence or scope of the obligation to investigate or prosecute.  
 
Before dealing with whether States have such an obligation, a brief mention of the major 
human rights monitoring mechanisms will be made. This machinery is important 
because it is able to enforce human rights norms.  This may make it more likely that 
States can be persuaded to re-evaluate their conduct and adhere to these norms.  
 
1. IHRL monitoring mechanisms 
                                            
2
 In any case, UN police conduct is unlikely to be attributable to the sending State. The conduct of FPUs 
may be attributable to their sending States in exceptional circumstances. See section 5 of this chapter. 
3
 These include war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and crimes listed in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. Some acts of terrorism can also constitute international crimes. Antonio Cassese and 
Paola Gaeta, Cassese's International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2013), p.63ff. Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, entered in force 1 June 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 
(hereinafter ‘Rome Statute’). 
4
 No such case was recorded in the author’s data. 
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The advantage of IHRL is that it contains mechanisms that can deal with individual 
cases of human rights violations.5 There are two types of mechanisms: first, there are 
treaty-based mechanisms, which have both monitoring and enforcement functions. 
They can investigate how States give effect to the obligation to prosecute and, more 
precisely, how they give effect to that obligation in relation to Peace Operations 
personnel outside their national territory.6 Some treaty bodies can also hear individual 
petitions regarding potential breaches of treaty obligations.7 The issue of non-
prosecution could be challenged through these petitions. Second, there are Charter-
based mechanisms, which include Special Procedures. Their key role is elaborating the 
scope of a norm in relation to a particular thematic issue or a particular State, 
depending on their mandate.8 Special Rapporteurs are independent experts, who have 
some discretion regarding the issues they consider. Special Rapporteurs could 
therefore focus on the issue of non-prosecution specifically in relation to their thematic 
mandates.  For example, the Special Rapporteur on torture,9 and the Special 
                                            
5
 Six of the treaty monitoring bodies (HRC, CERD, CAT, CEDAW, CRPD, and CED) can hear individual 
petitions. UN OHCHR, ‘Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties’  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx> accessed 27 December 2014.  
6
 There are nine core human rights treaties and bodies which monitor States’ compliance: Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), Committee against Torture (CAT), Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 
and Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED). See ibid. For the purposes of this work, the most 
relevant treaty is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1977), 999 UNTS 171 (hereinafter ‘ICCPR’). Its monitoring body is the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC). 
7
 As already noted, six of the treaty monitoring bodies (HRC, CERD, CAT, CEDAW, CRPD, and CED) 
can hear individual petitions. UN OHCHR, ‘Treaty bodies’. 
8
 UN OHCHR, ‘Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx> accessed 27 December 2014. 
9
 Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as 
created by UN CHR Res 1985/33 (13 March 1985) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1985/33, extended every three 




Rapporteur on violence against women,10 could adopt the issue of non-prosecution in 
respect of the impact it has on their particular theme.11 There is, however, no mandate 
specifically dealing with either the issue of accountability in general, or the specific issue 
of the accountability of UN Peace Operations personnel.12  
 
There are also regional mechanisms. These are the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR);13 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR);14 the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR);15 and the African Commission, and the 
African Court on Human and People’s Rights.16 As these institutions can hear individual 
petitions, it is possible that, in certain circumstances, the issue of non-prosecution of a 
UN police member may be considered by them.17 
  
Resorting to human rights machinery may also have the advantage of generating 
publicity and raising awareness of the issue of accountability. The pressure engendered 
                                            
10
 Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, as created by UN CHR 
Res 1994/45 (4 March 1994) UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, extended every three years since, most recently 
by UN Human Rights Council Res 23/25 (14 June 2013) UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/23/25. 
11
 For example, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of 
non-recurrence, created by UN Human Rights Council Res 18/7 (13 October 2011) UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/18/7, extended by UN Human Rights Council Res 27/3 (03 October 2014) UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/27/3. 
12
 If such a mandate were to be established, it would be useful in addressing the difficulties inherent in the 
unique context of UN Peace Operations. These difficulties include issues of jurisdiction and immunities, 
which do not normally arise in the domestic context. However, a consideration of the possible creation of 
a new Special Procedures mandate falls outside the scope of this work. The issues of jurisdiction and 
immunities are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
13
 The ECHR falls under the Council of Europe. Council of Europe, ‘European Court of Human Rights',   
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court&c=#n1354801701084_pointer> accessed 27 
December 2014. 
14
 The IACHR falls under the Organization of American States. OAS, ‘Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights’ <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/> accessed 27 December 2014. 
15
 OAS, ‘Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en> accessed 27 
December 2014. 
16
 AU, ‘African Commission on Human and People's Rights’ <http://www.achpr.org> accessed 27 
December 2014. 
17
 There may be an issue of the machinery’s competence in terms of ratione personae and ratione loci. 
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through this process may enable the UN and States to elicit more information on 
general or particularized misconduct in UN Peace Operations.     
 
The question then arises as to whether IHRL requires the investigation and, where 
appropriate, the prosecution of serious crimes. 
 
2. A State’s obligation to investigate and prosecute UN Police officers, in relation 
to serious crimes  
Under IHRL, there are three dimensions of obligation in respect of rights: 1) the 
obligation to respect the right; 2) the obligation to protect the right; and, 3) the obligation 
to fulfil the right. The first obligation is also called the ‘negative obligation’, whilst the 
other two obligations are known as ‘positive obligations’.18 Negative obligations require 
a State to refrain from infringing a right, whilst positive obligations require a State to do 
something to guarantee a right.19 States are required to protect individuals who are 
within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction20 from acts which would be human 
rights violations were they to be carried out by State agents.21 This obligation also 
                                            
18
 UN Human Rights Committee, 'General Comment 31 on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant' (29 March 2004) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 
(hereinafter ‘General Comment 31’). 
19
 Ibid, paras.6-7. 
20
 This formula is contained in the ICCPR, Article 2. Under the ECHR and American Convention on 
Human Rights, each State party has human rights obligations only in relation to persons subject to its 
‘jurisdiction’. There is no requirement that they be ‘within the territory’. Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) 
(ECHR) 213 UNTS 222, Article 1; American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, 
entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123, Article 1.  
21
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para.18. Joaquín David Herrera Rubio v 
Colombia 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 192; José Vicente and Amado Villafañe 
Chaparro, Dioselina Torres Crespo, Hermes Enrique Torres Solis and Vicencio Chaparro Izquierdo v 
Colombia 6 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 135, para.8.8 (this case is also known as 
Arhuacos v. Colombia); Osman and Osman v UK ECHR 1998-VIII, para.115; L C B v UK ECHR 1998-III 
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requires that States investigate and prosecute any such acts.22 The first question is 
whether such obligations exist in general. If they are found to exist, their source and 
scope will be discussed. 
 
2-1. Existence of the obligation in general  
This section focuses on a State’s duty to conduct an effective investigation into 
allegations that certain crimes have been committed by UN police officers,23 and its duty 
to prosecute private wrongdoers where these allegations are substantiated.24 IHRL is 
primarily concerned with the conduct of States, but it also covers a State’s conduct in 
relation to the acts of private individuals. A State’s responsibility in respect of a private 
actor’s criminal act that infringes on another’s rights can be engaged, ‘not because of 
the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to 
respond to it’.25 General Comment 31 of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) states: 
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights […] 
would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States 
Parties permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due 
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts 
by private persons or entities.26  
                                                                                                                                            
1403, para.36. See also Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, Human Rights Handbooks No 7, 2007), p.16, 
(hereinafter ‘Positive Obligations’), where it explains that such obligations are those that ‘call for the 
organisation of domestic procedures to ensure better protection of persons, those that ultimately require 
the provision of sufficient remedies for violations of rights’. 
22
 It is claimed that this aspect of the obligation is more onerous if the violation is committed by State 
agents. See section 5 below for further details. The obligation to investigate and prosecute is sometimes 
called the “procedural obligation”. For example, Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations, p.16. 
23
 This is because a member of the UN police is not a State agent at the time he is working for a UN 
Peace Operation. See the introductory section of this chapter. 
24
 For ease of reference, this obligation is referred to throughout this chapter as the ‘obligation to 
investigate and prosecute’. 
25
 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 4 (29 July 1988), para.172. 
26
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para.8. The HRC also affirmed that an effective 
remedy must be available to victims of torture, and that the perpetrators must be held responsible 
whether they are public officials or other persons acting on behalf of the State, or private persons. UN 




This was confirmed in a case where a victim’s Convention right was infringed by a 
private person.27  
 
Regional human rights mechanisms have also found that States have an obligation to 
respond appropriately to breaches of human rights by private actors. Velasquez 
Rodriquez is the leading IACtHR case in this regard. It establishes the procedural 
obligation to prevent or respond to an IHRL violation that is not initially directly 
attributable to the State, either because it is the act of a private person or the person(s) 
responsible have not been identified.28 The rationale for this obligation is: 
Where the acts of private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously 
investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by the government, thereby 
making the State responsible on the international plane.29 
 
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission found that if a State does not properly enforce 
those rules which prohibit violations, this could be a factor in the commission of 
subsequent violations.30 The IACtHR has confirmed this approach.31  
 
The ECtHR has also heard cases probing the appropriateness of the State’s response 
to private criminal acts, for example, M. C. v. Bulgaria, which involved rape and sexual 
                                                                                                                                            
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 7' (30 September 1992) UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 
paras.2, 13. 
27
 Khilal Avadanov v Azerbaijan Communication no 1633/2007 (Human Rights Committee, 25 October 
2010), para.9.5, in relation to ill-treatment by a private person. Also note that in the Herrera Rubio case, 
although it was not established that the victim was murdered by a State agent, the Committee affirmed 
the State’s obligation to establish effective facilities and procedures to ensure a thorough investigation. 
Herrera Rubio v Colombia. 
28
 Velásquez Rodríguez, para.172. 
29
 Ibid, para.177. 
30
 For example, in relation to domestic violence in the private sphere, the IACHR emphasized that, ‘[t]he 
failure to prosecute and convict the perpetrator under these circumstances is an indication that the State 
condones the violence suffered by Maria da Penha, and this failure by the Brazilian courts to take action 
is exacerbating the direct consequences of the aggression by her ex-husband’. 12.051 Maria da Penha 
Maia Fernandes v Brazil Inter-Am Com HR Series L No 54/01, paras.55-56.  
31
 Godinez-Cruz v Honduras (Merits) Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 5 (20 January 1989) paras.181-182, 
citing Velásquez Rodríguez, para.172; Caballero Delgado and Santana v Colombia Inter-Am Ct HR 
Series C No 22 (8 December 1995), para.56. 
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assault. The lack of a thorough investigation into allegations of rape was, in itself, found 
to be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.32 Cases dealing with the appropriateness 
of the State’s response to the deprivation of life by private individuals addressed the 
State’s duty to investigate and prosecute after the deaths.33 One of the cases in Al-
Skeini dealt with the duty to investigate a killing where the person who fired the fatal 
shot was not identified.34 In another case which concerned a local authority’s failure to 
prevent an explosion at a rubbish dump, resulting in the deaths of slum-dwellers, the 
State’s obligation to investigate these deaths adequately was examined.35 
    
It appears that, in general, the obligation to investigate and prosecute exists under IHRL 
treaties in relation to criminal conduct which would be a violation of a right protected in 
one of these treaties, had it been committed by a State agent.36 In order to determine 
the scope of this obligation, it is necessary to establish how it arises.  
 
2-2. Two ways in which the obligation to investigate and prosecute arises 
                                            
32
  In this case it was held that, ‘[…] the effectiveness of the investigation of the applicant’s case and, in 
particular, the approach taken by the investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell short of the 
requirements inherent in the States’ positive obligations – viewed in the light of the relevant modern 
standards in comparative and international law – to establish and apply effectively a criminal-law system 
punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse’. M C v Bulgaria ECHR 2003-XII, para.185. 
33
 Menson and Others v UK ECHR 2003-V; Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria ECHR 2007-IX; Gongadze v 
Ukraine App no 34056/02 (ECtHR, 8 November 2005); Dink v Turkey App no 2668/07 (ECtHR, 14 
September 2010). 
34
 Al-Skeini and Others v UK [2011] ECHR 1093. This case is significant in that the killing took place 
outside the respondent State’s territory, although the situation was said to be under its control for the 
purpose of application of the Convention. 
35
 Öneryildiz v Turkey ECHR 2004-XII. The obligation to investigate was also found to be violated in 
suicide cases. In Mammadov, the authority’s failure to interview the person who committed suicide before 
death, despite the availability of information about her life-threatening injuries, was found to be in violation 
of the obligation to investigate. Mikayil Mammadov v Azerbaijan App no 4762/05 (ECtHR, 17 December 
2009), para.130.  
36
 In general, there are positive obligations on State parties to guarantee the rights contained in the 
Covenant, by protecting individuals against ‘acts committed by private persons or entities that would 
impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private 
persons or entities’. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para.8. 
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There are two ways in which this obligation arises. One is reading it into each treaty 
right, and the other is to interpret the content of each right in light of the right to a 
remedy.  
 
Reading the obligation into each right 
Some of the HRC’s responses appear to read this obligation into each right. General 
Comment 31 of the ICCPR states that: 
 
[...] the Covenant itself envisages in some articles certain areas where there are 
positive obligations on States Parties to address the activities of private persons 
or entities.37 
 
General Comment 6 on the right to life concludes that the deprivation of life through 
criminal acts should be punished.38 In the Herrera Rubio case, which dealt with the 
disappearance of the applicant’s parents, the HRC held that an effective investigation 
was a requirement under the right to life.39  
  
In M. C. v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR found a violation due to the lack of an effective 
investigation into a crime.40 The Court also found violations of the right to be free from 
                                            
37
 Ibid, para.8. 
38
 UN Human Rights Committee, 'General Comment 6 on Article 6 (The Right to Life)' (30 April 1982) UN 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, para.3. 
39
 Herrera Rubio v Colombia. Note, however, that in the earlier examination of the case, the Committee 
referred to the State’s obligation under Article 2, which requires that the State give effect to the victim’s 
right to a remedy. Ibid, para.10.3. The HRC’s examination of Article 16 (the right to recognition before the 
law) in Kimouche may be worth noting. It was found that under the circumstances (the victim’s arrest by 
the authorities followed by a lack of provision of information), the lack of investigation placed the victim 
outside the protection of the law. Messaouda Kimouche v Algeria Communication no 1328/2004 (Human 
Rights Committee, 10 July 2007), para.7.9. 
40
 It was held that, ‘[…] the effectiveness of the investigation of the applicant’s case and, in particular, the 
approach taken by the investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell short of the requirements inherent 
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torture and ill-treatment, and the right to a private and family life.41 However, the Court 
found that no separate issue arose under the right to a remedy.42 The first leading 
ECtHR case on the obligation to investigate, the McCann case, dealt with this obligation 
under the right to life.43 This was followed by a number of cases before the European 
Court on right to life issues, including those dealing with fatal shootings, crimes by a 
private individual taking or threatening life, suspicious deaths and medical malpractice.44  
 
The IACtHR also took this approach. In the Velasquez-Rodriguez case, the Court found 
a violation of the right to life, as a result of the State’s general obligation under the 
                                                                                                                                            
in the States’ positive obligations – viewed in the light of the relevant modern standards in comparative 
and international law – to establish and apply effectively a criminal-law system punishing all forms of rape 
and sexual abuse’. M C v Bulgaria, para.185. 
41
 Articles 3 and 8. 
42
 M C v Bulgaria, para.187. 
43
 McCann and Others v UK Series A No 324. 
44
 Hugh Jordan v UK ECHR 2001-III; McKerr v UK ECHR 2001-III; Kelly and Others v UK App no 
30054/96 (ECtHR, 4 May 2001); Shanaghan v UK App no 37715/97 (ECtHR, 4 August 2001); McShane v 
UK App no 43290/98 (ECtHR 28 May 2002); Finucane v UK ECHR 2003-VIII; Öğur v Turkey ECHR 1999-
III; Tanis and Others v Turkey ECHR 2005-VIII. In Tanis and Others, the Court also found a violation 
under the right to remedy. In one of the Al-Skeini incidents, Article 2 was found to be breached because a 
full and independent investigation into the deaths did not take place, even though the applicant’s relative 
received a substantial sum in the settlement of his civil claim, together with the admission of liability on 
the part of the British Army. Al-Skeini and Others v UK. In Menson and Others, the Court stated that all 
life-threatening injuries in suspicious circumstances should lead to an effective official investigation, even 
where there is no indication that the authority concerned knew or should have known. Menson and 
Others v UK. See also Yaşa v Turkey ECHR 1998-VI; Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria. In Silih, the official 
inquiry into the death of a man due to medical malpractice by a doctor at a public hospital was found to be 
too slow and had other deficiencies, resulting in a violation of the right to life. In its judgment, the Court 
ruled that this obligation applies in cases related to medical care both in public and private sector. ‘[T]he 
procedural obligation of Article 2 requires the States to set up an effective independent judicial system so 
that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the 
private sector, can be determined, and those responsible made accountable.’ Silih v Slovenia ECHR 
2009, para.192. See also Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy ECHR 2002-I; Powell v UK ECHR 2000-V; Dodov v 
Bulgaria ECHR 2008; Eugenia Lazăr v Romania App no 32146/05 (ECtHR, 16 February 2010); Mehmet 
Şentürk and Bekir Şentürk v Turkey App no 13423/09 (ECtHR, 9 April 2013). In a number of cases 
involving a violation of Article 3, the Court also found the requirement of effective investigation was not 
satisfied. In those cases, the acts of torture/ill-treatment were carried out by State agents. Menesheva v 
Russia App no 59261/00 (ECtHR, 9 March 2006); Bekos v Greece App no 15250/02 (ECtHR, 13 
December 2005); Tanli v Turkey ECHR 2001-III; Kurt v Turkey ECHR 1998-III.    
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Convention to ‘ensure’ this right, but did not raise the question of the right to a remedy.45 
This approach has been followed in subsequent cases.46  
 
Reading the scope of each right in conjunction with the right to a remedy 
It is also possible to identify a procedural obligation in relation to various rights by 
reading the scope of each right in conjunction with the right to a remedy. Part of the 
HRC’s General Comment 31 appears to take this approach, by referring to the potential 
circumstances in which a violation of these rights would arise due to a State’s failure to 
guarantee them, as required by Article 2.47 ICCPR Article 2, paragraph 3 concerns the 
State Parties’ obligation to provide an effective remedy for victims in the event of a 
breach. This appears to suggest that the obligation to investigate and prosecute may 
arise from reading a substantive right in conjunction with the right to a remedy. General 
Comment 20 on the right to be free from torture and ill-treatment also takes this 
approach.48 Cases involving alleged torture or ill-treatment, arbitrary detention and 
issues regarding recognition before the law have followed this path.49 In several cases 
                                            
45
 Velásquez Rodríguez, paras.166, 172-182. The Court ruled that there was no issue under the right to 
judicial protection (Article 25). 
46
 Godinez-Cruz v Honduras, paras.170-171, 197-198, 203; Caballero Delgado and Santana v Colombia, 
paras.55-59, 72; Paniagua-Morales v Guatemala Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 37 (8 March 1998), 
paras.173-174. 
47
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para.8. Article 2 deals with the States Parties’ 
obligation to give effect to the rights enshrined in the Covenant, and paragraph 3 ensures that there are 
effective remedies for any violation of Covenant rights. Those two are inter-related, as set out in ibid, 
para.8.    
48
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, para.14. 
49
 Ali Medjnoune v Algeria 9 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 182, para.10; Zheikov v 
Russia Communication No 889/1999 (Human Rights Committee, 17 March 2006), para.7; Sundara 
Arachchige Lalith Rajapakse v Sri Lanka Communication no 1250/2004 (Human Rights Committee, 14 
July 2006), para.9.5, where the Committee found a violation of Article 2.3 in conjunction with Article 7, 
and subsequently held it unnecessary to consider possible violation under Article 7 alone. In a recent 
disappearance case, the Committee also examined the issue of effective investigation under Article 2.3 in 
conjunction with Article 7. El Hassy v Lybia Communication no 1422/2005 (Human Rights Committee, 24 
October 2007), para.6.9. See also Hassan Abbousedra v Lybia Communication no 1751/2008 (Human 
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dealing with acts by private persons, the HRC has taken this route to recognizing this 
obligation.50   
 
The ECtHR has observed that whether issues are raised under the right to a remedy is 
dependent on the existence of a ‘close procedural and practical relationship between 
the criminal investigation and the remedies available to those applicants in the legal 
system as a whole’.51 The scope of Article 13 (the right to a remedy) varies depending 
on the nature of the complaint.52 In Kurt, the Court compared the procedural 
requirements under Article 5 (the right to liberty and security) with those in Article 13, 
and ruled that the latter includes a:  
[...] thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification 
and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the 
relatives to the investigatory procedure.53  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Rights Committee, 25 October 2010), para.7.10. In this case, the HRC found a violation of Articles 6.1 
and 7, read in conjunction with Article 2.3. In the Kimouche case, the HRC examined substantive articles 
on their own, then examined Article 2.3 in conjunction with those substantive rights. It found a violation of 
Article 2.3 in conjunction with Articles 7, 9, and 16, as well as a separate violation of Article 2.3 read in 
conjunction with Article 7. Kimouche v Algeria, paras.7.9, 7.10. 
50
 Marija and Dragana Novakovic, on behalf of their son, Zoran Novakovic (deceased) v Serbia 
Communication no 1556/2007 (Human Rights Committee, 21 October 2010), para.7.3. The Committee 
used an argument under Article 5 in conjunction with Article 2.3 to reach this conclusion. In this regard, it 
is noteworthy that the HRC found that Article 2 cannot be invoked in isolation, but can only be invoked in 
conjunction with another Covenant right. R A V N v Argentina 3 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee 20, para.5.3. In Avadanov, the Committee found a violation of Article 7 read in conjunction 
with Article 2.3 in respect of the authority’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation into the 
allegations of ill-treatment by a private person. Avadanov v Azerbaijan, para.9.5. See also M G B and S P 
v Trinidad and Tobago 3 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 36, para.6.2. 
51
 Öneryildiz v Turkey, para.148; Salman v Turkey ECHR 2000-VII, para.109. In Öneryildiz, a violation 
was found under the right to a remedy on account of the lack of a prompt administrative procedure for 
compensation, but not on account of the lack of an effective investigation into the deaths of the 
applicant’s relatives. Öneryildiz v Turkey, paras.91-96, 150-155. 
52
 Menesheva v Russia; Fernando Felipe Basch, ‘The Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Regarding States' Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations and Its Dangers’ 23 American 
University International Law Review 195, p.222. 
53
 Kurt v Turkey, para.140. The Court refers to Aksoy v Turkey ECHR 1996-VI, para.98; Aydin v Turkey 
ECHR 1997-VI, para.103; Kaya v Turkey ECHR 1998-I, paras.106-107.  
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Thus, Article 13 is broader than Article 5.54 In relation to the right to life, an observation 
was made that the investigation requirement under Article 2 is more focused on official 
investigations leading to the establishment of criminal liability, whilst that under Article 
13 is more focused on civil remedies to enable the victims or their relatives to seek 
compensation.55 The ECtHR’s requirements relating to effective investigation and 
subsequent prosecution are increasingly demanding, which transforms the 
requirements into substantive rights.56    
 
The IACtHR has also considered the duty to investigate and prosecute under the right 
to a remedy.57 It has further considered the issue from the perspective of the right of a 
victim to a fair trial. It has taken a view that fair trial guarantees serve to protect the 
defendants as well as victims in criminal proceedings.58 
 
2-3. Does it matter which substantive right is at issue?  
The cases cited above relate to specific rights. It is thus necessary to clarify if the 
obligation to investigate exists only in relation to certain rights, and not others.  
                                            
54
 Kurt v Turkey, para.140. 
55
 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European 
Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2014), p.160, (hereinafter ‘European Convention’). 
This judgment was based inter alia on the Court’s judgment in Öneryildiz v Turkey. 
56
 Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations, pp.16-17. In Tanis and Others, the ECtHR found violations related 
to the duty to investigate under Article 2, Article 3 and subsequently under Article 13. Tanis and Others v 
Turkey. 
57
 ‘Article 25 in relation to Article 1 (1) […] obliges the State to guarantee to every individual access to the 
administration of justice and, in particular, to simple and prompt recourse, so that inter-alia, those 
responsible for human rights violations may be prosecuted and reparations obtained for the damages 
suffered.’ Loayza-Tamayo v Peru Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No42 (27 November 1998) para.168. 
58
 Bulacio v Argentina Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 100 (18 September 2003), para.162; Genie-Lacayo v 
Nicaragua Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 30 (29 January 1997), para.75; Blake v Guatemala Inter-Am Ct 
HR Series C No 36 (24 January 1998), paras.96-97; Tradesman v Colombia Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 
109 (5 July 2004), para.219; La Palmeras v Colombia Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 90 (6 December 2001), 




General Comment 31 provides that: 
The [ICCPR] itself envisages in some articles certain areas where there are 
positive obligations on States Parties to address the activities of private persons 
or entities.59 
 
It suggests that the obligation to bring those responsible to justice arises in relation to: 
[…] those violations recognized as criminal under either domestic or international 
law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article 
7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 
7 and 9 and, frequently, 6).60 
 
In the El Hassy and Kimouche cases, the HRC emphasized that the obligation to 
investigate is particularly important in relation to enforced disappearances, acts of 
torture and the right to life.61 In the latter case, the HRC also highlighted the relationship 
between the requirement to investigate and a violation of Article 16 (the right to 
recognition before the law).62 
 
It is possible that this obligation may arise only in relation to limited rights, although 
clearly the list provided is not exhaustive. It is also clear that it is not limited to 
international crimes, but it may be that it arises only in relation to serious crimes. The 
HRC has found that this obligation exists in relation to disappearance cases, as well as 
alleged criminal conduct in relation to the right to life, the right not to be tortured or 
subjected to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention.63  
                                            
59
 (Emphasis added.) UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para.8. 
60
 Ibid, para.18. 
61
 El Hassy v Lybia, para.8; Kimouche v Algeria, para.2.8. 
62
 Kimouche v Algeria, para.7.9. 
63
 This obligation arises even in cases in which either the conduct concerned was committed by private 




Different regional bodies have applied this obligation to different rights. Under the 
ECHR, this approach was taken to the right to life,64 and cases of rape and sexual 
assault (which raise the potential infringement of the right to be free from torture and ill-
treatment, as well as the right to a private and family life).65 While there is a suggestion 
that the obligation to investigate and prosecute only arises in relation to core rights66 or 
in relation to ‘grave facts’,67 the ECtHR has held that this obligation is dependent on the 
circumstances of each case.68 It observed that not all infringements of the right to a 
private and family life necessarily require criminal remedies.69 Since then the Court has 
                                                                                                                                            
para.7.3; Chaparro v Colombia, para.8.8. (This case is also known as Arhuacos v Colombia); Herrera 
Rubio v Colombia, para.10.3. In addition, in relation to the deprivation of life by State agents, see 
Marcellana and Gumanoy v The Philippines Communication no 1560/2007 (Human Rights Committee, 30 
October 2008), para.7.3. For other disappearance cases, see Yasoda Sharma v Nepal Communication 
no 1469/2006 (Human Rights Committee, 6 November 2008), para.3.2; Rafael Mojica v Dominican 
Republic 5 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 70, para.5.5; Rosario Celis Laureano v 
Peru 6 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 63, para.8.3; El Hassy v Libya, para.8. The 
requirement that a full and thorough investigation be held was found to exist in relation to ill-treatment and 
incommunicado detention in Medjnoune case. Medjnoune v Algeria, para.10. 
64
 Öneryildiz v Turkey. In addition, there are a number of cases in which the lack of effective investigation 
or prosecution and punishment was raised in relation to the deprivation of life by a State agent. Kaya v 
Turkey, para.86; Tanrikulu v Turkey ECHR 1999-IV; Kemal Kiliç v Turkey ECHR 2000-III; McCann v UK; 
Paul and Audrey Edwards v UK ECHR 2002-II, para.69; Ergi v Turkey ECHR 1998-IV; Güleç v Turkey 
ECHR 1998-IV. See also the cases listed above in n.44. 
65
 M C v Bulgaria; X and Y v The Netherlands Series A No 91. In addition, where a State agent is alleged 
to have tortured or ill-treated a victim, there is a clear case-law that the obligation to investigate and 
prosecute exists. See generally, supra, n.44. 
66
 That is chiefly in relation to Articles 2 and 3. Basch, ‘The Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Regarding States' Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations and Its Dangers’, pp.222-223. This 
view is based on the language used by the European Court. For example, the Court emphasized ‘the 
fundamental importance of the rights protected by Articles 2 and 3’ in Menesheva v Russia.   
67
 The examples given are suspicious death and ill-treatment. Basch, ‘The Doctrine of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Regarding States' Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations and Its Dangers’, 
pp.222, 226. 
68
 In one case, the Court also attached a caveat to the obligation to investigate and prosecute under 
Article 13 (the right to a remedy). It stated that the cases arising from the conflict in south-east Turkey in 
the 1990s must be considered in that context, which was characterized ‘by the absence of any such 
investigations into the applicants’ complaints’. Öneryildiz v Turkey, para.134.  
69




found that an obligation to investigate exists in relation to rape,70 and life-threatening or 
fatal assaults.71 It has also held that the response to a loss of life does not itself have to 
be criminal. In the case of a death through medical negligence at a private clinic, it was 
found that a civil remedy sufficed.72   
 
The Inter-American system has held that the obligation applies to cases involving 
disappearance, arbitrary detentions, kidnapping, ill-treatment and the deprivation of life. 
These cases involved the infringement of multiple rights, and the obligation to 
investigate and prosecute, where appropriate, was found in relation to the rights to 
liberty, humane treatment, and life.73 This indicates that most of the crimes committed 
by UN police officers would trigger an obligation to investigate.74 Furthermore, the 
Court’s language suggested that the obligation to investigate and prosecute arises in 
relation to every breach of the Convention, regardless of whether the infringement is 
due to State or private acts,75 although the scope of this obligation may depend on 
which right is at stake, as well as the severity of the breach.76 
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 M C v Bulgaria. 
71
 Kemal Kiliç v Turkey; Menson and Others v UK; Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria. The Court also dealt 
with the requirement that there be official investigations into suicides. Mammadov v Azerbaijan. In 
addition, there are numerous cases in relation to instances in which States were alleged to have been 
involved in killings or torture/ill-treatment under Articles 2 and 3. See in general, supra, n.44. 
72
 Ciglio v Italy. It examined the necessity of criminal proceedings in relation to cases dealing with the right 
to life. In the case at hand, no violation was found in relation to the absence of any criminal sanctions 
imposed on a doctor who was negligent. This was due to the fact that Italian law stipulates a particular 
time limit for bringing criminal proceedings in certain types of cases.  
73
 Velásquez Rodríguez; Godinez-Cruz v Honduras, paras.170-171, 197-198, 203; Caballero Delgado 
and Santana v Colombia, paras.55-59, 72; Paniagua-Morales v Guatemala. 
74
 For a discussion of the nature of crimes committed by UN police, see Chapter 3, section 2-2. 
75
 ‘The State is obliged to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the 
Convention.’ Velásquez Rodríguez, para.176; Godinez-Cruz v Honduras, para.175. Paniagua-Morales v 
Guatemala, para.174. See in general Basch, ‘The Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Regarding States' Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations and Its Dangers’, pp.196-200. 
76
 Diane F Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 




3. Scope of the obligation 
3-1. Obligation to investigate 
The first part of the obligation entails a requirement to investigate the allegation. The 
HRC observed that States must exercise due diligence by investigating allegations of 
violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively, through independent and impartial 
bodies.77 In Herrera Rubio, although it was not established that the victim was murdered 
by a State agent, the Committee found that States Parties are obliged to establish 
effective facilities and procedures to ensure a thorough investigation by an appropriate 
impartial body. It is interesting to note that the Committee observed that an investigative 
‘facility and process’ must be ‘established’, which may indicate that investigative bodies 
must, to a certain extent, be institutionalized, rather than investigations being carried out 
on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, the investigation itself must be conducted in good 
faith.78 
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 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para.15. In Rajapakse, the Committee found that 
the fact that an investigation was not opened by the Attorney General until over three months after the 
incident at hand, despite the fact that the victim was hospitalized and unconscious for 15 days, was found 
to fail the ‘prompt’ test. It observed that the expeditious and effectiveness requirements are particularly 
important in cases involving torture. Rajapakse v Sri Lanka, paras.9.4, 9.5.   
78
 This obligation was found in relation to cases of missing and disappeared persons in circumstances 
which might involve a violation of the right to life. In this case, the complainant’s parents were picked up 
by State agents. The next day, State agents came to the complainant’s house, and informed him that they 
had found his parents’ bodies. However it could not be proved that the State agents murdered them. The 
Committee found that the burden of proof was not on the complainant, as the State may have exclusive 
access to some of the relevant information. In such circumstances, the State has an obligation to give 
due weight to the complainant’s allegations. Herrera Rubio v Colombia, para.10-5. Eduardo Bleier v 
Uruguay 1 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 109, para.13.3; Almeida de Quinteros v 
Uruguay 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 138, para.11; El Hassy v Libya; para.6.9. 
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In other cases involving the actual or potential deprivation of life by State agents, it was 
found that there must be a criminal investigation.79 It was reasoned that procedural 
requirements can only be ensured through a complete and exhaustive investigation into 
the cause of death, and the events leading to it. Such an investigation is guaranteed 
through criminal, not civil proceedings.80 Proceedings must be brought promptly. The 
State’s failure to provide legitimate reasons for a delay in initiating criminal proceedings 
in relation to the death, which was allegedly due to improper medical treatment, was, in 
itself, a breach of the State’s obligation to properly investigate the case.81 
 
Similarly, under the European system, requirements are those of means, and not of 
result.82 Where there is an actual or potential loss of life, there must be ‘some form of 
effective official investigation’, whether or not the offender is established as being a 
State agent. 83 Whatever form such an investigation takes, the authorities are required 
to act once the matter has come to their attention, regardless of whether the next-of-kin 
has lodged a complaint.84 Such an investigation must be carried out promptly,85 in order 
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 Nydia Erika Bautista de Arellana v Colombia 6 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 103, 
para.8.2. This finding was reiterated in Jose Vicente, Chaparro v Colombia, paras.5.2., 8.8. 
80
 See also the case concerning the killing of a ‘suspected terrorist’ by a State agent: Marcellana and 
Gumanoy v The Philippines, para.7.3. Another case concerned a killing by police. See Vadivel 
Sathasivam and Parathesi Saraswathi v Sri Lanka Communication no 1436/2005 (Human Rights 
Committee, 8 July 2008), para.3.6.                
81
 Novakovic v. Serbia, para.7.3. 
82
 Jaloud v The Netherlands [2014] ECHR 1292, para.166; Ramsahai and Others v The Netherlands 
[2007] ECHR 393, para.324; Silih v Slovenia, para.193; Edwards v UK. 
83
 McCann v UK, para.161. The Courts in Kaya and Ergi also stated that procedural requirements under 
the right to life require that the loss of human life must be subject to an effective official investigation. 
Kaya v Turkey, para.87; Ergi v Turkey, para.82. See also Hugh Jordan v UK; McKerr v UK; Kelly and 
Others v UK; Shanaghan v UK; McShane v UK; Finucane v UK. 
84
 Kelly and Others v UK, para.94; Ilhan v Turkey ECHR 2000-VII, para.63; Ahmet Özkan and Others v 
UK App no 21689/93, (ECtHR, 6 April 2004), cited above, para.310; Isayeva v Russia App no 57950/00 
(ECtHR, 6 July 2005), para.210; Jaloud v The Netherlands, para.186. 
85
 In the Ramsahai case, the fact that the police officers involved in the shooting were not questioned until 
three days later was questioned by the Court. Ramsahai and Others v The Netherlands, paras.399-431. 
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to maintain public confidence in the authority’s adherence to the rule of law, and to 
prevent the perception of their collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.86 For an 
investigation to be effective, there are two requirements. The first is that it must be 
adequate; and the second is that it must be independent.87 Under the first requirement, 
the investigation must be thorough,88 and must be capable of leading to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible.89 Therefore, an investigation must 
take reasonable steps to secure the evidence, including testimonies of witnesses, 
forensic evidence and, where appropriate, autopsy.90 The domestic law must enable the 
authority to conduct an effective investigation.91 The investigation must be carried out 
on the basis of ‘objective evidence’.92 Where the deprivation of life was caused by lethal 
force, it must be capable of determining whether the force used was justified in the 
                                                                                                                                            
In Angelova and Iliev, four years of a stalled investigation into an allegedly racially motivated killing was 
found to be ineffective. The Court stated that the requirement of ‘promptness and reasonable expedition’ 
applies especially where death is alleged to follow a racially motivated attack. Angelova and Iliev v 
Bulgaria, paras.97-98. 
86
 Yaşa v Turkey; Çakıcı v Turkey [1999] ECHR 43; Tanrikulu v Turkey; Mahmut Kaya v Turkey ECHR 
2000-III. 
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 Ramsahai and Others v The Netherlands, paras.324-325; Hugh Jordan v UK, para.105ff; Akpinar and 
Altun v Turkey ECHR 2007-III; Osmanoglu v Turkey App no 48804/99 (ECtHR, 24 January 2008); Beker 
v Turkey App no 27866/03 (ECtHR, 24 March 2009). 
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 In the Finucane case, the official investigation was found inadequate because it only identified the man 
who shot the victim, and failed to examine the evidence that suggested the involvement of members of 
Royal Ulster Constabulary. Finucane v UK. 
89
 Ramsahai and Others v The Netherlands, paras.324-325; Menesheva v Russia, para.67 
90
 Jaloud v The Netherlands, para.186; Ahmet Özkan and Others v UK, paras.310, 312; Isayeva v Russia, 
paras.200, 212. See also Salman v Turkey; Tanrikulu v Turkey and Gül v Turkey App no 22676/93 
(ECtHR, 14 December 2000). It was required that non-military witnesses must be questioned promptly in 
order to satisfy the procedural requirement under the right to life. Al-Skeini and Others v UK, para.171. In 
addition, ‘[t]he mere fact that an appropriate measure was not taken to prevent collusion (of suspect with 
other witnesses) amounts to a shortcoming in the adequacy of investigation’. Jaloud v The Netherlands, 
paras.206-208. In Ramsahai, the authority’s failure to test the hands of police officers for gunshot residue, 
the lack of photographs of the injuries, its failure to reconstruct what happened in the incident, and the 
lack of examination of the weapons and ammunitions of the two police officers who may have been 
involved in the incident, was found to be inadequate. Ramsahai and Others v The Netherlands. See also 
Guiliani and Gaggio v Italy ECHR-2011.   
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 For example, in the Hugh Jordan case, the authorities lacked the power to compel a police officer to 
testify as a witness, and he refused to give evidence or to be cross-examined. The jury also lacked the 
power to give a verdict as to the lawfulness of the killing. This was found to be ineffective. Hugh Jordan v 
UK . 
92
 Ergi v Turkey. 
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prevailing circumstances.93 It also means attempting to identify those responsible.94 
Under the second requirement, the investigation must be headed by, and carried out by, 
persons who are institutionally and practically independent from those implicated in 
events.95 An investigation, and its results, must be subject to sufficient public scrutiny.96 
This includes the adequate involvement of the victim’s next-of-kin in the investigation, 
including sufficient access to the investigation, and to related information.97 A violation 
can be found even where the investigation was not conducted in ‘bad faith’.98 
Furthermore, the obligation to investigate remains applicable in difficult situations. This 
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is the case both where the security situation is fragile, including in the context of armed 
conflict, as well as military occupation.99 In one of the cases under Al-Skeini, it was 
found that the obligation to investigate also arises even where it was unclear who fired 
the fatal shot, killing the victim.100    
 
Under the Inter-American system, the Court, in Velasquez Rodriquez, ruled that the 
State is obliged to ‘carry out a serious investigation’, and ‘to identify those 
responsible’.101 The Court held that the State’s obligation to investigate covers every 
situation involving a violation of a right which is protected by the Convention,102 even in 
difficult circumstances. The investigation must ‘have an objective’, and must be treated 
by the State as a legal duty, which is not dependent on the victim, or his/her next-of-kin, 
bringing a complaint or proving the facts.103 If it did not take ‘reasonable measures’, the 
State would be responsible for failing to meet its obligation to protect an individual’s 
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rights through the exercise of due diligence. The Court observed, as did the HRC, that 
this obligation has a systemic nature. Thus, it involves the organization of: 
[...] governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which 
public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free 
and full enjoyment of human rights.104  
 
The absence of a pertinent explanation by the State was taken as indicating the 
absence of an investigation to establish responsibility. That was viewed in one case as 
amounting to a denial of justice, and to a breach of its obligation ‘to properly investigate 
the death of the victims and take appropriate action against those found guilty’.105 The 
requirements under this obligation should be considered in light of the relevant modern 
standards in comparative and international law to ‘establish and apply effectively a 
criminal-law system’.106 
  
3-2. Obligation to prosecute and punish 
The second part of the obligation entails the prosecution and punishment of the 
suspect. 
 
The HRC stated that, where an investigation reveals a violation of certain Covenant 
rights, State Parties are obliged to ensure that those responsible are brought to 
justice.107 This duty arises a fortiori in cases where the perpetrators have been 
identified.108 Courts in the European and Inter-American systems also largely support 
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this position.109 Recent cases before the IACtHR go further and suggest that, in cases 
of serious human rights violations, the victim or victim’s relatives have the right to 
secure prosecution.110 Where those responsible are identified through investigations, 
criminal proceedings should be brought against them, and appropriate criminal 
sanctions imposed.111 
 
However, the obligation to prosecute is not absolute. Private individuals do not possess 
the right to demand that the State prosecute or, for that matter, convict a suspect.112 
Even the Convention against Torture does not stipulate that the obligation entails more 
than ‘submit[ting] the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution’.113 Thereafter, prosecutorial discretion may be exercised. This necessitates 
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In many national legal systems, prosecutors have a discretionary power to decide 
whether or not to initiate criminal proceedings, and which specific charges(s) to lay 
against the suspected perpetrator(s).114 The basis for prosecutorial discretion differs, 
including the extent of public interest in pursuing prosecution.115 Public interest, in turn, 
is determined by various factors, including the strength of evidence, the prospect of 
conviction, the seriousness of the offence, the degree of harm or damage caused, the 
need to deter reoccurrence, the existence of an alternative mode of disposition, and its 
influence on the State’s relations with other States.116  
 
The extent of the limitations on prosecutorial discretion is not clearly set out. The 
obligation to prosecute is formulated in treaties as the obligation to submit a case to the 
relevant authority for the purpose of prosecution.117 This formulation is intended to 
accommodate prosecutorial discretion.118  
 
One limitation on prosecutorial discretion relates to the reasons for not prosecuting a 
suspect. Human rights bodies have found a violation in relation to the obligation to 
prosecute, when the reason for prosecutor’s decision to not pursue prosecution of an 
alleged criminal conduct is not sufficiently set out.119 In the Herrera Rubio case, the 
HRC found a violation on these grounds.120 Where a prosecutor fails to consider all the 
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relevant information in deciding to drop the prosecution of an alleged crime, this may be 
considered a violation of the obligation to prosecute. For example, the ECtHR found that 
a prosecutor’s decision to close an investigation was in violation of this obligation, 
because he failed to give consideration to the relevant factors.121 
 
One ground that is frequently questioned by human rights bodies is where the 
prosecutor claims that his decision was based on a lack of evidence. This will be 
discussed below. 
 
Lack of evidence  
Prosecutors often decide not to prosecute a case where there is a lack of sufficient 
evidence122 and, correspondingly, little prospect of a conviction.123  It is important to 
distinguish two potential reasons for there being a lack of evidence: first, following a 
thorough investigation, there may be insufficient evidence to prosecute; second, the 
lack of evidence may be the result of an inadequate investigation. The first constitutes a 
legitimate reason for not bringing a prosecution, as the duty to prosecute applies ‘a 
fortiori in cases in which the perpetrators of such violations have been identified’.124 
However, the second reason may constitute a violation of the obligation to 
investigate.125 Where a thorough investigation was not conducted and, as a result, a 
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prosecutor is left with insufficient evidence, the prosecutor appears to be required to 
order a further investigation.126  
 
In addition, the State cannot base its decision not to prosecute on a lack of evidence, 
without demonstrating that it has tried to gather evidence. For example, in relation to a 
case of kidnapping and killing of individuals by armed group members, the Committee 
held that the State’s submission that the prosecutorial authorities had decided not to 
initiate criminal proceedings due to a lack of sufficient evidence, without providing any 
specific information as to whether investigations were carried out in order to determine 
the responsibility of individuals identified by witnesses, was not accepted as a legitimate 
reason for relieving the State of its obligation.127 This means that the burden of proof for 
demonstrating that the decision to not prosecute a case is based on the results of a 
thorough investigation rests with the State.  
 
This leads to the conclusion that, where national legal systems permit, prosecutors have 
some discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a crime. However, if no prosecution is 
pursued, this could be incompatible with the obligation, depending on the reasons for 
this. Lack of evidence constitutes a legitimate reason for non-prosecution, provided that 
certain investigative standards have been met. That is an obligation of best effort. The 
submission by the Secretary-General, in respect of the Reparations case, argued that 
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the breach of the duty to protect was based partly on the failure to take all the measures 
required by international law to bring the culprits to justice.128 Therefore, it is possible to 
argue that there may be circumstances in which the duty to investigate alleged 
violations in good faith may bring about a duty to prosecute a certain person.129   
 
However, where prosecutorial discretion is misused, there is often no means of 
challenging the prosecutor’s decision within the domestic legal system.130 The only 
recourse in these circumstances may be to lodge a complaint with a relevant human 
rights mechanism. 
 
3-2-2. Obligation to criminalize certain behaviour 
In some circumstances, the State with the obligation to prosecute may claim that it 
cannot bring criminal proceedings because the behaviour in question is not criminal 
under its domestic law. In X and Y, heard by the ECtHR, the issue was the impossibility 
of instituting criminal proceedings because of the gap in criminal law provisions dealing 
with having sexual intercourse with a mentally disabled person of a particular age, 
against his or her will. The Court ruled that this act must be criminalized, and the State’s 
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failure to do so was itself a violation of the victim’s right to a private life.131 Under the 
ICCPR, States are similarly obliged to criminalize torture and ill-treatment within the 
meaning of Article 7. States should indicate which provisions of their criminal law 
penalize breaches of this prohibition, and specify the penalties for such acts, regardless 
of the offender’s status.132 The obligation to criminalize certain behaviour forms part of 
the State’s obligation to give effect to the rights enshrined in each treaty.133  
 
4. The obligation of the host State to investigate and prosecute 
The host State, being the State in which the act in question was committed, is the first 
State which has an obligation to investigate and prosecute. IHRL unquestionably binds 
a State in respect of the people who are within its territory, and subject to its 
jurisdiction.134 The host State’s obligations are only briefly discussed, because it is 
unlikely to be able to investigate and prosecute, rather than unwilling to do so. 
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The biggest problem is that States and territories where UN Peace Operations are 
deployed are, by their very nature, struggling to build or rebuild State institutions.135 It is 
also possible that the host State is unable to protect human rights adequately, including 
by conducting an appropriate investigation and prosecution,136 due to its lack of 
effective control over its territory and/or the persons within it.137 The question arises as 
to whether the host State has an obligation in such a situation to prosecute UN police 
officers’ crimes. That is, is the host State’s de jure sovereignty sufficient to engage its 
responsibility?138  
 
There is no question regarding any negative obligations on the part of the host State, as 
UN police officers are by definition foreign police personnel deployed to the host State 
under UN command. The question is limited to what the host State is obliged to do in 
response to a crime committed by one person against another person in its jurisdiction. 
  
It has been held that treaty obligations must not be interpreted in such a way as to 
‘impose an impossible or disproportionate burden’ on States.139 For example, 
recognizing the particular circumstances of Kosovo, that whilst it was theoretically part 
of Serbia, its territory was under the control of a UN interim administration (UNMIK), the 
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HRC suggested that UNMIK to report to it instead.140 However, this arrangement did not 
mean that the territorial State (Serbia) lacked any jurisdiction whatsoever within the 
meaning of ICCPR.141 At a minimum, it constituted the realization that it would be 
impractical to require Serbia to make efforts to protect the human rights of people 
present in the territory of Kosovo, and to allow complaints to be brought against Serbia 
for its failure to protect their rights.142 
 
The ECtHR has also addressed this issue. In Ilaşcu, it ruled that, ‘where a Contracting 
State is prevented from exercising its authority over the whole of its territory by a 
constraining de facto situation’, the territorial State’s jurisdiction continues. Therefore, 
the territorial State is still required to do everything it can, within the limits of its 
authority, to guarantee the rights of the people in its territory. However, the Court also 
acknowledged that the scope of a State’s jurisdiction may be reduced by the factual 
situation, and that it must be considered ‘only in the light of the Contracting State’s 
positive obligations towards persons within its territory’.143 The Court emphasized that 
the State must endeavour to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of these rights, taking 
into account ‘all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States 
and international organizations’.144 In the Assanidze case, the Court explained the steps 
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taken in defining what comes within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a Contracting State. Once the 
territory in question is determined to be an integral part of a State’s territory, that State 
is presumed to be competent. The Court must then determine whether ‘there is valid 
evidence to rebut that presumption’.145 
 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina also affirmed that, ‘the state in 
whose territory the violation of the rights occurred retains the responsibility to take 
appropriate steps to protect the victims’, even if ‘the violation is a result of the actions of 
representatives over whom the […] state has ‘no de facto control’, and even if ‘the threat 
against human rights came from an international organization’.146 In the Bilbija case, the 
same Court ruled that the State had breached its obligations to ensure an effective legal 
remedy under Article 13 of ECHR, as no such remedy was available against individual 
decisions of the High Representative.147 
 
Applying this reasoning to the Peace Operations context, it appears that, at least to 
some extent, the host State remains obliged to protect the rights of persons within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction, to the maximum extent possible. This might 
suggest that the host State has an obligation to demand a thorough investigation on the 
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part of the UN and, if it cannot itself prosecute, to insist that the UN ensure that the 
sending State should do so.148  
 
There may be exceptional cases, such as those host States in which there has long 
been a UN mission, and where State institutions function normally.149 In such a case, 
the host State itself will be expected to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute. 
The obligation to investigate may therefore vary according to the situation in, and 
capacity of, the host State at that time. Thus, the same host State may be found to have 
a different extent of obligation at different times.  
 
This raises a number of questions. Where the UN functions as the transitional 
government in a host State, this State may be relieved of its IHRL obligations, at least to 
some extent. Another issue arises where a UN police officer, who has allegedly 
committed a crime, has returned to his sending State, because his tour of duty has 
ended, or he has been withdrawn from the host State by his sending State, or as a 
result of the UN’s disciplinary proceedings.150 Where the host State wishes to prosecute 
the UN police officer in these circumstances, it must request the suspect’s transfer. Is 
the host State required to request such a transfer and, if so, under what circumstances? 
Moreover, if such a request is made, is there an obligation on the part of the sending 
State to comply? It is unclear whether transfer can only be done under an extradition 
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treaty, or also under some other arrangement. Under the new MOU concerning FPU 
personnel, the sending State is required to cooperate with the host State, if the latter 
seeks to bring proceedings.151 However, it is unclear what the obligation to cooperate 
entails. It may be possible for an MoU to include arrangements for the transfer of a 
suspect.  
 
5. The sending State’s obligation  
Due to the environment in which Peace Operations operate, the best possible forum for 
prosecution, in many cases, may be the sending State. The sending State is in a 
peculiar situation, as it is not the State in whose territory the crime has been committed, 
but it may be the State in whose territory the suspect is present. That is, the sending 
State does not control the territory in which the act was committed, nor does it ‘control’ 
victim of the crime, but it does have control over the suspect. By virtue of this, it also 
has at least partial control of any investigation into the crime. This requires a 
consideration of whether the scope and extent of the obligation to investigate and 
prosecute is different for the sending State than it would be if the crime was committed 
in its territory.   
 
Where the territory in which the crime was committed is located outside the State’s 
borders, but is under its de facto ‘control’ or ‘authority’,152 all of the State’s obligations 
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under both treaty and customary law apply.153 This means the obligation to investigate 
and prosecute applies to the extent of its control.154 
 
There is clear case-law obliging States to investigate the killing of an individual abroad, 
in cases where the crime concerned was committed by a State agent. However, it is 
unclear whether the obligation to conduct an investigation in these particular 
circumstances only arises in the place where the killing took place, or also arises as an 
obligation to continue the investigation when the suspect is back in its territory.155 It is 
possible that the scope of this obligation differs depending on the right affected. 
 
To date, no human rights body has examined a case that deals with the State’s 
obligation to bring criminal proceedings against its national for a criminal act committed 
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 In two cases, the ICJ held that the occupying State is bound by the entirety of human rights’ treaties 
and customary obligations. The Court further made it clear that the occupying power is responsible both 
for not violating international obligations, and for preventing violations by other actors. Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 
[2004] ICJ Rep 316; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168. 
The ECtHR has also heard cases in which a Contracting State was in control of the territory of another 
State. In the Loizidou ruling, it held that Turkey was in ‘effective control over the territory’, and that, in 
such a situation, it was not necessary to establish the existence of effective control over the specific 
conduct by the State’s authorities. Louzidou v Turkey Series A No 310. The Cyprus v Turkey and the 
Ilaşcu cases followed the Louzidou decision, and elaborated on the requirement that the troops 
contributed decisively to the survival and existence of the local authorities. Cyprus v Turkey ECHR 2001-
IV; Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia. The Bankovic case essentially re-iterated the Louzidou case, 
limiting the basis of jurisdiction to the fact of control over the relevant territory. In Bankovic, the Court held 
that the Convention only applies within the territories of Contracting States, even in an extraterritorial 
context. That interpretation was rebutted in later cases. The Issa case clarified that the Convention is 
applicable beyond the regional limits of Europe, if a Contracting State is exercising de facto control over 
the territory in question.  
154
 Al-Skeini and Others v UK. 
155
 Two cases that dealt with the obligation to investigate, in relation to killings by State agents in Iraq, 
only concerned the obligation to conduct an effective investigation in Iraq. The Court did not discuss 
whether or not the obligation requires the investigation to continue after the suspects were back in their 
States of nationality (UK and the Netherlands respectively). Jaloud v The Netherlands; Al-Skeini and 
Others v UK. 
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abroad, where that national is not a State agent.156 This does not mean that the 
obligation does not exist. The HRC’s General Comment does not exclude the possibility 
that the same obligation exists in such situations. In particular, where a crime is of a 
cross-border nature, such as drugs-trafficking, human-trafficking, sex-tourism involving 
a minor, or transnational terrorism-related crimes, the protection would be meaningless 
if the obligation to respond to a crime did not exist for crimes committed abroad.  
 
In fact, the global fight against impunity for serious crimes arguably supports the idea 
that the sending State has an obligation in this respect. With regard to crimes committed 
by the UN police in Peace Operations, the argument that supports the fight against 
impunity works in favour of finding that there is an obligation on the part of the sending 
State. This argument is based on the nature of these crimes, which are of international 
concern.157  Because of the nature of the roles played by the UN police in UN Peace 
Operations, and the potential impact that serious crimes can have on UN missions, 
these crimes should arguably be of international concern, although certainly not to the 
same extent as international crimes. In addition, UN police officers are not only 
nationals of their sending State,158 but are also qualified to serve as UN police by virtue 
of their previous status as State agents.159 The sending State retains disciplinary 
                                            
156
 One of the cases within Al-Skeini involved a situation where the person who fired the fatal shot was not 
identified. This means that the shot could have been fired by a private individual. Care needs to be taken 
in considering this case, as the situation was said to be under the respondent State’s control, albeit it 
outside that State’s territory. Al-Skeini and Others v UK. 
157
 UNGA Res 2840 (XXVI) (18 December 1971) UN Doc. A/RES/2840 (XXVI); UNGA Res 3074 (XXVIII)  
(3 December 1973) UN Doc. A/RES/3074 (XXVIII); UN ECOSOC Res 1989/65 (24 May 1989) UN Doc. 
ECS/RES/1989/65, principle 18. 
158
 See Chapter 2, section 3-1. 
159
 However, UN police officers do not perform their UN duties as State agents. See section 1. On the 
criteria for the selection of UN police, see Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
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authority and responsibility for serving police officers.160 Most of them are selected to 
join a UN mission by their sending States.161 This, along with the fact that the 
environment in the host State means that they are unlikely to be prosecuted there, may 
make it arguable that the sending State has an additional obligation to respond to 
crimes committed by its police officers. This is especially the case if, due to completing 
his service, or as a result of UN disciplinary proceedings, the suspect has returned to 
the sending State. If the suspect is back in the sending State, virtually no other State 
can prosecute the crime. Avoiding impunity in these circumstances would require the 
sending State to act. 
 
Therefore, it is arguable that sending States have certain obligations to respond to 
crimes committed by their UN police, based on their obligation to fight against impunity.  
 
6. Special circumstances pertaining to Formed Police Units (FPUs)  
As already stated, the question as to the attribution of the conduct of a UN police officer 
to the sending State does not normally arise.162 There may, however, be some 
exceptional cases in which certain conduct by FPU members can be attributed to their 
sending States.163 This is relevant only insofar as it affects the obligation to respond to 
that act. The determination of the attribution of UN police conduct to the UN and/or the 
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 Chapter 2, section 3-3; Chapter 4, section 2; Chapter 5, section 2. 
161
 This is with the exception of a few individual UN police officers, who applied directly to the UN, and 
were selected by it. See Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
162
 See section 1. 
163
 The distinction between direct and indirect responsibility is one of terminology in the Law of 
Responsibility. It corresponds better with the common human rights terminologies of negative and 




State is governed by Article 7 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (DARIO).164 The decisive question is who has effective control over 
particular conduct.165 The ‘effective control’ test is not applied to the overall conduct of 
the organ or the personnel, but rather to each specific act, in order to determine to 
whom the conduct is attributable.166 The ‘effective control’ test is a factual question, 
dealing with the circumstances surrounding the conduct in question, and not the legal 
status of UN police personnel.  
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 Article 7 states that  ‘[t]he conduct of an organ of a State […] that is placed at the disposal of another 
international organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization if 
the organization exercises effective control over that conduct’. UNGA, 'Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of International Organizations, as appears in International Law Commission Report on the Work of its 
Sixty-Third Session (26 April to 3 June and 4 July to 12 August 2011), para.87' (26 April to 3 June and 4 
July to 12 August 2011) UN Doc. A/66/10, Article 7 (hereinafter ‘DARIO’). The conduct of UN police 
personnel may be governed by two DARIO articles depending on the factual link between the personnel 
and the sending State. If the personnel are fully seconded, the rule dealing with the attribution of the 
conduct of such personnel is governed by Article 6, and their conduct is attributed only to the UN. 
(Commentaries, Comment (1) to Article 7.) Article 6 deals with the ‘organ’ of the organization, and this 
includes ‘agents’, who are ‘charged by an organ of the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry 
out, one of its functions – in short, any person through whom it acts’, regardless of his/her official status. 
(Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations  (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 
174.) However, if seconded personnel retain a link with their seconding State, Article 7 applies. It is 
claimed that a State’s security organs are unlikely to completely surrender this link with their home State 
(see Aurel Sari, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO: The Missing Link’ (2012) 9 
International Organizations Law Review 77, pp.79-80). This is despite the UN’s guidelines which state 
that UN police officers are not supposed to receive instructions from any other source than the 
Organization itself. UN DPKO, 2007 Guidelines, p.6. See also the DPKO/DFS policy on FPU suggesting 
three command models. In all cases, FULLCOM (full command) is with PCCs. See para.47. Taking all 
these into consideration, it appears more appropriate to apply Article 7. UN DPKO/DFS, 'Policy (Revised) 
on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (1 March 2013) UN Doc. 
Ref.2009/32. This is the case for the FPUs, as their members hold the same nationality under the national 
command. See Chapter 2, section 1-6. 
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 UNGA, 'Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with Commentaries, as 
appears in International Law Commission Report on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session (26 April to 3 
June and 4 July to 12 August 2011), para.88' (26 April to 3 June and 4 July to 12 August 2011) UN Doc. 
A/66/10, Commentary (8) to Article 7 (hereinafter ‘DARIO with Commentaries’).  
166
 The ILC, in its Commentaries, also cite scholarly interpretation of this “effective control” test. See 
Commentary (8) to Article 7. In addition to the scholarship referred to in the Commentaries, see 
Christopher Leck, ‘International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Command 




As national military contingents are governed by the same Article, some ideas can be 
borrowed from how cases concerning military contingents have dealt with attribution. In 
principle, the UN assumes ‘exclusive control’ over military contingents in UN operations, 
and thus assumes responsibility for their acts.167 However, this assumption is rebuttable 
where military contingents are found to have persisted in seeking, or acting on, orders 
received from their sending States.168 The cases before the Dutch courts, relating to the 
Srebrenica massacre, indicate the unsettled approaches in the determination of 
attribution of conduct.169  
                                            
167
 UNGA, DARIO with Commentaries, Comments to (5) – (6) to Article 7. 
168
 For example, several national contingents making up the UNOSOM II force were found to be ‘totally 
outside the command and control of the United Nations’. UNSC, 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on 
UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them' (1 June 1994) UN Doc. S/1994/653, 
paras.243-244.   
169
 This case concerned the responsibility of the Dutch contingent (Dutchbat) in UNPROFOR. On one 
hand, the District Court considered that their acts and omissions ‘should be attributed strictly, as a matter 
of principle, to the United Nations’ (Nuhanovic v The State of the Netherlands Case no 265615/HA ZA 06-
1671 (DC Hague, 10 September 2008), para.4.8.; an English translation is available at: 
<http://zoekenrechtspraaknl> accessed 29 December 2014), and that the assumption could only be 
overturned if ’Dutchbat was instructed by the Dutch authorities to ignore UN orders or to go against them, 
and Dutchbat behaved in accordance with this instruction’ (ibid, para.4.14.1.). The Court found no such 
evidence. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal focused on the criterion of ‘effective control’ in relation 
to the particular circumstances of the case, and held that the State was responsible for turning Bosnian 
Muslim men away from its compound, effectively handing them over to Bosnian Serb forces, They were 
then massacred. The Court looked into whether the State would have been able to prevent that conduct 
after finding that the Dutch authorities did not give a specific instruction which was contrary to UN orders. 
In the course of examination, the Court also set out the possibility that there could be the dual attribution 
of conduct to the Netherlands and the UN. It thus considered the existence of ‘effective control’ by the 
former, but without considering the same by the latter. Nuhanovic v The State of The Netherlands Case 
no 265618 HA ZA 06-1672 (Court of Appeal in The Hague, 5 July 2011); an English translation is 
available at: <http://zoekenrechtspraaknl> accessed 29 December 2014, para.5.9. “The question whether 
the State had 'effective control' over the conduct of Dutchbat which Mustafic et al. consider to be the basis 
for their claim, must be answered in view of the circumstances of the case. This does not only imply that 
significance should be given to the question whether that conduct constituted the execution of a specific 
instruction, issued by the UN or the State, but also to the question whether, if there was no such specific 
instruction, the UN or the State had the power to prevent the conduct concerned. Moreover, the Court 
adopts as a starting point that the possibility that more than one party has 'effective control' is generally 
accepted, which means that it cannot be ruled out that the application of this criterion results in the 
possibility of attribution to more than one party. For this reason the Court will only examine if the State 
exercised 'effective control' over the alleged conduct and will not answer the question whether the UN 
also had 'effective control'.” Consequently, the State was held responsible. The Supreme Court upheld 
the Court of Appeal’s ruling. The State of The Netherlands (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) v Hasan Nuhanovic (Judgment of 6 September 2013) Supreme Court of The Netherlands. Note 
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also that, in response to the State’s argument that the mission had already failed at the time, and that the 
State thus was not in “effective control” over the conduct, the Court responded that the fact that Dutchbat 
could not exert any influence outside the compound did not “detract from the fact that the State had 
effective control over Dutchbat’s conduct in the compound”. The State of The Netherlands (Ministry of 
Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) v Hasan Nuhanovic Case no 12/03324 LZ/TT (Judgment of 6 
September 2013) Supreme Court of The Netherlands, para.3.12.3. An English translation is available at: 
<http://wwwrechtspraaknl/Organisatie/Hoge-
Raad/OverDeHogeRaad/publicaties/Documents/12%2003324pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. Note that 
the Commentaries state that it is also possible that States are co-responsible for the conduct of the UN, in 
a subsidiary manner. (UNGA, DARIO with Commentaries, Comment (6) to Article 3 of DARIO states, for 
example, ‘an international organization may have cooperated with a State in the breach of an obligation 
imposed on both’.) This part refers to parallel responsibility: if it directs and controls the UN in the 
commission of the act in question (Draft Article 59), aids or assists (Draft Article 58), coerces (Draft Article 
60), or avoids its own obligation by causing the Organization to commit the act (Draft Article 61), or if it 
has accepted responsibility for that act (Draft Article 62). To hold States accountable for their voting 
decisions or similar acts in the administration of international organisations may be one possible method 
for increasing the available remedies. (Council of Europe, Accountability of International Organisations for 
Human Rights Violations (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc 13370, 2013), para.74. 
(hereinafter ‘COE Accountability Report’). This form of accountability would seem to be most legitimate in 
cases where a State voted for a programme that involves what could be seen as amounting to a prima 
facie human rights violation in and of itself, such as the SC sanctions regime (ibid, para.74.). It is also 
noted that, if one considers the lack of criminal prosecution for a serious crime, such as the conduct in 
question, and not the serious crime itself, this would be a matter in which the relevant State would be 
responsible for its own conduct (non-prosecution), rather than incurring subsidiary responsibility. The next 
level or aspect of State responsibility occurs when States allow the International Organization to commit 
the conduct in question as a result of their lack of vigilance over the Organization’s conduct. This 
approach was taken in several cases at the ECtHR. This obligation requires States to ensure that the 
transfer of competences does not result in the infringement of the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention. For example, in Matthews, the Court observed that, ‘[t]he Convention does not exclude the 
transfer of competences to international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be 
“secured”. Member States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer’.
 
(Matthews v UK, 
para.32. See also Etienne Tête v France Series A No 54; M & Co v Germany Series A No 64.) This type 
of responsibility is not so much about the direct responsibility of the State over the conduct as such, but 
more about the State’s conduct, that is, its lack of vigilance over the International Organization’s conduct, 
and is thus of greater relevance when considering the responsibility of States in their roles as member 
States of the UN. However, if, for example, a State sends a large number of police personnel to a UN 
mission whilst knowing that it that engages in the systematic infringement of human rights law, such as 
arbitrary arrest and detention, or the denial of fair trial rights to those accused of committing crimes, there 
may be the space to argue that the State can be held responsible for “allowing” the UN to commit the 
conduct in question. However, note the ‘Mothers of Srebrenica’ case, in which the conduct was found to 
be attributed to the UN, but that the UN was protected by immunity. Mothers of Srebrenica Association v 
State of The Netherlands Case no 10/04437 EV/AS (Supreme Court of The Netherlands, 13 April 2012); 
an English translation is available at: <http://wwwrechtspraaknl/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad/Supreme-
court/Summaries-of-some-important-rulings-of-the-Supreme-Court/Pages/Ruling-Dutch-Supreme-Court-
Mothers-of-Srebrenicaaspx> accessed 1 January 2015. Several cases have raised the issue of the 
attribution of conduct of a national military contingent operating under the UN flag, at both human rights 
and domestic courts. Behrami and Behrami v France and Sarmati v France, Germany and Norway 
(Admissibility) App nos 71412/01, 78166/01 (ECtHR, 2 May 2007) were the first cases to be heard by the 
ECtHR in this regard. The Court did not discuss the possibility of the dual attribution of conduct to the UN 
and the sending States, even though dual attribution is acknowledged by the ILC. (Note that the ILC’s 
Articles appear to assume that conduct is normally attributed to one entity. UNGA, DARIO with 
Commentaries, Commentaries to ARIO Article 7. For example, in (4), it states, ’The criterion for attribution 
of conduct either to the contributing State or organization or to the receiving organization is based 
according to article 7 on the factual control that is exercised over the specific conduct taken by the organ 
or agent placed at the receiving organization’s disposal’ (emphasis added). See also: Sari, ‘UN 
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Following the same logic, there remains a limited possibility that certain conduct could 
be attributed to the sending State, depending on its level of involvement.170 This could 
                                                                                                                                            
Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO: The Missing Link’). However, it is also acknowledged that 
the same conduct can be simultaneously attributed to the Organization and State(s). UNGA, DARIO with 
Commentaries, Comment (7) to Article 3, ARIO Commentaries, states, ‘Another example may be that of 
conduct which is simultaneously attributed to an international organization and a State and which entails 
the international responsibility of both the organization and the State’. Instead, it only considered that the 
decisive test for attribution is ‘ultimate authority and control’, and found that the Security Council retained 
such ultimate authority and control, while ‘operational command only was delegated’ to the contingents of 
the respondent States. (Behrami and Behrami v France and Sarmati v France, Germany and Norway, 
para.133.) It thus found that the conduct in question was attributable to the UN alone. This approach was 
followed in subsequent cases at the same Court, which dealt with the attribution of conduct by national 
contingents at UNMIK. For example, Kasumaj v Greece (Admissibility) App no 6974/05 (ECtHR, 5 July 
2007); Gajić v Germany (Admissibility) App no 31446/02 (ECtHR, 28 August 2007). This approach has 
been open to criticism. Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, ‘Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The 
‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 509, pp.521-522; 
Marko Milanović and Tatjana Papić, ‘As Bad as it Gets: The European Court of Human Rights's Behrami 
and Saramati Decision and General International Law’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 267, pp.283-286; Aurel Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support 
Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 151, p.164; 
Francesco Messineo, ‘The House of Lords in Al-Jedda and Public International Law: Attribution of 
Conduct to Un-Authorized Forces and the Power of the Security Council to Displace Human Rights’ 
(2009) 56 Netherlands International Law Review 35, pp.39-43. The ECtHR appears to have failed to 
apply the factual “effective control” test as visualized by the ILC. Compared to the approach the same 
Court has taken to other cases dealing with the attribution of conduct of non-state actors to the State, as 
discussed above, in which it emphasized the factual link between the actor and the State, this seems 
peculiar. This may be better explained in terms of the Court’s attempt to refrain from ruling on matters 
involving the UN. (Larsen, Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers, p.435
 
) The Al-Jedda complaints 
concerned the detention of a person by British troops, which were operating in Iraq following authorization 
by Security Council resolution 1546 (2004). The UK’s House of Lords found that the detention was 
attributable to the UK rather than to the UN, because the conduct of the British troops was not carried out 
under the “effective command and control” of the UN.
 
R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v Secretary 
of State for Defence (Sep Op Bingham LJ) [2007] UKHL 58, paras.22-24; Opinion of Baroness Hale of 
Richmond, para.124; Opinion of Lord Carswell, para.131. Note, however, that the Opinions compare the 
situations surrounding Behrami and Saramati in Kosovo to the case in question in Iraq, reasoning that the 
situations differ. The issue of internment was then heard by the ECtHR, which found the conduct 
attributable to the UK, not the UN, because the Security Council had “neither effective control nor ultimate 
authority and control over the acts and omission of troops”, and that the internment “took place within a 
detention facility […] controlled exclusively by British forces”. On this basis, it found that the applicant was 
“within the authority and control of the United Kingdom throughout his detention”. (Al-Jedda v UK [2011] 
ECHR 1092, paras.84-85.) 
170
 Although in a majority of cases, the conduct of UN police personnel is attributed to the UN. This is 
because UN police personnel technically only work with the UN’s interests in view, and are not supposed 
to receive instructions from their own governments. UN DPKO, 'Undertaking and Declaration by Experts 
on Mission: UN Police Officer/Corrections Officer/Military Observers/Military Liaison Officer' UN Doc. (on 
file with author); UN DPKO, 2007 Guidelines, Annex 3. See also UNGA, 'Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in the Report of the International Law 
Commission, 53rd Session (23 April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 2001), para.77' (23 April - 1 June 
and 2 July - 10 August 2001) UN Doc. A/56/10. The commentary to Article 6 explains that, for conduct to 
be attributed to the receiving State, it must be “under its exclusive direction and control, rather than on 
instructions from the sending State”. If applied analogously to the UN police, this would mean that the UN 
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occur if the conduct is carried out in response to an explicit order by the sending State. 
In addition, some sending States have explicitly acknowledged that their police 
personnel carry their human rights obligations with them when they are assigned to 
international operations, including UN Peace Operations.171 This conduct would amount 
to a violation of the State’s negative human rights obligations. Where a negative 
obligation is infringed, the extent of the obligation to investigate and prosecute the 
responsible individual(s) may be more onerous.172 
 
It should be noted that the agreements entered into between the UN and sending States 
in relation to FPUs provide that sending States agree to impose criminal sanctions on 
individual FPU officers who commit criminal acts in cases where the host State does not 
do so, for whatever reason.173 The wording of these agreements may be influenced by 
the potential IHRL obligations of the sending States, even though these agreements do 
not cite IHRL. 
  
7. Does immunity have any impact on a State’s obligation to prosecute?  
                                                                                                                                            
police conduct in question must have been carried out under the exclusive direction and control of the UN, 
without the UN police receiving any related instructions from their sending State.  
171
 Italy has confirmed that the ICCPR applies to the acts of Italian military and police officers stationed 
abroad, whether committed in the context of peace or armed conflict. UN Human Rights Committee, 
'Concluding Observations to Italy’s Fifth Periodic Report' (24 April 2006) UN Doc. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5. 
Germany has affirmed that the ICCPR applies to persons subject to its jurisdiction in situations where its 
troops or police forces operate abroad, especially in the context of peace operations. Larsen, Treaty 
Obligations of Peacekeepers, pp.205-206. Note, however, that this does not mean that the sending State 
will be held responsible for the conduct in question, as the issue of attribution must first be considered. 
172
 For example, in relation to the right to life, having the ‘duty to prevent, investigate and punish violations 
of the right to life by private actors’ is arguably ‘more onerous when evidence indicates that government 
officials are involved’, Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, vol 386 (Oxford University Press 2000), pp.128-130. 
173
 Model MOU, Article 7 quinquiens, 7.22. UN, FPU MoU, Article 7 quinquiens, 7.19. 
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To the extent that circumstances oblige either or both the host and sending States to 
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute, immunity may prevent this from 
happening.  
 
Three separate issues could arise in relation to the impact of immunity on the scope of 
the obligation to prosecute. The first is where the State prosecutor rightly or wrongly 
thinks that the suspect has been granted immunity by the UN, and decides not to 
prosecute the suspect on this basis. The second issue concerns where the UN 
inappropriately grants immunity to a suspect. In this situation, may/must a State ignore 
this immunity and prosecute the suspect? The third issue arises where the UN has 
waived a suspect’s immunity, but where the suspect is challenging the State’s 
proceedings against him, on the basis that immunity should not have been waived. 
 
In relation to the first issue, one of the factors a prosecutor must take into account when 
deciding whether to prosecute a crime is immunity. However, does immunity provide a 
legitimate basis on which to exercise prosecutorial discretion? No case has yet been 
heard concerning a situation where there has been a lack of criminal proceedings on 
the basis of a grant of immunity. The Al-Adsani case has come closest to considering 
this issue. In this case, there was a civil claim for compensation for torture, which was 
blocked by sovereign immunity.174 In Germany v. Italy, the ICJ held that, because 
Germany had immunity, the Italian courts had breached the jurisdictional immunity of 
the State by hearing civil cases in which victims sought compensation from Germany in 
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 Al-Adsani v UK ECHR 2001-XI. 
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relation to war crimes.175 Thus, there appears to be strong evidence that States would 
be not be in breach of their IHRL obligations if they did not bring criminal proceedings 
against a suspect who had been granted immunity.  
 
A second issue concerns the situation in which the UN inappropriately grants immunity 
to a suspect, and does not waive it even though it was inappropriate to have given it in 
the first place.176 In these circumstances, it is not clear whether States must give effect 
to this immunity, and thus refrain from bringing criminal proceedings, or whether they 
can or must ignore it, and bring a prosecution against the suspect. In this regard, the 
ICJ’s decision, that the Secretary-General’s finding in relation to immunity ‘can only be 
set aside for the most compelling reasons’ by national courts,177 appears to indicate 
that, in most circumstances, national courts are obliged to give effect to immunity 
asserted by the UN. However, if the UN invokes immunity for a serious crime committed 
outside official functions, or possibly in relation to an international crime, this may satisfy 
the ‘most compelling reasons’ test.178   
 
The third issue could arise where the UN decides to waive a defendant’s immunity. It 
should be remembered that waiver assumes that the act would otherwise be covered by 
immunity. If UN personnel have a right to immunity in order to permit them to deliver 
their functions, and given that UN personnel must be able to rely solely on the UN’s 
                                            
175
 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 
99. 
176
 The UN may grant immunity inappropriately either through overstepping the bounds of a source of 
immunity through incorrectly interpreting this source, or because it has wrongly determined that the 
conduct fell within the suspect’s official functions. See Chapter 6, section 2. 
177
 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights (Advisory Opinion) [1999] ICJ Rep 62, para.61. 
178
 See Chapter 6, section 1-5-1. 
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protection,179 this raises the question as to whether a defendant is permitted to 
challenge the decision to remove his or her immunity.  
 
Having analysed this obligation in relation to States, this chapter will now examine if the 
UN has any obligation to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by the UN police 
and, if so, what the scope of this obligation would be. 
 
8. Does the UN have an obligation to investigate and prosecute crimes committed 
by UN Police officers?  
In order for the UN to have a specific procedural obligation, first it is necessary to 
establish whether or not the UN has such an obligation under IHRL.  
 
Even if the UN is found to have obligations under IHRL, the UN clearly cannot be 
expected to deliver the same obligations as States, because it does not have the same 
relationship with the individuals whose rights it is supposed to protect.180 However, in 
some Peace Operations, the UN has some control over the local population. In 
particular, in the case of transitional administrations, the relationship between the UN 
and the local population is the same as between a State and its nationals. Because of 
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 A key element of IHRL is the relationship between State power and that State’s responsibility to those 
under its jurisdiction. Scott P Sheeran, ‘A Constitutional Moment?: United Nations Peacekeeping in the 




this, the UN has virtually the same obligations as States in this particular 
circumstance.181  
 
8-1. Applicability of IHRL to the UN  
The UN is not party to any human rights treaties. Thus, for the UN to have any human 
rights obligations, these must derive from other sources. There are two main arguments 
that support the contention that the UN is bound by IHRL. The first relies on the UN 
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 There were two transitional administrations where the UN assumed all governmental functions: UNMIK 
and UNTAET. See Chapter 2, section 1-5. In 2002, the position of Kosovo Ombudsperson was 
established to receive complaints concerning any abuse of authority by ‘the Interim Civil Administration 
and any emerging local institutions and any non-state actors claiming or exercising authority’, UNGA, 
'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo' (12 July 
1999) UN Doc. S/1999/779, para.89; UNMIK Regulation no 2000/38 of 30 June 2000 on the 
Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo. The Ombudsperson looked into UNMIK’s 
response to allegations of ill-treatment by UN police personnel. Recalling that an investigation into ill-
treatment allegations must be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible, 
and considering that UNMIK’s response merely amounted to ‘steps to discipline’ the publically 
unidentified personnel without any criminal proceedings taking place, the Ombudsperson found that this 
response fell short of meeting the required human rights standards. Shefqet Maliqi, against the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Registration no 361/01, (the Kosovo Ombudsperson, 13 March 
2002). The Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP) in Kosovo (established by UNMIK Regulation no 
2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the Establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel) also heard many 
complaints alleging violations of ECHR in relation to the right to property.
 
In Shaip Canhasi, the Panel 
found that UNMIK had violated the right to life due to lack of an effective investigation into the killing of the 
complainant’s wife. Shaip Canhasi v UNMIK Case no 004/08 (The Human Rights Advisory Panel, 15 July 
2008). In Jočić, the HRAP found that UNMIK had violated Article 2 and 3 of the ECHR by failing to 
adequately investigate the disappearance and subsequent death of a Kosovo Serb civilian. Svetlana 
Jočić v UNMIK Case no 34/09 (Human Rights Advisory Panel, 23 April 2013). See Amnesty International, 
Serbia (Kosovo): UNMIK Legacy - The Failure to Deliver Justice and Reparations to the Relatives of the 
Abducted (EUR 70/009/2013, 2013), Kosovo: UNMIK’s Legacy, where the failure to deliver justice and 
reparation to the relatives of the abducted is discussed. Another argument specifically developed in 
relation to transitional administrations is that the UN ‘steps into’ fulfil the human rights obligations of the 
host State. Karen Kenny, UN Accountability for its Human Rights Impact: Implementation through 
Participation (Manchester University Press 2005), p.441. The UN itself acknowledges the need to comply 
with the host State’s human rights obligations. The HOM [Head of Mission] shall ensure that the peace 
operation’s performance and impact in integrating human rights is monitored, taking into consideration 
country-specific human rights indicators, including compliance with international human rights obligations 
by the host country. UN OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS, 'Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace 
Operations and Political Missions' (1 September 2011) UN Doc. Ref. 2011.20, para.39. 
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Charter, whilst the second is based on customary law.182 These will be discussed in 
turn.183  
 
8-1-1. The UN is bound by IHRL on the basis of the UN Charter 
The Reparations case establishes that the UN’s rights and duties are dependent on its 
purposes and functions, as specified or implied in its constitutive instrument, and are 
then developed through its practice.184 It was held that the UN:  
[...] must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided 
in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential 
to the performance of its duties [...] 
  
Although this finding is related to the UN’s rights, it is reasoned that it must also apply in 
relation to its obligations.185 The first argument follows this approach, reasoning that the 
UN Charter implicitly requires the UN to act in accordance with IHRL. A similar view is 
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 There are other arguments regarding the basis on which the UN is bound by IHRL. These arguments 
are: obligations deriving from the nature of human rights (Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of 
Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006), p.87; Frédéric Mégret and Florian Hoffman, ‘UN as a 
Human Rights Violator - Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing Human Rights 
Responsibilities’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 314, p.317, (hereinafter ‘UN as Human Rights 
Violator’); obligations deriving from States own membership of the UN; and being bound by virtue of the 
IHRL obligations of the host State. 
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 The strongest case for making the argument that the UN has IHRL obligations is where the UN 
functions as the transitional administration. In these circumstances, it is generally uncontested that the 
UN would be fully bound by IHRL. Cerone, ‘Reasonable Measures’, p.60; Sheeran, ‘Constitutional 
Moment’, p.79. The ECtHR has taken the position that where a State is in effective control of territory 
outside its borders, the State has full human rights obligations. Cyprus v Turkey. Note, however, that the 
possibility of the existence of a state of emergency and derogation from human rights obligations, as well 
as the possibility of national actors sharing human rights obligations, was raised. See Mégret and 
Hoffman, ‘UN as Human Rights Violator’, pp.334-5. The Kosovo Ombudsperson clarified that, to the 
extent that the Security Council resolution created UNMIK “as a surrogate state”, “all ensuing obligations, 
including affirmative obligations to secure human rights to everyone within UNMIK jurisdiction” were 
imposed on the international administration. Ombudsperson Institution of Kosovo, On Certain Aspects of 
UNMIK Regulation No 2000/59 Amending UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 on the Law Applicable in Kosovo 
(27 Oct 2000) (Special Report no 2  2000). These obligations could arise as a result of the host State’s 
treaty obligations, according to agreements made prior to the UN governing the territory. 
184
 Reparations, p.178. 
185
 The content of the UN’s legal capacity, and its rights and duties, ‘must depend upon its purposes and 
functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice’ ibid, para.180. 
The Secretary-General commented in relation to Peace Operations, ‘the international responsibility of the 
UN for the activities of UN forces is an attribute of its international personality and its capacity to bear 
international rights and obligations’. 
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that the UN’s purposes and principles are at the core of the Charter and, as such, the 
Charter is considered to be legally binding on the UN as a whole.186 According to Article 
1 of the Charter, one of the UN’s purposes is to achieve international cooperation in 
encouraging respect for human rights.187 What precisely this Article requires of the UN 
is unclear. However, under Article 55, the UN is obliged to promote ‘universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’.188 This does 
not mean that the UN has a duty to protect, promote or fulfil human rights.189 Rather, it 
places on an obligation on the UN to assist other entities to do so.190 However, 
promoting universal respect for human rights can only be achieved if the UN itself 
respects human rights.191 This argument reinforces that IHRL is ‘characteristically 
embedded’ in the UN’s operations in general.192 The UN’s OLA has confirmed that the 
UN takes the position that the UN Charter provides an obligation for the UN to ‘uphold, 
promote and encourage respect for human rights’. 193   
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 Zenon Stavrinides, ‘Human Rights Obligations under the United Nations Charter’ (1999) 3 The 
International Journal of Human Rights 38, p.40; Mégret and Hoffman, ‘UN as Human Rights Violator’, 
p.317. 
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 The Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI, Article 1. 
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 This obligation is set out in Article 55, and should be read together with Article 56. Kenny, UN 
Accountability for its Human Rights Impact: Implementation through Participation, p.442. Notice the 
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section 2. 
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 Mégret and Hoffman, ‘UN as Human Rights Violator’, p.319. 
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 Kenny, UN Accountability for its Human Rights Impact: Implementation through Participation, p.442. 
The UN is bound by international human rights standards because it is tasked with promoting such 
standards. (Amnesty International, Peace-keeping and Human Rights 13 (IOR 40/001/1994, 1994)). 
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Operations, available in ‘UN Army Told Not to Join Congo Army in Operation'’ New York Times (New 




The human rights principles in the Charter are embodied by,194 and interpreted in, in a 
number of documents,195 such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
and the twin Covenants.196 According to this approach, the UDHR and the two 
Covenants can be used to elaborate on the meaning of the Charter. Some claim that 
the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration and the two Covenants are regarded as 
forming the UN’s constitution.197 Thus, another, possibly tenuous, argument which has 
been made, is that the UN is bound by these treaties. 
 
8-1-2. The UN is bound by IHRL on the basis of custom 
Another argument is that the UN is bound by customary human rights law. The ICJ has 
affirmed that international organizations, including the UN, are bound by the ‘obligations 
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions 
or under international agreements to which they are parties’.198 ‘General rules of 
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 It is argued that the Charter imposes binding norms on the UN, including the Secretariat. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) must also be respected by the Secretariat. Another approach is that 
the Charter and its accompanying instruments form a “constitution”. Consistent with this view, the UDHR 
and the human rights Covenants are “UN by-laws”, with the effect that the norms contained therein may 
apply to all elements of the UN system. Nigel D White and Dirk Klaasen (eds), The UN, HR and Post-
Conflict Situations (Manchester University Press 2005), p.7. 
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 Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart 2004), pp.199-200; 
White and Klaasen, The UN, HR and Post-Conflict Situations, p.6, who state that these instruments 
provide the legal principles which govern UN practice. 
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 ICCPR; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976), 993 UNTS 3 (hereinafter ‘ICESCR’). 
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 For example, P.M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United 
Nations Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, p.1. It is argued that the 
Charter imports many of these norms as binding on the Organization, including the Secretariat, and that 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) must also be respected by the Secretariat. 
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 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) 
[1980] ICJ Rep 73, pp.89-90, para.37. In relation to WHO, the Court found that there is an obligation to 
give a reasonable period of notice to the host State when terminating an existing arrangement, and to 
consult the host State in good faith on the transfer of the Organization’s regional office. At a general level, 
Rosalyn Higgins has stated that all UN activities must comply with both the Charter and general 
international law. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford 
University Press 1994), p.181. Its obligations are not restricted to those which are explicitly accepted by 
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international law’ can be divided into customary law and general legal principles.199 
Thus, the second argument posits that the UN is bound by IHRL to the extent it has 
customary law status. Many scholars take this position.200  
 
Finally, the UN itself has affirmed that it is bound by customary international law. The 
UN’s OLA affirmed the position that customary international law obliges the UN to 
‘uphold, promote and encourage respect for human rights, international humanitarian 
law and refugee law’. 201 Also of note is that an ‘applicable portion’ of the UDHR is 
incorporated into the rules that bind the military and the UN police in Peace 
Operations.202 Another convention ‘universally recognized [that] standards of human 
rights as contained in international instruments’ apply to UN personnel.203  
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Thus, it appears likely that the UN is bound by fundamental IHRL obligations arising 
from the Charter or customary law.204 This work proceeds on the assumption that 
customary IHRL is applicable to the UN. 
 
8-2. Content of the UN’s obligations  
This section examines what these customary obligations might be. Human rights 
obligations are usually defined only in general terms.205 Discussion regarding the 
detailed contents of the UN’s IHRL obligations is scarce and, where it exists, it often 
focuses on the UN’s obligations in the context of transitional administrations.206 Even 
the observation that some norms, such as the right to life, personal security, basic due 
process guarantees, freedom from arbitrary detention, torture or cruel treatment, slavery 
and apartheid-like racial discrimination,207 have crystallized into customary international 
                                                                                                                                            
responsibility of such personnel to respect such law and standards.’ UNGA Res 49/59 (9 December 
1994) UN Doc. GA Res 49/59. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 
(adopted on 9 December 1994, entered into force on 15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363, Article 20 (a). 
The UN’s policy on the integration of human rights into Peace Operations requires all personnel to act ‘in 
accordance with [IHRL] and International Humanitarian Law’, and to ‘understand how their tasks intersect 
with human rights’. They shall refrain from committing human rights abuses or being associated with 
human rights violations and, if they do, they will be “held accountable”. The Head of Mission is tasked 
with ensuring their compliance with their obligations, and he or she must issue all necessary instructions 
in this regard. UN OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS, Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace 
Operations and Political Missions, paras.36, 38. Clapham claims that the UN is bound by IHRL because it 
has declared itself bound by it. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, p.127. 
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 White and Klaasen, The UN, HR and Post-Conflict Situations. They go further and state that ‘the UN is 
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 Kondoch, ‘Human Rights Law and UN Peace Operations in Post-Conflict Situations’, p.41. 
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 On the human rights obligations of the UN as a transitional administrator, see section 7. 
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 Cerone, ‘Reasonable Measures’, p.62. Clapham claims that ‘the rules prohibiting arbitrary killing, 
slavery, torture, detention, and systematic racial discrimination’ are now recognized as rules of customary 
international law. In addition, he claims that other rights, including ‘the right to self-determination, the right 
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of customary international law. (Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, p.86). The 
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customary international law. Hannum stated that the prohibition against slavery under the UDHR is also 
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law, does not mean that the UN is required to meet all the obligations related to these 
rights at all times. The same consideration applies to duties arising from non-derogable 
IHRL.208  
 
One of the difficulties the UN encounters in meeting the obligation to respond to a crime 
is that it does not generally have the same kind of relationship that a State has with 
those under its authority. The UN also lacks a number of powers and functions that 
States have,209 most notably, the authority and capacity to bring criminal proceedings 
against suspects. However, the UN has the authority and ability to conduct 
investigations into disciplinary offences by the UN police and, indeed, it claims that 
authority to do so.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
‘universally held to form part of customary law’. According to Hannum, the prohibition against “torture or 
[…] cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” under Article 5 of the UDHR has been 
confirmed as customary. The prohibition provided under Article 9 of the UDHR against arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile is customary only if it is “prolonged”. Those who urge acceptance of the UDHR in toto 
as customary law are clearly in a minority. UDHR Article 8’s guarantee of an effective remedy before 
domestic courts for violations of human rights is not generally included in the list of customary law rules. 
Hannum claims that the right to a fair trial is often considered among those now guaranteed under 
customary law. Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law’, pp.340-346. Sheeran states that certain basic human rights norms have crystallised 
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derogable are: the right to life; the prohibition of torture or cruel and degrading treatment; the prohibition 
of slavery and servitude or civil imprisonment; the impermissibility of retroactive punishment; the right to 
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A challenge remains in determining the exact content of the obligations, and in what 
situations such obligations apply.210 A further complexity is the possibility that the UN’s 
IHRL obligations differ depending on the functions, responsibilities, roles and activities 
of each mission.211 It is possible to take a ‘sliding-scale’ approach, or to argue that the 
UN’s obligations should be proportionate, relative to its functions, mandates,212 and 
activities.213 This may differ not only from one operation to the next, but also within the 
same operation. However, a more detailed analysis of the exact content of the UN’s 
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 Still, difficult issues remain, including the possibility of derogation in times of emergency, and whether 
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human rights obligations falls outside the scope of this work. For these reasons, it is 
assumed that the content of customary human rights law is similar to the content the 
human rights treaties.214 Specifically, it is assumed that the UN has an obligation to 
investigate serious crimes which are alleged to have been committed by those over 
whom it exercises control, in the same way that a State would have, were the crime to 
be committed by a State agent within its national territory. 
 
8-2-1. Two kinds of potential obligations 
The first question is whether the UN has an obligation to investigate and prosecute a 
crime committed by a UN police officer. The second is whether the UN is required to 
assist States in meeting their obligations to investigate and prosecute. These will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
(1) The UN’s obligation to investigate and prosecute  
Obligation to investigate 
Where IHRL requires that an investigation be conducted, this should be prompt, 
thorough and effective.215 It is necessary to translate this into terms appropriate for a 
UN mission. The requirement is to initiate and conduct prompt, through and effective 
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215
 As presented in section 3-1. 
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investigations by a sufficiently independent investigative body into crimes that infringe 
on a right, when committed by UN police officers. In light of the requirement of due 
diligence, the UN arguably has an obligation to begin an investigation on its own 
initiative, and to ensure that this investigation is conducted by professional investigators, 
who are sufficiently independent institutionally-speaking, and in reality. This is likely to 
mean that investigation by the UN police is not necessarily problematic, but that there is 
likely to be a problem if the suspect and the investigator have the same nationality.216 
The investigative body must not be ad hoc. The investigation must be thorough, 
including interviewing relevant witnesses and securing evidence. Once a suspect is 
identified, the UN should take measures to avoid any collusion with potential witnesses. 
For the investigation to be effective, all available means must be resorted to, and the 
response must be prompt. This appears to exclude the possibility that all investigators 
be located at the UN headquarters.  
  
Obligation to prosecute 
The UN does not have the authority or capacity to prosecute those UN police officers 
who are alleged to have committed crimes. As a result, the UN’s obligation to prosecute 
must be interpreted in another way, such as imposing on the UN the requirement to use 
its best endeavours to ensure that a suspect is prosecuted by a State. There are two 
possible manifestations of this obligation. One is the obligation not to obstruct a State 
which is conducting a prosecution, and the other is the obligation to equip States in 
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bringing criminal proceedings. The obligation not to obstruct a prosecution would entail 
limiting the use of immunity to appropriate cases, and waiving it promptly where 
required.217 The obligation may also require the UN to clarify those aspects of immunity 
granted to UN police which are unclear, in particular its geographic coverage, the scope 
of official acts, and the circumstances in which the UN would waive immunity. If any 
aspect of immunity is unclear, this could hinder the prompt initiation of criminal 
proceedings by States. Furthermore, vital evidence may be lost whilst the UN is in the 
process of determining whether the act in question is covered by immunity. 
 
The obligation to use its best endeavours to enable States to prosecute would mean 
that the UN is required to give the evidence that it has collected to the appropriate State 
authority, in a form which would permit the receiving State to bring criminal proceedings 
as promptly as possible. This is vital, as the UN has something (evidence) without which 
States and, in particular, sending States, may not be able to deliver their obligations.  
 
When a UN investigation establishes that a disciplinary offence has been committed 
that is also criminal in nature, leading it to fire the suspect, the UN should be able to 
detain that person until he is repatriated to his sending State, in order to ensure that he 
does flee to another country. At the same time, the UN should transfer all the 
information from its own investigation to a specific, previously designated person in the 
sending State, who has responsibility for ensuring that prosecutions are brought where 
appropriate. This might mean altering the MoU to require each sending State to identify 
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the correct person to receive the information, and to give an undertaking to act on it. In 
fact, the obligation of the sending States to prosecute is clearly set out in the MoU 
between the UN and sending States in relation to FPUs. However, it should also be 
included in Note Verbales in relation to IPOs. The details of cooperation in potential 
criminal proceedings against UN police personnel need to be decided between the two 
parties and clearly set out.   
 
The obligation would also require the UN to initiate and continue follow-up with the 
sending State until either criminal proceedings are finalized (i.e. criminal sanctions are 
imposed, or the person is acquitted), or the UN is convinced that there is a good reason 
not to initiate criminal proceedings, taking into account the sending State’s IHRL 
obligations. Where the UN attempts to follow up, but where the sending States’ 
responses only contain general remarks, such as ‘it is taken seriously’, ‘an investigation 
is underway’, or ‘the person in question has been properly disciplined’, the UN must 
demand further details regarding the measures taken, the results of any investigation, 
the reason for any delay, or the reason the case has been closed, if this has 
occurred.218  
 
In essence, the UN needs to be prepared to respond when a crime has been committed 
by UN police personnel. This requires having permanent systems in place to deliver its 
due diligence obligations in this regard. Given the nature and expected effect of criminal 
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sanctions, the condemnation of the wrongdoing needs to be public. This may require 
the UN to assist, or at least not obstruct, any public criminal proceedings.219  
  
(2) The UN’s obligation to assist States in delivering their obligations 
In addition to obligations based on their primary responsibilities, States also have, in 
some contexts, an obligation to assist others in the delivery of their obligations. Does 
the UN have such an obligation and, if so, does it apply in this context, so as to require 
that the UN assist States in delivering effective investigations and prosecutions?  This 
argument is based on two sources. The first is the UN Charter. The UN is required to 
‘achieve international co-operation […] in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms’,220 and to ‘be a centre for harmonizing the actions 
of nations in the attainment of these common ends’.221 Based on these articles, there is 
a view that the UN must assist other entities in protecting, promoting and fulfilling 
human rights.222  
 
The second possible source is IHRL. An analogy may be made with the obligation 
imposed on States by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) to cooperate with, and assist States in, achieving human rights goals. 
Drawing on several articles, in particular Article 2 of the ICESCR,223 it can be argued 
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that all State Parties have an obligation to cooperate and assist others in the realization 
of Covenant rights.224  
 
Even if such a legal obligation could in theory exist, it would be necessary to show that it 
forms part of customary human rights law, and that it applies outside the context of 
economic, social and cultural rights. More specifically, it would need to apply to the 
obligation to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute. It appears difficult to find 
evidence to support such a contention.  
 
However, if this obligation were found to exist, it would entail the UN assisting a sending 
State to make an arrangement between itself and the host State to conduct its own 
investigation, if that is what is required for the sending State to prosecute its UN police 
officer. It may also entail responding to requests for additional evidence, or evidence in 
a different form, from the sending State for the purposes of prosecution. It may require 
technical cooperation, such as providing specific expertise or equipment in order for that 
State to conduct an effective investigation.  
 
It is submitted that the stronger argument regarding whether the UN has an obligation to 
investigate and prosecute is that based on the UN’s own obligation to investigate and, 
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where appropriate, use its best endeavours to secure criminal prosecution, as 
discussed in the previous sub-section. 
  
9. Conclusion 
The obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish certain criminal conduct is firmly 
enshrined in IHRL. It requires States to conduct a prompt, thorough and effective 
investigation, carried out by a sufficiently independent body, into allegations of crimes. 
The investigation must be of such a nature as to be capable of identifying the 
perpetrator. Where the evidence warrants it, there is an obligation to prosecute the 
wrongdoer. This obligation is not absolute. The standard is that of due diligence and of 
best effort, taking into account all available means. Prosecutorial discretion is 
acknowledged, but this discretion is not without limits. Where a case is closed without 
charges being brought against a suspect, and where a State has not made its ‘best 
effort’ to bring charges, it may be found to have violated its obligation to prosecute.  
 
Cases decided by human rights bodies indicate that this obligation forms part of 
substantive human rights, including the right to life, physical integrity, liberty and 
security, and a private life.225 In some cases, the State’s obligation under these 
substantive rights must be read in conjunction with the victim’s right to a remedy, or that 
of their next-of-kin. Certain kinds of behaviour must be criminalized and, where this 
behaviour occurs, civil redress will not suffice.   
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In the context of UN Peace Operations, the host State has an obligation to investigate 
and prosecute. However, the problem in respect of the host State is rarely that it is 
unwilling to prosecute; rather, it is often that it lacks the capacity to do so. As IHRL does 
not require States to deliver impossible tasks, the content of the host State’s obligation 
will depend on its capacity. However, where, exceptionally, a host State has the 
capacity to investigate and prosecute,226 it must meet this obligation in full. 
 
The circumstances regarding sending States are more complicated, because the 
criminal conduct is committed outside their borders. However, the obligation to 
investigate and prosecute does not explicitly distinguish between crimes committed 
within a State’s territory, and those committed outside its territory. Where the suspect is 
present in the sending State, it may have an obligation to investigate and, in particular, 
to prosecute him. The fact that the individual has usually been seconded by the State 
itself, and is usually one of its own police officers, may add weight to this argument. An 
additional factor is the need to combat impunity, at least in circumstances in which the 
host State is not itself in a position to investigate and prosecute.  
 
Generally, the conduct of a member of UN police is not attributable to the sending State. 
Where, exceptionally, it is attributable to that State, its obligation to investigate and, 
where appropriate, prosecute, may be more onerous.227 
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The obligation of a State to respond to a crime may conflict with the immunity afforded 
to the UN police officer who committed that crime. Legitimate claims to immunity are 
likely to be accepted by human rights bodies, either as part of prosecutorial discretion or 
as a requirement that forms part of general international law. It is not clear whether, 
where immunity has been inappropriately claimed, a State has an obligation to 
disregard that immunity. Another issue which is unclear is whether a defendant can 
challenge a decision to waive his immunity. 
 
The UN may also have an obligation to respond to crimes committed by UN police 
officers. If one takes the position that the UN is bound by customary human rights law, 
and that the content of customary obligations is similar to those enshrined in human 
rights treaties, it can be argued that the UN has an obligation to investigate and, where 
appropriate, prosecute, particularly since the UN police are UN agents. 
 
However, the UN’s obligations to investigate and prosecute are different to those of 
States because of the different relationship between it and those under its control. Since 
the UN has control over the initial investigation, the obligation to investigate can be 
delivered through the UN conducting its own investigation. The requirement that an 
investigation take place promptly would require that some investigators be present in 
missions. The UN’s responses must not be of an ad hoc nature. Investigations must be 
conducted by professional investigators, who are sufficiently independent of the 
suspect. This, in turn, means that UN police officers who share the same nationality as 
the suspect should not investigate allegations against him. Once a suspect is identified, 
438 
 
the UN must take measures to prevent the suspect colluding with other potential 
witnesses. An effective investigation requires the UN to resort to all available means. 
Thorough investigation requires that the UN interview witnesses outside the UN. 
 
The obligation of best endeavours to ensure that criminal proceedings are brought, 
where appropriate, means not making inappropriate immunity claims, or refusing to 
waive immunity when it should be waived. It may also require the UN to clarify the 
scope and procedure of immunity. This obligation also entails the investigation being 
conducted in such a way that its findings can be used in criminal proceedings brought 
by a State. This means that the standard of investigation needs to be that of a criminal 
investigation and, where it is known which State may prosecute, that the UN do its best 
to collect evidence according to that State’s legal requirements. In order to ensure that 
the investigation is thorough, the UN may be required to hold the suspect during the 
investigation, either by detaining him, or otherwise ensuring he does not flee. Where 
criminal conduct is substantiated in the UN’s investigation, the suspect must be handed 
over to a State which is willing to prosecute him. At the same time, information collected 
by the UN needs to be sent to the relevant State and, subsequently, a systematic 
follow-up with that State is required. 
 
Finally, although tenuous, it is also possible to argue that the UN has an obligation to 
assist States in delivering their procedural obligations. If this obligation is found to exist, 
it may mean that the UN must assist a State, which is seeking to prosecute, to obtain 
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additional evidence. It may also require the UN to assist the State in making an 
arrangement to send its own investigators. 
 
In short, it is submitted that the States’ obligation to investigate a crime, which would 
have been a human rights violation were it to be committed by a State agent, exists in 
relation to serious crimes committed by the UN police. The obligation exists both for 
host and sending States, although the extent of the host State’s obligation is dependent 
on the nature of its legal system. The UN may also have an obligation to conduct an 
effective investigation, and to do its best to ensure that the suspect is prosecuted. 
Where such an obligation is a possibility, it may be in the UN’s interests to deliver that 






CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
This work has focused on the individual criminal accountability of UN police officers, 
who work in UN Peace Operations. It has analyzed various ways to ensure that, where 
it is alleged that an individual UN police officer has engaged in criminal conduct, the 
matter is investigated and, where appropriate, the officer prosecuted. This issue has 
become vitally important because of the nature of the work the UN police undertake, 
and the impact that a lack of response to these crimes may have both on the UN, and 
on the effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of its Peace Operations. 
  
This issue has increased in importance as a result of the evolution of UN Peace 
Operations. The environments into which UN police are deployed increasingly suffer 
from fragile security, and lack basic national institutions. Thus, Peace Operations have 
become more intrusive. The evolution of the UN police is also reflected in its increased 
size. Beginning as a small police contingent serving in a single mission, there are now 
more than 12,000 UN police officers in the field.1 The issue of the criminal accountability 
of the UN police has also become more important due to the dramatic transformation of 
the functions they carry out. Since the 1990s, these functions have been clearly 
distinguished from those of military contingents. The nature of the functions that the UN 
police are entrusted with have shifted from monitoring the behaviour of the local police, 
to building or rebuilding the police force and other national institutions. More importantly, 
their functions involve inculcating the values of the rule of law, including the notion of 
                                            
1
 See Chapter 2, section 2. 
442 
 
accountability. In doing so, the UN police are required to act as role models.2 Thus, the 
effective delivery of individual criminal accountability of UN police officers is of 
increasing importance to the effectiveness and legitimacy of UN Peace Operations 
across the world.  
 
UN police officers are selected and trained primarily by their sending States, save for a 
limited number who are selected directly by the UN. This applies to both Individual 
Police Officers (IPOs) and Formed Police Unit (FPU) personnel. Two types of qualities 
are sought in respect of UN police officers: first, the expertise to deliver the requisite 
functions, with a focus on policing experience, language and driving skills; and, second, 
personal integrity. The analysis in this work makes it clear that there is a major problem 
in securing a sufficient number of qualified personnel in a timely manner. It appears that 
the increasing reliance on FPUs is partly due to the difficulties in securing police 
personnel.3  
 
In connection to the selection of personnel, there has been a major shift in the States 
which send UN police to missions. In the 1990s, it was mainly western States which 
sent police to UN missions. Currently, sending States are concentrated in South Asia 
and Africa. The majority of UN police personnel come from only a handful of States.4 It 
is recommended that specialized training, which targets policing in the Peace 
Operations context, be given to police officers in these States or regions. Those who 
complete the course should be awarded a certificate, and should be given priority over 
                                            
2
 See Chapter 2, section 1. 
3
 See Chapter 2, section 3. 
4
 See Chapter 2, section 3-3-1. 
443 
 
those who have not successfully completed this training when recruitment is carried out 
for a Peace Operation. 
 
It is clear that crimes have been, and continue to be, committed by UN police personnel. 
However, due in part to the fact that there is little publicly available data that properly 
indicates the scale of this problem,5 it is difficult to assess its true extent.6 In an attempt 
to address this issue, the author constructed a database using what little information 
there is regarding the incidence of alleged crimes.7 It became clear from this (limited) 
data that serious crimes have been committed by UN police personnel, and that a large 
proportion of these are crimes against the person. The author’s data showed that a 
majority of these offences are unrelated to their official functions.8 This indicates that the 
element that has the greatest impact on the commission of crimes may be not the 
mandate, the functions, or the environment they are deployed in; instead, it appears to 
be the personal qualities of UN police personnel. Thus, the issue of the proper selection 
of personnel appears vital. In most cases for which data are available, criminal 
proceedings did not appear to have been brought against the suspects, either in the 
host or sending States.9 
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This apparent absence of criminal proceedings is not the result of there being no 
mechanism to deal with allegations of criminal conduct. The current UN machinery is 
triggered by complaints.10 This indicates that a certain proportion of allegations do not 
reach the UN, in particular because victims and witnesses face greater obstacles in 
lodging complaints in societies in which Peace Operations are deployed.11 Since the 
mid-1990s and, in particular, since the Zeid Report was issued, the UN has taken 
measures to address the issue of the individual criminal accountability of UN 
personnel.12 The ad hoc mechanism was reformed and, initially, all misconduct 
investigations were entrusted to the Board of Inquiry (BoI) system. However, BoI 
investigators lacked the requisite investigative skills.13 Since then, a number of 
measures have been taken: mechanisms have been created for raising awareness of 
what constitutes misconduct; how to lodge a complaint and how to handle a complaint, 
both within the UN and outside it, have been publicized; codes of conduct and complaint 
mechanisms have been established; procedures have been introduced to ensure the 
smoother receipt of complaints, as well as the centralization of these complaints; and 
agreements have been entered into with States regarding arrangements for 
investigation and prosecution.14  
 
Currently, the two main offices entrusted with disciplinary issues are the Office of the 
Oversight Services (OIOS), and the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) and its field 
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teams (CDTs). The OIOS has investigators who are assigned solely to conduct 
investigations, and the office is responsible for investigating all allegations of serious 
misconduct. The CDU is tasked with serving as a focal point for all misconduct 
allegations, including the centralization of information, and data management. The 
selection standards for UN police personnel have been clarified, an internal policy has 
been developed to protect whistle-blowers, and the UN has begun to refer some 
allegations of criminal misconduct to sending States.15 The problem of UN police 
misconduct has also been acknowledged by the General Assembly, which has 
discussed the criminal accountability of civilian personnel, including the UN police.16    
 
Nevertheless, the analysis in this work has revealed persistent shortcomings. There is 
no evidence that the policy on the protection of whistle-blowers is being effectively 
implemented.17 Even though the need for professional and independent investigations 
has resulted in the UN referring all serious misconduct to the OIOS, due to the OIOS 
being overloaded with cases, about half of the investigations referred to it are now sent 
back to the originating mission to investigate.18 Furthermore, OIOS investigations do not 
serve the needs of criminal investigations, as the evidence gathered by the OIOS 
cannot be used in criminal proceedings.19  
 
                                            
15
 Chapter 4, section 2. 
16
 Chapter 1, section 1. 
17
 Chapter 4, section 3-1 (2) c. 
18
 Chapter 4, section 2. 
19
 Chapter 4, section 3-3-2. 
446 
 
In fact, the OIOS was originally established for a specific purpose, and its investigators 
may be qualified to fulfil that purpose,20 but they appear to lack the ability to investigate 
‘ordinary’ crimes. One possibility would be to create a special unit within OIOS to 
investigate criminal conduct by UN personnel, but a putative unit would be likely to be 
based in New York, which would be problematic. Another possibility would be to 
designate UN police to investigate allegations against mission personnel. To ensure 
impartiality, UN police would not be permitted to investigate allegations against other 
UN police with the same nationality. These investigators could come under the control 
of an OIOS investigator. 
 
Regarding data, the CDU does not collect all data dealing with misconduct, as the data 
concerned are independently collected and managed by both the OIOS and the CDU.21 
Without accurate and comprehensive data, it is difficult for the UN to respond to, or 
prevent, criminal misconduct. It is recommended that a single office should be 
responsible for collecting comprehensive data on misconduct and, given that the 
OIOS’s data are confidential, for it to be the office responsible for collecting and 
managing the entire database.22 The UN should also seek to ensure that the system for 
collecting information on criminal misconduct does so regardless of whether a complaint 
has been lodged or not.  
 
The UN should also seek information about misbehaviour proactively. At the very least, 
it should respond to all allegations that reach any mission members, even if no formal 
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complaint is made. Every member of a mission should be under an obligation to forward 
such information to a designated person. A failure to do so should result in a serious 
sanction.23 The data collected by the UN regarding criminal misconduct should be 
disaggregated according to the mission during which the misconduct occurred, the type 
of alleged misconduct, the personnel category into which the suspect falls, the type of 
victim, and the nationality of the suspect.24 
 
A separate issue is the extent to which this information should be made public. It is 
submitted that the majority should be made public.25 Transparency is, in and of itself, 
necessary for the UN because it is trying to inculcate good governance, which involves 
being transparent. In addition, by making the information public, civil society will join the 
UN in bringing pressure to bear on States to resolve the issue of the individual criminal 
accountability of UN Peace Operations personnel.26   
 
In relation to making public the nationality of the suspect, there are two possible 
approaches. One is to make public the nationality of all suspects in respect of whom 
substantiated allegations of criminal conduct have been made which warrant 
prosecution. The other is to publish the names of States that fail to act on receipt of a 
                                            
23
 Chapter 4, section 3-2. 
24
 Chapter 4, sections 3-1 and 3-2. 
25
 The information that should be made public is as follows: the date on which the criminal misconduct 
was committed, the mission during which the crime was committed, the nature of the criminal conduct, a 
brief summary of the alleged crime, the personnel category to which the suspect belongs, the suspect’s 
nationality, the type of the victim(s) if any, the nationality(ies) of the victim(s), and a brief explanation of 
what action has been taken. 
26
 Chapter 4, sections 3-1 and 3-2. 
448 
 
report of substantiated criminal misconduct. The latter may work as a sanction against 
non-cooperation.27  
 
The UN’s responses have also disproportionately focused on sexual crimes.28 Other 
equally serious crimes also need to be addressed effectively.29  
 
Once information is made available, criminal prosecution can take place in either the 
host or the sending State. It is noteworthy that, in recent years, the UN has shifted its 
focus from the host State to sending States in terms of providing potential legal fora for 
prosecution.30 The shift appears to have taken place as a result of mission 
environments, as well as the state of the host State’s legal system.31 The recent 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UN and States sending FPUs to 
missions establishes that the sending State is required to prosecute the suspect if the 
host State does not do so itself.32 This should be written into the Note Verbale between 
the UN and States sending IPOs. 
 
However, the idea that sending States should be required to prosecute their own police 
officers for misconduct should be complemented with practical measures to enable 
them to do so. The practical difficulties inherent in bringing criminal proceedings based 
on evidence gathered by another entity for disciplinary purposes cannot be 
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underestimated. It is very difficult for the sending State to respond promptly to an 
allegation of serious criminal conduct against its national UN police officer, and to 
investigate an act that occurred outside its borders. Thus, where an allegation is made 
that there has been criminal misconduct, the UN should put in place arrangements for 
ensuring that evidence is collected promptly, and in a form which is able to serve the 
needs of a criminal prosecution. In some cases, this may entail an agreement between 
the host State, the sending State and the UN, which would enable the sending State to 
send its own investigators to the host State. In other cases, it may mean that UN 
investigators conduct an investigation under the guidance of the sending State, in order 
to ensure that the right kind of evidence is collected in the right form. In either case, it 
would be useful to have a contact person in each sending State with whom to negotiate 
practical arrangements.33 By systematizing the entire procedure, reliance on the 
individual SRSG’s willingness to pursue the issue of criminal accountability could be 
minimized. 
 
There are other practical steps that need to be taken after the initial collection of 
evidence. Where sending States require additional information, the UN would need to 
assist in gathering it. It also needs to follow up systematically in order to ensure that the 
sending State does all it can to investigate and, where facts warrant it, to prosecute a 
suspect. Where the UN has substantiated an allegation of criminal misconduct, the UN 
should also be equipped with the power to detain or otherwise hold the suspect until it 
hands him over to the State which will prosecute him. This would ensure that the 
suspect does not flee to another jurisdiction to avoid facing criminal proceedings. At the 
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same time, the UN should transfer all the information from its own investigation to a 
person in the prosecuting State, who has been previously designated for this purpose. 
This person would have the responsibility for ensuring that the State concerned makes 
its best efforts to prosecute the suspect. This may involve a modification of the MoU, 
and the same modification should be written into Notes Verbales between the UN and 
the State sending IPOs.  
 
It is often claimed that one of the main legal obstacles to the prosecution of a suspect is 
the limits imposed on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by States. However, 
international law poses no difficulties for either the host or sending State in relation to 
bringing criminal proceedings. The former can rely on the territorial principle, whilst the 
latter may rely on the active nationality principle.34 Under its domestic laws, the host 
State will not encounter any problem in exercising jurisdiction.35 There may, however, 
be a problem under domestic law for the sending State. There is generally no problem 
in this regard in relation to sending States which have a civil-law system, as their 
criminal laws provide criminal jurisdiction over their nationals for acts committed abroad. 
This work has shown that a significant proportion of common-law countries also claim to 
be able to exercise criminal jurisdiction in these circumstances. The majority of sending 
States, from whom the bulk of UN police come, can exercise jurisdiction either by 
ensuring that they can prosecute nationals for all relevant crimes even when committed 
abroad, or by making criminal law applicable to public officials or security personnel 
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when they are abroad. 36 On this basis, it is recommended that the UN only accept 
police officers from those States that are able to show that they can exercise 
jurisdiction. Quite apart from States exercising criminal jurisdiction, recent argument 
posits that the UN should establish its own model criminal code, 37 create a hybrid 
criminal tribunal similar to the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the Extraordinary 
Chambers in Cambodia, and exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
personnel serving in Peace Operations.38 This option may warrant further consideration, 
but rather in the form of a special chamber of the already-existing ICC, in order to 
mitigate resource problems.  
 
This research also showed that, in theory, immunity can only shield UN police officers 
from prosecution in relation to acts committed in the performance of their official duties. 
Since most of the criminal acts in question have nothing do to with their official 
performance, immunity should not apply to these. The law provides additional immunity 
to UN police from arrest and detention, but, in reality, this does not appear to be invoked 
on its own unless the offence itself is also protected by immunity. The UN Police 
Commissioner, whilst in office, has immunity for all his conduct. 
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Some uncertainty remains about the geographic coverage of immunity. If the entire 
scope of immunity derives from the General Convention,39 the scope of cover in relation 
to official acts will be global, both for UN police officers and the UN Police 
Commissioner.40 However, if the immunity concerned is dependent on a SOFA, 41 it is 
limited in relation to the host State.42 It is submitted that the UN should make its 
understanding of the demarcation of immunity clear, so that both States who seek 
prosecution of the UN police, and the UN police themselves, know what conduct is 
protected by immunity and where.43 
 
The waiving of immunity is a complex issue. Immunity can and must be waived by the 
Secretary-General when, ‘in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of 
justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the [UN]’.44 It is unclear 
whether this two-fold test should be understood as requiring waiver unless it harms the 
UN’s interests, or whether its application is much more discretionary. There is no 
mechanism to challenge the Secretary-General’s decision, except for taking the issue to 
the ICJ.45 It could be problematic if immunity is not waived when it should be waived.46  
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In Peace Operations, the determination both of what comes within the UN polices’ 
official functions for the purposes of deciding the issue of the applicability of immunity, 
and whether or not to waive it where it is found to exist, is made by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in the name of the Secretary-
General.47 Two main problems arise in this regard: the first is that the UN sometimes 
invokes immunity where no such immunity exists, and then “waives” this non-existent 
immunity. It would be better if the UN were to simply and clearly state that there was no 
such immunity in the first place.48 Second, the UN sometimes invokes immunity, and 
does not waive it even where it does not in fact exist. In some cases, it appears that the 
real reason for this is the UN’s concern about handing over its personnel to a legal 
system that either may not be able to conduct a trial at all, or that is unable to protect a 
suspect’s right to a fair trial. While that is a legitimate concern, it is recommended that 
this issue be dealt with separately via another mechanism.49 It is possible that 
inappropriate claims of immunity amount to a breach of human rights obligations by the 
UN. To the extent that this is the case, States may be required not to give effect to such 
immunity.50  
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Given that States are free to exercise jurisdiction in relation to criminal conduct 
committed by the UN police in a majority of cases, an obstacle to prosecution may 
either be practical, or it may indicate that States are reluctant to exercise jurisdiction. 
Where reluctance is the problem, it may be possible to argue that the State has an 
obligation to investigate and prosecute (where appropriate) under international human 
rights law (IHRL). This is the case in relation to allegations of crimes which would be 
human rights violations had they been committed by State officials. As the territorial 
State, the host State is subject to this obligation, although the extent of that obligation 
depends on its ability to meet it.51 It is submitted that the obligation also arises in 
respect of sending States. While the offence is committed outside its territory, the 
suspect is nevertheless its national and, moreover, he or she is selected and sent as its 
representative to a Peace Operation. Once a suspect is back in its territory, the sending 
State has an obligation to investigate the misconduct, and to do its best to prosecute 
serious crimes committed by its UN police officer, depending on its circumstances.52  
 
The UN may also have certain obligations in this respect. If it is taken as given that the 
UN has customary human rights obligations, and that the content of its customary 
obligations is similar to its treaty obligations,53 it is arguable that the UN has an 
obligation to: 1) conduct a prompt, effective and impartial investigation; and, 2) to use its 
best endeavours to ensure that suspects are prosecuted.54 Where it is clear that the 
misconduct constitutes a crime, the obligation to investigate may require the UN to 
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conduct its disciplinary investigation according to criminal law standards. The obligation 
to use its best endeavours may require the UN to hold the suspect, and then to hand 
him or her over to the prosecuting authority of the State concerned. When the UN hands 
over the suspect, it should also hand over all the results of its investigations to enable 
the State to prosecute him or her. This obligation may also require that the UN conduct 
a systematic follow-up with that State to establish whether it has carried out the 
prosecution and, if not, why not.55 It also means that the UN is required not to shield a 
suspect from prosecution, and to do its best to ensure prosecution.56 This further means 
that the UN must refrain from resorting to inappropriate claims of immunity, or refusing 
to waive immunity where it is inappropriate to do so.   
 
The research conducted for this work indicates that the problems encountered in 
ensuring the criminal accountability of the UN police are much more fundamental. One 
key aspect of the problem is that the UN57 may be getting offers of police personnel that 
they have difficulty accepting.58 The UN receives police personnel from States where 
the police are not routinely called to account.59 If that is the case, there is little prospect 
of sending States bringing criminal proceedings against their police officers who are 
accused of committing crimes. If a sending State does not recognize the importance of 
accountability, it is not likely that pressure exerted on it by the UN to do so will have any 
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real impact. However, there could be an impact if the pressure exerted on a State 
brought shame on it, leading it to change its behaviour.60  
 
This appears mostly not to be the fault of the UN. Nevertheless, the UN should improve 
its transparency in relation to accountability issues61 and, more broadly, in relation to its 
operations in general. There should be no hesitation on its part to make publicly 
available data regarding the nationality of those police personnel against whom 
allegations of serious misconduct have been established. Nor should the UN hesitate to 
publicize the names of States that are not willing to bring criminal proceedings against 
suspects, following the UN’s referral of such cases to them. It is possible that the UN is 
concerned that disclosing such information would reveal the extent to which UN police 
officers accused of serious misconduct disproportionately come from a limited number 
of States, which also happen to be the largest and most constant source of UN police 
officers. However, if information reveals that the majority of wrongdoers come from 
certain States, this should not be of major concern to the UN. Instead, the UN should 
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consider imposing conditions on those sending States with accountability problems. For 
example, where there is an indication that certain States have major issues regarding 
accountability, it could require those States to make changes, and to provide evidence 
of this, before accepting further police personnel from them.  
 
By concealing the nationality of suspected wrongdoers, and by concealing the names of 
States which fail to make efforts to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by their 
nationals, the UN is, in fact, colluding with those States. If the real problem is the quality 
of police personnel that the UN attracts, this problem needs to be acknowledged by the 
UN and its member States. In some situations, the UN may have to choose between 
having police personnel who are of poor quality, and having no police personnel. This is 
an issue that the political organs of the UN should resolve. All actors are tacitly aware of 
these problems, which need to be explicitly discussed with States. 
 
Another action which is not currently being undertaken by the UN, but which could be 
taken, is the monitoring of the requirements States must meet. Where, for example, the 
UN establishes selection criteria for UN police personnel, but does not monitor whether 
the personnel who are sent meet these criteria,62 the perception will be that these 
criteria do not really matter. It may be that the UN is not willing to reveal the extent to 
which UN police officers are not qualified for the job. If that is the case, the UN 
Secretariat would be missing an opportunity to advise the Security Council about this 
problem. If problems in this regard lie with the sending States, and not the UN 
Secretariat, if the UN Secretariat nevertheless covers these up, it is also at fault. With 
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regard to many of these points, the UN has shown that it has identified the issues 
correctly, but the measures it has adopted, and its attitude toward non-compliance, 
suggest that the UN does not think these things actually matter.  
 
The issues identified in this assessment of the UN’s approach to UN police personnel’s 
criminal accountability are closely connected to how the UN operates. Without an 
accurate assessment of where the key problems lie, as well as adopting the means for 
addressing these problems effectively with greater transparency, this predicament 







International treaties and instruments 
 
Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations concerning the 
Status of the United Nations Mission in Sudan, (adopted and entered into force 28 
December 2005), 2005 UN Jurid YB 44 
 
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 
18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 
 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 
85 
 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) 213 UNTS 222 
 
Convention on the High Seas (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 
1962) 450 UNTS 11 
 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (adopted 13 
February 1946, entered into force 17 September 1946) 1 UNTS 15 
 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (adopted on 9 
December 1994, entered into force on 15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363 
 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (adopted 8 December 1949, entered into 
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 30 
 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (adopted 8 
December 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 84 
 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Population in Time of War of 
August 12, 1949 (adopted 8 December 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 
UNTS 286 
 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 
(adopted 8 December 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 134 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European  
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) 213 UNTS 222 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 




International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1977), 999 UNTS 171 
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1979 UNTS 4 
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, entered in force 1 June 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90 
 
The Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI 
 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 
March 1967), 1 UNTS 596 
 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into force 





Code Penal (Niger, Loi N° 2003-025 du 13 Juin 2003 Modifiant la Loi N° 61-27 du 15 
Juillet 1961, portant Institution du Code Pénal, Journal Officiel Spécial N° 4 du 7 Avril 
2004) 
 
Code de Procedure Penale (Niger, Loi N° 61-33 du 14 Août 1961 portant Institution du 
Code de Procédure Pénale, Modifiée par la Loi N° 2003-026 du 13 Juin 2003, la Loi N° 
2004-21 du 16 Mai 2004 et la Loi N° 2007-04 du 22 Février 2007) 
 
Code Pénal (Niger, tel qu’Amendé par la Loi no 2008-18) 2003  
 
Crimes and Misconduct (Overseas Operations) Act (NZ, Public Act 2004 no 17) 2004 
 
Criminal Code (Chech) 2009 
 
Criminal Code (Germany, Version promulgated on 13 November 1998, Federal Law 
Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I p 3322, last amended by Article 3 of the Law of 2 October 
2009, Federal Law Gazette I p 3214)  
 
Criminal Code (Ghana, Act 29) 1960 
 
Criminal Code (Hungary) 2012 
 




Criminal Code (Norway, The General Civil Penal Code, Act of 22 May 1902 no 10, with 
subsequent amendments, the latest made by Act of 21 December 2005 no 131) 1902 
 
Criminal Code (Panama) 2007 
 
Criminal Code (Poland) 1997 
 
Criminal Code (Portugal) 1982 
 
Criminal Code (Romania) 1969 
 
Criminal Code (Sweden, 'Brottsbalken') 1965 
 
Human Trafficking and Transportation (Control) Act (Nepal, 2064 [2007], shrawan 8, 
2064 [24 July 2007, Act no 5 of the Year 2064 [2007]) 
 
International Crimes Act (The Netherlands) 2003  
 
Loi no 043/96/ADP du 13 Novembre 1996 Portant Code Pénal (Burkina Faso) 13 
December 1996 
 
New General Civil Penal Code (Norway) 2005 
 
Organic Act 1/2009 (Spain, 3 November 2009) 
 
Penal Code (Bangladesh, Act no XLV of 1860 of 6 October 1980) 
 
Penal Code (France) 2005 
 
Penal Code (Greece) 1950 
 
Penal Code (India, 1860 Act no 45 of 1860 of 6 October 1860) 
 
Penal Code (Indonesia, Undang-undang RI no 27 Tahun 1999, Tanggal 19 Mei 1999) 
1982  
 
Penal Code, (Pakistan, Act XLV of 6 October 1860) 
 
Penal Code (The Philippines, as Revised by an Act Revising the Penal Code and Other 
Penal Laws, Act no 3815, 8 December 1930) 
 
Penal Code (Togo, Code Pénal) 1980 
 
Penal Code (Yemen, Republican Decree for Law no 12 for the Year 1994 Concerning 




Perjury Act (UK) 1911 
 
Republican Decree for Law no 12 for the Year 1994, Concerning Crimes and Penalties 
(Yemen) 
 
Republican Decree for Law no 13 for the Year 1994, Concerning the Criminal 
Procedures (Yemen) 
 
Sexual Offences Act (c 43) (UK) 2003 
 
The Anti-Human Trafficking Act (Sierra Leone, Act Supplement to the Sierra Leone 
Gazette vol CXXXVI, no 44 of 18 August 2005)  2005 
 
The Criminal Code (Amendment) Act (Ghana, Act 646) 2003 
 
The Criminal Code (Ukraine, entered into force 1 September 2001) 
 
The Criminal Procedure Acts (Sierra Leone, Act No 32) 1965 
 
The Offences Against the Person Act (UK) 1861 
 
The Organic Law of the Judiciary 6/1985 (Spain, LOPJ - Ley Organica del Poder 
Judicial) 1985 
 
The Sex Offenders Act (c 51) (UK) 1997 
 
The United Nations (Police) Act (NZ) 1964 
 
UNMIK Regulation no 1999/24 on the Law Applicable in Kosovo (12 December 1999) 
 
UNMIK Regulation no 2000/38 of 30 June 2000 on the Establishment of the 
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo 
 
UNMIK Regulation no 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the Establishment of the Human 
Rights Advisory Panel 
 
UNTAET Regulation no 1999/1 on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in 
East Timor 
 
2003 Amendment to the Crimes (Overseas) Act (Australia) 1964 
 
 
Cases and decisions 
 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 




Affaire Gentilhomme, Schaff-Benhadji and Zerouki v France App nos 48205/99, 
48207/99 and 48209/99 (ECtHR, 14 May 2002) 
 
Ahmet Özkan and Others v UK App no 21689/93, (ECtHR, 6 April 2004) 
 
Akpinar and Altun v Turkey ECHR 2007-III 
 
Aksoy v Turkey ECHR 1996-VI 
 
Al-Adsani v UK ECHR 2001-XI 
 
Al-Jedda v UK [2011] ECHR 1092 
 
Al-Skeini and Others v UK [2011] ECHR 1093 
 
Ali Medjnoune v Algeria 9 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 182 
 
Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria ECHR 2007-IX 
 
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1989] ICJ Rep 177 
 
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations (Written Statement Submitted on behalf of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations) [1989] ICJ Rep 173 
 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168 
 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium) (Diss Op Van den Wyngaert) [2002] 
ICJ Rep 137 
 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 3 
 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium) (Sep Op Guillaume P) [2002] ICJ Rep 
35 
 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium) (Sep Op Higgins, Koojimans and 
Buergenthal) [2002] ICJ Rep 63 
 
Assanidze v Georgia ECHR 2004-II 
 
Aydin v Turkey ECHR 1997-VI 
 




Bazorkina v Russia ECHR 2006-I 
 
Behrami and Behrami v France and Sarmati v France, Germany and Norway 
(Admissibility) App nos 71412/01, 78166/01 (ECtHR, 2 May 2007) 
 
Beker v Turkey App no 27866/03 (ECtHR, 24 March 2009) 
 
Bekos v Greece App no 15250/02 (ECtHR, 13 December 2005) 
 
Bilbija et al (2006) AP-953/05 (Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the 
Appeal of Milorad Bilbija et al, 8 July 2006) 
 
Blake v Guatemala Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 36 (24 January 1998) 
 
Boery v Ghaddafi Cour de Cassation [2001] 125 ILR 490 
 
Bogdan Subotić (2005) AP-696/04 (The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 23 September 2005)  
 
Bouterse v Public Prosecutor Court of Appeal of Amsterdam (Gerechtshof Amsterdam) 
20 November 2000 
 
Bulacio v Argentina Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 100 (18 September 2003) 
 
Caballero Delgado and Santana v Colombia Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 22 (8 
December 1995) 
 
Çakıcı v Turkey [1999] ECHR 43 
 
Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy ECHR 2002-I 
 
Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment 
of 26 February 2007) [2007] ICJ Rep 43 (ICJ) 
 
Case concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (New 
Application: 1962) (Second phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 
 
Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 12 
 
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) 
(Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep 172 
 




Cynthia Brzak and Nasr Ishak v The United Nations, Kofi Annan, Wendy Chambering, 
Ruud Lubbers, et al (Certiorari - Summary Dispositions) Order list 562 US 09-1481  
 
Cynthia Brzak and Nasr Ishak v The United Nations, Kofi Annan, Wendy Chambering, 
Ruud Lubbers, et al Docket No. 08-2799-cv 597 F 3d 107 (2010) 
 
Cynthia Brzak and Nasr Ishak v The United Nations, Kofi Annan, Wendy Chambering, 
Ruud Lubbers, et al 551 F Supp 2d 313 (SDNY 2008) 
 
Cyprus v Turkey ECHR 2001-IV 
 
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights (Advisory Opinion) [1999] ICJ Rep 62 
 
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights (Diss Op Koroma) [1999] ICJ Rpt 111 
 
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights (Written Statement submitted on behalf of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations) (ICJ 2 October 1999),  <http://wwwicj-
cijorg/docket/files/100/8658pdf>, accessed 30 November 2011  
 
Dink v Turkey App no 2668/07 (ECtHR, 14 September 2010) 
 
Dodov v Bulgaria ECHR 2008 
 
Durand v Peru Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 68 (16 August 2000) 
 
Eduardo Bleier v Uruguay 1 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 109 
Almeida de Quinteros v Uruguay 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 
138 
 
Edwards v UK Series A No 247 B 
 
El Hassy v Lybia Communication no 1422/2005 (Human Rights Committee, 24 October 
2007) 
 
El Moctar v Secretary-General of the United Nations Case no UNDT/NBI/2011/011, 
Judgment no UNDT/2012/113, (UNDT, 24 July 2012) 
 
Ergi v Turkey ECHR 1998-IV 
 
Etienne Tête v France Series A No 54 
 




Ferrini v Germany [2004] Italian Court of Cassation, Decision No 5044/2004, 128 ILR 
658 
 
Finucane v UK ECHR 2003-VIII 
 
Gajić v Germany (Admissibility) App no 31446/02 (ECtHR, 28 August 2007) 
 
Genie-Lacayo v Nicaragua Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 30 (29 January 1997) 
 
Georgia v Russia (II) (Admissibility) App no 38263/08 (ECtHR, 19 December 2011) 
 
Godinez-Cruz v Honduras (Merits) Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 5 (20 January 1989)  
H C M A v The Netherlands 3 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 19 
 
Gongadze v Ukraine App no 34056/02 (ECtHR, 8 November 2005) 
 
Guiliani and Gaggio v Italy ECHR-2011 
 
Gül v Turkey App no 22676/93 (ECtHR, 14 December 2000) 
 
Güleç v Turkey ECHR 1998-IV 
 
Hassan Abbousedra v Lybia Communication no 1751/2008 (Human Rights Committee, 
25 October 2010) 
 
HRH Prince Abdul Aziz Bin Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz v Mrs Janan George Harb [2015] 
EWCA Civ 481 
 
Hugh Jordan v UK ECHR 2001-III 
 
Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia ECHR 2004-VII 
 
Ilhan v Turkey ECHR 2000-VII 
 
Imakayeva v Russia ECHR 2006-XIII 
 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt 
(Advisory Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 73  
 
Isayeva v Russia App no 57950/00 (ECtHR, 6 July 2005)  
 
Jaloud v the Netherlands [2014] ECHR 1292 
 





Joaquín David Herrera Rubio v Colombia 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee 192 
 
Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia) [2006] UKHL 26 
 
Jones and Others v UK ECHR 2014 
 
José Vicente and Amado Villafañe Chaparro, Dioselina Torres Crespo, Hermes Enrique 
Torres Solis and Vicencio Chaparro Izquierdo v Colombia 6 Selected Decisions of the 
Human Rights Committee 135 
 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (Diss Op 
Trindade) [2012] ICJ Rep 179 
 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) 
(Judgement) [2012] ICJ Rep 99 
 
Kalogeropoulou and Others v Greece and Germany (Admissibility) EHCR 2002-X 
 
Kasumaj v Greece (Admissibility) App no 6974/05 (ECtHR, 5 July 2007) 
 
Kaya v Turkey ECHR 1998-I 
 
Kelly and Others v UK App no 30054/96 (ECtHR, 4 May 2001) 
 
Kemal Kiliç v Turkey ECHR 2000-III 
 
Khilal Avadanov v Azerbaijan Communication no 1633/2007 (Human Rights Committee, 
25 October 2010) 
 
Kurt v Turkey ECHR 1998-III 
 
L C B v UK ECHR 1998-III 1403 
 
La Palmeras v Colombia Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 90 (6 December 2001) 
 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 316 
 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v Norway) (Judgment) PCIJ Rep 
Series A/B, No 53, 48  
 
Loayza-Tamayo v Peru Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No42 (27 November 1998) 
 




Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10 
 
M C v Bulgaria ECHR 2003-XII 
 
M G B and S P v Trinidad and Tobago 3 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee 36 
 
M & Co v Germany Series A No 64 
 
Mahmut Kaya v Turkey ECHR 2000-III 
 
Marcellana and Gumanoy v The Philippines Communication no 1560/2007 (Human 
Rights Committee, 30 October 2008) 
 
Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v Brazil 12.051 Inter-Am Com HR Series L No 54/01 
Özgür Gündem v Turkey ECHR 2000-III 
 
Marija and Dragana Novakovic, on behalf of their son, Zoran Novakovic (deceased) v 
Serbia Communication no 1556/2007 (Human Rights Committee, 21 October 2010) 
 
Matthews v UK [1999] ECHR 12 
 
McCann and Others v UK Series A No 324 
 
McKerr v UK ECHR 2001-III 
 
McShane v UK App no 43290/98 (ECtHR 28 May 2002) 
 
Mehmet Şentürk and Bekir Şentürk v Turkey App no 13423/09 (ECtHR, 9 April 2013) 
 
Menesheva v Russia App no 59261/00 (ECtHR, 9 March 2006) 
 
Menson and Others v UK ECHR 2003-V 
 
Messaouda Kimouche v Algeria Communication no 1328/2004 (Human Rights 
Committee, 10 July 2007) 
 
Mikayil Mammadov v Azerbaijan App no 4762/05 (ECtHR, 17 December 2009) 
 








Mothers of Srebrenica Association v State of the Netherlands Case no 10/04437 EV/AS 
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 April 2012), English translation available at: 
<http://wwwrechtspraaknl/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad/Supreme-court/Summaries-of-some-
important-rulings-of-the-Supreme-Court/Pages/Ruling-Dutch-Supreme-Court-Mothers-
of-Srebrenicaaspx> Accessed 1 January 2015 
 
Nguyen-Kropp Postica v Secretary-General of the United Nations Cases no 
UNDT/NY/2010/107; UNDT/NY/2011/004 Judgment no UNDT/2013/176 (UNDT, 20 
December 2013) 
 
North Sea Continental Shelf case (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/The 
Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 
 
Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Rep 253 
 
Nuhanovic v The State of the Netherlands Case no 265618 HA ZA 06-1672 (Court of 
Appeal in the Hague, 5 July 2011) English translation available at 
<http://zoekenrechtspraaknl> Accessed 29 December 2014 
 
Nuhanovic v The State of the Netherlands Case no 265615/HA ZA 06-1671 (DC Hague, 
10 September 2008) English translation available at <http://zoekenrechtspraaknl> 
Accessed 29 December 2014 
 
Nydia Erika Bautista de Arellana v Colombia 6 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Commitee 103 
 
Ognyanova v Bulgaria App no 46317/99 (ECtHR, 23 February 2006) 
 
Öğur v Turkey ECHR 1999-III  
 
Öneryildiz v Turkey ECHR 2004-XII 
 
Osman and Osman v UK ECHR 1998-VIII 
 
Osmanoglu v Turkey App no 48804/99 (ECtHR, 24 January 2008) 
 
Paniagua-Morales v Guatemala Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 37 (8 March 1998) 
 
Paul and Audrey Edwards v UK ECHR 2002-II 
 
Powell v UK ECHR 2000-V 
 
Prisacariu v Secretary-General of the United Nations Case no UNDT/NY/2012/023, 





Prosecutor v Akeyasu (Decision on the Motion to Subpoena a Witness) ICTR-96-4-T 
(19 November 1997) 
 
Prosecutor v Braškić (Decision of Trial Chamber I on Protective Measures of General 
Phillippe Morillon, Witness of the Trial Chamber) IT-95-14-T (12 May 1999) [2] 
 
Prosecutor v Braškić (Judgment on the request of Croatia for review of the decision of 
the Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997) IT-95-14-A (29 October 1997) 
 
Prosecutor v Brima et al (Decision on Prosecution Appeal Against Decision on Oral 
Application for Witness TF1-150 to Testify Without Being Compelled to Answer 
Questions on Grounds of Confidentiality) SCSL-2004-16-AR73 (26 May 2006) 
 
Prosecutor v Brima et al (Diss Op Donerty on the Prosecution's Oral Application for 
Leave to Be Granted to Witness TF1-150 to Testify Without Being Compelled to Answer 
Any Questions on Grounds of Confidentiality) SCSL-04-16-T, TC II (22 September 
2005) 
 
Prosecutor v Brima et al (Sep and Conc Op Robertson, Decision on Prosecution Appeal 
against Decision on Oral Application for Witness TF1-150 to Testify Without Being 
Compelled to Answer Questions on Groudns of Confidentiality) SCSL-04-16, AC (26 
May 2006) 
 
Prosecutor v Furundzija (Trial Judgement) ICTY-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) 
 
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) 
[2012] ICJ Rpt 422 
 
R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v Secretary of State for Defence (Sep Op 
Bingham LJ) [2007] UKHL 58 
 
R A V N v Argentina 3 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 20 
 
Rafael Mojica v Dominican Republic 5 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee 70 
 
Ramsahai and Others v the Netherlands [2007] ECHR 393 
 
Reavey v UK App no 34640/04 (ECtHR, 27 November 2007) 
 
Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet [1999] 
UKHL 17, [2000] 1 AC 147 
 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations  (Advisory Opinion) 




Rosario Celis Laureano v Peru 6 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 
63 
 
S E v Argentina 3 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 41 
 
Salman v Turkey ECHR 2000-VII 
 
Shaip Canhasi v UNMIK Case no 004/08 (The Human Rights Advisory Panel, 15 July 
2008) 
 
Shanaghan v UK App no 37715/97 (ECtHR, 4 August 2001) 
 
Shefqet Maliqi, against the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Registration no 
361/01, (the Kosovo Ombudsperson, 13 March 2002) 
 
Silih v Slovenia ECHR 2009 
 
Solomou and Others v Turkey App no 36832/97 (ECtHR, 24 June 2008) 
 
Standard Chartered Bank v ITC and Others [1987] 1 WLR 641, 648 (Bingham J) 
 
Sundara Arachchige Lalith Rajapakse v Sri Lanka Communication no 1250/2004 
(Human Rights Committee, 14 July 2006) 
 
Svetlana Jočić v UNMIK Case no 34/09 (Human Rights Advisory Panel, 23 April 2013) 
 
Tanis and Others v Turkey ECHR 2005-VIII 
 
Tanli v Turkey ECHR 2001-III 
 
Tanrikulu v Turkey ECHR 1999-IV 
 
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ 
Rep 238 
 
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Declaration of Bedjaoui P) 
[1996] ICJ Rep 268 
 
The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) v 
Hasan Nuhanovic Case no 12/03324 LZ/TT (Judgement of 6 September 2013) 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands, English translation available at: 
<http://wwwrechtspraaknl/Organisatie/Hoge-
Raad/OverDeHogeRaad/publicaties/Documents/12%2003324pdf> Accessed 10 March 
2015 
 




US v Coplon et al US Dist Ct SDNY 10 May 1949, 84 F Supp 472 (SDNY 1949) 
Nottebohm case (Lichtenstein v Guatemala) (Second phase) (Judgment of 6 April 1955) 
[1955] ICJ Rep 4  
 
US v Melekh US Dist Ct SDNY, 28 November 1960, 190 F Supp 67 (SDNY 1960) 
Attorney-General v Eichmann (Israel Sup Ct 1962), 36 Int’l L Rep 277, 1968 (English 
translation) 
 
US v Rey 663 F 2d 1086 DNM (2009) 
 
Vadivel Sathasivam and Parathesi Saraswathi v Sri Lanka Communication no 
1436/2005 (Human Rights Committee, 8 July 2008) 
 
Varnava and Others v Turkey ECHR 2009 
 
Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras Inter-Am Ct HR Series C No 4 (29 July 1988) 
 
Westchester County v William Ranollo New Rochelle City Ct,  8 November 1946, 187 
Misc 777; 67 NYS 2d 31 (City Ct of New York, New Rochelle 1946); (1946) 13 ILR 168-
171 
 
Wong Sun et al v US 371 US 471 (1963), 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441; 1963 US LEXIS 
2431 
 
X and Y v The Netherlands Series A No 91 
 
Yaşa v Turkey ECHR 1998-VI 
 
Yasoda Sharma v Nepal Communication no 1469/2006 (Human Rights Committee, 6 
November 2008) 
 
Yousuf v Samantar 699 F 3rd 763 (4th Circuit) 
 




UN and other international and governmental documents 
 
American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the US (1965) 
 






ILC,'Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-Eighth 
Session, 6 May - 26 July 1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first 
session, Supplement no10',(6 May - 26 July 1996),UN Doc. A/51/10 
 
ILC,'Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session',(23 
April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 2001),UN Doc. A/56/10 
 
ILC,'Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 'Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
Itnernational Law',(18 July 2006),UN Doc. A/CN.4/L702 
 
ILC,'The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Aut dedere aut judicare)',(5 March, 30 
April, 5 June, 2 and 11 July 2007),UN Doc. A/CN.4/579 and Add. 1-4 
 
ILC, The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency concerning their Status, Privileges and Immunities: Study 
Prepared by the Secretariat (1967), 2 ILC YB 154 
 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Kosovo: A Review of the Criminal Justice System 1 
September 2000 - 28 February 2001 (Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, 
2001) 
 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Kosovo Review of the Criminal Justice System, September 
2001 - February 2002 - Themes: Independence of the Judiciary, Detention, Mental 
Health Issues (Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, 2002) 
 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Kosovo Review of the Criminal Justice System - Themes: 
Legal Representation, Detention, Trafficking & Sexually Related Crimes, Municipal & 
Minor Offence Courts (Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, October 2001) 
 
Rasmussen J,'MONUC: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, End of Assignment Report',(25 
February 2005), (on file with author) 
 
UN,'Amendments to the 100 Series of the Staff Rules (ST/SGB/2002/1) ',(1 January 
2003),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/1 
 
UN,'Amendments to the 100 Series of the Staff Rules (ST/SGB/2002/1)',(1 January 
2004),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2004/1 
 
UN,'Amendments to the 100 Series of the Staff Rules (ST/SGB/2002/1)',(1 January 
2005),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2005/1 
 
UN,'Amendments to the 100 Series of the Staff Rules (ST/SGB/2002/1)',(1 January 





UN,'Code Cable on the Clarification of Roles within Mission Administration with Regard 
to Conduct and Discipline Issues',(4 June 2007), (on file with author) 
 
UN,'Code Cable on the Clarification of Conduct and Discipline Issues',(1 February 
2006), (on file with author) 
 
UN,'Code Cable on the Guidance on Cooperation with OIOS on Investigation',(22 
November 2005), (on file with author) 
 
UN,'Comprehensive Review of All Aspects of Boards of Inquiry Report',(2005), (on file 
with author) 
 
UN, District Court of Haifa, The Government of Israel against Papa Coli Ben Dista Saar: 
Judgement of 10 May 1979: Question of the Jurisdiction of an Israeli Court Regarding a 
Member of a National Contingent within UNIFIL, Accused of Smuggling Explosives into 
Israeli Territory - Claim of Immunity from Territorial Jurisdiction - Question Whether the 
Accused Could be Considered as a Member of a Foreign Military Force Present in 
Israel with the Consent and Permission of the State - Extent of the Immunity of 
Jurisdiction of Members of Such Forces in the Absence of a Specific Agreement on the 
Matter between the Host State and the Country of the Military Forces Origin - Question 
Whether the Accused Could be Considered as Enjoying Immunity from Jurisdiction as a 
Member of a United Nations Force (1979), 1979 UN Jurid YB 205 
 
UN, Exclusive Authority of the Secretary-General as Regards Permission to Execute the 
Waivers of Privileges and Immunities Required by a Member State from Staff Members 
Maintaining or Seeking Permanent Resident Status in that State - Policy of the United 
Nations in that Respect (1969), 1969 UN Jurid YB 224 
 
UN, Extent of the Immunity from Local Prosecution Enjoyed by United Nations Officials 
under Existing International Agreements (1974), 1974 UN Jurid YB 188 
 
UN,'Field Administration Handbook',(January 1974),UN Doc. ST/OGS/L.2/Rev.3. 
 
UN,'Human Rights Secreening of United Nations Personnel',(11 December 2012), (on 
file with author) 
 
UN, Immunity from Legal Process of United Nations Officials - Memorandum to the 
Deputy Chef de Cabinet (1963), 1963 UN Jurid YB 188 
 
UN,'Information Circularon the Reporting of Suspected Misconduct',(24 March 
2005),UN Doc. ST/IC/2005/19 
 
UN, Legal Status of Certain Categories of United Nations Personnel Serving in 
Peacekeeping Operations - Civilian Police and Military Observers - Military Members of 




UN, Legal Status of Experts Employed by Specialized Agencies - Question whether 
Salaries and Emoluments of Experts on Mission Should be Accorded Exception from 
National Taxation in Pursuance of the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies - Scope of the Privileges and Immunities 
Enjoyed by UNIDO Experts and UNDP Volunteers  (1992), 1992 UN Jurid YB 
UN, Letter to the Acting Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 
United Nations, Regarding Immunities of Civilian Police and Military Personnel (2004), 
2004 UN Jurid YB 323 
 
UN, Liability of the Organization for Claims Concerning Loss of or Damage to Personal 
Property of the Members of the Peacekeeping Contingents - Report of the Secretary-
General Entitled "Review of the Background and Development of Reimbursement to 
Member States Contributing Troops to Peacekeeping Operations" (A/44/605/Add.l) of 
12 October 1989 - Financial Arrangements with States Contributing Troops for UNIFIL 
and UNFICYP - Reimbursability of Extra and Extraordinary Costs as They are Incurred 
by the States as a Result of their Soldiers' Participation in UNIFIL and UNFICYP - Loss 
and Damage to Personal Property Fall within the Category of Extra and Extraordinary 
Costs (15 July 1993) (1993), 1993 UN Jurid YB 346 
 
UN, Liability of the United Nations for Claims Involving Off-Duty Acts by Members of 
Peace-Keeping Forces – Determination of “Off-Duty” and “On-Duty” Status (1986) 
UN,'Revised Disciplinary Measures and Procedures',(2 August 1991),UN Doc. 
ST/AI/371 
 
UN,'Memorandum dated 17 April 1981 from the Assistant Administrator, Bureau for 
Finance and Administration, to the Field Offices of UNDP and UNDP Headquarters 
Staff',(17 April 1981),UN Doc. UNDP/ADM/FIELD/762; UNDP/ADM/HQRTS/503 
 
UN,'Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and 
[participating State] contributing resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation] ', in Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and 
Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in 
Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual), UN Doc A/51/967, annex A  
 
UN,'Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and 
[participating State] contributing resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation] ', in Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and 
Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in 
Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual), (2007), UN Doc. A/C.5/60/26, annex A  
 
UN,'Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the xxx 







UN, Panel Discussion: Sexual exploitation and Abuse in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Situations (Available at <http://wwwunmultimediaorg/tv/webcast/2011/10/panel-
discussion-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-in-conflict-and-post-conflict-situationshtml> 
accessed 10 January 2015, 2011) 
 
UN, Privileges and Immunities of Officials of the United Nations and the Specialized 
Agencies - Concept of Functional Immunity - Right of the Secretary-General under the 
International Instruments in Force to Independently Determine, in Case a Staff Member 
is Being Subjected to Legal Process, Whether an Official Act is Involved - Meaning of 
the Term "Officer" in the Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations and of the Specialized Agencies (1981), 1981 UN Jurid YB 161 
 
UN, Proposed Accession by a Member State to the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations Subject to a Reservation Denying to any United 
Nations Official of That State's Nationality any Privilege or Immunity under the 
Convention - Interpretation Of Articles IV, V and VI of the Convention (1963), 1963 UN 
Jurid YB 188 
 
UN, Question of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, of Representatives of 
Member States and of Officials of the Organization - Statement Made by the Legal 
Counsel at the 1016th Meeting of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on 6 
December 1967 (1967), 1967 UN Jurid YB 311 
 
UN, Question of Whether Contractors’ Personnel Could be Considered as “Experts on 
Mission” – Article VI, Section 22, of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations – Status of Consultants (1998), 1998 UN Jurid YB 481 
 
UN, Question of Whether United Nations Laissez-Passer Can Be Issued to Individuals 
Engaged on Special Service Agreements - Article VII 
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1995), 1995 
UN Jurid YB 409 
 
UN, Question of Who Can Determine Whether the Acts of United Nations Officials are 
Performed in their Official Capacity - Section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations (24 January 1995) (1995), 1995 UN Jurid YB 403 
 
UN,'Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations',(23 December 
1945),UN Doc. PC/20 
 
UN,'Report on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for the Period 
from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009',(26 August 2009),UN Doc. A/64/326 (Part I)/Add.1 
 
UN,'Report Submitted by Subcommittee to Committee IV, UN Conference on 





UN,'Reporting of Inappropriate Use of United Nations Resources and Proposals for 
Improvement of Programme Delivery',(7 September 1994),UN Doc. ST/AI/397 
 
UN, Request by the Government of a Member State that United Nations Technical 
Assistance Experts Sign a Declaration under an Act on State Security (1973), 1973 UN 
Jurid YB 166 
 
UN,'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Establishment of the Office of the Oversight 
Services',(7 September 1994),UN Doc. ST/SGB/273 
 
UN,'Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United 
Nations',(9 May 2003),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/7 
 
UN,'Secretay-General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of 
International Humanitarian Law',UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 
 
UN,'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Protection against Retaliation for Reporting 
Misconduct and for Cooperating with Duly Authorized Audits or Investigations',(19 
December 2005),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2005/21 
 
UN,'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights 
and Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission  (entered 
into force 1 July 2002)',(18 June 2002),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2002/9 
 
UN,'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Special measures for protection from sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse,(9 October 2003),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 
 
UN,'Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Staff Rules, Staff Regulations of the United 
Nations and Staff Rules I00.1 to 112.8',(1 January 2002),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2002/1 
 
UN,'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of United 
Nations Staff Members (entered into force 1 January 1999) ',(10 December 1998),UN 
Doc. ST/SGB/1998/19 
 
UN,'Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of United 
Nations Staff Members (entered into force on 1 December 2002)',(1 November 
2002),UN Doc. ST/SGB/2002/13 
 
UN, Status of Military Observers Serving with a United Nations Mission (1964), 1964 
UN Jurid YB 261 
 
UN,'Summary Report of the Second Meeting of Committee IV/2’, UN Conference on 






UN CHR,'Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective, 
Violence against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, on Trafficking in 
Women, Women's Migration and Violence against Women',(24 January 2006),UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/68 
 
UN CHR,'Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: 
Violence against Women, The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination fo 
Violence against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk',(20 January 2006),UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/61 
 
UN CHR,'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences, Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy',(23 January 2001),UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/73 
 
UN CHR, Res 1985/33 (13 March 1985) 
 
UN CHR, Res 1994/45 (4 March 1994) 
 
UN Committee on Economic Social Cultural Rights, Globalization and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights at the 18th Session (27 April - 15 May 1998) (Available at 
<http://www2ohchrorg/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/Globalisation-1998doc> 
accessed 10 January 2015, 1998) 
 
UN DPKO,'Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and 
Military Observers',(2003),UN Doc. DPKO/CPD/DDCPO/2003/001; DPKO/MD/03/00994 
 
UN DPKO,'Directives for Heads of Police Components in Peacekeeping Operations',(21 
November 2006),UN Doc. DPKO/PD/2006/00122 
 
UN DPKO,'Functions and Organization of United Nations Formed Police Units',(9 
November 2006),UN Doc. DPKO/PD/2006/00060 
 
UN DPKO,'Guidelines for Civilian Police Officers on Assignment with the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)',(January 2005), (on file with author) 
 
UN DPKO,'Guidelines for Governments Contributing Special Police Units to 
UNMIK',(1999), (on file with author) 
 
UN DPKO,'Guidelines for United Nations Police Officers on Assignment with 
Peacekeeping Operations',UN Doc. DPKO/PD/2006/00135 
 
UN DPKO, Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations (2008), (on 




UN DPKO,'Standing Operating Procedure on the Assessment of Individual Police 
Officers for Service in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political 
Missions',UN Doc. Ref 2011/18 
 
UN DPKO,'Standing Operating Procedures on the Assessment of Operational 
Capability of Formed Police Units for Service in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations',UN Doc. Ref.2012.11 
 
UN DPKO,'Standard Operating Procedures on the Performance Appraisal of United 
Nations Police Officers',(19 December 2006),UN Doc. Ref. 2006.29, 
DPKO/PD/2006/00132 
 
UN DPKO,'Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets', (on file with author) 
 
UN DPKO,'Undertaking and Declaration by Experts on Mission: UN Police 
Officer/Corrections Officer/Military Observers/Military Liaison Officer', (on file with 
author) 
 
UN DPKO,'We are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel', (on file with author) 
 
UN DPKO/DFS,'Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations',(1 
March 2010),UN Doc. 2009.32 
 
UN DPKO/DFS,'Policy Directiveon the Boards of Inquiry',(27 May 2008),UN Doc. Ref. 
2008.23 
 
UN DPKO/DFS,'Policy (Revised) on Formed Police Units in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations',(1 March 2013),UN Doc. Ref.2009/32 
 
UN DPKO/DFS,'Standing Operating Procedure ‘Board of Inquiry’ ',(1 March 2011),UN 
Doc. Ref.2011.15 
 
UN DPKO/DFS,'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines',(January 2008), (on file with author) 
 
UN ECOSOC, Res 1989/65 (24 May 1989) 
 
UN ECOSOC,'Working Paper on the Accountability of International Personnel Taking 
Part in Peace Support Operations Submitted by Françoise Hampson',(7 July 2005),UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/42 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 





UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: India',(4 August 1997),UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.81 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Jordan',(18 November 2010),UN Doc. CCPR/C/JOR/CO/4 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Nepal',(10 November 1994),UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.42 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Nigeria',(24 July 1996),UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Rwanda',(7 May 2009),UN Doc. CCPR/C/RWA/CO/3 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Senegal',(28 December 1992),UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.10 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Serbia and Montenegro',(12 August 2004),UN Doc. CCPR/CO/81/SEMO 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'Concluding Observations to Italy’s Fifth Periodic 
Report',(24 April 2006),UN Doc. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'General Comment 6 on Article 6 (The Right to Life)',(30 
April 1982),UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'General Comment 20 on the Prohibition of Torture, or 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 7',(30 September 
1992),UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 
4)',(31 August 2001),UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 
 
UN Human Rights Committee,'General Comment 31 on the Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant',(29 March 2004),UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 
 
UN Human Rights Council,'Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie -Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework',(21 
March 2011),UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
 
UN Human Rights Council,'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 




UN Human Rights Council,'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: Burkina Faso',(8 July 2013),UN Doc. A/HRC/24/4 
 
UN Human Rights Council,'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: Pakistan',(26 December 2012),UN Doc. A/HRC/22/12 
 
UN Human Rights Council, Res 18/7 (13 October 2011) 
 
UN Human Rights Council, Res 23/25 (14 June 2013) 
 
UN Human Rights Council, Res 25/13 (15 April 2014) 
 
UN Human Rights Council, Res 27/3 (03 October 2014) 
 
UN OCHA,'Humanitarian Situation Report - Sierra Leone, February 01 - 28 2002', (on 
file with author) 
  
UN OHCHR, Africa Quarterly Report  
 
UN OHCHR, Nepal Conflict Report (Available at 
<http://wwwohchrorg/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/NepalConflictReportaspx> 
accessed 10 January 2015, 2012) 
 
UN OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS,'Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace 
Operations and Political Missions ',(1 September 2011),UN Doc. Ref. 2011.20 
 
UN OIOS,'Evaluation Report - Programme evaluation of the Standing Police Capacity of 
the Police Division, DPKO',(12 June 2015),UN Doc. IED-14-002 
 
UN OIOS,'Investigation into Allegations of Misconduct, Mismanagement and Corruption 
in the Engineering and Procurement Section of UNDOF',(5 November 2007) 
 
UN OIOS, Investigations Manual (Available at 
<http://wwwunorg/Depts/oios/pages/id_manual_mar2009pdf> accessed 6 October 
2014, March 2009) 
 
UN OIOS,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on its Investigation into 
Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Ituri Region (Bunia) in the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo',UN Doc. 
A/61/841 
 






UNAT,'Administrative Tribunal Judgement No 1266',(31 January 2006),UN Doc. 
AT/DEC/1266 
 
UNGA,'A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations',(24 March 2005),UN Doc. A/59/710 
 
UNGA,'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change',(2 December 2004),UN Doc. A/59/565. 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services',(27 October 2004),UN Doc. 
A/59/359 
 
UNGA,'Comprehensive Report on All Processes Involved in the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed against Deployed United Nations Peacekeepers',(9 
December 2011),UN Doc. A/66/598 
 
UNGA,'Comprehensive Report on the Pilot Project Designated by the General 
Assembly in Resolution 63/287 ',(21 February 2013),UN Doc. A/67/751 
 
UNGA,'Comprehensive Report Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 
59/296 on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, Including Policy Development, 
Implementation and Full Justification of Proposed Capacity on Personnel Conduct 
Issues',(24 May 2006),UN Doc. A/60/862 
 
UNGA,'Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission',(11 
September 2007),UN Doc. A/62/329 
 
UNGA,'Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, as appears in 
International Law Commission Report on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session (26 April to 
3 June and 4 July to 12 August 2011), para.87',(26 April to 3 June and 4 July to 12 
August 2011),UN Doc. A/66/10 
 
UNGA,'Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with 
Commentaries, as appears in International Law Commission Report on the Work of its 
Sixty-Third Session (26 April to 3 June and 4 July to 12 August 2011), para.88',(26 April 
to 3 June and 4 July to 12 August 2011),UN Doc. A/66/10 
 
UNGA,'Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, in the Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Session (23 
April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 2001), para.77',(23 April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 
August 2001),UN Doc. A/56/10 
 
UNGA,'Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission with 






UNGA,'Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court',(17 July 1998),UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/10 
 
UNGA,'Fourth Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction',(29 May 2015),UN Doc. A/CN.4/686 
 
UNGA,'Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo',(5 January 2005),UN Doc. A/59/661 
 
UNGA,'Investigation into Allegations of Fraud at the United Nations Mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina',(20 December 1999),UN Doc. A/54/683 
 
UNGA,'Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West 
Africa',(11 October 2002),UN Doc. A/57/465 
 
UNGA,'Note by the Secretary-General on the Investigations Function in the United 
Nations System',(13 July 2012),UN Doc. A/67/140 
 
UNGA,'Note by the Secretary-General on the Reform of the Procedures for Determining 
Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent-Owned Equipment',(9 July 1996),UN 
Doc. A/50/995 
 
UNGA,'Promotion and Protection of the rights of Children - Impact of Armed Conflict on 
Children',(26 August 1996 ),UN Doc. A/51/306 
 
UNGA,'Recommendations Presented by the Secretary-General, Categories of Officials 
to which the Provisions of Article V and Article VII Shall Apply',(16 October 1946),UN 
Doc. A/116 
 
UNGA,'Recommendations Presented by the Secretary-General, Categories of Officials 
to which the Provisions of Article V and Article VII Shall Apply - Addendum',(9 
Novermber 1946),UN Doc. A/116/Add.1 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission',(15 April 2008),UN Doc. A/63/54 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services',(11 September 2003),UN 
Doc. A/58/364 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services',(19 September 2001),UN 
Doc. A/56/381 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services - Part One',(15 August 




UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for the Period from 1 July 
2001 to 30 June 2002',(4 Oct 2002),UN Doc. A/57/451 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on its Investigation into 
Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Ituri Region (Bunia) in the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo',(5 April 
2007),UN Doc. A/61/841 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Peacekeeping 
Operations',(1 March 2011),UN Doc. A/65/271 (Part II) 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Peacekeeping 
Operations',(13 March 2012),UN Doc. A/66/286 (Part II) 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Peacekeeping 
Operations',(23 February 2009),UN Doc. A/63/302 (Part II) 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Peacekeeping 
Operations',(23 February 2010),UN Doc. A/64/326 (Part II) 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of the Internal Oversight Services on the Activities of the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services on Peace Operations for the Period 1 January to 
31 December 2013',(25 February 2014),UN Doc. A/68/337 (Part II) 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Evaluation of the 
Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilians Mandates in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations',(7 March 2014),UN Doc. A/68/787 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Global Review of 
Discipline in Field Missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations',(8 
March 2006),UN Doc. A/60/713 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Activities of the 
Procurement Task Force for the Period from 1 July 2007 to 31 July 2008',(15 
September 2008),UN Doc. A/63/329/Add.1 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation 
Conducted by the Investigations Task Force into Fraud and Corruption Allegations at 
Pristina Airport',(14 March 2006),UN Doc. A/60/720 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Review of the 
Reporting by United Nations Peacekeeping Missions on the Protection of Civilians',(15 





UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services',(9 September 2005),UN Doc. A/60/346 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Comprehensive Report of Conduct and 
Discipline Including Full Justification of All Posts',(20 March 2008),UN Doc. A/62/758 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission',(11 August 2008),UN Doc. A/63/260 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission - Addendum',(26 September 2008),UN Doc. 
A/63/260/Add.1 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission',(22 July 2013),UN Doc. A/68/173 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission',(23 September 2011),UN Doc. A/66/174/Add.1 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission',(28 July 2009),UN Doc. A/64/183 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission - Addendum',(28 July 2009),UN Doc. A/64/183/Add.1 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission',(29 July 2010),UN Doc. A/65/185 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission',(31 July 2012),UN Doc. A/67/213 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Model Agreement between the United 
Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Operations',(23 May 1991),UN Doc. A/46/185 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for 
Peace-Keeping Operations',(9 October 1990),UN Doc. A/45/594 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Progress of Training in 
Peacekeeping',(21 December 2010),UN Doc. A/65/644 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Proposed United Nations Code of 
Conduct',(17 October 1997),UN Doc. A/52/488 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Special Measures for Protection from 




UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Special Measures for Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse',(17 February 2012),UN Doc. A/66/699 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Special Measures for Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse',(18 February 2011),UN Doc. A/65/742 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Special on Measures for Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse',(28 February 2013),UN Doc. A/67/766 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Strengthening Investigations',(12 
December 2007),UN Doc. A/62/582 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force',(9 
October 1957),UN Doc. A/3694 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo',(12 July 1999),UN Doc. S/1999/779 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Police',(15 December 
2011),UN Doc. A/66/615 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Secretary-General on Special Measures for Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse',(15 June 2007),UN Doc. A/61/957 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working 
Group',(GAOR 59th Session Supp no 19, 31 January-25 February 2005; 4-8 April 
2005),UN Doc. A/59/19/Rev.1 
 
UNGA,'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences, Yakin Ertürk, Mission to the DRC',(28 February 2008),UN Doc. 
A/HRC/7/6/Add.4 
 
UNGA,'Report on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight',(23 February 
2007),UN Doc. A/61/264(Part II) 
 
UNGA,'Report on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for the Period 
from 1 January to 31 December 2007',(25 February 2008),UN Doc. A/62/281 (Part II) 
 
UNGA,'Report on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on Peace 
Operations for the Period from 1 January to 31 December 2014',(23 February 2015),UN 
Doc. A/69/308 (Part II) 
 
UNGA,'Report on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight on Peacekeeping 





UNGA, Res 44/49 (8 December 1989) 
 
UNGA, Res 48/218 B (12 August 1994) 
 
UNGA, Res 49/59 (9 December 1994) 
 
UNGA, Res 50/54 (11 December 1995) 
 
UNGA, Res 52/12B (9 January 1998) 
 
UNGA, Res 56/83 (28 January 2002) 
 
UNGA, Res 57/306 (22 May 2003) 
 
UNGA, Res 59/287 (13 April 2005) 
 
UNGA, Res 59/300 (30 June 2005) 
 
UNGA, Res 60/251 (3 April 2006) 
 
UNGA, Res 62/63 (8 January 2008) 
 
UNGA, Res 62/214 (7 March 2008) 
 
UNGA, Res 62/247 (24 April 2008) 
 
UNGA, Res 63/119 (15 January 2009) 
 
UNGA, Res 63/287 (21 February 2013) 
 
UNGA, Res 64/110 (15 January 2010) 
 
UNGA, Res 65/20 (10 January 2011) 
 
UNGA, Res 66/93 (13 January 2012) 
 
UNGA, Res 67/88 (14 January 2013) 
 
UNGA, Res 957 (X) (8 November 1955) 
 
UNGA, Res 2840 (XXVI) (18 December 1971) 
 





UNGA,'Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding, as annexed to UNGA, 
Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group 
on the 2007 Resumed Session',(12 June 2007),UN Doc. A/61/19 (Part III) 
 
UNGA,'Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction',(10 June 2010),UN Doc. A/CN.4/631 
 
UNGA,'Secretary-General's Report on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse',(17 February 2009),UN Doc. A/63/720 
 
UNGA,'Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and 
Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General',(9 October 1958),UN Doc. 
A/3943 
 
UNGA Fifth Committee,'Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the 
Period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011',(13 July 2010),UN Doc. A/C.5/65/15 
 
UNGA Fifth Committee,'Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the 
Period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012',(13 January 2011),UN Doc. A/C.5/66/14 
 
UNGA Fifth Committee,'Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the 
Period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 ',(27 June 2012),UN Doc. A/C.5/66/18 
 
UNGA Fifth Committee,'Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the 
Period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014',(18 July 2013),UN Doc. A/C.5/67/19 
 
UNGA Fifth Committee,'Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the 
Period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014',(23 January 2014),UN Doc. A/C.5/68/21 
 
UNGA Sixth Committee,'Draft Resolution on Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission',(3 November 2014),UN Doc. A/C.6/69/L.11 
 
UNGA Sixth Committee,'Draft Resolution on the Criminal Accountability of United 
Nations Officials and Experts on Mission',(27 October 2011),UN Doc. A/C.6/66/L.16 
  
UNGA Sixth Committee 'First Report of the Sub-Committee on Privileges and 
Immunities',(26 January 1946),UN Doc. A/C.6/17 
  
UNGA Sixth Committee,'Report of the Sixth Committee on the Criminal Accountability of 
United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission',(19 November 2013),UN Doc. 
A/68/461 
 
UNGA Sixth Committee,'Summary Record of the 8th Meeting, Held at Headquarters, 





UNGA Sixth Committee,'67th Session: Summary Record of the 24th Meeting',(28 
December 2012),UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR24 
 
UNGA Sixth Committee,'68th Session: 10th & 11th Meetings (AM & PM) - Criminal Acts 
by United Nations Officials, Experts on Mission Must Not Go Unpunished, Sixth 
Committee Told as Debate Begins',(16 October 2013),UN Doc. GA/L/3460 
 
UNGA/UNSC,'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping',(17 June 1992),UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111 
 
UNGA/SC,'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations',(21 August 
2000),UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 
 
UNGA/UNSC,'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations',(January),UN 
Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 
 
UNGA/SC,'Uniting Our Strength for Peace - Politics, Partnerships and People - Report 
of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations',(16 June 
2015),UN Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446 
 
UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, Note for Implementing and Operational Partners on 
Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone based on Initial Findings and Recommendations from Assessment 
Mission 22 October - 30 November 2001 (February 2002) 
 
UNICEF, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe (June 2002, 2002) 
United Nations Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, ‘UN Peacekeeping and The Model 
Status of Forces Agreement - Background Paper’ (Experts' Workshop, London, 26 
August 2010) 
 
UNMIL,'CIVPOL: International Police Service - Standard Operating Procedures’',(June 
2004), (on file with author) 
 
UNMIT,'UNMIT Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section Report: Report on 
Human Rights Developments in Timor Leste, August 2006 – August 2007', (on file with 
author) 
 
UNSC,'Cable Dated 60/07/12 from the President of the Republic of the Congo and 
Supreme Commander of the National Army and the Prime minister and Minister of 
National Defence Addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations',(13 July 







UNSC,'Explanatory Statement by the Secretary-General Concerning his Further Report 
(S/20412) Concerning the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435 (1978) 
and 439 (1978) Concerning the Question of Namibia',(9 February 1989),UN Doc. 
S/20457 
 
UNSC,'First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council 
Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960',(18 July 1960),UN Doc. S/4389 
 
UNSC,'Further Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Implementation of 
Security Council Resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) Concerning the Question of 
Namibia',(23 January 1989),UN Doc. S/20412 
 
UNSC,'Letter Dated 26 May 1989 from the President of the Security Council Addressed 
to the Secretary-General',(26 May 1989),UN Doc. S/20658 
 
UNSC,'Letter Dated 28 September 1989 from the President of the Security Council 
Addressed to the Secretary-General',(28 September 1989),UN Doc. S/20872 
 
UNSC,'Note Verbale Dated 5 August 1960 from the Permanent Representative of 
Ghana Addressed to the Secretary-General',(6 August 1960),UN Doc. S/4420 
 
UNSC,'Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which 
Led to Casualties Among Them ',(1 June 1994),UN Doc. S/1994/653 
 
UNSC,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 640 (1989) Concerning the Question of Namibia',(6 October 1989),UN Doc. 
S/20883 
 
UNSC,'Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies',(23 August 2004),UN Doc. S/2004/616 
 
UNSC,'Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999)',(12 June 1999),UN Doc. S/1999/672 
 
UNSC, Res 39 (14 January 1948) 
 
UNSC, Res 47 (21 April 1948) 
 
UNSC, Res 145 (22 July 1960) 
 
UNSC, Res 435 (29 September 1978) 
 
UNSC, Res 629 (16 January 1989) 
 




UNSC, Res 643 (31 October 1989) 
 
UNSC, Res 827 (25 May 1993) 
 
UNSC, Res 955 (8 November 1994) 
 
UNSC, Res 1035 (21 December 1995) 
 
UNSC, Res 1159 (27 March 1998) 
 
UNSC, Res 1244 (10 June 1999) 
 
UNSC, Res 1270 (22 October 1999) 
 
UNSC, Res 1272 (25 October 1999) 
 
UNSC, Res 1291 (24 February 2000) 
 
UNSC, Res 1315 (14 August 2000) 
 
UNSC, Res 1320 (15 September 2000) 
 
UNSC, Res 1422 (12 July 2002) 
 
UNSC, Res 1528 (27 February 2994) 
 
UNSC, Res 1542 (30 April 2004) 
 
UNSC, Res 1545 (21 May 2004) 
 
UNSC, Res 1547 (11 June 2004) 
 
UNSC, Res 1590 (24 March 2005) 
 
UNSC, Res 1769 (31 July 2007) 
 
UNSC, Res 1778 (25 September 2007) 
 
UNSC, Res 1925 (28 May 2010) 
 
UNSC, Res 1996 (8 July 2011) 
 
UNSC, Res 4387 (14 July 1960) 
 




UNSC, Res 4426 (9 August 1960) 
 
UNSC,'Second Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960',(6 August 
1960),UN Doc. S/4417 
 
UNSC,'Second Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960 - Addendum 
No 5',(11 August 1960),UN Doc. S/4417/Add.5 
 
UNSC,'Second Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960',(6 August 
1960),UN Doc. S/4417 
 
UNSC,'Second Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960 - Addendum 
No 5',(11 August 1960),UN Doc. S/4417/Add.5 
 
UNSC,'Second Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960 - Addendum 
No 10',(20 August 1960),UN Doc. S/4417/Add.10 
 
UNSC,'Security Council Official Records, 15th Year: 873rd Meeting, 13/14 July 1960',(1 
January 1960),UN Doc. S/PV.873 
 
UNSC,'Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire',(29 March 2012),UN Doc. S/2012/186 
 
UNSC,'Statement by the President of the Security Council',(3 May 1994),UN Doc. 
S/PRST/1994/22 
 
US Department of Justice, Civilian Police and Multinational Peacekeeping - A Workshop 
Series A: Role for Democratic Policing (US Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, National Institute of Justice, 6 October 1997) 
 
US Dept of State, The Global Landmine Crisis: 1994 Report to the US Congress on the 
Problem with Uncleared Landmines and the United States Strategy for Demining and 
Landmine Control (Prepared by the Office of International Security and Peacekeeping 
Operations, 1994) 
 
US House of Representatives, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (House of 





US State Government, US State Government Report: Liberia - Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, HR and Labor (6 
March 2007, 2007) 
 
 
Books and articles 
 
The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (UN, Dept of Public 
Information 1985) 
 
International peacekeeping (Taylor & Francis 1994) 
 
International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, vol 8 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 
 
Abi-Mershed EAH, ‘Due Diligence and the Fight against Gender-Based Violence in the 
Inter-American System’ in Benninger-Budel C (ed), Due Diligence and its Application to 
Protect Women from Violence, vol 73 (Brill 2008) 
 
Akehurst M, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ in Reisman M (ed), Jurisdiction in 
International Law (pp. 25-138, Ashgate 1999) 
 
Aksu E, The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and Normative Change 
(Manchester University Press 2003) 
 
Allan JH, Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer (Praeger 1996) 
 
Allison GT, Kelley PX and Garwin RL (eds), Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities Report 
of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (Council 
on Foreign Relations Press 2004) 
 
Al-Qaq RK, Managing World Order: United Nations Peace Operations and the Security 
Agenda (Tauris Academic Studies 2009) 
 
Alvarez JE, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2005) 
 
Amerasinghe CF, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2nd 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2005) 
 
Andreas P, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of 
Sarajevo (Cornell University Press 2008) 
 






Ashdown P, United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004 - Swords and Ploughshares: 
Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (Berdal M and Economides S eds, Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 
 
Aust A, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
 
Azimi N (ed) The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-
Keeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer Law International 1996) 
 
Azimi N and Lin CL (eds), The Nexus between Peacekeeping and Peace-building: 
Debriefing and Lessons; Report of the 1999 Singapore Conference (Kluwer Law 
International 2000) 
 
Badsey S and Latawski P (eds), Britain, NATO, and the Lessons of the Balkan 
Conflicts, 1991-1999 (Frank Cass 2004) 
 
Basch FF, ‘The Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Regarding 
States' Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations and Its Dangers’ 23 American 
University International Law Review 195 
 
Bayley DH, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do it (US 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice 2001) 
 
Bekker PHE, ‘Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights’ (1999) 93 American Journal of 
International Law 921 
 
Bekker PHP, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organizations - A Functional 
Necessity Analysis of Their Legal Status and Immunities, vol 17 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1994) 
 
Bellamy AJ, Peace Operations and Global Order (Routledge 2008) 
 
Bellamy AJ, Williams P and Griffin S, Understanding Peacekeeping (1st edn, Polity 
Press 2004) 
 
Bellamy AJ and Williams PD, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd edn, Polity 2010) 
 
Belloni R, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia (Routledge 2007) 
 
Bentley KA and Southall R, An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and 
Burundi (HSRC Press 2005) 
 





Bercovitch J and Jackson R, ‘Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, 
Methods, and Approaches ’ in Adebajo A (ed), From Global Apartheid to Global Village: 
Africa and the United Nations (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; University of 
Michigan Press 2009) 
 
Berdal M and Leifer M, ‘Cambodia’ (1991) 1994 The New Interventionism 25 
Berger U, Mochizuki MM and Tsuchiyama J (eds), Japan in International Politics: The 
Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2007) 
 
Bhatia MV, War and Intervention Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations (Kumarian 
Press 2003) 
 
Bianchi A, ‘Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’ (1999) [2] 10 European 
Journal of International Law 237 
 
Biermann W and Vadset M (eds), UN peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from 
the Former Yugoslavia: Peacekeepers' Views on the Limits and Possibilities of the 
United Nations in a Civil War-Like Conflict (Ashgate 1998) 
 
Blokker N and Schrijver N, The Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory and 
Reality - A Need for Change? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005) 
 
Bloom ET, ‘Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel’ [1995] American Journal of International Law 
 
Bloomfield LP and Bowman EH, International Military Forces: The Question of 
Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World (Little, Brown 1964) 
 
Bolkovac K, The Whistleblower: Sex Trafficking, Military Contractors, and One Woman's 
Fight for Justice (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 
 
Bolton JR, ‘The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from 
America's perspective’ [2001] Law and Contemporary Problems 167 
 
Bothe M and Dörschel T (eds), UN Peacekeeping: A Documentary Introduction (Kluwer 
Law International 1999) 
 
Boulden J (ed) Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional 
Organizations (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) 
 
Bourke-Martignoni J, ‘The History and Development of the Due Diligence Standard in 
International Law and Its Role in the Protection of Women against Violence’ in 
Benninger-Budel C (ed), Due Diligence and its Application to Protect Women from 




Boutros-Ghali B, ‘Beyond Peacekeeping’ (1992) 25 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 
 
Boutros-Ghali B, ‘Introduction’ in UN (ed), The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-
1995 (UN, 1995) 
 
Bowett DW and Barton GP, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (The Lawbook 
Exchange 2008) 
 
Brenchley F and Fursdon E, The Aegean and Cyprus (Research Institute for the Study 
of Conflict and Terrorism 1990) 
 
Briscoe N, Britain and UN Peacekeeping, 1948-67 (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) 
 
Brown G, Barker B and Burke T, Police as Peacekeepers: The History of the Australian 
and New Zealand Police Service with the United Nations Force in Cyprus 1964-1984 
(UN CIVPOL Victoria 1984) 
 
Brownlie I, Principles of Public International Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
1979) 
 
Brownlie I, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 
Oxford 1995) 
 
Butler MJ, International Conflict Management (Routledge 2009) 
 
Cain K, Postlewait H and Thomson A, Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures: 
A True Story from Hell on Earth (Miramax 2004) 
 
Call C and Barnett M, ‘Looking for a Few Good Cops: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding 
and CIVPOL’ (1999) 6 International Peacekeeping 43 
 
Call C and Barnett M, ‘Looking for a Few Good Cops: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding 
and CIVPOL’ in Holm TT and Eide EB (eds), Peacebuilding and Police Reform (Frank 
Cass 2000) 
 
Cameron I, The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction (Dartmouth 
1994) 
 
Caplan R, International Governance of War-Torn Territories Rule and Reconstruction 
(Electronic reproduction. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2004. (Oxford Scholarship 
Online). University of Essex members only., Oxford University Press 2005) 
 
Caplan R, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction 




Carlisle RP, ‘Persian Gulf War’ in Ikenberry J and Inoguchi T (eds), Reinventing the 
alliance US - Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (Palgrave Macmillan 
2003) 
 
Cassese A, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2003) 
 
Cassese A and Gaeta P, Cassese's International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 
2013) 
 
Center for International Cooperation and Security, International Post-Conflict Policing 
Operations: Enhancing Co-ordination and Effectiveness (CICS 2004) 
 
Cerone J, ‘Reasonable Measures in Unreasonable Circumstances: A Legal 
Responsibility Framework for Human Rights Violations in Post-Conflict Territories under 
UN Administration’ in White ND and Klaasen D (eds), The UN, Human Rights and Post-
Conflict Situations (Manchester University Press 2005) 
 
Cerone J, ‘Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human 
Rights Law During Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations’ (2006) 39 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1417 
 
Chappell D and Evans J, ‘The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (1998) 24 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1248 
 
Chesterman S, You, the People: the United Nations, Transitional Administration, and 
State-building (Oxford University Press 2004) 
 
Chesterman S, ‘You, the People: the United Nations, Transitional Administration, and 
State-Building’ in Armstrong D, Farrell T and Maiguashca B (eds), Force and Legitimacy 
in World Politics (Cambridge University Press; Oxford University Press 2005) 
 
Chiyuki A, De Coning C and Thakur R (eds), Unintended Consequences of 
Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations University 2007) 
 
Choi S-W and James P, Civil-Military Dynamics, Democracy, and International Conflict: 
A New Quest for International Peace (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 
 
Christie N, Towards an Enhanced United Nations Peacekeeping? (Peace Research 
Centre, Australian National University, Research School of Pacific Studies 1993) 
 
Clapham A, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 
2006) 
 
Cleaver G, ‘African Perspectives: Regional Peacekeeping’ in Furley O and May R (eds), 




Cohen B and Stamkoski G, With No Peace to Keep...: United Nations Peacekeeping 
and the War in the Former Yugoslavia (Grainpress 1995) 
 
Cohen J, One-Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide (Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers 2007) 
 
Coicaud J-M, Beyond the National Interest: The Future of UN Peacekeeping and 
Multilateralism in an Era of US Primacy (United States Institute of Peace Press 2007) 
 
Coicaud J-M and Heiskanen V (eds), The Legitimacy of International Organizations 
(United Nations University Press 2001) 
 
Coleman KP, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of 
International Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2007) 
 
Collins R and White ND, International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: 
Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order (Routledge 2011) 
 
Connaughton RM, Peacekeeping and Military Intervention (Strategic and Combat 
Studies Institute 1992) 
 
Cooper AF, Hughes CW and De Lombaerde P, Regionalisation and Global 
Governance: The Taming of Globalisation? (Routledge 2008) 
 
Costa G, ‘The United Nations and Reform of the Police in El Salvador’ (1995) 2 
International Peacekeeping 365 
 
Costa G, ‘The United Nations and the Reform of the Police in El Salvador’ in Azimi N 
(ed), The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-Keeping 
Operations: Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer Law International 1996) 
 
Cottey A and Forster A, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military 
Cooperation and Assistance (Oxford University Press for the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 2004) 
 
Coulon J, Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New 
World Order (University of Toronto Press 1998) 
 
Council of Europe, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction (1990) 
 
Cox AM, Prospects for Peacekeeping (Brookings Institution 1967) 
 
Cryer R, ‘International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?’ (2005) 16 





Dalgaard-Nielsen A (ed) Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester 
University Press 2006) 
 
Dallaire R and Beardsley B, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in 
Rwanda (Arrow 2004) 
 
Daniel DC and Hayes BC, Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International 
Crises (US Institute of Peace Press 1999) 
 
Daniel DCF, Taft P and Wiharta S (eds), Peace Operations Trends, Progress, and 
Prospects (Georgetown University Press 2008) 
 
De Brabandere E, ‘Immunity as a Guarantee for Institutional Autonomy’ in Collins R and 
White ND (eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional 
Independence in the International Legal Order (Routledge 2011) 
 
De Rossanet B, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia (Kluwer Law 
International 1996) 
 
De Wet E, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart 2004) 
Defeis EF, ‘UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity’ 
(2008) 7 Washington University Global Study Law Review 185 
 
Der S, ‘Is More Accountability Needed in Peacekeeping Operations?’ (LLM thesis, 
University of Essex 2002) 
 
Diehl PF, International Peacekeeping (Johns Hopkins University Press 1994) 
 
Diehl PF (ed) The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an 
Interdependent World (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1997) 
 
Diehl PF, ‘Peace Operations’ in Jarstad AK and Sisk TD (eds), From War to 
Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge University Press; Polity 2008) 
 
Diehl PF, ‘Evaluating Peace Oerations’ in Charlesworth H and Coicaud J-M (eds), Fault 
Lines of International Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press; Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 2010) 
 
Diehl PF and Cho YL, ‘Passing the Buck in Conflict Management: The Role of Regional 
Organizations in the Post-Cold War Era’ (2006) 12 Brown Journal of World Affairs 191 
 
Dobbins J, The UN's Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq (RAND Corp 2005) 
 





Dokken K, African Security Politics Redifined (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 
 
Dorman AM, Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone 
(Ashgate 2009) 
 
Doyle MW, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 1995) 
 
Doyle MW and Sambanis N, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace 
Operations   (Princeton University Press 2006) 
 
Duffield MR, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of 
Peoples (Polity 2007) 
 
Dupuy P-M, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations 
Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1 
 
Durch WJ (ed) The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative 
Analysis (St Martin's Press 1993) 
 
Durch WJ, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis 
 (Macmillan 1994) 
 
Durch WJ, UN Peacekeeping, American Politics,and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s 
(Macmillan 1997) 
 
Dwan R, Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations (Oxford University 
Press 2002) 
 
Dziedzic MJ, ‘Policing the New World Disorder: Addressing Gaps in Public Security 
during Peace Operations’ in Manwaring MG and Fishel JT (eds), Toward Responsibility 
in the New World Disorder - Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations (Frank Cass 
1998) 
 
Echle R, ‘Passive Personality Principle and the General Principle of Ne Bis In Idem’ 
(2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 56 
 
Elliott L and Cheeseman G (eds), Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the 
Twenty-First Century (Manchester University Press 2004) 
 
Engdahl O, ‘Protection of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the "Safety 
Convention" against the Background of General International Law’ in Chandler D and 
Heins V (eds), Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes 





Fagan A, The Atlas of Human Rights: Mapping Violations of Freedom Worldwide 
(Earthscan 2010) 
 
Fermann G, Bibliography on International Peacekeeping (Martinus Nijhoff 1992) 
 
Fetherston AB, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (Macmillan 1994) 
 
Findlay M, ‘Sign up or Sign off – Asia’s Reluctant Engagement with the International 
Criminal Court’ (2013) No. 13/44 Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
 
Findlay T, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (Oxford University Press 
1995) 
 
Findlay T, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 2002) 
Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford University Press 
2001) 
 
Forster A, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 
 
Fortier P, ‘The Evolution of Peacekeeping’ in McRae RG and Hubert D (eds), Human 
Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace (Carleton 
University Press 2001) 
 
Fortna VP, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War 
(Princeton University Press 2008) 
 
Fottrell D, ‘How much Due Diligence is Due? The Concept of 'Due Diligence' in the 
context of Human Rights Violations’ (LLM thesis, University of Essex 2002) 
 
Francis DJ and et al (eds), Dangers of Co-Deployment: UN Co-Operative Peacekeeping 
in Africa (Ashgate 2005) 
 
Frantzen H-A, NATO and Peace Support Operations, 1991-1999: Policies and 
Doctrines (Frank Cass 2005) 
 
Frederking B, The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security since the 
Cold War (Routledge 2007) 
 
Friman HR and Reich S (eds), Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans 
(University of Pittsburgh Press 2007) 
 
Furley O and May R, Peacekeeping in Africa (Ashgate 1998) 
 





Gaeta P, ‘Is NATO Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia?’ (1998) 9 European Journal of 
International Law 174 
 
Giegerich B, European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality 
(Routledge 2008) 
 
Girard PR, ‘Clinton in Haiti the 1994 US Invasion of Haiti’ in (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 
 
Goldman P, ‘Abuse of Power: The Law and Violations by United Nations Peacekeeping 
Forces’ (LLM thesis, University of Essex 1996) 
 
Goldman RM and Hardman WM, Building Trust: An Introduction to Peacekeeping and 
Arms Control (Ashgate 1997) 
 
Graça M, The Impact of War on Children (Orient Blackswan 2001) 
 
Gray C, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press 2000) 
 
Gray CD, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd ed edn, Oxford University Press 
2008) 
 
Greener BK, ‘UNPOL: UN Police as Peacekeepers’ (2009) 19 Policing & Society 106 
 
Greener BK, ‘The Rise of Policing in Peace Operations’ (2011) 18 International 
Peacekeeping 183 
 
Greenwood C, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’ 
(1998) 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 
 
Grzyb AF (ed) The world and Darfur: International Response to Crimes against 
Humanity in Western Sudan (McGill-Queen's University Press 2009) 
 
Guehenno JM, ‘On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace 
Operations’ (2002) 9 International Peacekeeping 
 
Guliyev MF, ‘The International Criminal Court and its Jurisdiction over Peacekeeping 
Operations with Specific Reference to the United States of America’ (LLM thesis, 
University of Essex 2002) 
 
Hampson F and Kihara-Hunt A, ‘The Accountability of Personnel Associated with 
Peacekeeping Operations’ in Aoi C, De Coning C and Thakur R (eds), Unintended 
Consequences of Peacekeeping (UNU 2007) 
 
Hanitzsch T, ‘Journalists as Peacekeeping Force?: Peace Journalism and Mass 




Hannum H, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law’ (1995) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 287 
 
Hansen AS, From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations (Oxford 
University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies 2002) 
 
Harrington AR, ‘Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations Against UN Peacekeepers 
and the Role of Law in Preventing Them in the Future’ (2005) 12 ILSA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 125 
 
Harrington C, Politicization of Sexual Violence: From Abolitionism to Peacekeeping 
(Ashgate 2010) 
 
Harrison SS and Nishihara M (eds), UN peacekeeping : Japanese and American 
perspectives (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1995) 
 
Hartz H, ‘CIVPOL: The UN Instrument for Police Reform’ (1999) 6 International 
Peacekeeping 27 
 
Hartz HA, ‘Experiences from UNPROFOR – UNCIVPOL’ in Biermann W and Vadset M 
(eds), UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia 
(Ashgate 1998) 
 
Harvard Law School's Reseach on International Law, ‘Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
with Respect to Crime’ (1935) 29 American Journal of International Law 435 
 
Heininger JE, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia (Twentieth 
Century Fund Press 1994) 
 
Henkin AH (ed) Honoring Human Rights (Kluwer Law International 2000) 
 
Hesztera G, 30 Jahre Polizei - Kontingente im UN - Einsatz (BMI 1994) 
 
Higgins R, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations (Oxford University Press 1963) 
 
Higgins R, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary 
(Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford 
University Press 1969) 
 
Higgins R, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford 
University Press 1994) 
 
Higgins R, ‘Allocating Competence: Jurisdiction’ in Reisman WM (ed), Jurisdiction in 




Hilaire M, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations: United Nations Law and the 
Security Council (Lynne Rienner Publishers; Ashgate 2006) 
 
Hill M, Immunities and Privileges of International Officials: The Experience of the 
League of Nations (The Lawbook Exchange 2003) 
 
Hill SM, United Nations Disarmament Processes in Intra-State Conflict (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2004) 
 
Hill SM, United Nations Disarmament Processes in Intra-State Conflict (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2005) 
 
Hill SM and Malik SP, Peacekeeping and the United Nations (Dartmouth 1996) 
 
Hills A, ‘The Inherent Limits of Military Forces in Policing Peace Operations’ (2001) 8 
International Peacekeeping 79 
 
Hirsch JL and Oakley RB, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (United States Institute of Peace Press 1995) 
 
Hirst M, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2003) 
 
Holm TT and Eide EB (eds), Peacebuilding and Police Reform (Frank Cass 2000) 
 
Hood L, ‘Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force 
Development in Timor Leste, 1999-2004’ (2006) 8 Civil Wars 143 
 
Hood L, ‘Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999-2004’ (2006) 13 International 
Peacekeeping 60 
 
Houghton RB and Trinka FG (eds), Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East 
(Foreign Service Institute, US Dept of State 1990) 
 
Howard J and Oswald B (eds), The Rule of Law on Peace Operations: A 'Challenge of 
Peace Operations' Project Conference (Law School, University of Melbourne 2002) 
 
Howard LM, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge University Press 2008) 
 
Hughes BW, Hunt CT and Kondoch B (eds), Making Sense of Peace and Capacity-
Building Operations: Rethinking Policing and Beyond (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 
 
Hurwitz A (ed) Civil War and the Rule of Law (Lynne Rienner 2008) 
 
Hurwitz AG and Huang R, Civil War and the Rule of Law: Security, Development, 




IBA, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (IBA 2009) 
 
Ingram JL, Criminal Evidence (Elsevier 2011) 
 
International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (Pergamon Press 1984) 
 
Iqbal MA, ‘An Overview of the CIVPOL Operations in Angola (UNAVEM)’ in Azimi N 
(ed), The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-Keeping 
Operations: Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer Law International 1996) 
 
Ishizuka K, Ireland and international peacekeeping operations 1960-2000 : A Study of 
Irish Motivation (Frank Cass 2004) 
 
James A, Peacekeeping in International Politics (Macmillan in association with the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 1990) 
 
James A, Keeping the peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64 (Palgrave 2002) 
 
Jenks CW, International Immunities (Stevens Inst Technol 1961) 
 
Jett DC, Why Peacekeeping Fails (Macmillan 2000) 
 
Jett DC, Why Peacekeeping Fails (1st ed edn, Palgrave 2000) 
 
Jockel JT, Canada and International Peacekeeping (Canadian Institute of Strategic 
Studies ; Center for Strategic and International Studies 1994) 
 
Johansen K, ‘Civilian Police in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)’ in Azimi N (ed), The 
Role and Functions of Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: 
Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer International 1996) 
 
Jones BD, Peacemaking in Rwanda :The Dynamics of Failure (Lynne Rienner 2001) 
 
Jonson L, ‘Russia and Peacekeeping in Eurasia’ in Jonson L and Archer C (eds), 
Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia (Westview Press 1996) 
 
Jonson L and Archer C (eds), Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia 
(Westview Press 1996) 
 
Joseph S, Schultz J and Castan M, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, vol 386 (Oxford University Press 2000) 
 
Kalyuzhnova Y and Lynch D (eds), The Euro-Asian World a Period of Transition (St. 




Katayanagi M, Human Rights Functions of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2002) 
 
Kavalski E, Extending the European Security Community: Constructing Peace in the 
Balkans (Tauris Academic Studies 2008) 
 
Kelly MJ, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search 
for a Legal Framework (Kalyuzhnova Y and Lynch D eds, Kluwer Law International 
1999) 
 
Kenny K, UN Accountability for its Human Rights Impact: Implementation through 
Participation (Manchester University Press 2005) 
 
Khan KAA, Buisman C and Cosnel C, Principles of Evidence in International Criminal 
Justice (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 
 
Khan SM, The Shallow Graves of Rwanda (IB Tauris Publishers 2000) 
 
Kholov M, ‘Accountability for the UNCIVPOL involved in sexual abuse of local 
population in Peace Support Operations?’ (LLM thesis, University of Essex 2005) 
 
Kihara-Hunt A, ‘Mechanisms of Individual Criminal Accountability of Civilian Police in 
Peace Support Operations’ (LLM thesis, University of Essex 2004) 
 
Kim L, Cheryl M and Metrikas M, ‘Holding a Fragile Peace: The Military and Civilian 
Components of UNTAC’ in Doyle M, Johnstone I and Orr RC (eds), Keeping the Peace: 
Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge University 
Press 1997) 
 
King I and Mason W, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (Hurst 2006) 
 
Kinloch-Pichat S, A UN 'Legion': Between Utopia and Reality (Frank Cass 2004) 
 
Klabbers J and Wallendahl A, Research Handbook on the Law of International 
Organizations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 
 
Knight WA (ed) Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era (Palgrave 2001) 
 
Komori T and Wellens K (eds), Public Interest Rules of International Law: Towards 
Effective Implementation    (Ashgate 2009) 
 
Kondoch B, ‘Human Rights Law and UN Peace Operations in Post-Conflict Situations’ 
in White ND and Laasen DK (eds), The UN, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Situations 
(Manchester University Press 2005) 
 




Krasno JE (ed) The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society  
(Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004) 
 
Ladley A, ‘Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal 
and Civil Accountability on International Peace Operations’ (2005) 1 Politics and Ethics 
Review 81 
 
Langholtz HJ (ed) The Psychology of Peacekeeping (Praeger 1998) 
 
Larsen KM, ‘Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and 
Control’ Test’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 509 
 
Larsen KM, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 
 
Lau M, ‘Islamic Law and the Afghan Legal System’ (2001) 2002 Yearbook of Islamic 
and Middle Eastern Law 27 
 
Leck C, ‘International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: 
Command and Control Arrangements and the Attribution of Conduct ’ (2009) 10 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 346 
 
Ledgerwood J, UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia (PN 1994) 
Lehmann IA, Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire (Frank 
Cass 1999) 
 
Lewis CJ, State and Diplomatic Immunity (3rd edition edn, Lloyd's of London Press 
1990) 
 
Ling Y-L, ‘A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations 
Member Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities of 
Diplomatic Agents’ (1976) 33 Washington & Lee Law Review 91 
 
Linton S, ‘Liability for the Actions of Members of the Armed Forces Involved in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (LLM thesis, University of Essex 1997) 
 
Liu FT, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force (L Rienner Publishers 
1992) 
 
Llewellyn H, ‘The Optional Protocol to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 
 
Lowe V, The United Nations Security Council and War the Evolution of Thought and 




Lowe V and others (eds), The United Nations, Security Council and War - The Evolution 
of Thoughts and Practice Since 1945 (Oxford University Press 2008) 
 
Lynch D, The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian 'Peacekeeping' Policy (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1998) 
 
Lynch D, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS - The Cases of Moldova, Georgia 
and Tajikistan (Macmillan 2000) 
 
Lynch D, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia 
and Tajikistan (Macmillan 2000) 
 
MacKinnon MG, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton: A Fairweather 
Friend? (Frank Cass 2000) 
 
Macqueen N, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (Longman 2002) 
 
Macqueen N, Peacekeeping and the International System (Routledge 2006) 
 
Magyar KP and Conteh-Morgan E (eds), Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia 
(Macmillan 1998) 
 
Mahmoud A, ‘UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)’ in Azimi N (ed), The Role and 
Functions of Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing 
and Lessons (Kluwer Law International 1996) 
 
Maley W, Sampford C and Thakur R (eds), From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and 
Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States (United Nations University Press 2003) 
 
Malone DM, The International Struggle over Iraq Politics in the UN Security Council 
1980-2005 (Oxford University Press 2006) 
 
Mann FA, ‘The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty Years’ 
(1964) III Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye 
 
Mann FA, ‘The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revised after Twenty Years’ in 
Reisman WM (ed), Jurisdiction in International Law (Aldershot 1999) 
 
Mansson K, ‘Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo’ 
(2005) 12 International Peacekeeping 
 
Manwaring MG and Joes AJ (eds), Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The 





Marten KZ, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (Columbia University 
Press 2004) 
 
Matheson MJ, Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and 
Postconflict Issues after the Cold War (United States Institute of Peace Press 2006) 
 
Mays TM, Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping (Scarecrow Press 1996) 
 
Mays TM, Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation the OAU in Chad, 1981-1982 (Praeger 
2002) 
 
McCLanahan GV, Diplomatic Immunity (Hurst & Company 1989) 
 
McCoubrey H and Morris J, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (Kluwer 
2000) 
 
McCoubrey H and White ND, The Blue Helmets:Legal Regulation of United Nations 
Military Operations (Dortmouth) 
 
McGregor L, ‘Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty’ 
(2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 903 
 
McRae R and Hubert D (eds), Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting 
People, Promoting Peace (McGill-Queen's University Press 2001) 
 
McRae RG and Hubert D, Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, 
Promoting Peace (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP 2001) 
 
Mégret F and Hoffman F, ‘UN as a Human Rights Violator - Some Reflections on the 
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 25 Human Rights 
Quarterly 314 
 
Mendelson S, ‘US-Russian Military Relations: Between Friend and Foe’ (2001) 25 
Washington Quartery 161 
 
Mendelson SE, Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the 
Balkans (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005) 
 
Merkel W and Grimm S (eds), War and Democratization (Routledge 2010) 
 
Merlingen M and Ostrauskaite R, European Union Peacebuilding and Policing 
Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy (Routledge 2006) 
 





Messineo F, ‘The House of Lords in Al-Jedda and Public International Law: Attribution 
of Conduct to Un-Authorized Forces and the Power of the Security Council to Displace 
Human Rights’ (2009) 56 Netherlands International Law Review 35 
 
Mettle S, ‘Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)’ in Azimi N (ed), The Role and Functions of 
Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons 
(Kluwer Law International 1996) 
 
Meyer J, ‘Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction’ 
(1990) 31 Harvard International Law Journal 108 
 
Mgbeoji I, Collective Insecurity the Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism, and Global Order 
(UBC Press 2003) 
 
Milanović M and Papić T, ‘As Bad as it Gets: The European Court of Human Rights's 
Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law’ (2009) 58 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 267 
 
Miller AJ, ‘Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations’ (2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 71 
 
Miller AJ, ‘Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Officials’ [2007] International 
Organizations Law Review 169 
 
Miller AJ, ‘United Nations Experts on Mission and their Privileges and Immunities’ 
(2007) 4 International Organizations Law Review 11 
 
Montgomery TS (ed) Peacemaking and Democratization in the Western Hemisphere    
(North-South Center Press, University of Miami 2000) 
 
Morgan PM, International Security: Problems and Solutions (CQ Press 2006) 
 
Morrison A, ‘Methodology, Contents and Structure of UN Civilian Police Training 
Programmes’ in Azimi N (ed), The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in United 
Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer Law International 
1996) 
 
Morrison A, Blair SA and Anderson D (eds), Refugees, Resources and Resoluteness 
(Canadian Peacekeeping Press 1997) 
 
Morrison A, Tychonick R and McNish S (eds), Changing Face of Peacekeeping 
(Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies 1993) 
 
Mowbray A, Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on 




Moxon-Browne E (ed) A Future for Peacekeeping? (Macmillan 1998) 
 
Munch W, ‘Wrongdoing of International Civil Servants - Referral of Cases to National 
Authorities for Criminal Prosecution’ (2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law 
 
Murphy R, ‘Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel’ in Murphy R and Mansson 
K (eds), Peace Operations and Huma Rights (Routledge 2008) 
 
Murphy R and Mansson K (eds), Peace Operations and Human Rights (Routledge 
2008) 
 
Mychajlyszyn N and Shaw TM (eds), Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles: Humanitarian 
Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective (Ashgate 2005) 
 
Nasu H, International Law on Peacekeeping: A Study of Article 40 of the UN Charter 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 
 
Nasu H, ‘Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect in the Context of Civilian 
Protection by UN Peacekeepers’ (1995) 18 International Peacekeeping 364 
 
Newman E and Richmond OP (eds), The United Nations and Human Security (Palgrave 
2001) 
 
Newman E and Schnabel A (eds), Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace, 
and Development  (Frank Cass 2002) 
 
Nsereko DDN, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion before National Courts and International 
Tribunals’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 124 
 
Oakley RB, Dziedzic MJ and Goldberg EM (eds), Policing the New World Disorder: 
Peace Operations and Public Security (NDU Press 1998) 
 
Odello M, ‘Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Accountability of 
Peacekeepers’ (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
 
O'Flaherty M, The Human Rights Field Operation: Law, Theory and Practice (Ashgate 
Publishing 2007) 
 
Oh KC, ‘Singapore Civilian Police Contingent in UNTAC: Observations and Lessons 
Learned’ in Azimi N (ed), The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer International 1996) 
 
O'Hanlon ME, Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention 




Olonisakin F, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in 
ECOMOG Operations (Kluwer Law International 2000) 
 
Olonisakin F, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 2008) 
 
Olsson L, Gender Equality and United Nations Peace Operations in Timor Leste 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 
 
Olsson L and Tryggestad TL (eds), Women and International Peacekeeping (Frank 
Cass 2001) 
 
Omaar R and De Waal A, Somalia: Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment 
(African Rights 1993) 
 
O'Neil WG, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Rule of Law Programs’ in Hurwitz A (ed), 
Civil War and the Rule of Law (Lynne Rienner 2008) 
 
Orakhelashvili A, ‘The Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations’ 
[2003] Virginia Journal of International Law 485 
 
Orentlicher DF, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2537 
 
Orler A-M, ‘Professionalism: UN Policing 2012’ (2011) 8 UN Police Magazine 3 
 
Osman MA, The United Nations and Peace Enforcement: Wars, Terrorism, and 
Democracy (Ashgate 2002) 
 
Oswald B, ‘Peacekeeping and Legal Immunities’ (1997) 126 Australian Defence Force 
Journal 19 
 
Oswald B, Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 
2010) 
 
Oswald B and Bates A, ‘Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Police’ in Hughes 
BW, Hunt CT and Kondoch B (eds), Making Sense of Peace and Capacity-Building 
Operations: Rethinking Policing and Beyond (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 
 
Oswald B and Finnin SJ, ‘Combating the Trafficking of Persons on Peace Operations’ 
(2006) 10 International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations 
1 
 
Perito RM, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?: America's Search for a 




Phal KS, ‘The Lessons of the UNTAC Experience and the Ongoing Responsibilities of 
the International Community for Peacebuilding and Development in Cambodia’ (1995) 7 
Global Change, Peace & Security 129 
 
Polman L, We Did Nothing: Why the Truth Doesn't Always Come out When the UN 
Goes in (Penguin 2004) 
 
Pouligny B, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People (C. 
Hurst & Co. 2006) 
 
Pugh M (ed) Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations 
Operations (Manchester University Press 1994) 
 
Raevsky A and Vorob'ev IN, Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations (United 
Nations 1994) 
 
Rainey B, Wicks E and Ovey C, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2014) 
 
Ramcharan BG (ed) Human Rights Protection in the Field (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 
Ramsbotham O and Woodhouse T, Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping 
Operations (ABC-CLIO 1999) 
 
Rathbun BC, Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in 
the Balkans (Cornell University Press 2004) 
 
Ratner SR, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the 
Cold War (Macmillan 1996) 
 
Ravo LM, ‘The Role of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and its 
Impact on National Jurisdictions’ (2012) 1 Sources of Law and Legal Protection 101 
 
Rawski F, ‘To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations’ (2002) 18 Taken from Connecticut journal of international law 103 
 
Razack S, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the 
New Imperialism (University of Toronto Press 2004) 
 
Rees E, ‘Security-Sector Reform and Transitional Administrations’ (2002) 2 Conflict, 
Security and Development 151 
 
Reese WLM, ‘Legislative Jurisdiction’ [1978] Columbia Law Review 1587 
 
Regan PM, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict 




Reimann J, ‘Debriefing on CIVPOL Experiences: United Nations Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)’ in Azimi N (ed), The Role and Functions 
of Civilian Police in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons 
(Kluwer International 1996) 
 
Reinisch A, International Organizations Before National Courts (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) 
 
Reinisch A, ‘Securing the Accountability of International Organizations’ (2001) 7 Global 
Governance 131 
 
Reinisch A, ‘Privileges and immunities’ in Klabbers J and Wallendahl A (eds), Research 
Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 
 
Ricci A, From Early Warning to Early Action?: The Debate on the Enhancement of the 
EU's Crisis Response Capability Continues (European Commission 2008) 
 
Ricci A (ed) From Early Warning to Early Action?: The Debate on the Enhancement of 
the EU's Crisis Response Capability Continues (Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities 2008) 
 
Rifkind M, ‘ UN Peacekeeping: Past Lessons and Future Prospects’ in (David Hume 
Institute 1995) 
 
Rikhye IJ, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (St Martin's 1984) 
 
Rikhye IJ, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General: UN Peacekeeping and the Congo 
Crisis (Hurst 1993) 
 
Rikhye IJ, Harbottle M and Egge B, ‘The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping 
and its Future’ in (Yale University Press 1974) 
 
Rikhye IJ and Skjelsbaek K (eds), The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, 
Limitations and Prospects - The Lessons of 40 Years of Experience (Macmillan in 
association with the International Peace Academy 1990) 
 
Roberts A, ‘The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping’ (1994) 36 Survival 93 
 
Roos KC, ‘Debriefing of Civilian Police Components: UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC)’ in Azimi N (ed), The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons (Kluwer Law 
International 1996) 
 
Roper J and et al, Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening 
Multilateral Peacekeeping - A Report to the Trilateral Commission  




Rubinstein RA, Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention (Paradigm 
Publishers 2008) 
 
Ruiz CA, ‘Role and Functions of the Civilian Police in Human Rights Verification 
Missions’ in Azimi N (ed), The Role and Functions of Civilian Police in United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Operations (Kluwer Law International 1996) 
 
Ryngaert C, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 
 
Sari A, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The 
Behrami and Saramati Cases’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 151 
 
Sari A, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO: The Missing Link’ (2012) 9 
International Organizations Law Review 77 
 
Sarooshi D, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The 
delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (Clarendon Press 
1999) 
 
Schmalenbach K, ‘Third Party Liability of International Organizations - A Study on Claim 
Settlement in the Course of Military Operations and International Administrations’ (2006) 
19 Journal of International Peacekeeping 33 
 
Schmidl EA, Peace Operations between War and Peace (Frank Cass 2000) 
 
Schnabel A and Ehrhart H-G (eds), Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding (United Nations University Press 2005) 
 
Schöndorf E, ‘Against the Odds - The Ill-Structured Conditions, Organizational 
Pathologies, and Coping Strategies of United Nations Transitioanl Administrations’ (Dr 
rer soc thesis, Universität Konstanz 2009) 
 
Seidl-Hohenveldern I, ‘Failure of Controls in the Sixth International Tin Agreement’ in 
Blokker N and Muller S (eds), Towards More Effective Supervision by International 
Organizations, Essays in Honour of Henry G Schermers, vol I (Multinus Nijhoff 1994) 
 
Shatzmiller M, Islam and Bosnia Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic 
States (McGill-Queen's University Press 2002) 
 
Shaw MN, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 
 
Sheeran SP, ‘A Constitutional Moment?: United Nations Peacekeeping in the 





Shelton D, ‘Private Violence, Public Wrongs and the Responsibilities of States’ (1989) 
13 Fordham International Law Journal 1 
 
Shope VC, Peacekeeping: A Selected Bibliography (US Army War College Library 
1995) 
 
Shope VC, Peacekeeping: A Selected Bibliography (3rd revised ed edn, US Army War 
College Library 1996) 
 
Shotton A, ‘A Strategy to Address Sexual Exploitation by UN Peacekeeping Personnel’ 
(2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 103 
 
Simm G, Sex in Peace Operations (Cambridge University Press 2013) 
 
Simma B and others, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, vol 2 (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2002) 
 
Sitkowski A, UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality (Praeger Security International 2006) 
Sklansky DA, ‘Hearsay's Last Hurrah’ (2009) 1 Supreme Court Review 1 
 
Skold N, United Nations Peacekeeping after the Suez War: UNEF I -The Swedish 
Involvement (Hurst 1996) 
 
Smith D, ‘Managing CIVPOL - The Potential of Performance Management in 
International Public Services’ in Dijkzeul D and Beigbeder Y (eds), Rethinking 
International Organizations (Berghahn Books 2003) 
 
Smith JDD, Canada in Croatia, Peacekeeping & UN Reform - The View from the 
Ground (Strategic and Combat Studies Institute 1995) 
 
Smith MG and Dee M, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 2003) 
 
Smith SS, Afghanistan's Troubled Transition Politics, Peacekeeping and the 2004 
Presidential Election (First Forum Press 2011) 
 
Snow DM, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-enforcement: The US Role in the 
New International Order (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College 1993) 
 
Stahn C, ‘The United Nations Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor: A 
First Analysis’ (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 105 
 
Stahn C, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to 





Staley RS, The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers 1992) 
 
Stavrinides Z, ‘Human Rights Obligations under the United Nations Charter’ (1999) 3 
The International Journal of Human Rights 38 
 
Steiner HJ, Alston P and Goodman R, International Human Rights in Context 
(Clarendon Press Oxford 1996) 
 
Stewart C, ‘What Limitations Exist, or Should Exist, on a UN-Mandated Transformative 
Peacekeeping Operation?’ (LLM thesis, University of Essex 2006) 
 
Stjernfelt B, The Sinai Peace Front: UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East, 
1973-1980 (Nihlen S tr, Hurst 1992) 
 
Stodiek T, ‘International Police Forces in Peace Operations’ in Langholtz H, Kondoch B 
and Wells A (eds), International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace 
Operations, vol 9 (Koninklijke Brill N V 2004) 
 
Sugget N, See the Road Well Shaping East Timor's Frontier (Pandanus Books 2005) 
Synge R, Mozambique : UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94 (United States Institute of 
Peace Press 1997) 
 
Taibo FJ, Uruguayos en el Congo: La Primera Guerra Mundial Africana (La Republica 
2003) 
 
Taylor AM, Cox D and Granatstein JL, Peacekeeping: International Challenge and 
Canadian Response (Canadian Institute of International Affairs 1968) 
 
Taylor I, China's New Role in Africa (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2009) 
 
Teixeira P, The Security Council at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century to What 
Extent is it Willing and Able to Maintain International Peace and Security? (UNIDIR 
2003) 
 
Thakur R and Schnabel A (eds), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Ad Hoc 
Missions, Permanent Engagement (United Nations University Press 2001) 
 
Thakur RC, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International 
Commission (University of Alberta Press 1984) 
 
Thakur RC and Schnabel A, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc 
Missions, Permanent Engagement (United Nations University Press 2001) 
 




Thornberry C, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Human Rights (INCORE 1995) 
 
Tillett G, Peacekeeping: Conflict Resolution Training for Military Peacekeepers: Paper 
Presented at the INCORE Conference on the Training and Preparation of Military and 
Civilian Peacekeepers (Conflict resolution training for military p ed, INCORE 1997) 
 
Tomuschat C, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New 
Century: General Course on Public International Law, vol 281 (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 
 
UN, Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization 16 June 
1962 - 15 June 1963 (UN 1963) 
 
UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, vol 5 (UN 1990) 
 
UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (2 edn, UN 1990) 
 
UN, Peace-Keeping Information Notes, vol 1995 (UN 1995) 
 
UN, United Nations Civilian Police Handbook (UN 1995) 
 
UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping (3 edn, UN 1996) 
 
UN DPKO, Selection Standard and Training Guidelines for UNCIVPOL (UN 1997) 
 
UN DPKO, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations 
(UN 2003) 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Brief History’ [2011] UN Police Magazine 6 
 
UN DPKO, UN Police Magazine (6 edn, 2011) 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Recruitment: Member States’ [2012] UN Police Magazine 22 
 
UN DPKO, ‘“Police Week” Brings the UN's Top Cops to New York’ (2014) 12th Edition 
UNPOL Magazine 7 
 
UN DPKO, UNPOL Magazine (9 edn, UN July 2012) 
 
UN DPKO, UN Police Magazine (2nd edn, UN June 2007) 
 
UNITAR and IPS, The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC: 
Debriefing and Lessons: Report and Recommendations of the International Conference, 






UNITAR and IPS, United Nations as Peacekeeper and Nation-Builder: Continuity and 
Change: What Lies Ahead? - Report of the 2005 Hiroshima Conference (Azimi N and 
Chang LL eds, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 
 
UNITAR, IPS and JIIA, The Reform Process of United Nations Peace Operations: 
Debriefing and Lessons - Report of the 2001 Singapore Conference (Azimi N and 
Chang LL eds, Kluwer Law International 2001) 
 
UNITAR, IPS and JIIA, From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military 
Responsibilities in Disrupted States -The United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET): Debriefing and Lessons - Report of the 2002 Tokyo Conference 
(Maley W, Sampford C and Thakur R eds, United Nations University Press; Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 
 
Urscheler M, ‘Accountability of Non-Military Personnel in PSOs’ (LLM thesis, University 
of Essex 2005) 
 
US Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Reform of United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change (Senate. Committee on Foreign 
Relations US GPO 1993) 
 
US Senate, US Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping: Hearing before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, 1st session, 
October 19 and 20, 1993 (US GPO 1993) 
 
Utley RE (ed) Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the 
Challenges of Military Intervention (Ashgate 2006) 
 
Van Dervort TR, International Law and Organization: An Introduction (Sage Thousand 
Oaks 1998) 
 
Van Steenberghe R, ‘The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute Clarifying its Nature’ 
(2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1089 
 
Verdirame G, ‘UN Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Post-Conflict Situations’ 
in White ND and Klaasen D (eds), The UN, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Situations 
(Manchester University Press 2005) 
 
Verdirame G, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 
 
Verrier A, International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World 
(Penguin 1981) 
 





Virally M, ‘Review Essay: Good Faith in Public International Law’ (1983) 77 American 
Journal of International Law 130 
 
Vogel FE, Islamic Law and the Legal System of Saudi: Studies of Saudi Arabia, vol 8 
(Brill 2000) 
 
Wainhouse DW, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support - 
Experience and Prospects (Johns Hopkins University Press 1973) 
 
Warner D (ed) New Dimensions of Peacekeeping (M. Nijhoff 1995) 
 
Weiss TG and Daws S (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 
 
Wellens KC, Remedies against International Organisations (Cambridge University 
Press 2002) 
 
Weller M, Law Enforcement within the Framework of Peace Support Operations - Peace 
Lost: The Failure of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo (Arnold R ed, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2008) 
 
White ND, Keeping the Peace - The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security (Manchester University Press 1993) 
 
White ND, ‘The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues’ (1996) 3 
International Peacekeeping 43 
 
White ND, Democracy Goes to War: British Military Deployments under International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 
 
White ND and Klaasen D (eds), The UN, HR and Post-Conflict Situations (Manchester 
University Press 2005) 
 
Whiteman MM, Digest of International Law, vol 8 (US Government Printing Office 1967) 
 
Whitfield T, Friends Indeed?: The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the 
Resolution of Conflict (US Institute of Peace Press 2007) 
 
Whitman J, Peacekeeping and the UN Agencies (Frank Cass 1999) 
 







Wilde R and Schrijver N, ‘The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser When International 
Organizations Administer Territory’ (2001) 95 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law) 251 
 
Williams GH, Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction 
(United States Institute of Peace Press 2005) 
 
Williams MC, Civil-Military relations and peacekeeping (Oxford University Press for the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies 1998) 
 
Williams P and Scharf MP, ‘The Letter of the Law’ in Cohen B and Stamkoski G (eds), 
With No Peace to Keep: United Nations Peacekeeping and the War in the Former 
Yugoslavia (Grainpress 1995) 
 
Williams S and Sherif L, ‘The Arrest Warrant for President Al-Bashir: Immunities of 
Incumbent Heads of State and the International Criminal Court - Immunities of 
Incumbent Heads of State and the ICC’ (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
 
Wills S, ‘The ‘Responsibility to Protect’by Peace Support Forces under International 
Human Rights Law’ (2006) 13 International Peacekeeping 477 
 
Wills S, ‘The 'Responsibility to Protect' by Peace Support Forces under International 
Human Rights Law’ in Murphy R and Mansson K (eds), Peace Operations and Human 
Rights (Routledge 2008) 
 
Wills S, Protecting civilians : the obligations of peacekeepers (Oxford University Press 
2009) 
 
Wilson W, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory (2nd edn, Pearson Education 2003) 
 
Winckler JG, ‘Protectionism within the Organization of United Nations Peacekeeping: 
Assessing the Disconnection between Headquarters and Mission Perspectives’ (2014) 
5 Journal of International Organizations Studies 71 
 
Woodhouse T and Ramsbotham O, Peacekeeping: Terra Incognita - Here Be Dragons - 
Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Contemporary Conflict: Some Relationships 
Considered (INCORE 1996) 
 
Woodhouse T and Ramsbotham O (eds), Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution    
(Frank Cass 2000) 
 
Woodhouse T and Ramsbotham O, Peacekeeping in the 21st Century: 






Woods JL, ‘Mozambique: The CIVPOL Operation’ in Oakley RB, Dziedzic MJ and 
Goldberg EM (eds), Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public 
Security (DIANE Publishing 1998) 
 
Wulf H, Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 
Yew GCK, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and the legal limits in Singapore’ (2013) 25 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 15 
 
Zacarias A, The United Nations and International Peacekeeping (IB Tauris 1996) 
 
Zacarias A, The United Nations and International Peacekeeping (Tauris Academic 
Studies 1996) 
 
Zacklin R, ‘Diplomatic Relations: Status, Privileges and Immunities’ in Dupuy RJ (ed), A 
Handbook on International Organizations (1988) 
 
Zacklin R, ‘Managing Peacekeeping from a Legal Perspective’ in Warner D (ed), New 
Dimensions of Peacekeeping (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 
 
Zacklin R, ‘United Nations Management of Legal Issues’ in Howard J and Oswald CSC 
B (eds), The Rule of Law on Peace Operations, ‘Challenges of Peace Operations' 
Project Conference (Law School, University of Melbourne,11–13 November 2002, 
Kluwer Law International 2002) 
 
Zwanenburg M, ‘The Secretary-General's Bulletin on Observance by United Nations 
Forces of International Humanitarian Law: A Pyrrhic Victory?’ (2000) XXXIX The Military 
Law and Law of War Review 15 
 




Miscellaneous, NGO documents and reports by other organizations 
 
NGO reports and reports by other organizations 
 
ACCORD, South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and 
Oppportunities for Future Peace Missions (Occasional Paper Series vol 2, no 2, 2000) 
 
Advocacy Forum - Nepal, Vetting in Nepal: Challenges and Issues (July 2014, 2014) 
 
Akandji-Kombe J-F, Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Council of Europe, Human Rights Handbooks No 7, 2007) 
 
Amnesty International, East Timor: Justice Past Present and Future (ASA 57/001/2001, 




Amnesty International, Peace-keeping and Human Rights 13 (IOR 40/001/1994, 1994) 
 
Amnesty International, Setting the Standard? UNMIK and KFOR's Response to the 
Violence in Mitrovica (EUR 70/013/2000, 2000) 
 
Amnesty International, Asia Pacific Report (2003) 
 
Amnesty International, The Apparent Lack of Accountability of International Peace-
Keeping Forces in Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina (EUR 05/002/2004, 31 March 2004, 
2004) 
 
Amnesty International, Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro): So Does It Mean That We 
Have the Rights? - Protecting the Human Rights of Women and Girls Trafficked for 
Forced Prostitution in Kosovo (EUR 70/010/2004, 2004) 
 
Amnesty International, Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo): The Legacy of Past Human 
Rights Abuses (EUR 70/009/2004, 31 March 2004, 2004) 
 
Amnesty International, Serbia (Kosovo): UNMIK Legacy - The Failure to Deliver Justice 
and Reparations to the Relatives of the Abducted (EUR 70/009/2013, 2013) 
 
Amnesty International, Kosovo (Serbia) The UN in Kosovo – a Legacy of Impunity 
(EUR70/015/2006 November 2006) 
 
Call C, Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability (IPA 
Policy Report, 2003) 
 
Carlson SN, Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping 
Operations: Lessons-Learned Study (UN DPKO, 2006) 
 
Chappell D and Evans J, The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1997) 
 
Council of Europe, Accountability of International Organisations for Human Rights 
Violations (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc 13370, 2013) 
 
Csáky C, No One to Turn to - The Under-Reporting of Child Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by Aid Workers and Peacekeepers (Save the Children - UK, 2008) 
 
Durch et al WJ, Improving Criminal Accountability in United Nations Peace Operations 
(Stimson Center Report, 2009) 
 
Durch WJ, United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks (The 




Durch WJ and England ML, Ending Impunity: New tools for Criminal Accountability in 
UN Peace Operations by William J. Durch and Madeline L. England (Stimson Center, 
Accountability Issue Brief September 2009, 2009) 
 
Durch WJ and England ML, Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-
Conflict Policing and Rule of Law: Revised and Updated (Stimson Centre Report No 63 
Rev 1, 2010) 
 
Durch WJ and Ket M, Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, 
and Deployment (Providing for Peacekeepning, 2013) 
 
Dziedzic M and Stark C, Bridging the Public Security Gap (United States Institute of 
Peace Briefing, June, 2006) 
 
Fleshman M, Tough UN Line on Peacekeeper Abuses (Africa Survival, April 2005, 
2005) 
 
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Counterpiracy 
under International Law (Academy Briefing No 1, August 2012) 
 
Government of Canada, Toward a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations 
(Prepared for the 50th session of the UNGA, September 1995, 1995) 
 
Grimstad E, Final Report, Review of the OIOS Investigations Division, United Nations 
(Submitted to the Under-Secretary-General of Office of Internal Oversight Services, 
2007) 
 
Hansen AS, Policing the Peace: The Rise of United Nations Formed Police Units (ZIF 
Center for International Peace Operations-Policy Briefing vol 2, 2011) 
 
Human Rights Watch, Killings in Kiwanja: The UN's Inability to Protect Civilians 
(December 2008) 
 
Human Rights Watch, Somalia: Beyond the Warlords; the Need for a Verdict on Human 
Rights Abuses (7 March 1993, vol 2, 1993) 
 
Human Rights Watch, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of 
UN Peacekeeping (October 1995, vol 7, no 13, 1995) 
 
Human Rights Watch, Hopes Betrayed - Trafficking of Women and Girls To Post-
Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution (November 2002, vol 14, no 9 
(D), 2002) 
 
Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Hearts and Minds - Post-War Civilian Deaths in Baghdad 




Human Rights Watch, "We'll Kill You If You Cry" - Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone 
Conflict (Vol 15, No 1 (A) – January 2003, 2003) 
 
Human Rights Watch, Imperatives for Immediate Change: The African Union Mission in 
Sudan (January 2006, vol 18, no 1 (A), 2006) 
 
Human Rights Watch, Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design - Peacekeeping Challenges for 
AMIS and UNAMID (September 2007, vol 19, no 15 (A), 2010) 
 
Independent Police Complaints Commission, Misconduct Sanctions Imposed on 
Officers 2007/08 (2008) 
 
Independent Police Complaints Commission, Misconduct Sanctions Imposed on 
Officers 2008/9 (2009) 
 
Independent Police Complaints Commission, Police Complaints: Statistics 2011/12 
(IPCC Research and Statistics Series: Paper 25, 2012) 
 
International Alert, Gender Mainstreaming in Peace Support Operations: Moving 
beyond Rhetoric to Practice (July 2002) 
 
International Law Association, Report of the Seventy-First Conference, Accountability of 
International Organizations: First Report (2004) 
 
International Peace Institute, Being a Peacekeeper: The Challenges and Opportunities 
of 21st-Century Peace Operations (February 2011) 
 
IRIN-HOA, Horn of Africa IRIN-HOA (Weekly Round-up #53, 1-7 September 2001, 
2001) 
 
Jan A, Orr RCO and Wilkins TA, ‘Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century’ 
(25th Vienna Seminar, Co-sponsored by the Government of Austria & International 
Peace Academy , 2-4 March 1995) 
 
Lattu K, To Complain or Not to Complain: Still the Question, Consultations with 
Humanitarian Aid Beneficiaries on Their Perceptions of Efforts to Prevent and Respond 
to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, 2007) 
 
Lin T and Law P, ‘Objective-Based Policing Typology’ (The Oceanic Conference on 
International Studies, 2-4 July 2008) 
 
Lutz C, Gutmann M and Brown K, Conduct and Discipline in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations:Culture, Political Economy and Gender - Report submitted to the Conduct 
and Discipline Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations (Watson 




Marcus BBR and Powers-Steves T, (Report No3) 
 
Marks RT and Denham T, Roundtable Report: A Roundtable on Police and 
Gendarmerie Women in Peace Operations - West African Solutions to Gender 
Mainstreaming Challenges (Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, The Canadian 
Peacekeeping Press, West African Police Project, 2006) 
 
Martin S, Must Boys be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN 
Peacekeeping Missions (Refugees International, October 2005) 
 
McFarlane J and Maley W, Civilian Police in United Nations Peace Operations 
(Australian Defence Studies Centre Working Paper, vol 64, 2001) 
 
Mobekk E, Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions 
(Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper vol 9, 
November 2005) 
 
Omaar R and Waal AD, Somalia - Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces 
(African Rights, July 1993) 
 
Ombudsperson Institution of Kosovo, On Certain Aspects of UNMIK Regulation No 
2000/59 Amending UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 on the Law Applicable in Kosovo (27 
Oct 2000) (Special Report no 2  2000) 
 
Palwankar U, Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peace-Keeping Operations 
(ICRC Legal Division, 1994) 
 
Pearson Peacekeeping Center, Roundtable Report UNSCR 1820: A Roundtable 
Discussion with Female UN Police Officers Deployed in Peacekeeping Operations 
(Pearson Peacekeeping Center, 6 August 2009) 
 
Ramsbotham D, The Changing Nature of Intervention: The Role of UN Peacekeeping 
(Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995) 
 
REDRESS/FIDH, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the European Union - A Study of the 
Laws and Practice in the 27 Member States of the European Union (December 2010) 
 
Save the Children, From Camp to Community: Liberia Study on Exploitation of Children 
(2006) 
 
Schaefer BD, The UN Should Stop Ignoring Its Financial Regulations and Pay its Debts 
to the Member States (Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation no 2484, 2010) 
 
Schmidl EA, Police in Peace Operations (Militärwiss Büro d Bundesministeriums für 




Serafino NM, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and 
Proposed Solutions (Library of Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 30 March 2004) 
 
Sismanidis RDV, Police Functions in Peace Operations - Report from a Workshop 
organized by the United States Institute of Peace (United States Institute of Peace, 
1996) 
 
Smith JG, Holt VK and Durch WJ, Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict 
Police Operations (The Henry L Stimson Center, 2007) 
 
Smith JG, Holt VK and Durch WJ, From Timor-Leste to Darfur: New Initiatives for 
Enhancing UN Civilian Policing Capacity (The Henry L Stimson Center, Future of Peace 
Operations Programe Issue Brief, August 2007, 2007) 
 
Smith JG, Holt VK and Durch WJ, From Timor-Leste to Darfur: New Initiatives for 
Enhancing UN Civilian Policing Capacity (The Henry Stimson Center Issue Brief August 
2007, 2007) 
 
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, Human Rights Features (Volume 
6(3), 31 March - 6 April 2003, 2003) 
 
St-Pierre K, Then and Now: Understanding the Spectrum of Complex Peace Operations 
(Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2008) 
 
Xefina Consulting, Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) Project: KAPB 





CNN (19 September 2000) <http://www.cnn.com/2000/us/09/19/ussoldiers.kosovo.ap/> 
accessed 8 September 2006 
 
Der Spiegel (1 February ) 
<http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/feb01/hed2555.shtml> accessed 21 August 
2007 
 
Inter-Press Service (24 July 1995) <www.ips.org> accessed 6 June 2008 
 
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) (Hong Kong, 28 December 1992) 
<www.scmp.com/>  accessed 22 June 2010 
 
The Associated Press (6 December 1993) 
 




The Associated Press (24 November 2004) 
 
The Gazette (Montreal) (25 April 1997) 
 
The Globe and Mail  <http://www.haiti-news.com/article.php3?id_article=2876> 
accessed 29 August 2008 
 
The Times (27 August 1993) 
 
USA Survival  <www.usasurvival.org/ck052804.shtml> accessed 6 August 2008 
 
Washington Post (29 October 1993) 
 
‘A police officer and divorced mother of three, Kathryn Bolkovac was looking for a fresh 
start when she signed up as a UN peacekeeper in Bosnia’ The Guardian Weekend 
(London, 22 January 2011) 19 
 
‘African Refugees Condemn Sex Abuses’ BBC (London, 28 February 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1847483.stm> accessed 15 August 2015 
  
‘Aid-for-Sex Children Speak Out’ BBC (27 February 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1843930.stm> accessed 28 August 2015 
 
‘An Open Letter to Yasushi Akashi’ The Phnom Penh Post (Phnom Penh, 22 August 
2014) <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/open-letter-yasushi-akashi> accessed 
25 August 2015  
 
‘Britons in Sex-for-Aid Scandal’ BBC (18 March 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1878063.stm> accessed 12 August 2015 
 
‘Burundi: UN Mission Sets Up Units to Check Sexual Abuse’ IRIN (15 November 2004) 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2004/1115checkabuse.htm> 
accessed 9 July 2008 
 
‘Burundi: UN Peacekeepers Suspended for Sexual Misconduct’ IRIN (21 December 
2004) <http://list.web.net/archives/women-peace-and-security/2004-
December/001261.html> accessed 15 July 2006 
 
‘Canadian troops did not visit Serb brothels Federal official says’ The Vancouver Sun 
(Vancouver, 2 November 1993) 
 
‘Child Refugee Sex Scandal’ BBC (26 February 2002) 






‘Eritrea Arrests UN Staff’ Reuters (2006) 
<http://www/redorbit.com/news/international/639859/eritrea_arrests_un_staff_on_peopl
e_smuggling_charge/index.html> accessed 10 September 2008 
 
‘Eritrea Arrests UN Staff on People Smuggling Charge’ Reuters (31 August 2006) 
<http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/639859/eritrea_arrests_un_staff_on_peopl
e_smuggling_charge/index.html> accessed 2 September 2007 
 
‘Eritrea Expels Five UN Staff over Episonage’ AFP (5 September 2006) 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/HMYT-
6TCR4P?OpenDocument&query=unmee> accessed 20 August 2015 
 
‘Eritrea Expels Five UN Staff Over Espionage’ AFP (5 September 2006 ) 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/node/434798> accessed 26 August 2008 
 
‘Great Lakes: Focus on Sexual Misconduct by UN Personnel’ Irinnews (23 July 2004) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=42343&SelectRegion=Africa&SelectCou
ntry=GREAT%20LAKES> accessed 25 August 2015 
 
‘Haiti: Poor Residents of Capital Describe a State of Siege’ Inter Press Service (28 
February 2007) <http://www.ipsnews.net/2007/02/haiti-poor-residents-of-capital-
describe-a-state-of-siege/> accessed 29 August 2015 
 
‘Horn-Eritrea-Italy: Eritrean Govt Probing Allegations of Child Prostitution Ring’ AFP (30 
August 2001) <http://www.aegis.com/news/afp/2001/af010883.html> accessed 10 
August 2005 
 
‘Human Development: UNMIS Spokesperson: No Evidence that Supports Akhir Lahza 
Allegations’ Sudan Vision Daily (19 May 2007) 
<http://www.sudanvisiondaily.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=21319> 
accessed 7 July 2008 
 
‘Iraq Expels Five UN Staff’ CNN (5 September 2001) 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/09/05/iraq.un/index.html> accessed 8 
August 2008 
 
‘Jaque Grinberg - an Apology’ The Independent (28 April 2005) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/jaque-grinberg--an-apology-
6147266.html> accessed 15 August 2006 
 
‘Justice Minister Investigates UNMIS Rape Allegations’ Sudan Vision Daily (13 
September 2007) 
<http://www.sudanvisiondaily.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25518> 





‘Kosovo Peacekeepers Accused of Theft’ BBC (26 June 2000) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/806408> accessed 2 August 2007 
 
‘Kosovo UN Troops 'Fuel Sex Trade'’ BBC (London, 6 May 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3686173.stm> accessed 27 August 2015 
 
‘Liberia: Gambian Peacekeepers Flog Lawmaker’ All Africa (17 May 2004) 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200405170740.html> accessed 30 August 2015 
 
‘Morroco Soldiers Face Sexual Abuse Charge’ CNN (13 February 2005) 
<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/02/13/morroco.abuse.reut/> accessed 26 
August 2006 
 
‘Over Allegations of Abusing Duty Free Privilege: Unmil Boss Demands Evidence Or 
Apology’ All Africa (26 February 2004) <http://allafrica.com/stories/200402270636.html> 
accessed 29 August 2015 
 
‘Pakistan UN Peacekeeping Role at Risk after 3 Punished in Haiti Sexual Abuse Case’ 
The Express Tribune (14 March 2012) <http://tribune.com.pk/story/349652/pakistan-
risks-un-peacekeeping-role-after-3-found-guilty-of-sexual-abuse-in-haiti/> accessed 12 
August 2015 
 
‘Peacekeeper Kills E Timor Refugee’ BBC (23 February 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6388741.stm> accessed 1 August 2010 
 
‘Peacekeepers 'Abusing Children'’ BBC (London, 27 May 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7420798.stm> accessed 2 May 2010 
 
‘Peacekeepers Die in Clash over Iraq’ The Telegraph (19 April 2004) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/04/19/wkos19.xml> 
accessed 25 August 2006 
 
‘Peacekeepers Held for Sex Crimes’ CBS News (15 February 2005) 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/15/world/main674173.shtml> accessed 15 
August 2006 
 
‘Probe into MONUC Gold, Arms Trafficking "Well Advanced"’ IRIN (25 May 2007) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=72373> accessed 15 August 2006 
 
‘Push to Make Dads of 'Peacekeeper Babies' Pay’ The Weekend Australian (26 May 
2005) 
 
‘S Lanka Troops 'Abused Haitians'’ BBC (2 November 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7075866.stm> accessed 15 September 2009 
 




‘Seven UN Uruguayan Peacekeepers Probed for Stealing Sacred Objects in DRCongo’ 
BBC (London, 12 September 2003) 
 
‘Sex-for-Aid Under UN Spotlight’ BBC (8 March 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1861763.stm> accessed 20 August 2015 
 
‘Sri Lanka to Probe UN Sex Claims’ BBC (3 November 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7076284.stm> accessed 11 August 2012 
 
‘Three Army Officers Facing Rape Allegations’ Tha Indian News (18 March 2008) 
<http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/lifestyle/three-army-officers-facing-rape-
allegations_10028631.html> accessed 5 September 2010 
 
‘UN Acts to Halt Abuses’ BBC (18 October 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4354934.stm> accessed 24 August 2007 
 
‘UN Haiti Troops Accused of Rape’ BBC (30 November 2006) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/carribian/news/story/2006/11/061130_unrapehaiti.shtml> 
accessed 30 August 2008 
 
‘UN Investigating Allegation of Rape in Haiti by Three UN Pakistani Peacekeepers’ 
Reuters (23 Feburuary 2005) <http://www2.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti-archive-
new/msg24640.html> accessed 25 July 2008 
 
‘UN Peace Missions in Fraud Probe’ BBC (19 December 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7151558.stm> accessed 20 August 2009 
 
‘UN Peacekeeper Charged with Rape’ BBC (London, 24 August 2001) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1508473.stm> accessed 25 August 2006 
 
‘UN Peacekeepers in Haiti Cleared or Rape’ Jamaica Observer (25 February 2005) 
<http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050224T200000-
0500_75738_OBS_UN_PEACEKEEPERS_IN_HAITI_CLEARED_OF_RAPE.asp> 
accessed 2 September 2008 
 
‘UN Peacekeepers in Timor Face Possible Sex Charges’ Reuters (3 August 2001) 
 
‘UN Says Scores Of Peacekeepers Ousted for Abuse’ Washington Post (1 December 
2006) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/30/AR2006113001388.html> accessed 20 August 2009 
 
‘UN Says 10 Withdrawn from Iraq’ BBC (7 September 2001) 





‘UN Sends Home Sri Lankan Peacekeepers on Sex Misconduct Charges’ DPA News (2 
November 2007) <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/244922> accessed 15 August 
2010 
 
‘UN Sends Porn Peacekeeper Home’ Breaking News (20 December 2002) 
<http://archives.tcm.ie/breakingnews/2002/12/20/story81564.asp> accessed 10 July 
2014 
 
‘UN Sex Abuse Sackings in Burundi’ BBC (19 July 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4697465.stm> accessed 25 August 2008 
 
‘UN Soldiers Arrested for Alleged Sexual Abuse’ China Daily (16 February 2005) 
<http://china.org.cn/english/international/120416.htm> accessed 16 May 2007 
 
‘UN Soldiers Arrested in DR Congo’ BBC (London, 13 February 2005) 
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4262743.stm> accessed 24 August 2005 
 
‘UN Suspends Soldiers in Burundi Over Sex Abuse’ Afrol News (17 December 2004) 
<http://www.afrol.com/articles/15055> accessed 25 August 2015 
 
‘UN Takes Step to Prevent Sex Abuse in East Timor’ ABC PM (30 August 2006) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2006/s1728448.htm> accessed 28 August 2015 
 
‘UN to Probe Alleged Sexual Abuse by Danish Peacekeepers’ AP (28 February 2001) 
 
‘UN to Probe Sudan Sex Abuse Claim’ BBC (3 January 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6226829.stm> accessed 10 September 2009 
 
‘UN Tribunal Overturns Ruling Backing Whistleblower’ The New Zealand Herald (4 
September 2014) 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11320116> 
accessed 6 October 2014 
 
‘UN Troops Held Over Sex Crimes’ CNN (15 February 2005) 
<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/02/15/un.congo.peacekeepers/> accessed 
25 August 2006 
 
‘UN Wants Charges against Sri Lanka Troops for Misconduct in Haiti’ Tamil Week (30 
March 2008) <http://tamilweek.com/news-features/archives/1243> accessed 3 July 
2010 
 
‘Uruguay Apologises’ BBC (7 September 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-
america-14817191> accessed 30 August 2015 
 
‘Uruguay Marines Charged over Haiti Abuse’ BBC (24 September 2012) 




‘US Servicemen Beat Kosovo Civilians’ BBC (16 September 2000) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/927323.stm> accessed 8 August 2008 
 
Bernstein D, ‘Answers needed to charges of UN misconduct in Bosnia’ Pacific News 
Service (6 April 1993) <http://politicsforum.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=42&t=31398> 
accessed 5 September 2005 
 
Bonzio R, ‘Establising an International Framework for the Elimination of Trafficking in 
Persons Especially Women and Children’ Reuters (28 August 2001) 
<http://www.protectionproject.org/human_rights/countryreport/ethiopia.htm> accessed 
29 August 2005 
 
Borger J, ‘UN Tribunal Finds Ethics Office Failed to Protect Whistleblower’ The 
Guardian (London, 27 June 2012) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/27/un-
tribunal-whistleblower-james-wasserstrom > accessed 6 October 2014 
 
Bowcott O, ‘Nepalese Colonel Faces Torture Trial in UK ’ The Guardian (London, 27 
February 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/feb/27/nepalese-colonel-faces-
torture-trial-in-uk> accessed 2 April 2015 
 
Bowcott O, ‘Report Reveals Shame of UN Peacekeepers’ The Guardian (London, 25 
March 2005 ) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/mar/25/unitednations> accessed 
30 November 2014 
 
Clayton J and Bone J, ‘Sex Scandal in Congo Threatens to Engulf UN's Peacekeepers’ 
The Times (23 December 2004) 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/article1975210.ece> accessed 15 July 2006 
 
Correspondence, ‘Behaviour of UNTAC Troops in Cambodia and Thailand, Lieutenant 
General John Sanderson’ Sanderson Papers, MS 359, Box 31, Folder 181 (29 June 
1992) 
 
Deen T, ‘Rights: UN Targets Sexual Exploitation by Peacekeepers’ Inter Press Service 
(25 July 2002) <http://www.ipsnews.net/2002/07/rights-un-targets-sexual-exploitation-
by-peacekeepers/> accessed 28 August 2015 
 
Dodd M, ‘Hushed Rape of Timor’ The Weekend Australian (26 March 2005) 
<http://www.etan.org/et2005/march/20/26hushed.htm> accessed 25 August 2005 
 
Doualy A,  Fraternite Matin  <http://fratmat.net/content/detail.php?cid=185T4Y955V1> 
accessed 19 August 2008 
 
Editorial, ‘UN Boss Faces Harassment Charge’ BBC News (London, 31 March 2005) 




Gerstenfeld M, ‘The UN's Own Abuses’ Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, 30 August 2001) 
<http://www.jpost.com/editions/2001/08/30/opinion/opinion.33735.html> accessed 20 
July 2005 
 
Henao LA, ‘Uruguay Apologizes over Alleged Rape by UN Peacekeepers’ Reuters (6 
September 2011) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/07/us-haiti-uruguay-un-
idUSTRE78603I20110907> accessed 20 August 2014 
 
Holt K, ‘DR Congo's Shameful Sex Secret’ BBC (03 June 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/3769469.stm> accessed 25 August 2006 
 
Holt K and Hughes S, ‘Sex and Death in the Heart of Africa’ The Independent (25 May 
2004) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sex-and-death-in-the-heart-of-
africa-6169265.html> accessed 14 August 2008 
 
Holt K and Hughes S, ‘Sex and the UN: When Peacemakers Become Predators’ 
Independent (11 January 2005) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sex-
and-the-un-when-peacemakers-become-predators-6155183.html> accessed 5 January 
2015 
 
Holt K and Hughes S, ‘UN Staff Accused of Raping Children in Sudan’ The Telegraph (2 
Jan 2007) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1538476/UN-staff-accused-of-
raping-children-in-Sudan.html> accessed 10 October 2012 
 
Last A, ‘Porn Scandal Rocks Eritrean Peace Force’ BBC (Asmara, 20 December 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2595003.stm> accessed 3 August 2006 
 
Lewis D, ‘Sexual Abuse in Congo’ Reuters (10 May 2004)  
<www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/news/04/sexabusecongo.html> accessed 26 
August 2006 
 
Lingsay R, ‘UN Effort Dogged by Sex Claims Peacekeepers Based in Haiti the Latest 
Accused of Abuse’ San Francisco Chronicle (22 December 2006) 
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/12/22/MNGRLN47IA1.DTL> 
accessed 28 August 2009 
 
Loconte J, ‘The UN Sex Scandal’ The Magazine (3 January 2005) 
<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/081zxelz.asp> 
accessed 15 August 2012 
 
Lyall S, ‘Aid Workers Are Said to Abuse Girls’ The New York Times (9 May 2006) 







Lynch C, ‘Misconduct, Corruption by US Police Mar Bosnian Mission’ Washington Post 
(Washington, 29 May 2001) 
<http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=11668> accessed 12 
August 2014 
 
Lynch C, ‘UN Cites Misconduct in Firing Elections Chief’ Washington Post (7 December 
2005) 21 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/06/AR2005120601515.html> accessed 12 August 2015 
 
Lynch C, ‘UN Faces More Accusations of Sexual Misconduct’ Washington Post (13 
March 2005) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30286-
2005Mar12.html> accessed 25 August 2015 
 
Lynch C, ‘UN Says Its Workers Abuse Women in Congo’ Wathington Post (27 
November 2004) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15363-
2004Nov26.html> accessed 22 July 2007 
 
Lynch C, ‘UN Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo’ The Washington Post (16 December 
2004) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3145-2004Dec15.html> 
accessed 24 August 2007 
 
MacFarquhar N, ‘Peacekeepers’ Sex Scandals Linger, On Screen and Off’ New York 
Times (New york, 7 September 2011 ) 
 
Milmo C, ‘UN Troops Buy Sex from Teenage Refugees in Congo Camp’ The 
Independent (25 May 2005) 
<http://www.africaspeaks.com/reasoning/index.php?topic=1834.0;wap2> accessed 29 
August 2015 
 
Murdoch L, ‘UN Under Fire for Turning a Blind Eye to Peacekeepers Misconduct’ The 
Sydney Morning Herald (7 May 2007) <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/un-under-
fire-for-turning-a-blind-eye-to-peacekeepers-
misconduct/2007/05/06/1178390145310.html> accessed 30 August 2015 
 
Payne T, ‘Brothel-Running, Child Abuse Images, and Selling Firearms Among Nearly 
200 Crimes Committed by Police in Last Three Years’ Independent (16 January 2014) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/sex-drugs-and-evenin-all--the-police-
officers-that-break-the-law-9065376.html> accessed 1 January 2015 
 
Plaut M, ‘UN Troops 'Traded Gold for Guns'’ BBC (23 May 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6681457.stm> accessed 22 August 2008 
 
Price S, ‘Annan Sacks UN Head of Elections’ BBC News (London, 7 December 2005) 





Proudman CR, ‘Charitable Rape: Peacekeepers’ Dirty Little Secrets’ The Independent 
Blogs (22 May 2012) <http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2012/05/22/charitable-rape-
peacekeepers-dirty-little-secrets/> accessed 24 May 2012 
 
Saloomey K, ‘Panel Says UN Failed to Protect Whistleblower’ Al Jazeera (23 June 
2012) <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/americas/2012/06/201262322950126228.html> 
accessed 6 October 2014 
 
Sengupta S and Gladsone R, ‘Panel Urges Changes in Using UN Soldiers’ The New 
York Times (New York, 16 June 2015) 
<www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/html?smid> accessed 26 June 2015 
 
Stuart J, ‘Dark Side of Peacekeeping’ The Independent (10 July 2003) 
<http://www.peacewomen.org/news/SierraLeone/newsarchive03/darksidepk.html> 
accessed 10 September 2006 
 
Tekle B, ‘UN Peacekeeping Watch - Learning from Others' Experiences: Human Rights 
Violations Committed by Peacekeepers’ Dehai News (9 May 2004) 
<http://www.dehai.org/archives/dehai_news_archive/0163.html> accessed 8 August 
2008 
 
Travis A, ‘Police Numbers Fall by Further 3,488 Officers’ The Guardian (London, 29 
January 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/29/police-numbers-fall-
by-3488-officers> accessed 21 August 2014 
 
UN, ‘Letter dated 1 April 2009 from UN Office of Legal Affairs to the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, available in ‘UN Army Told Not to Join Congo Army in 
Operation'’ New York Times (New York, 9 December 2009) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/world/africa/10congo.html> accessed 3 January 
2015 
 
Wallis W, ‘UN Staff in Congo Face Child Sex Claims’ Financial Times (Nairobi, 15 May 
2004) <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1137380/posts> accessed 14 
November 2014 
 
Walsh D, ‘Peacekeeper Jailed for Porn Films’ Scotsman (23 January 2003) 
<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/News/03/Irishpeacekeeper.html> accessed 
28 August 2006 
 
Walsh D and Byrne N, ‘UN Peacekeepers Criticized’ The Scotsman (22 December 
2002) <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/40816.html> 
accessed 22 August 2014 
 
Watkins T, ‘Ban Ki-Moon Backs UN Use of Fiji Soldiers’ Fairfax News NZ (7 September 
2011) <http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/5577793/Ban-Ki-moon-backs-UN-use-of-




Watson I and Vaccarello J, ‘UN Sued for 'Bringing Cholera to Haiti,' Causing Outbreak 
that Killed Thousands’ CNN (New York, 10 October 2013) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/09/world/americas/haiti-un-cholera-lawsuit/> accessed 
6 October 2014 
 
Weisbrot M, ‘Is This Minustah's 'Abu Ghraib Moment' in Haiti?’ The Guardian (3 
September 2011) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/sep/03/minustah-un-haiti-
abuse> accessed 2 September 2014 
 
Wilson J and Maguire K, ‘American Firm in Bosnia Sex Trade Row Poised to Win MoD 
Contract ’ The Guardian (London, 29 November 2002) 






(Social Council Research Council) 
<http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/gsc_quarterly/newsletter5/content/graybill.page/> 
accessed 15 August 2006 
 
‘Briefing Deboutcongolais’  <http://www.deboutcongolais.info/weblogs/briefing> 
accessed 15 August 2006 
 
‘Canadian Armed Forces: Peacekeepers Brief Performance sheet’  
<http://www.geocities.com/famous_bosniaks/english/general_lewis_mackenzie.html> 
accessed 3 August 2005 
 
‘Global Policy Forum’  <www.globalpolicy.org> accessed 25 August 2006 
 
‘Heritiers de la Justice’  <www.heritiers.org/> accessed 15 August 2006 
 
‘M2 Presswire’  <http://www.m2.com/m2/web/page.php/home> accessed 5 September 
2005 
 
‘Somalia: Atrocities Committed by UN Troops’ (OZ) 
<http://www.oz.net/~vvawai/sw/sw35/somalia.html> accessed 15 August 2005 
 
‘UN Atrocities in Somalia’ (Shire) <http://www.shire.net/big.brother/unatroc.htm> 
accessed 25 August 2006 
 
‘UNMEE to Investigate Misconduct of Peacekeepers’ (Intellnet, 1 March 2001) 




‘Millennials Writing for Social Change: MINUSTAH Soldiers: Personae Non Gratae’ (5 
February 2015) <https://w4socialchange2015.wordpress.com/2015/02/05/minustah-
soldiers-personae-non-gratae/> accessed 30 March 2015 
 
‘UN Peacekeepers Sweep into Violent Haitian Shanty Town’ (ReliefWeb, 14 December 
2004) 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/bf3b6ea11a7
6e78f85256f6a0076ee82?OpenDocument> accessed 22 July 2008 
 
‘Sexual Exploitation in Liberia: Are the Conditions Ripe for Another Scandal?’ (SOS, 20 
August 2004) <http://www.sos-sexisme.org/English/Sexual_Exploitation.htm> accessed 
30 August 2015 
 
‘UN in Haiti Accused of Second Massacre’ (Haiti Information Project, 21 January 2007) 
<http://www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/1_21_7/1_21_7.html> accessed 30 August 2015 
 
‘US Embassy in Haiti Acknowledges Excessive Force by UN’ (Haiti Information Project, 
24 January 2007) <http://www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/1_23_7/1_23_7.html> accessed 
29 August 2015 
 
‘B-info’ (27 October 1993) <www.b-info.com/places/macedonia/republic/news/93-10/93-
10-27.mic> accessed 15 September 2005 
 
‘News from Africa: War and Peace’ (January 2002) 
<http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_614.html> accessed 14 
August 2006 
 
‘UN Peacekeeper Accused of Assaulting Congo Girl’ (Paksearch, January 2002) 
<http://www.pakseach.com/br2002/jan/3/un%20peacekeeper%20accused%20of%20as
saulting%20congo%20girl.htm> accessed 29 August 2005 
 
ABC, ‘Allegations against Jordanian Peacekeepers’ (AM Archive, 25 June 2001) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s317953.htm> accessed 28 August 2015 
 
AFLANZ, ‘Armed Forces Law Association of New Zealand’  
<http://www.aflanz.org/news.htm> accessed 2 September 2005 
 
AFP, ‘UN Says It Has Insufficient Evidence of Sexual Exploitation by Staff’ (Reliefweb, 1 
March 2002) 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/RWB.NSF/s/1D842B6723EC082BC1256B6F005D68CC> 
accessed 30 August 2015 
 
Amnesty International, ‘News’  
<http://news.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur700052002?open&of=eng-2eu> accessed 




Amnesty International, ‘Nepal: Bar Human Rights Violators from UN Peacekeeping 
Missions’ (17 December 2009) <http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/22304/> 
accessed 2 April 2015 
 
AU, ‘African Commission on Human and People's Rights’  <http://www.achpr.org> 
accessed 27 December 2014 
 
AU, ‘African Court of Human and People's Rights’  <http://www.african-court.org/en/> 
accessed 27 December 2014 
 
Australian Federal Police, ‘Peace Support Operations and Policing - An Explosive 
Human Skills Mix’ (2000) <http://www.afp.gov.au/media-
centre/publications/platypus/previous-editions/2000/september-2000/3penrose.aspx> 
accessed 26 July 2011 
 
Australian Federal Police, ‘International Policing Conference 2011 - Australian Federal 
Police’ (2001) <http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/publications/platypus/previous-
editions/2001/june-2001/unmills.aspx> accessed 26 July 2011 
 
Ben and Alexis, ‘Ben and Lexi: Regarding MINUSTAH’ (29 July 2011) 
<http://blexi.blogspot.it/2011/07/regarding-minustah.html> accessed 30 August 2015 
Brodeur J-P, ‘C & C’ (2002) <http://conflits.org/article.php3?id_article=496> accessed 2 
September 2005 
 
Burke L, ‘UN Peacekeepers Traded Food For Sex’ (The World Post-WikiLeaks, 9 
January 2011) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/01/wikileaks-un-
peacekeepers_n_944917.html> accessed 12 August 2015 
 
Capps R, ‘Sex-Slave Whistle-Blowers Vindicated ’ (Salon, 7 August 2002) 
<http://www.salon.com/2002/08/06/dyncorp/> accessed 16 October 2012 
 
Clarin, ‘Acusan a Cascos Azules de Uruguay por Torturas en Africa’ (21 September 
2003) <http://old.clarin.com/diario/2003/09/21/i-02201.htm> accessed 15 August 2006 
Council of Europe, ‘European Court of Human Rights, ’  
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court&c=#n1354801701084_pointer> 
accessed 27 December 2014 
 
Danto E, ‘Statement of Haitian Mother of Five, Raped and Sodomized by Jordanian 
Soldier "Peacekeeping" in Haiti’ (28 November 2005) 
<http://www.margueritelaurent.com/campaigns/campaignone/testimonies/jordanrape.ht
ml> accessed 22 August 2008 
 
East Timor Action Network (ETAN), ‘UN Peacekeepers in Timor Face Possible Sex 
Charges’ (3 August 2001) <http://www.etan.org/et2001c/august/01-4/03unpeac.htm> 




East Timor Action Network (ETAN), ‘UN Policeman Charged with Rape in East Timor’ 
(19-25 August 2001) <http://www.etan.org/et2001c/august/19-25/24unpolc.htm> 
accessed 3 September 2005 
 
Ely-Raphel N, ‘The UN and the Sex Slave Trade in Bosnia: Isolated Case or Larger 
Problem in the UN system’ (US Government, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking, 
24 April 2002) <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2002/9777.htm> accessed 20 July 2007 
European Parliament, ‘Sitting on Thursday 4 Oct 2001’ (4 October 2001) 
<http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/debatsl5?file=20011004en&langue=en&q
uestid=h-0745_01&level=annex_quest_doc> accessed 31 August 2006 
 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Involvement of UN Forces in Sexual Abuse in 
Liberia and Haiti’ (14 December 2006) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?Type=TA&Reference=P6-TA-2006-
0606&language=RO> accessed 8 October 2014 
 
FOK, ‘Lawsuit against the UN and Other International Organizations’ (5 May 2006) 
<http://www.un-follies.blogspot.com/> accessed 29 August 2015 
 
Geevon-Smith W, ‘The Grand Gedeh: Advocacy Group Expresses Concerns About 
Sexual Exploitation by Aid Staff’ (17 March) <http://www.grandgedeh.com/gg-
en0504.htm> accessed 22 August 2010 
 
Grigg WN, ‘Beasts in Blue Berets’ (The New American, 1997) 
<http://whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/UN/peace.html> accessed 28 
August 2015 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Mozambique’  <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AFRICA-
06.htm> accessed 28 August 2006 
 
Human Rights Watch, ‘EU Should Ensure International Mission is Accountable’ (10 
March 2008) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/09/kosovo-eu-should-ensure-
international-mission-accountable> accessed 29 August 2015 
 
ICC, ‘The States Parties to the Rome Statute’  <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%
20rome%20statute.aspx> accessed 19 October 2014 
 
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, ‘Soldiers in Uruguay Released from 
Charges of Sexual Assault in Haiti’ (Canada Haiti Action Network, 9 January 2012) 
<<http://www.canadahaitiaction.ca/content/soldiers-uruguay-released-charges-sexual-
assault-haiti>> accessed 30 August 2015 
 
IRIN, ‘Eritrea: UN Protests at Staff Expulsions’ (Reliefweb, 7 September 2006) 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ-




IRIN, ‘DRC’ (Peacewomen, 11 January 2004) 
<www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/press.html#drc> accessed 25 August 2005 
JJ, ‘Home Planet’  <http://home.planet.nl/~kempe103/> accessed 23 August 2005 
 
Jones K, ‘International Workers Bulletin: Canadian Government Defends Military over 
Atrocities in Somalia’ (World Socialist Website, 28 July 1997) 
<http://www.wsws.org/public_html/iwb7-28/canada.htm> accessed 22 August 2006 
 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme, ‘JSMP’ (6 November 2002) 
<http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:0Vvw99PcDQIJ:www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/Su
mmary%25201-8%2520November.pdf+rape+Police+Jordan&hl=ja> accessed 28 July 
2005 
 
JuriGlobe, ‘Muslim Law Systems and Mixed Systems with a Muslim Law Tradition’  
<http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droit-muslman.php> accessed 26 June 
2015 
 
Khaleeli J, ‘Addressing the Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeepers’ (Refugees 
International, 23 September 2004) 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2004/0923misconduct.htm>  
Mackay A, ‘Sex and the Peacekeeping Soldier: The New UN Resolution’ (Peace News, 
June - August 2001) <http://peacenews.info/node/3602/sex-and-peacekeeping-soldier-
new-un-resolution> accessed 22 August 2014 
 
Martin S, ‘Sexual Exploitation in Liberia: Are the Conditions Ripe for Another Scandal?’ 
(Refugees International, 20 April 2004) <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/cgi-
bin/ri/bulletin> accessed 22 September 2008 
 
McKenna M, ‘Sins of the Peacekeepers’ (Sunday Herald, 30 June 2002) 
<http://www.sundayherald.com/25914> accessed 30 August 2005 
MONUC, ‘MONUC News’  <http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=9167> accessed 
15 August 2006 
 
MONUC, ‘Press Release: United Nations Investigates Allegations of Gold Trafficking in 
Ituri’ (23 May 2007) <http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=14640> accessed 22 
April 2009 
 
Muindi M, ‘Sex scandal threatens UN peace mission’ (Peacelink, September 2001) 
accessed 22 August 2005 
 
Munyaneza J, ‘Rwanda Insists on Probe into MONUC Misconduct’ (Allafrica, 15 July 






Nadin P, ‘Peace Support: A New Concept for UN Peacekeeping?’ (United Nations 
University, 29 May 2013) <http://unu.edu/publications/articles/peace-support-a-new-
concept-for-un-peacekeeping.html> accessed 22 August 2014 
 
NATO, ‘NATO Ends SFOR Mission’ (2 December 2004) 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/12-december/e1202a.htm> accessed 22 August 
2014 
 
NATO, ‘NATO's Role in Kosovo’ (10 June 2010) 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20100611233430/http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics
_48818.htm> accessed 28 August 2015 
 
Ngowi R, ‘CNews’ (CANOE, 11 May 2004) 
<http://cnews.canoe.ca/cnews/world/2004/05/11/455562-ap.html> accessed 24 August 
2005 
 
Norwegian Refugee Council,  <www.nrc.no/engindex.htm> accessed 18 August 2006 
OAS, ‘Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’  <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/> 
accessed 27 December 2014 
 
OAS, ‘Inter-American Court of Human Rights’  <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en> 
accessed 27 December 2014 
 
OIOS U, ‘About Us’  <http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/about_us.html> accessed 8 
October 2014 
 
O'Meara KP, ‘US: DynCorp Disgrace’ (Insight Magazine, 14 January 2002) 
<http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11119> accessed 22 August 2014 
 
ONUB, ‘Press Release: Heeding Annan's Zero-Tolerance on Sex Abuse, UN Suspends 
Two Solders in Burundi’ (17 December 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/onub/pr45e.pdf> accessed 10 August 2008 
 
Payne T, ‘Brothel-Running, Child Abuse Images, and Selling Firearms Among Nearly 
200 Crimes Committed by Police in Last Three Years’ (The Independent, 16 January 
2014) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/sex-drugs-and-evenin-all--the-
police-officers-that-break-the-law-9065376.html> accessed 21 August 2014 
 
Peacewomen, ‘Peacewomen’  <www.peacewomen.org/> accessed 25 August 2005 
 
Peacewomen, ‘Liberia: UNMIL Investigating Alleged Sexual Misconduct by 
Peacekeepers in Four Incidents’ (3 May 2005) 
<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/News/05/UNMILinvestigating.html> accessed 





Peacewomen, ‘Nigeria Recalls UN Peacekeepers’ (19 September 2005) 
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=12877> accessed 2 September 2007 
 
Peacewomen, ‘Sexual Abuse in Congo’ (2004) 
<www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/news/04/sexabusecongo.html> accessed 26 
August 2005 
 
Peacewomen, ‘UN Sex Abuse Sackings in Burundi’ (July 2005) 
<www.peacewomen.org/news/Burundi/July05/UNSexAbuse.htm> accessed 22 July 
2006 
 
Refugees International, ‘Haiti: Sexual Exploitation by Peacekeepers Likely to Be a 
Problem’ (7 March 2005) <www.refworld.org/docid/47a6eeb40.html> accessed 3 
September 2014 
 
Reliefweb, ‘Four Ethiopian Peacekeepers Suspected of Sex Crimes in Burundi’ (10 
March 2005) <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/RMOI-
6AD37F?OpenDocument&query=onub%20sexual> accessed 30 August 2008 
 
Scoop, ‘UN-Arrest of 6 Peacekeepers for Sexual Abuse’ (16 February 2005) 
<http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0502/S00429.htm> accessed 23 August 2006 
 
Survival International,  <www.survival-international.org/> accessed 15 August 2006 
 
UN, ‘Kosovo News’  <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm> accessed 23 
August 2006 
UN, ‘Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Related Personnel’  
<http://www.un.org/en/pseataskforce/tools_engage.shtml> accessed 12 December 
2012 
 
UN, ‘SEA Task Force ‘Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by UN and Non-UN Personnel  ’  
<http://www.un.org/en/pseataskforce/docs/statement_of_commitment_on_eliminating_s
exual%20_exploitation.doc> accessed 6 October 2014 
 
UN, ‘Serve with Pride’  <http://www.un.org/en/pseataskforce/video_english.shtml> 
accessed 6 October 2014 
 
UN, ‘United Nations Treaty Collection’  <https://treaties.un.org/> accessed 7 November 
2014 
 
UN, ‘UN-SAAT[1] UN Selection Assistance Assessment Team’  
<http://womenspolicenetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/UN-SAAT.pdf.> 





UN, ‘Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Begins Review of Report on 
Sexual Exploitation’ (4 April 2005) <http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gapk186.doc.htm> 
accessed 16 December 2014 
 
UN, ‘Press Statement on Establishment of Board of Inquiry on Allegations of 
Misconduct’ (5 September 2001) <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/unmee/st050901.htm> 
accessed 22 August 2006 
 
UN, ‘UN Electoral Chief Receives Letter of Dismissal’ (6 December 2005) 
<http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites/hilites_arch_view.asp?HighID=443> accessed 12 
August 2015 
 
UN, ‘Police Officers Suspected of Rape Will Enjoy No Immunity UN Official Says’ (6 
July 2001) <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/01jul06.htm> accessed 22 August 
2005 
 
UN, ‘UN News: As Eritrea Decides to Expel 5 UN Personnel, Annan Decries 'Pattern of 
Hostility'’ (6 September 2006) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19735&Cr=eritrea&Cr1=#> accessed 
20 August 2015 
 
UN, ‘Task-Force on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, ‘Draft Guidelines on the 
Community-Based Complaints Mechanisms Regarding Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
by UN and non-UN Personnel’’ (15 September 2009) accessed 1 January 2015 
 
UN, ‘Probe Closed of Police Officers Connected to Deadly Shootings in Kosovo’ (19 
May 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10794&Cr=kosovo&Cr1=&Kw1=unmi
k&Kw2=misconduct&Kw3=> accessed 26 August 2006 
 
UN, ‘UN Spokesperson's Noon Briefing’ (21 March 2007) 
<http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/db070321.doc.htm> accessed 20 August 
2008 
 
UN, ‘Spokesperson's Daily Highlights’ (23 January 2012) 
<http://un.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/legengreadboard.jsp?typeID=
16&boardid=10470&seqno=671694&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_ENGLEG
ATIO&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=> accessed 30 August 2015 
 
UN, ‘Jordanian Civilian Police Indicted on Rape Charges’ (24 August 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/DB/db240801.htm> 
accessed 8 October 2014 
 
UN, ‘Police Officer Serving with UN Mission in East Timor Charged with Rape’ (24 





UN, ‘Press Conference on Peacekeeping Misconduct Allegations’ (25 July 2007) 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/070725_Lute.doc.htm> accessed 12 August 2015 
 
UN, ‘Press Conference on Peacekeeping Misconduct Allegations’ (25 July 2007) 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/070725_Lute.doc.htm> accessed 22 August 2008 
 
UN, ‘Member of UN Mission in DR of Congo Accused of Sexual Abuse Sent Home for 
Trial’ (26 May 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10882&Cr=congo> accessed 26 
August 2006 
 
UN, ‘Security Council Condemns 'In the Strongest Terms' All Acts of Sexual Abuse, 
Exploitation by UN Peacekeeping Personnel’ (31 May 2005) 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8400.doc.htm> accessed 16 December 2014 
 
UN, ‘United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for Peacekeeping Police’ (1994) 
<http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/BlueBook/BlueBook/english/bbeforeword.html>  
UN CDU, ‘Conduct and Discipline Teams’  
<http://cdu.unlb.org/AboutCDU/ConductandDisciplineTeams.aspx> accessed 3 June 
2014 
 
UN CDU, ‘Conduct and Discipline Unit’  <https://cdu.unlb.org/> accessed 6 October 
2014 
 
UN CDU, ‘Statistics’  <https://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/OverviewofStatistics.aspx> 
accessed 6 October 2014 
 
UN DFS, ‘Standard Training Module 2: Combating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Role 
of Mid-Level Managers and Commanders’  
<www.un.org/en/pseataskforce/docs/dpko_dfs_standard_training_module_2_role_of_mi
d_level_manager_ppt> accessed 6 October 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Angola - UNAVEM I Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem1/UnavemIF.html> accessed 22 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Angola - UNAVEM II Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIF.html> 
accessed 22 August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Angola - UNAVEM III’  






UN DPKO, ‘Angola - United Nations Angola Verification Mission II’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm> accessed 
8 December 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina - UNMIBH Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/facts.html> accessed 10 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Burundi - ONUB - Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/facts.html> accessed 16 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Cambodia - UNTAC Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html> accessed 10 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Department of Peacekeeping Operations’  
<https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/> accessed 7 August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Department of Peacekeeping Operations’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/> accessed 14 February 2013 
 
UN DPKO, ‘East Timor - UNMISET - Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/facts.html> accessed 16 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘East Timor - UNTAET Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetF.htm> accessed 10 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘El Salvador - ONUSAL Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusalfacts.html> accessed 22 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/facts.html> accessed 29 
August 2015 
 
UN DPKO, ‘First United Nations Emergency Force: UNEF I (November 1956 - June 
1967)’  <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unefi.htm> accessed 30 
November 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Formed Police Units’  





UN DPKO, ‘Former Yugoslavia - UNPROFOR’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm> accessed 10 August 
2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Getting Involved’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/recruitment.shtml> accessed 10 
January 2015 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Haiti Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihfacts.html> accessed 10 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘MINURCAT Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minurcat/facts.shtml> accessed 16 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘MINURSO -United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/> accessed 8 December 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘MINUSTAH Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml> accessed 16 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘MONUC Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/facts.shtml> accessed 29 
August 2015 
 
UN DPKO, ‘MONUSCO Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml> accessed 16 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Mozambique - ONUMOZ Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozF.html> accessed 10 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Namibia - UNTAG’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htm> accessed 27 June 
2013 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Peacekeeping Fact Sheet Archive’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml> 
accessed 28 February 2015 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Peacekeeping Resource Hub’  
<http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx> accessed 




UN DPKO, ‘Republic of the Congo - ONUC Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html> accessed 10 August 
2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/facts.html> accessed 29 
August 2015 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Sierra Leone - UNOMSIL Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomsil/UnomsilF.html> accessed 
22 August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Somalia - UNOSOM I Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1facts.html> accessed 22 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Somalia - UNOSOM II Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2facts.html> accessed 22 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Somalia: United Nations Operation in Somalia I ’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosomi.htm> accessed 2 January 
2015 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Standing Police Capacity’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/capacity.shtml> accessed 9 December 
2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Troop and Police Contributors’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml> accessed 
10 December 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UN Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml> accessed 12 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNAMID Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml> accessed 16 August 
2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNFICYP Background’  






UN DPKO, ‘UNFICYP Fact Sheet’  <http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1593> 
accessed 2 January 2015 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNMIBH’  <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/> 
accessed 16 August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNMIK Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/facts.shtml> accessed 10 August 
2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNMIL Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/facts.shtml> accessed 16 August 
2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNMIS Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/facts.shtml> accessed 16 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNMIT Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/facts.shtml> accessed 16 
August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNOCI Facts and Figures’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/facts.shtml> accessed 16 August 
2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNPOL’  <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/division.shtml > 
accessed 12 December 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/> accessed 3 August 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Women in Peacekeeping’  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml> accessed 23 
September 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Jordanian Civilian Police Indicted on Rape Charges’ (24 August 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/DB/db240801.htm> 
accessed 16 December 2014 
 
UN DPKO, ‘Gender Statistics’ (November 2014) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/gender/2014gender/nov14.pdf> 
accessed 31 December 2014 
 
UN Jobs, ‘Investigator, Vienna’ (18 January 2012) 




UN MINUGUA, ‘Press Release’ (4 June 1997) accessed 22 August 2005 
 
UN MINUGUA, ‘Press Release’ (7 August 1997) accessed 22 August 2005 
 
UN MINUGUA, ‘Press Release’ (25 June 1998) accessed 20 August 2005 
 
UN MINUGUA, ‘Press Release’ (28 May 1997) accessed 22 August 2005 
 
UN News Center, ‘UN Probe Finds Peacekeepers in DR Congo Used Excessive Force’ 
(11 June 2007) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=22862> accessed 22 
August 2008 
 
UN News Center, ‘Haiti - Three UN Peacekeepers Repatriated for Sexual Abuse’ (13 
March 2012) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41538#.VUJL-
mZzdW0> accessed 2 August 2014 
 
UN News Center, ‘Heeding Annan’s Zero-Tolerance on Sex Abuse, UN Suspends Two 
Soldiers in Burundi’ (17 December 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12853&Cr=sex&Cr1> accessed 7 
September 2008 
 
UN News Center, ‘UN Will Not Turn ‘Blind Eye’ to Peacekeepers’ Misconduct, Vows UN 
Official’ (25 July 2007) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23333> 
accessed 22 August 2009 
 
UN News Centre, ‘UN Mission Expresses Shock That Eritrea Alleges Old and New 
Offenses’ (10 May 2004)  
 
UN Office of Administration of Justice, ‘UN Appeals Tribunal’  
<http://www.un.org/en/oaj/appeals/jurisdiction.shtml> accessed 6 October 2014 
 
UN Office of Administration of Justice, ‘UN Dispute Tribunal’  
<http://www.un.org/en/oaj/dispute/> accessed 6 October 2014 
 
UN OHCHR, ‘Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties’  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx> accessed 27 
December 2014 
 
UN OHCHR, ‘Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council’  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx> accessed 27 
December 2014 
 
UN OIOS, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’  <https://oios.un.org/page?slug=frequently-




UN OIOS, ‘Investigation Division’  <http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/id.html> 
accessed 13 December 2012 
 
UN OIOS, ‘Office of Internal Oversight Services: Annual Reports’  
<http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/annual_reports.html> accessed 22 December 
2014 
 
UN OIOS, ‘Overview of Investigations; How to Report Misconduct’ (November 2008) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/id_brochure.pdf> accessed 8 October 2014 
 
UN Press Release, ‘Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Begins  (New 
York)’ (4 April 2005) <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gapk186.doc.htm> accessed 
8 October 2014 
 
UN Radio, ‘UN Is Investigating Allegations of Peacekeepers Trafficking in Arms and 
Gold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (23 May 2007) 
<http://www.un.org/radio/detail/7017.html> accessed 10 August 2010 
 
UN Wire, ‘UN to Investigate Alledged Sex Abuse by Peacekeepers’ (2 March 2001) 
<http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20010302/13293_story.asp> accessed 10 October 2005 
 
UN Wire, ‘Survey Finds UN Staff Fear Retribution for Reporting Misconduct’ (10 June 
2004) <http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20040610/449_24749.asp> accessed 5 June 
2006 
 
UN Wire, (20 April 2004) <http://unwire.org/UNWire/20040420/Current_Print.asp> 
accessed 26 August 2005 
 
UN Wire, (27 May 2004) <http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20040527/449_24314.asp> 
accessed 25 August 2005 
 
UNGA Sixth Committee, ‘68th Session and Previous Sessions: Criminal Accountability 
of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission’  
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/68/CrimAcc.shtml> accessed 1 October 2014 
 
UNGA Sixth Committee, ‘69th Session: Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission (Agenda Item 75)’ (2014) 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/69/criminal_accountability.shtml> accessed 30 
November 2014 
 
United States Institute for Peace, ‘Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief 
Operations’  <http://www.usip.org/node/5545> accessed 9 November 2014 
 
University of Lille, ‘UNMEE’  <http://www.univ-





UNMEE, ‘Statement on Allegations against UNMEE Staff’ (25 September 2006) 
<http://www.unmeeonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=419&Itemi
d=53> accessed 26 August 2015 
 
UNMEE, ‘UN Mission in Ethiopia to Probe Misconduct Charges against Former 
Peacekeeper’ (Reliefweb, 28 Feb 2001) 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/5ee44b3a66b9466685256a01006bfdf0?opendocu
ment> accessed 22 August 2006 
 
UNMEE, ‘SG Annan Responds to Eritrean Allegations against UNMEE’ (May 2004) 
<http://www.unmeeonline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=935&Itemi
d=53> accessed 15 July 2008 
 
UNMEE Military Officers, ‘Military Officers Raise Questions on Force Commander’ (UN 
Forum, 15 December 2005) <http://www.unforum.com/UNheadlines290.htm> accessed 
29 August 2015 
 
UNMIK, ‘UNMIK Online’ (13 August 2001) 
<http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/trans/tr130801.html> accessed 24 August 
2005 
 
UNMIK, ‘UNMIK Online’ (May 2004) 
<http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/may04/focuskchron.htm> accessed 23 
August 2006 
 
UNMIL, ‘Press Release’ (7 June 2006) 
<www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/pr7june.pdf> accessed 20 August 2008 
 
UNOCI, ‘Press Release’ (31 October 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/onuci/pr83.pdf> accessed 20 
August 2006 
 
UNPOL, ‘Towards a New UN Police: Revised Procedures for Assessment of Individual 
Police Officers’ (2013) <http://www.womenspolicenetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/II.1.B-Importance-of-new-assessment-procedure.pdf> 
accessed 10 December 2014 
 
UNPOL, ‘UN Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT)’ (2013) 
<www.womenspolicenetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/UN-SAAT.pdf> accessed 
15 December 2014 
 
UNTAET, ‘Media Release’ (3 August 2001) 





UNTAET, ‘Media Release’ (6 August 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db060801.htm> accessed 29 August 2005 
 
UNTAET, ‘Media Release’ (6 July 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db060701.htm> accessed 22 August 2005 
 
UNTAET, ‘Media Release’ (10 August 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db100801.htm> accessed 23 August 2005 
 
UNTAET, ‘Media Release: Jordanian Civilian Police Indicted on Rape Charges’ (24 
August 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/DB/db240801.htm> 
accessed 28 August 2015 
 
US Department of State, ‘Italy Human Rights Practices, 1995’ (March 1996) 
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_eur/Italy.html> 
accessed 3 September 2014 
 
US Office, ‘US Office Pristina’  <http://www.usofficepristina.rpo.at/hrkos2.htm> 
accessed 22 August 2005 
 
US Senate, ‘Debate in US senate’ (The Library of Congress, 05 November 1993) 
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r103:S05NO3-1112> accessed 29 August 2005 
 
Wada H, ‘Houjin Dansei-ni UNTAET ga Syazai Wakai Seiritsu Hutou Taiho Meguru 
Teiso Jiken’ (Asia Kisya Club,, 1 February 2002) 
<http://apc.cup.com/?no=93.1.0.0.33.0.0.0.0.0.> accessed 3 September 2005 
 
Wallis W, ‘UN Staff in Congo Face Child Sex Claims’ (Peacewomen, 17 May 2004) 
<www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/news/04/sexclaims.html> accessed 25 August 
2006 
 
Wilson R, ‘Violent Truths: the Politics of Memory in Guatemala’  <http://www.c-
r.org/accord/guat/accord2/wilson.shtml> accessed 22 August 2005 
 
Xinhua, ‘English News’  <www.xinhuanet.com/english/> accessed 28 August 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
554 
 
 
